止觀輔行傳弘決 3.67

3.67

「問三權」下，簡理教機實。有二問答。初文，可見。次問答中，初問文中含於二意。初「問若知何意名權」者，問通別兩教仍名權耶？次「問若言不知，二經相違」者，難三藏教初後不知，即與《涅槃》、《勝鬘》相違，彼之二經皆有明文。云三藏之答中，先答初意別帶方便。雖初聞實，從教成權，通教八地可接者知，故教亦權。「若言」下，答第二意。初先牒難、次「大經」下通難。於中先通《大經》，仍先出《大經》為彼難辭。準應前文，先列二經以為難辭、後方結難；為避煩文，故於答中方始引經難辭竟，後方正答以申經旨。故《大經》三十二云「雖信別相，不信一體無差別相，名信不具。信不具故，所有禁戒亦不具足。信不具故，所有多聞亦不具足。」第三云「善男子！應當修習佛法及僧而作常想。此三寶者，無有異相、無無常相、無變異相。若於此三修異相者，當知此輩清淨三歸無所依處，所有禁戒皆不具足，終不能得聲聞緣覺菩提；若修常想則有歸處。」如所立問據，此二文合為一問，牒難辭竟。次「此義」下，今家為通。初明不聞則不知。言「自力」者，若無諸佛菩薩願力加彼今知，尚不得在方等聞彈、般若加說，況於法華親蒙記莂。次舉譬者，「天眼未開」，譬自力不知。若聞而知，譬被彈等。「羅漢」下，合不知。「故法華」下，引證自力不知，他力方知。「又云」下，結前不聞則自力不知，兼舉菩薩以況聲聞。次「經稱」下，正申經意。若其不知，經云何通？故次申云「齊知己理」。所以《大經》作此說者，舉昔斥今。聲聞不聞真諦常住一體不變，小乘歸戒尚不具足，況復未聞大乘常住，豈能具足菩提之道？故準《法華》自此已前佛眼未開、未蒙授記，仍於所得生滅度想、故於淨名自悲敗種。若佛滅後縱生滅想、亦遇四依而聞常住。南嶽釋云：「餘佛者，四依也。」若決了已，復非二乘，故知法華已前不得彰灼云知。所以經云知者，但知真諦。故引須菩提不禮色身者，以於石室見小乘法身無去來故。亦如陳如得無生證，無生證者秖是常住。此並小乘真諦常住耳。「又律儀」下，次申兩文歸戒之難。若能見空，尚得無漏律儀與道俱發，名為具足，何況不具事律儀耶？「故華嚴」下，引證真諦得名常住。既云常住，二乘亦得，復不名佛，當知常住語通，何必局大？「若不」下，結成申難之意。若據聲聞不知之文，則不應能具於禁戒。禁戒已具，常名不應局在於大。「又舉例」下，引例釋成。先引經。「欲名」下，例並結成。「故三藏」下，結答。如前所釋，實不違於《涅槃》文也。是則《涅槃經》文意兼兩向，在昔則須知小常，在今則須知妙常。「勝鬘」下，次通《勝鬘經》意，亦先牒難辭、次申經意。若欲銷通《勝鬘經》意，須作兩種初業釋之。初文且標久遠初業，故云「根本」。莫不結緣十六王子，且指迹化，故曰「遠尋」。「若取」下，近指此生初聞四諦滅理真常，此意同前。「若古昔」下，重釋久遠，即是順前問答。今日聲聞具禁戒者，良由久遠初業聞常；若昔不聞，小尚不具，況復大耶？若全未曾聞大乘常，既無小果，誰論禁戒具不具耶？為實施權覆相論具，逗彼久遠初業聞常，此世顯論得記方具。「畏怖生死」等者，如舍利弗度布施河。故《大論》十二云「舍利弗六十劫中行菩薩行。有婆羅門從其乞眼，舍利弗言：『當乞有所堪者，此眼無堪。』婆羅門言：『不須身及財物，唯須於眼。若汝實行檀者，當以眼與我。』便出一眼與之。婆羅門得已嗅之，語言：『此眼臭。』唾而棄之，以脚踐之。舍利弗言：『此弊惡人，何由可度？實無所用而彊索之。不如自度，早免生死。』」退大已後輪迴生死，名不到彼岸。「法才王子」者，《本業瓔珞》上卷云「第六住菩薩止觀現前，值佛菩薩及善知識之所護故，入第七住已得不退，人無我畢竟不生。若不爾者，一劫乃至退菩提心。如我初會八萬人退。」謂淨目天子、法才王子、舍利弗等。欲入七住，值惡知識退入凡夫，乃至千劫作大邪見及五逆罪，無惡不造。「及涅槃中退轉菩薩」者，二十六經「師子吼白佛言：『佛性若常，何故有退？』佛言：『譬如二人俱聞他方有七寶山，一人患路遠多難、乏少糧食，便退不往。一人以命往至於彼，多獲珍寶。退者見已，心熱復去。其退轉者喻退菩薩，不退轉者喻不退菩薩，豈以退故令道無常？』」「譬如」下，舉譬。「大地」者，初發菩提心也。依初發心而有小乘初業等用。故小乘初業如樹萌芽，皆由菩提地而得成就。「小乘」下，合譬。言「羯磨不成」者，所謂久遠必無大者，則令小乘秉法不成，以無本故諸行不成，如樹無根不成華果。時機未熟權立小名，汝等所行是菩薩道，非始得記方名大人。故知無心趣於寶渚，化城之路一步不成，豈能入城生安隱想？不信常住，聲聞禁戒皆不具足，斯言有徵。此斥都未發大心者，則成無本。雖復無本，據受者心，據佛本懷已施大化。有無之意，須審思之。「若作此釋」等者，此顯兩解初業意也。四念初業不違於小，久遠初業不達於大。

From “Question: The three provisionals…” onward, [the text] distinguishes the reality of principle, teaching, and capacity. There are two questions and answers. The first text is clear. In the next question and answer, the opening question contains two meanings. First, “Question: If they know, for what reason is it termed provisional?” asks why the shared and distinctive teachings are still called provisional. Next, “Question: If it is said that they do not know, this contradicts two sūtras” challenges that if the Tripiṭaka teaching does not know from beginning to end, this contradicts the Nirvāṇa and the Śrīmālādevī, both of which contain explicit passages. In the answer regarding the Tripiṭaka [and others], [the Master] first answers the first meaning: the distinctive teaching involves expedient means. Although they initially hear the real, in accord with the teaching it becomes provisional; in the shared teaching, those on the eighth stage who can be received know it, and therefore the teaching is also provisional. From “If it is said…” onward, [the Master] answers the second meaning. First, he cites the objection; next, from “The Great Sūtra…” onward, he resolves the objection. Therein, he first resolves [the issue regarding] the Great Sūtra, still first citing the objection based on the Great Sūtra. According to standard order, the two sūtras should have been listed first as the objection and the objection concluded afterward; to avoid cumbersome text, the objection citing the sūtra is only brought forward in the answer, and only afterward does he directly answer to clarify the sūtra’s purport. Thus, the thirty-second scroll of the Great Sūtra states: “Although one has faith in the distinct characteristics, if one does not have faith in the single entity of non-differentiated characteristics, this is called incomplete faith. Because faith is incomplete, all prohibitions and precepts are also incomplete. Because faith is incomplete, all vast learning is also incomplete.” The third scroll states: “Good sons! You should cultivate the contemplation of the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha as eternal. These Three Jewels have no different characteristics, no impermanent characteristics, and no mutable characteristics. If one cultivates [the view of] different characteristics regarding these three, know that these people’s pure three refuges have no place of reliance, all of their prohibitions and precepts are incomplete, and they can never attain the bodhi of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas; if they cultivate the thought of eternity, they have a place of refuge.” Basing the framed objection on these two passages, they are combined into one question, concluding the citation of the objection. Next, from “This meaning…” onward, our lineage resolves it. First, it clarifies that without hearing, they do not know. As for “by their own power,” if they lack the vow-power of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas augmenting them to know now, they still could not receive the rebukes at the Vaipulya [assemblies] or the augmented preaching in the Prajñā, let alone personally receive predictions of Buddhahood in the Lotus. Next, giving an analogy, “the heavenly eye not yet opened” is an analogy for not knowing by one’s own power. Knowing upon hearing is an analogy for being rebuked and the like. From “Arhats…” onward, he matches the analogy of not knowing. From “Therefore the Lotus…” onward, he cites proof that they do not know by their own power, but only know through the power of another. From “It also says…” onward, he concludes the preceding point that without hearing, they do not know by their own power, while also citing bodhisattvas to illustrate the case of śrāvakas. Next, from “The sūtra calls…” onward, he directly clarifies the sūtra’s purport. If they did not know, how could the sūtra be reconciled? Hence, he next explains: “They only know their own principle.” Why the Great Sūtra spoke this way was to cite the past to reprove the present. If śrāvakas do not hear that the true truth is eternal, of a single entity, and immutable, even their Hinayāna refuges and precepts are incomplete; how much less could they be complete in the path of bodhi when they have not yet heard of the Mahāyāna eternity? Therefore, according to the Lotus, prior to this their Buddha-eye was not yet opened and they had not yet received predictions, still conceiving the notion of cessation regarding what they had attained; hence in the Vimalakīrti they lamented being ruined seeds. Even if they conceived the thought of extinction after the Buddha’s parinirvāṇa, they would still meet the four reliances and hear of the eternal. Nanyue explained: “Other Buddhas are the four reliances.” Once they have definitively resolved it, they are no longer of the two vehicles; thus we know that prior to the Lotus, it could not be clearly said that they knew. When the sūtra says they know, they only know the true truth. Hence he cites Subhūti not bowing to the physical body because in the stone chamber he saw that the Hinayāna dharmakāya has no coming or going. It is also like Kaundinya attaining the realization of non-arising, which is simply eternity. These are all the Hinayāna true truth’s eternity. From “Furthermore, the discipline…” onward, he next addresses the objection regarding the refuges and precepts in both passages. If one can see emptiness, one even attains the untainted discipline arising together with the path, which is called complete; how could they lack worldly discipline? From “Therefore the Avataṃsaka…” onward, he cites proof that the true truth is also named eternal. Since it says eternal, and the two vehicles also attain it without being called Buddhas, know that the word ‘eternal’ is shared; why must it be restricted to the Mahāyāna? From “If not…” onward, he concludes the purport of resolving the objection. If based on the passage saying the śrāvakas do not know, they should not be able to possess the precepts. Since the precepts are already complete, the name ‘eternal’ should not be restricted to the Mahāyāna. From “Further citing an example…” onward, he cites an example to explain and establish [the point]. First, he cites the sūtra. From “Wishing to name…” onward, he draws the parallel and concludes. From “Therefore the Tripiṭaka…” onward, he concludes the reply. As explained before, it does not actually contradict the text of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. Thus, the Nirvāṇa Sūtra’s purport holds two directions: in the past, one had to know the lesser eternal, while at present, one must know the wondrous eternal. From “The Śrīmālā…” onward, he next resolves the purport of the Śrīmālā Sūtra, likewise first citing the objection and next clarifying the sūtra’s purport. If one wishes to resolve the purport of the Śrīmālā Sūtra, one must explain it using two kinds of initial practice. The first text tentatively indicates the initial practice in the distant past, hence called “the root.” None failed to establish karmic ties with the sixteen princes, which refers provisionally to trace-transformations, hence called “seeking far back.” From “If taking…” onward, it refers immediately to first hearing in this lifetime the true eternity of the principle of cessation of the four truths; this meaning is the same as before. From “If in antiquity…” onward, he re-explains the distant past, which accords with the preceding question and answer. That today’s śrāvakas possess the precepts is truly due to hearing the eternal in their initial practice in the distant past; if they had not heard it formerly, they would not even possess the lesser, let alone the greater. If they had never heard the Mahāyāna eternal at all, lacking even the lesser fruit, who could discuss whether their precepts are complete or not? Deploying the provisional for the sake of the real, completeness is discussed implicitly; meeting their hearing of the eternal in their initial practice in the distant past, completeness is explicitly discussed in this lifetime upon receiving prediction. “Fearing birth and death…” refers to cases like Śāriputra crossing the river of giving. Thus, the twelfth scroll of the Great Treatise says: “Śāriputra practiced the bodhisattva path for sixty kalpas. A Brahmin begged him for his eye. Śāriputra said: ‘You should beg for something useful; this eye is of no use.’ The Brahmin said: ‘I do not need your body or possessions, I only need your eye. If you truly practice giving, give me your eye.’ He then gouged out an eye and gave it to him. Having obtained it, the Brahmin smelled it and said: ‘This eye stinks.’ He spat on it, threw it away, and trampled it with his foot. Śāriputra said: ‘How can such an evil person be saved? He forced me for it when he truly had no use for it. It is better to save myself and escape birth and death early.’” After regressing from the Mahāyāna, he wandered in birth and death, which is termed failing to reach the other shore. As for “Prince Dharmamati,” the upper fascicle of the Benye yingluo states: “When a bodhisattva of the sixth abode manifests calming and contemplation, protected by Buddhas, bodhisattvas, and good spiritual friends, upon entering the seventh abode he attains non-retrogression, and the non-existence of a self of persons never arises again. If not, for one kalpa or more he regresses from the aspiration for awakening. Just as in my first assembly eighty thousand people regressed.” This refers to the devaputra Śuddhaprabha, Prince Dharmamati, Śāriputra, and others. Wishing to enter the seventh abode, they met bad spiritual friends and regressed to the status of ordinary beings, even committing great wrong views and the five heinous crimes for a thousand kalpas, leaving no evil undone. As for “and the regressing bodhisattva in the Nirvāṇa,” scroll twenty-six states: “Siṃhanāda said to the Buddha: ‘If the Buddha-nature is eternal, why is there regression?’ The Buddha said: ‘It is like two people who both hear that in another place there is a mountain of seven jewels. One person, troubled that the road is long with many difficulties and lacking provisions, regresses and does not go. The other person risks his life, reaches it, and obtains many precious jewels. The regressed person, seeing this, feels ardent in his heart and goes again. The one who regressed is an analogy for the regressing bodhisattva; the one who did not regress is an analogy for the non-regressing bodhisattva. How could regression render the Path impermanent?’” From “It is like…” onward, he offers an analogy. “The great earth” is the initial arousal of the aspiration for awakening. Relying on this initial arousal of aspiration, there are the functions of Hinayāna initial practice, etc. Therefore, Hinayāna initial practice is like the sprouting of a tree, all accomplished relying on the earth of bodhi. From “The Hinayāna…” onward, he matches the analogy. “Karmic acts are not accomplished” means that if in the distant past there had definitively been no Mahāyāna, then the Hinayāna’s holding of the Dharma would not be accomplished; because there is no root, all practices would not be accomplished, just as a tree without roots cannot produce flowers or fruit. Because the capacity of the time was not yet mature, the name ‘lesser’ was provisionally established; what you practice is the bodhisattva path, and you are not called great persons only after just receiving the prediction. Thus we know that without the mind directed toward the jewel island, not a single step on the path to the conjured city is completed; how could one enter the city and give rise to the notion of security? ‘Not having faith in the eternal, the śrāvaka’s precepts are all incomplete’—these words have evidentiary support. This reproves those who have not aroused the great aspiration at all, for they lack the root. Although they lack the root, looking from the recipient’s mind, and looking from the Buddha’s fundamental intention, he has already bestowed the great transformation. The meaning of presence and absence must be carefully contemplated. “If interpreted this way…” and so forth reveals the intention behind the two explanations of initial practice. The initial practice of the four mindfulnesses does not contradict the lesser; the initial practice of the distant past does not fail to reach the greater.