止觀輔行傳弘決 4.8

4.8

○三明犯相者，先標譬本，即是羅剎同為愛見而作喻也。「行人」下，略合。愛見皆能損於篇聚，故並喻羅剎來乞浮囊。「愛羅剎」下，廣合。此中文九義二，意在顯持。言文九者，愛見各有九，謂五篇、定及三觀。言義二者，復有三別：一者愛見、二者事理、三者持犯。持犯是能判，事理是犯境，愛見是犯因。言顯持者，犯亦成持，況復本淨。若從理說，本淨雖持猶名為犯，用懺淨已方復本淨。先合愛中，經但五段：一者全乞、喻犯四重。二者乞半、喻犯十三。三乞手許、喻犯偷蘭。今文稱為乞重方便，且為成於漸犯之相，故置果存因。四乞指許，喻犯二提。五乞微塵，喻犯吉羅。今文依經故無所改，為篇闕於提舍又剩偷蘭，為聚不開第五亦闕提舍。大乘經文佛意罕測，《文殊問經》篇聚亦爾，彼列五夷、三蘭、二提、一吉，罪種雖少該攝極寬。此等並是菩薩律儀，是故不可全同三藏。若破觀境是犯律儀，即於十中犯前三戒分為五罪，五罪不同復分愛見。五中前夷及殘，各先犯、次持。蘭提吉三，文相略故，但存犯相。次夷罪中持相文言「汝寧殺我」等者，寧殺陰身，戒囊叵得。乃至應云毒蛇口中等也。次殘犯相中云「摩觸」等者，若分因果以對罪名，具如律部。次持相中云「下意」等者，犯第二篇，僧中行白，名為下意。別住名擯，乃至奪其三十五事及本日等，名為治擯。次「乞重方便」者，則喻因。「蘭吉羅」下，舉況勸持。微塵不足損於浮囊，而惜惠於羅剎者，恐水漸入，能為沒海遠方便故。今亦如是，吉罪既為染污種類，能遠開於無救之門。第五既然，餘三亦然。重罪如死，故云「而死」。「貪攀」下，定共戒也。定共雖即未證於真，欲違於定，故即名犯。「深著」下，即空戒也。以無隨道無著，不能破於三有之因，是故名為「為有造業」。假中二戒，例前說之。從「深著」下名為犯理。次以羅剎喻見者，初文辨異。則色屬愛，因此破戒。一切皆然，故云「觸人」。無始與俱，名「已生惡」。依見破戒，或因後時推理起計，名「未生惡」。預識防過，是故列之，故云「此見雖未起」。後為內外兩緣所壞而生惡見，一得少禪、二無師友。非深非久，故名為「少」。適得根本，因而生見，「即生念著」，吉羅也。「而起過患」，重罪也。「佛在世一比丘」下，引事。《大論》十九云「有一比丘得第四禪，生增上慢謂得四果。初得初禪謂得初果，乃至得第四禪謂得羅漢，恃此自高不肯進道。臨終之時見四禪陰，便生邪見，謂無涅槃，佛為欺我。惡見生故，失禪中陰。阿鼻相現，命終生彼。諸比丘問佛：『阿蘭若比丘死，今生何處？』佛言：『生阿鼻獄。』諸比丘大驚：『坐禪持戒，便至爾耶？』佛如前答竟，而說偈言：『多聞持戒禪，未得漏盡法，雖有是功德，是事難可信。墮獄由謗佛，非關第四禪。』」此證得少禪也。「佛在世」下，舉況以釋師友意也。大師在世尚有僻計生見之人，況滅後無師不得禪者。又惡見者，如《譬喻經》、《賢愚經》並云：佛在舍衛，有婆羅門邪見，與五百弟子相隨，莫不歸敬。因與佛弟子觸試不如，恥見本群，沒水而死。佛言：「彼有二罪：一毒盛、二謗佛。」佛言：「今墮阿鼻。」「故大虛空藏」等者，彼《虛空孕經》下卷，文列六重，第三云「復次善男子！或有初行菩薩見他眾生作如是言：『仁者勿行毘尼戒律，勿為精進速發菩提心、速誦經典。作身口意惡、因為惡故即得清淨。』是名第三重罪。」「云何」下，正明犯相。亦先事犯、後理犯。初事犯中，亦先明五罪，犯十中三。食噉人狗喻，破世出世因果，此從優劣為譬也。「破正見威儀」等者，起見即破正見。應引《大經》十二等，文無者略。犯前三聚名破戒，犯下四聚名破威儀，四邪五邪名破正命。邪法活命，故云邪命。四邪者，一方邪，謂通國使命。二維邪，謂醫方卜相。三仰邪，謂仰觀星宿。四下邪，謂種植根栽五穀等類。亦曰四口食。故《大論》「舍利弗乞食，有一女人問舍利弗言：『汝方口食耶？乃至下口食耶？』皆答言：『不。』女人言：『何食耶？』舍利弗次第解釋四種食已云：『我唯乞食自活。』」五邪者，一為利養故現奇特相、二為利養故自說功德、三卜相吉凶為人說法、四高聲現威令人畏敬、五說所得供養以動人心。此等並是高名上輩所慎，應非寡德末流所闚。「或重方便乃至吉羅」，準愛中說。「謂諸法」下，重明過相。從初乃至永沒，例前吉羅乃至而死。「當知此人」下，結破僻計。「近尚」等者，近謂見心，遠謂諦理。「既以惡空」下，例前貪攀等乃至破律儀戒。「堅執見」下，例前貪五欲故破於理戒。「當知」下結中云「尚不得人天涅槃」者，人天中樂亦名涅槃。「何不引無行」等者，經中總有七十餘行偈，汝何不引終不破於戒等文，獨引貪欲是道文耶？況復經說欲是道者，秖云道性不出於欲，亦云欲性不離於道。約理云即約事須離，而汝錯計謂欲是道。若爾，秖有道即是婬，何曾婬即是道？經又云「見有無法異，是不離有無。若知有無等，超勝成佛道。」汝唯見有尚不見無，況有無等？經又云「道及婬怒癡，是一法平等。」意亦如前。

Part three, clarifying the marks of violation: first, the source of the parable is identified, which is that rākṣasas serve as a shared metaphor for craving and views. From "practitioners" onward, it is briefly applied: craving and views are both able to damage the classes and categories [of precepts], hence both are compared to a rākṣasa coming to beg for the floating buoy. From "the rākṣasa of craving" onward, it is extensively applied. In this there are nine text sections and two meanings, the intent being to reveal adherence. As for the nine text sections, craving and views each have nine: namely, the five classes [of offenses], dhyāna, and the three contemplations. As for the two meanings, there are again three distinctions: first, craving and views; second, phenomenal and principle; third, adherence and violation. Adherence and violation are what judge; phenomenal and principle are the objects violated; craving and views are the causes of violation. As for "revealing adherence": even violation constitutes adherence, so how much more so fundamental purity? If speaking from principle, although fundamental purity is adhered to, it is still termed violation; only after purifying it through repentance does it return to fundamental purity. First, in applying [the metaphor to] craving, the scripture has only five sections: 1. Begging for the whole [buoy], which illustrates violating the four pārājikas. 2. Begging for half, which illustrates violating the thirteen saṅghāvaśeṣas. 3. Begging for a hand's breadth, which illustrates violating thullaccayas. The present text refers to this as begging for the preparatory means to a grave offense; temporarily, in order to establish the marks of gradual violation, it sets aside the result and preserves the cause. 4. Begging for a finger's breadth, which illustrates violating the two types of prāyaścittikas. 5. Begging for a speck of dust, which illustrates violating duṣkṛtas. The present text follows the scripture and therefore makes no alteration: as classes [of the Vinaya], it lacks prātideśanīya and has an excess of thullaccaya; as categories, it does not open the fifth and likewise lacks prātideśanīya. The Buddha's intent in Mahāyāna scriptures is difficult to fathom; the classes and categories in the Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā-sūtra are also like this: that text lists five pārājikas, three thullaccayas, two prāyaścittikas, and one duṣkṛta; although the varieties of offenses are few, their subsumption is extremely broad. These are all the bodhisattva's moral discipline, and therefore they cannot be entirely equated with the Tripiṭaka. If destroying the object of contemplation constitutes violating moral discipline, then among the ten [precepts] one violates the first three precepts, dividing them into five offenses; and as the five offenses differ, they are again divided into craving and views. Among the five, the pārājikas and saṅghāvaśeṣas each present violation first and adherence second. Because the textual phrasing for thullaccaya, prāyaścittika, and duṣkṛta is brief, only the marks of violation are preserved. Next, regarding the text of the mark of adherence under pārājika offenses that says "You had rather kill me," and so forth: one would rather have the body of aggregates killed than have the buoy of the precepts be obtained [by the demon]. It should even extend to [putting one's head] into the mouth of a venomous snake, and so forth. Next, in the marks of violation under saṅghāvaśeṣa, where it says "bodily contact," and so forth: if one distinguishes cause and effect to match offense designations, it is fully as set forth in the Vinaya treatises. Next, in the marks of adherence, where it says "submitting one's mind," and so forth: violating the second class, carrying out the motion (jñapti) before the Saṅgha is termed "submitting one's mind." Living in separate quarters is termed suspension (parivāsa), and up to stripping them of the thirty-five matters, their original status, and so forth, is termed disciplinary suspension (mānatta). Next, "begging for the preparatory means to a grave offense" illustrates the cause. From "thullaccaya and duṣkṛta" onward, an analogy is raised to encourage adherence: a speck of dust is insufficient to damage the floating buoy, yet sparing it from the rākṣasa is because of fear that water will gradually enter, which can act as a remote preparatory means to drowning in the sea. The present case is also like this: since a duṣkṛta offense is a variety of defilement, it can remotely open the gate of having no salvation. Since this is so for the fifth, it is likewise so for the other three. A grave offense is like death, hence it says "and dies." From "coveting and grasping" onward is the precept coexistent with concentration. Although concentration-coexistent [precepts] have not yet realized the true, desire goes against concentration, and hence is immediately termed violation. From "deeply attached" onward is the precept of emptiness. Because one lacks non-attachment in accordance with the path, one cannot destroy the causes of the three realms of existence, and therefore it is termed "creating karma for the sake of existence." The two precepts of provisionality and the middle are explained by analogy with the preceding. From "deeply attached" onward is termed violating principle. Next, regarding using the rākṣasa to illustrate views: the initial text distinguishes the difference. Form belongs to craving, and through this one breaks the precepts. This is so for all [beings], hence it says "contacting people." Existing together with beginningless time, it is termed "already-arisen evil." Breaking precepts based on views, or conceiving calculations later by deducing principle, is termed "not-yet-arisen evil." One foresees it to guard against transgressions, and for that reason it is listed; hence it says "although this view has not yet arisen." Later, broken by two conditions, internal and external, evil views arise: first, obtaining little dhyāna; second, lacking a teacher and spiritual friends. Because it is neither deep nor prolonged, it is termed "little." Merely obtaining the fundamental [absorption], one consequently gives rise to views: "at once giving rise to mindful attachment" is a duṣkṛta; "and giving rise to transgressions and afflictions" is a grave offense. From "While the Buddha was in the world, a monk" onward, an incident is cited. Chapter Nineteen of the Dazhidulun says: "There was a monk who attained the fourth dhyāna and gave rise to excessive pride, claiming he had attained the four fruits. When he first obtained the first dhyāna, he claimed he had attained the first fruit, up to obtaining the fourth dhyāna, claiming he had attained arhatship; relying on this, he exalted himself and refused to advance on the path. When close to death, he saw the aggregates of the fourth dhyāna, and thereupon gave rise to evil views, claiming, 'There is no nirvāṇa; the Buddha deceived me.' Because evil views arose, he lost the intermediate existence of the dhyāna. The signs of the Avīci [Hell] appeared, and when his life ended, he was born there. The monks asked the Buddha: 'Where is the araṇya monk who died born now?' The Buddha said: 'Born in the Avīci Hell.' The monks were greatly alarmed: 'Does sitting in meditation and upholding precepts lead to this?' After the Buddha replied as above, he spoke a verse: / 'Much learning, upholding precepts, and dhyāna, / Not having attained the dharma of the exhaustion of outflows— / Although one possesses these merits, / This matter is difficult to trust. / Falling into hell was due to slandering the Buddha; / It had nothing to do with the fourth dhyāna.'" This proves [the danger of] obtaining little dhyāna. From "While the Buddha was in the world" onward, an analogy is raised to explain the meaning of a teacher and spiritual friends: during the Great Master's lifetime, there were still people who formed perverse calculations and gave rise to views, so how much more so after his decease, for those who lack a teacher and do not attain dhyāna! Furthermore, regarding evil views, as both the Avadāna-sūtra and the Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish say: The Buddha was in Śrāvastī. There was a brahmin with evil views who was followed by five hundred disciples, none of whom did not take refuge in and revere him. Because he came into contact and tested himself against the Buddha's disciples and was inferior, ashamed to face his original group, he drowned himself in water and died. The Buddha said: "He had two sins: first, raging poison; second, slandering the Buddha." The Buddha said: "He has now fallen into Avīci." Regarding "Therefore the Great Ākāśagarbha..." and so forth: in the second fascicle of that Ākāśagarbha-sūtra, the text lists six grave offenses, the third stating: "Furthermore, good son! There may be an initial-practice bodhisattva who, seeing other sentient beings, speaks like this: 'Worthy one, do not practice the Vinaya moral rules! Do not, for the sake of vigor, swiftly arouse the aspiration for awakening and swiftly chant the scriptures! Commit physical, verbal, and mental evils, for through doing evil you will immediately attain purity.' This is termed the third grave offense." From "How..." onward directly clarifies the marks of violation. It also first [clarifies] phenomenal violation, and afterward violation of principle. In the initial phenomenal violation, it also first clarifies five offenses, violating three among the ten [precepts]. The metaphor of a human-devouring dog illustrates destroying worldly and world-transcending cause and effect; this employs a metaphor based on superiority and inferiority. Regarding "destroying right views, deportment," and so forth: giving rise to views immediately destroys right views. One should cite chapter twelve of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra and so forth; where the text lacks it, it is omitted for brevity. Violating the first three categories is termed destroying precepts; violating the lower four categories is termed destroying deportment; the four wrong livelihoods and five wrong livelihoods are termed destroying right livelihood. Sustaining life through wrong dharmas is therefore called wrong livelihood. As for the four wrong livelihoods: first, directional wrong livelihood, referring to acting as an envoy across states; second, diagonal wrong livelihood, referring to medical recipes and fortune-telling; third, upward wrong livelihood, referring to gazing upward at the stars and constellations; fourth, downward wrong livelihood, referring to planting roots, saplings, five grains, and the like. These are also called the four mouth-foods. Hence the Dazhidulun says: "Śāriputra was begging for food. A woman asked Śāriputra, saying: 'Do you eat by directional mouth? ...Up to eating by downward mouth?' To all he replied, saying: 'No.' The woman said: 'By what do you eat?' After Śāriputra explained the four kinds of eating in sequence, he said: 'I sustain myself solely by begging for food.'" As for the five wrong livelihoods: 1. Displaying unusual appearances for the sake of material gain; 2. Speaking of one's own merits for the sake of material gain; 3. Divining fortunes and misfortunes to preach the Dharma for people; 4. Raising one's voice to display majesty to make people fear and respect oneself; 5. Speaking of offerings received in order to sway people's minds. These are all things that those of high renown and superior caliber are cautious of, and should not be things peeped at by the inferior dregs of meager virtue. "Either preparatory means to a grave offense up to duṣkṛta" is explained in accordance with [the section on] craving. From "stating that all dharmas..." onward re-clarifies the marks of transgressions. From the beginning up to eternal drowning, it follows the pattern of the previous duṣkṛta up to dying. From "One should know that this person..." onward concludes by refuting perverse calculations. Regarding "Proximally, still..." and so forth: "proximally" refers to the mind of views; "distantly" refers to the truth-principle. From "Having already, through evil emptiness..." onward follows the pattern of the previous coveting and grasping, up to destroying the precepts of moral discipline. From "Firmly grasping views..." onward follows the pattern of previously destroying the precepts of principle due to coveting the five desires. In the conclusion from "One should know..." onward, regarding "still cannot attain the nirvāṇa of humans and devas": happiness among humans and devas is also termed nirvāṇa. Regarding "Why not cite the Non-Practice..." and so forth: in the scripture there are more than seventy lines of verse in total; why do you not cite the passages such as "never destroying the precepts," but exclusively cite the passage "greed and desire are the path"? How much more so when the scripture says desire is the path, it merely says that the nature of the path does not go beyond desire, and also says that the nature of desire is not separate from the path. In terms of principle it is said to be identical; in terms of phenomena one must depart from it; yet you mistakenly calculate that desire is the path. If so, there is only that the path is identical to lust; how was lust ever identical to the path? The scripture also says: "Seeing existence and non-existence as different—this is not departing from existence and non-existence. If one knows that existence and non-existence are equal, one transcends and accomplishes the Buddha path." You only see existence and do not even see non-existence, so how could existence and non-existence be equal? The scripture also says: "The path, lust, anger, and ignorance—this is a single dharma, equal." The intent is also as before.