止觀輔行傳弘決 4.8

4.8

Part three, clarifying the marks of violation: first, the source of the parable is identified, which is that rākṣasas serve as a shared metaphor for craving and views. From "practitioners" onward, it is briefly applied: craving and views are both able to damage the classes and categories [of precepts], hence both are compared to a rākṣasa coming to beg for the floating buoy. From "the rākṣasa of craving" onward, it is extensively applied. In this there are nine text sections and two meanings, the intent being to reveal adherence. As for the nine text sections, craving and views each have nine: namely, the five classes [of offenses], dhyāna, and the three contemplations. As for the two meanings, there are again three distinctions: first, craving and views; second, phenomenal and principle; third, adherence and violation. Adherence and violation are what judge; phenomenal and principle are the objects violated; craving and views are the causes of violation. As for "revealing adherence": even violation constitutes adherence, so how much more so fundamental purity? If speaking from principle, although fundamental purity is adhered to, it is still termed violation; only after purifying it through repentance does it return to fundamental purity. First, in applying [the metaphor to] craving, the scripture has only five sections: 1. Begging for the whole [buoy], which illustrates violating the four pārājikas. 2. Begging for half, which illustrates violating the thirteen saṅghāvaśeṣas. 3. Begging for a hand's breadth, which illustrates violating thullaccayas. The present text refers to this as begging for the preparatory means to a grave offense; temporarily, in order to establish the marks of gradual violation, it sets aside the result and preserves the cause. 4. Begging for a finger's breadth, which illustrates violating the two types of prāyaścittikas. 5. Begging for a speck of dust, which illustrates violating duṣkṛtas. The present text follows the scripture and therefore makes no alteration: as classes [of the Vinaya], it lacks prātideśanīya and has an excess of thullaccaya; as categories, it does not open the fifth and likewise lacks prātideśanīya. The Buddha's intent in Mahāyāna scriptures is difficult to fathom; the classes and categories in the Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā-sūtra are also like this: that text lists five pārājikas, three thullaccayas, two prāyaścittikas, and one duṣkṛta; although the varieties of offenses are few, their subsumption is extremely broad. These are all the bodhisattva's moral discipline, and therefore they cannot be entirely equated with the Tripiṭaka. If destroying the object of contemplation constitutes violating moral discipline, then among the ten [precepts] one violates the first three precepts, dividing them into five offenses; and as the five offenses differ, they are again divided into craving and views. Among the five, the pārājikas and saṅghāvaśeṣas each present violation first and adherence second. Because the textual phrasing for thullaccaya, prāyaścittika, and duṣkṛta is brief, only the marks of violation are preserved. Next, regarding the text of the mark of adherence under pārājika offenses that says "You had rather kill me," and so forth: one would rather have the body of aggregates killed than have the buoy of the precepts be obtained [by the demon]. It should even extend to [putting one's head] into the mouth of a venomous snake, and so forth. Next, in the marks of violation under saṅghāvaśeṣa, where it says "bodily contact," and so forth: if one distinguishes cause and effect to match offense designations, it is fully as set forth in the Vinaya treatises. Next, in the marks of adherence, where it says "submitting one's mind," and so forth: violating the second class, carrying out the motion (jñapti) before the Saṅgha is termed "submitting one's mind." Living in separate quarters is termed suspension (parivāsa), and up to stripping them of the thirty-five matters, their original status, and so forth, is termed disciplinary suspension (mānatta). Next, "begging for the preparatory means to a grave offense" illustrates the cause. From "thullaccaya and duṣkṛta" onward, an analogy is raised to encourage adherence: a speck of dust is insufficient to damage the floating buoy, yet sparing it from the rākṣasa is because of fear that water will gradually enter, which can act as a remote preparatory means to drowning in the sea. The present case is also like this: since a duṣkṛta offense is a variety of defilement, it can remotely open the gate of having no salvation. Since this is so for the fifth, it is likewise so for the other three. A grave offense is like death, hence it says "and dies." From "coveting and grasping" onward is the precept coexistent with concentration. Although concentration-coexistent [precepts] have not yet realized the true, desire goes against concentration, and hence is immediately termed violation. From "deeply attached" onward is the precept of emptiness. Because one lacks non-attachment in accordance with the path, one cannot destroy the causes of the three realms of existence, and therefore it is termed "creating karma for the sake of existence." The two precepts of provisionality and the middle are explained by analogy with the preceding. From "deeply attached" onward is termed violating principle. Next, regarding using the rākṣasa to illustrate views: the initial text distinguishes the difference. Form belongs to craving, and through this one breaks the precepts. This is so for all [beings], hence it says "contacting people." Existing together with beginningless time, it is termed "already-arisen evil." Breaking precepts based on views, or conceiving calculations later by deducing principle, is termed "not-yet-arisen evil." One foresees it to guard against transgressions, and for that reason it is listed; hence it says "although this view has not yet arisen." Later, broken by two conditions, internal and external, evil views arise: first, obtaining little dhyāna; second, lacking a teacher and spiritual friends. Because it is neither deep nor prolonged, it is termed "little." Merely obtaining the fundamental [absorption], one consequently gives rise to views: "at once giving rise to mindful attachment" is a duṣkṛta; "and giving rise to transgressions and afflictions" is a grave offense. From "While the Buddha was in the world, a monk" onward, an incident is cited. Chapter Nineteen of the Dazhidulun says: "There was a monk who attained the fourth dhyāna and gave rise to excessive pride, claiming he had attained the four fruits. When he first obtained the first dhyāna, he claimed he had attained the first fruit, up to obtaining the fourth dhyāna, claiming he had attained arhatship; relying on this, he exalted himself and refused to advance on the path. When close to death, he saw the aggregates of the fourth dhyāna, and thereupon gave rise to evil views, claiming, 'There is no nirvāṇa; the Buddha deceived me.' Because evil views arose, he lost the intermediate existence of the dhyāna. The signs of the Avīci [Hell] appeared, and when his life ended, he was born there. The monks asked the Buddha: 'Where is the araṇya monk who died born now?' The Buddha said: 'Born in the Avīci Hell.' The monks were greatly alarmed: 'Does sitting in meditation and upholding precepts lead to this?' After the Buddha replied as above, he spoke a verse: / 'Much learning, upholding precepts, and dhyāna, / Not having attained the dharma of the exhaustion of outflows— / Although one possesses these merits, / This matter is difficult to trust. / Falling into hell was due to slandering the Buddha; / It had nothing to do with the fourth dhyāna.'" This proves [the danger of] obtaining little dhyāna. From "While the Buddha was in the world" onward, an analogy is raised to explain the meaning of a teacher and spiritual friends: during the Great Master's lifetime, there were still people who formed perverse calculations and gave rise to views, so how much more so after his decease, for those who lack a teacher and do not attain dhyāna! Furthermore, regarding evil views, as both the Avadāna-sūtra and the Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish say: The Buddha was in Śrāvastī. There was a brahmin with evil views who was followed by five hundred disciples, none of whom did not take refuge in and revere him. Because he came into contact and tested himself against the Buddha's disciples and was inferior, ashamed to face his original group, he drowned himself in water and died. The Buddha said: "He had two sins: first, raging poison; second, slandering the Buddha." The Buddha said: "He has now fallen into Avīci." Regarding "Therefore the Great Ākāśagarbha..." and so forth: in the second fascicle of that Ākāśagarbha-sūtra, the text lists six grave offenses, the third stating: "Furthermore, good son! There may be an initial-practice bodhisattva who, seeing other sentient beings, speaks like this: 'Worthy one, do not practice the Vinaya moral rules! Do not, for the sake of vigor, swiftly arouse the aspiration for awakening and swiftly chant the scriptures! Commit physical, verbal, and mental evils, for through doing evil you will immediately attain purity.' This is termed the third grave offense." From "How..." onward directly clarifies the marks of violation. It also first [clarifies] phenomenal violation, and afterward violation of principle. In the initial phenomenal violation, it also first clarifies five offenses, violating three among the ten [precepts]. The metaphor of a human-devouring dog illustrates destroying worldly and world-transcending cause and effect; this employs a metaphor based on superiority and inferiority. Regarding "destroying right views, deportment," and so forth: giving rise to views immediately destroys right views. One should cite chapter twelve of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra and so forth; where the text lacks it, it is omitted for brevity. Violating the first three categories is termed destroying precepts; violating the lower four categories is termed destroying deportment; the four wrong livelihoods and five wrong livelihoods are termed destroying right livelihood. Sustaining life through wrong dharmas is therefore called wrong livelihood. As for the four wrong livelihoods: first, directional wrong livelihood, referring to acting as an envoy across states; second, diagonal wrong livelihood, referring to medical recipes and fortune-telling; third, upward wrong livelihood, referring to gazing upward at the stars and constellations; fourth, downward wrong livelihood, referring to planting roots, saplings, five grains, and the like. These are also called the four mouth-foods. Hence the Dazhidulun says: "Śāriputra was begging for food. A woman asked Śāriputra, saying: 'Do you eat by directional mouth? ...Up to eating by downward mouth?' To all he replied, saying: 'No.' The woman said: 'By what do you eat?' After Śāriputra explained the four kinds of eating in sequence, he said: 'I sustain myself solely by begging for food.'" As for the five wrong livelihoods: 1. Displaying unusual appearances for the sake of material gain; 2. Speaking of one's own merits for the sake of material gain; 3. Divining fortunes and misfortunes to preach the Dharma for people; 4. Raising one's voice to display majesty to make people fear and respect oneself; 5. Speaking of offerings received in order to sway people's minds. These are all things that those of high renown and superior caliber are cautious of, and should not be things peeped at by the inferior dregs of meager virtue. "Either preparatory means to a grave offense up to duṣkṛta" is explained in accordance with [the section on] craving. From "stating that all dharmas..." onward re-clarifies the marks of transgressions. From the beginning up to eternal drowning, it follows the pattern of the previous duṣkṛta up to dying. From "One should know that this person..." onward concludes by refuting perverse calculations. Regarding "Proximally, still..." and so forth: "proximally" refers to the mind of views; "distantly" refers to the truth-principle. From "Having already, through evil emptiness..." onward follows the pattern of the previous coveting and grasping, up to destroying the precepts of moral discipline. From "Firmly grasping views..." onward follows the pattern of previously destroying the precepts of principle due to coveting the five desires. In the conclusion from "One should know..." onward, regarding "still cannot attain the nirvāṇa of humans and devas": happiness among humans and devas is also termed nirvāṇa. Regarding "Why not cite the Non-Practice..." and so forth: in the scripture there are more than seventy lines of verse in total; why do you not cite the passages such as "never destroying the precepts," but exclusively cite the passage "greed and desire are the path"? How much more so when the scripture says desire is the path, it merely says that the nature of the path does not go beyond desire, and also says that the nature of desire is not separate from the path. In terms of principle it is said to be identical; in terms of phenomena one must depart from it; yet you mistakenly calculate that desire is the path. If so, there is only that the path is identical to lust; how was lust ever identical to the path? The scripture also says: "Seeing existence and non-existence as different—this is not departing from existence and non-existence. If one knows that existence and non-existence are equal, one transcends and accomplishes the Buddha path." You only see existence and do not even see non-existence, so how could existence and non-existence be equal? The scripture also says: "The path, lust, anger, and ignorance—this is a single dharma, equal." The intent is also as before.