止觀輔行傳弘決 3.67

3.67

From “Question: The three provisionals…” onward, [the text] distinguishes the reality of principle, teaching, and capacity. There are two questions and answers. The first text is clear. In the next question and answer, the opening question contains two meanings. First, “Question: If they know, for what reason is it termed provisional?” asks why the shared and distinctive teachings are still called provisional. Next, “Question: If it is said that they do not know, this contradicts two sūtras” challenges that if the Tripiṭaka teaching does not know from beginning to end, this contradicts the Nirvāṇa and the Śrīmālādevī, both of which contain explicit passages. In the answer regarding the Tripiṭaka [and others], [the Master] first answers the first meaning: the distinctive teaching involves expedient means. Although they initially hear the real, in accord with the teaching it becomes provisional; in the shared teaching, those on the eighth stage who can be received know it, and therefore the teaching is also provisional. From “If it is said…” onward, [the Master] answers the second meaning. First, he cites the objection; next, from “The Great Sūtra…” onward, he resolves the objection. Therein, he first resolves [the issue regarding] the Great Sūtra, still first citing the objection based on the Great Sūtra. According to standard order, the two sūtras should have been listed first as the objection and the objection concluded afterward; to avoid cumbersome text, the objection citing the sūtra is only brought forward in the answer, and only afterward does he directly answer to clarify the sūtra’s purport. Thus, the thirty-second scroll of the Great Sūtra states: “Although one has faith in the distinct characteristics, if one does not have faith in the single entity of non-differentiated characteristics, this is called incomplete faith. Because faith is incomplete, all prohibitions and precepts are also incomplete. Because faith is incomplete, all vast learning is also incomplete.” The third scroll states: “Good sons! You should cultivate the contemplation of the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha as eternal. These Three Jewels have no different characteristics, no impermanent characteristics, and no mutable characteristics. If one cultivates [the view of] different characteristics regarding these three, know that these people’s pure three refuges have no place of reliance, all of their prohibitions and precepts are incomplete, and they can never attain the bodhi of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas; if they cultivate the thought of eternity, they have a place of refuge.” Basing the framed objection on these two passages, they are combined into one question, concluding the citation of the objection. Next, from “This meaning…” onward, our lineage resolves it. First, it clarifies that without hearing, they do not know. As for “by their own power,” if they lack the vow-power of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas augmenting them to know now, they still could not receive the rebukes at the Vaipulya [assemblies] or the augmented preaching in the Prajñā, let alone personally receive predictions of Buddhahood in the Lotus. Next, giving an analogy, “the heavenly eye not yet opened” is an analogy for not knowing by one’s own power. Knowing upon hearing is an analogy for being rebuked and the like. From “Arhats…” onward, he matches the analogy of not knowing. From “Therefore the Lotus…” onward, he cites proof that they do not know by their own power, but only know through the power of another. From “It also says…” onward, he concludes the preceding point that without hearing, they do not know by their own power, while also citing bodhisattvas to illustrate the case of śrāvakas. Next, from “The sūtra calls…” onward, he directly clarifies the sūtra’s purport. If they did not know, how could the sūtra be reconciled? Hence, he next explains: “They only know their own principle.” Why the Great Sūtra spoke this way was to cite the past to reprove the present. If śrāvakas do not hear that the true truth is eternal, of a single entity, and immutable, even their Hinayāna refuges and precepts are incomplete; how much less could they be complete in the path of bodhi when they have not yet heard of the Mahāyāna eternity? Therefore, according to the Lotus, prior to this their Buddha-eye was not yet opened and they had not yet received predictions, still conceiving the notion of cessation regarding what they had attained; hence in the Vimalakīrti they lamented being ruined seeds. Even if they conceived the thought of extinction after the Buddha’s parinirvāṇa, they would still meet the four reliances and hear of the eternal. Nanyue explained: “Other Buddhas are the four reliances.” Once they have definitively resolved it, they are no longer of the two vehicles; thus we know that prior to the Lotus, it could not be clearly said that they knew. When the sūtra says they know, they only know the true truth. Hence he cites Subhūti not bowing to the physical body because in the stone chamber he saw that the Hinayāna dharmakāya has no coming or going. It is also like Kaundinya attaining the realization of non-arising, which is simply eternity. These are all the Hinayāna true truth’s eternity. From “Furthermore, the discipline…” onward, he next addresses the objection regarding the refuges and precepts in both passages. If one can see emptiness, one even attains the untainted discipline arising together with the path, which is called complete; how could they lack worldly discipline? From “Therefore the Avataṃsaka…” onward, he cites proof that the true truth is also named eternal. Since it says eternal, and the two vehicles also attain it without being called Buddhas, know that the word ‘eternal’ is shared; why must it be restricted to the Mahāyāna? From “If not…” onward, he concludes the purport of resolving the objection. If based on the passage saying the śrāvakas do not know, they should not be able to possess the precepts. Since the precepts are already complete, the name ‘eternal’ should not be restricted to the Mahāyāna. From “Further citing an example…” onward, he cites an example to explain and establish [the point]. First, he cites the sūtra. From “Wishing to name…” onward, he draws the parallel and concludes. From “Therefore the Tripiṭaka…” onward, he concludes the reply. As explained before, it does not actually contradict the text of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. Thus, the Nirvāṇa Sūtra’s purport holds two directions: in the past, one had to know the lesser eternal, while at present, one must know the wondrous eternal. From “The Śrīmālā…” onward, he next resolves the purport of the Śrīmālā Sūtra, likewise first citing the objection and next clarifying the sūtra’s purport. If one wishes to resolve the purport of the Śrīmālā Sūtra, one must explain it using two kinds of initial practice. The first text tentatively indicates the initial practice in the distant past, hence called “the root.” None failed to establish karmic ties with the sixteen princes, which refers provisionally to trace-transformations, hence called “seeking far back.” From “If taking…” onward, it refers immediately to first hearing in this lifetime the true eternity of the principle of cessation of the four truths; this meaning is the same as before. From “If in antiquity…” onward, he re-explains the distant past, which accords with the preceding question and answer. That today’s śrāvakas possess the precepts is truly due to hearing the eternal in their initial practice in the distant past; if they had not heard it formerly, they would not even possess the lesser, let alone the greater. If they had never heard the Mahāyāna eternal at all, lacking even the lesser fruit, who could discuss whether their precepts are complete or not? Deploying the provisional for the sake of the real, completeness is discussed implicitly; meeting their hearing of the eternal in their initial practice in the distant past, completeness is explicitly discussed in this lifetime upon receiving prediction. “Fearing birth and death…” refers to cases like Śāriputra crossing the river of giving. Thus, the twelfth scroll of the Great Treatise says: “Śāriputra practiced the bodhisattva path for sixty kalpas. A Brahmin begged him for his eye. Śāriputra said: ‘You should beg for something useful; this eye is of no use.’ The Brahmin said: ‘I do not need your body or possessions, I only need your eye. If you truly practice giving, give me your eye.’ He then gouged out an eye and gave it to him. Having obtained it, the Brahmin smelled it and said: ‘This eye stinks.’ He spat on it, threw it away, and trampled it with his foot. Śāriputra said: ‘How can such an evil person be saved? He forced me for it when he truly had no use for it. It is better to save myself and escape birth and death early.’” After regressing from the Mahāyāna, he wandered in birth and death, which is termed failing to reach the other shore. As for “Prince Dharmamati,” the upper fascicle of the Benye yingluo states: “When a bodhisattva of the sixth abode manifests calming and contemplation, protected by Buddhas, bodhisattvas, and good spiritual friends, upon entering the seventh abode he attains non-retrogression, and the non-existence of a self of persons never arises again. If not, for one kalpa or more he regresses from the aspiration for awakening. Just as in my first assembly eighty thousand people regressed.” This refers to the devaputra Śuddhaprabha, Prince Dharmamati, Śāriputra, and others. Wishing to enter the seventh abode, they met bad spiritual friends and regressed to the status of ordinary beings, even committing great wrong views and the five heinous crimes for a thousand kalpas, leaving no evil undone. As for “and the regressing bodhisattva in the Nirvāṇa,” scroll twenty-six states: “Siṃhanāda said to the Buddha: ‘If the Buddha-nature is eternal, why is there regression?’ The Buddha said: ‘It is like two people who both hear that in another place there is a mountain of seven jewels. One person, troubled that the road is long with many difficulties and lacking provisions, regresses and does not go. The other person risks his life, reaches it, and obtains many precious jewels. The regressed person, seeing this, feels ardent in his heart and goes again. The one who regressed is an analogy for the regressing bodhisattva; the one who did not regress is an analogy for the non-regressing bodhisattva. How could regression render the Path impermanent?’” From “It is like…” onward, he offers an analogy. “The great earth” is the initial arousal of the aspiration for awakening. Relying on this initial arousal of aspiration, there are the functions of Hinayāna initial practice, etc. Therefore, Hinayāna initial practice is like the sprouting of a tree, all accomplished relying on the earth of bodhi. From “The Hinayāna…” onward, he matches the analogy. “Karmic acts are not accomplished” means that if in the distant past there had definitively been no Mahāyāna, then the Hinayāna’s holding of the Dharma would not be accomplished; because there is no root, all practices would not be accomplished, just as a tree without roots cannot produce flowers or fruit. Because the capacity of the time was not yet mature, the name ‘lesser’ was provisionally established; what you practice is the bodhisattva path, and you are not called great persons only after just receiving the prediction. Thus we know that without the mind directed toward the jewel island, not a single step on the path to the conjured city is completed; how could one enter the city and give rise to the notion of security? ‘Not having faith in the eternal, the śrāvaka’s precepts are all incomplete’—these words have evidentiary support. This reproves those who have not aroused the great aspiration at all, for they lack the root. Although they lack the root, looking from the recipient’s mind, and looking from the Buddha’s fundamental intention, he has already bestowed the great transformation. The meaning of presence and absence must be carefully contemplated. “If interpreted this way…” and so forth reveals the intention behind the two explanations of initial practice. The initial practice of the four mindfulnesses does not contradict the lesser; the initial practice of the distant past does not fail to reach the greater.