止觀輔行傳弘決 5.18

Next, in the personal analysis, there are sixteen rounds of questions and answers in total. The first question and answer broadly asks why there are only ten objects. For instance, in the object of the aggregates and sense bases, the various aggregates differ, and the varieties of defilements are also boundless; the various illnesses and karma, down to the expedient and genuine practices of the two vehicles in the two teachings, and the various stages of bodhisattvas in the three teachings are diverse; hence it says, "If phenomena are as numerous as dust and sand, why are the objects fixed at ten?" The import of the answer is: it is truly as asked. The dharma-nature is like the earth, the seeds are like the objects, the practice of contemplation is like the rain, and the manifesting is like the sprouting of shoots; by briefly using a numerical formula, it tentatively posits ten. Next, from "Question: The ten objects" below, there are nine questions and answers, serving to establish the four propositions of shared and distinctive. First is the shared question that initiates it. Next, in the answer, it first answers the shared proposition, and the text naturally divides into ten. In the initial object of the aggregates, the meaning also runs through the ten, but based on two meanings, the aggregates must come first. Although the text below says that it distinctively heads the list, the textual intent here tentatively accords with the shared aspect. Practitioners universally take the body of the aggregates as the beginning, and the sūtras universally take the aggregates as the beginning of contemplation; form among the aggregates comes first, hence it says, "All the sūtras begin from form." Not only do the aggregates run through the ten, down to the bodhisattvas the meaning also universally runs through the ten. Here, "shared" only refers to the name being shared; the meanings are still distinctive. For instance, the ten objects can all be called aggregates, yet distinguishing the aggregates according to cause and effect, the meanings are fundamentally distinctive. As it is with the object of the aggregates, so it is with the remaining nine. First, they are collectively called aggregates because the aggregates are the foundation. The aggregates are the object; defilements and karma are called the causes of the aggregates; illness is the affliction of the aggregates; demons are the masters of the aggregates, wishing to prevent people from escaping the three realms; dhyāna is the wholesome aggregate—tentatively contrasted with the ten objects, dhyāna is the wholesome aggregate. If discussed universally, the six desire realms, four human continents, down to the stations of mindfulness, and the stages of suppression in the various teachings are all subsumed under the wholesome aggregates. Now, taking the two vehicles as distinctive aggregates, it does not rely on the shared aspect. The two objects of views and conceit are called further causes of the aggregates; the meaning of cause is the same as before, but because the text lists them later, it merely says "further". Although the two vehicles and bodhisattvas have not yet transcended the realms, in meaning they oppose birth and death, and internal and external differ, distinct from the preceding eight, hence they are called distinctive. Furthermore, if this object manifests, it is subsumed under the aggregates beyond the realms, hence it is called distinctive. Although the ten meanings differ, universally they have not departed from the aggregates; subsuming the distinctive into the shared, they are universally called aggregates. The subsumption of the distinctive in the other nine objects has the same import. As for "dhyāna is immovable karma and so forth", it is contrasted with the motion of the desire realm, hence called immovable. As for "karma is the function of defilements", if defilements have no karma, then they have no function that leads to future results. Following upon immovable karma, the text explains it in passing, hence saying that karma is the function of defilements. The primary intent of the text is to say that dhyāna is the function of defilements: although bound to the realms, it has the function of experiencing pleasure for a long duration, hence it is called function. As for "demons rule the desire realm" and so forth, although they rule the desire realm, their intention is to make people increase the fetters of the three realms. The two lords Śakra and Brahmā both possess rule, but they are both disciples of the Buddha and weary of birth and death, hence they cannot be called masters of defilements. The phrase "distinctive defilements" means that although they arouse the aspiration to leave the world and still have defilements, they are not like the preceding seven, hence called distinctive. This is determined from the cause. If determined from the result, the preceding seven possess shared delusions, and the latter two possess distinctive delusions; the meaning runs through cause and effect, but the text's intent follows the cause. Furthermore, from the perspective of the result, one must also distinguish the three kinds of bodhisattvas: for instance, a Tripiṭaka bodhisattva who has not yet broken shared delusions is also called distinctive; therefore, one should take the first meaning as correct. As for "The king is now gravely ill" and so forth, King Ajātaśatru considered the sores on his body to be the illness, while the Tathāgata and Jīvaka considered the rebellious acts to be the illness. Question: King Ajātaśatru committed only the one rebellion of killing his father; why does it speak of five? Answer: The one is subsumed under the five, hence it broadly says five. The rebellious act is precisely karma, hence karma is also called illness. As for "demons can cause illness", demons do not envy people's retributive life of the physical body, but only envy those who possess the Way and transform their subjects. Here speaking of illness, it is in the hope that through physical illness they will retreat from the path of awakening. As for "the three disasters are external illnesses", it clarifies that dhyāna is also called illness. Disasters and afflictions are alternative names for illness. The "Five Elements" in the Hongfan says, "All harmful things are called disasters (zāi)." The Chunqiu Commentary says, "When Heaven acts contrary to the seasons, it is a disaster." Furthermore, the Commentary's Guidelines says, "Fires from Heaven are called disasters." Although there are these sayings, they actually do not know where Heaven resides or the scope of disasters; hence we know this is not what the Confucian tradition discusses. The Abhidharmakośa says: "There must be seven fires and one water; after seven waters, fires and wind: passing through seven fire disasters, next is one water disaster; passing in this manner through seven sets of seven fire disasters and seven sets of seven water disasters, and sequentially passing through another seven fire disasters, only then is there one wind disaster. In total, they make eight sets of seven—fifty-six fires—and another set of seven waters and one wind disaster. Why is it so? Fire reaches the first dhyāna, water reaches the second dhyāna, and wind reaches the third dhyāna. When the second dhyāna is destroyed, the first dhyāna is definitely destroyed; when the third dhyāna is destroyed, the first and second are definitely destroyed. Therefore, kalpa after kalpa, the first dhyāna is always destroyed, in accordance with the one-kalpa lifespan of the first dhyāna; it must pass through eight kalpas before reaching the second dhyāna, in accordance with the eight-kalpa lifespan in the third heaven of the second dhyāna; the wind disaster must pass through sixty-four kalpas before reaching the third dhyāna, in accordance with the lifespan of the third heaven of the third dhyāna. Therefore, the first dhyāna internally has the affliction of applied and sustained thought, and externally has the fire disaster; the second dhyāna internally has the affliction of joy, and externally has the water disaster; the third dhyāna internally has the affliction of bliss, and externally has the wind disaster; the fourth dhyāna has no afflictions, and therefore also has no disasters." Now speaking of "panting, joy, and bliss", this is contrasted with the fourth dhyāna having no panting; the lower three all have panting and so forth. The text omits applied and sustained thought, briefly mentioning joy and bliss. As for "the two vehicles and bodhisattvas have the illness of emptiness", since these three bodhisattvas have not yet perceived the middle, they share the illness of emptiness with the two vehicles. As for "the illness of emptiness is also empty", it cites Vimalakīrti as proof. Because emptiness is an illness, it is called the illness of emptiness. The illness of emptiness must be emptied, hence it says "is also empty". That is, the emptiness of the middle empties the one-sided emptiness, hence it says "is also empty". As for "defilements, views, and conceit are the roots of karma", "root" means cause: depending on these three, one can each perform karma. As for "the two vehicles and bodhisattvas have uncontaminated karma", it is also distinguished as before. As for "the remainder are subsumed under the demon of the aggregate of volition", the aggregate of volition subsumes wide categories of phenomena; therefore the remainder are all subsumed within it, which is precisely subsumption under the demon of the aggregates. Defilements, views, conceit, and so forth being also called dhyāna means that dhyāna is merely concentration; since it extends across mental factors, it also has the name of concentration; this concentration further extends to defilements, views, and conceit, hence these three are all called dhyāna. As for "demons are the fruit of threshold concentration", this threshold stage can also be called concentration. Having attained this concentration, upon relinquishing their lifespan they are born there, hence it is called the fruit of concentration.

Regarding "the pure dhyāna of the two vehicles and bodhisattvas": since the Great Sūtra takes the fundamental four dhyānas as the intermediate concentration, we now take these to be the pure dhyānas. Pure dhyānas are generally subsumed under the superior concentration; therefore it next explains that the superior concentration subsumes the two vehicles and bodhisattvas, while the intermediate and inferior concentrations subsume the remaining eight objects. However, among the objects of dhyāna, only the fundamental ones are subsumed under the intermediate concentration; the exceptional [methods] and transparent illumination should be subsumed under two alternatives; the nine contemplations of decay and beyond are all subsumed under the superior concentration; and the remaining seven objects are all subsumed under the inferior concentration. As for the "three concentrations," Chapter Twenty-five of the Great Sūtra states: "Good son, all sentient beings are fully endowed with three concentrations, namely: superior, intermediate, and inferior. The superior concentration refers to the Buddha-nature. The intermediate concentration is that all sentient beings are fully endowed with the first dhyāna, which they can cultivate when conditions are present. The inferior concentration is subsumed under the mental factor of concentration among the ten universal mental factors." However, while the lower eight objects actually pertain to good and evil, now, comparing the eight objects to the mental factor of concentration, they all share the name of concentration; hence they are subsumed under the universal mental factors of the ten universals, because the concentration among the universal mental factors encompasses both good and evil. Although the sūtra's explanation of the superior concentration states that it resides in the Buddha, since the intermediate concentration is said to reside in the first dhyāna, we now generally take the two vehicles and bodhisattvas to be the superior concentration. Regarding "the aggregates and sensory realms are subsumed under the view of a self and the view of a sentient being": if discussed comprehensively, the sixteen views are not separate from the aggregates and sensory realms. Now speaking distinctly, generally apprehending the aggregates is called a sentient being, while falsely conceiving the aggregates [as an enduring entity] is called a self; what is apprehended and conceived are the aggregates and sensory realms. Regarding "the defilements are fully endowed with the five views": just as the five views are fully present among the ninety-eight proclivities, these ninety-eight are generally called defilements; hence it says that defilements subsume the five views. Regarding "illness is [subsumed under] the view of a long-lived one and the view of a life-principle": "life-principle" conceives of continuity; "long-lived one" conceives of a single lifespan. Although usually conceived, they are most urgent at the time of illness, fearing the rupture of continuity and fearing that the single lifespan will be short; speaking from the predominant aspect, they are matched with these two. Regarding "karma, dhyāna, and so forth are [subsumed under] the view of an agent and the view of attachment to precepts": conceiving that the self can perform actions and cultivate dhyāna-concentration is called an agent. Dhyāna is not the path of transcendence, yet conceiving it to be the path of transcendence is called attachment to precepts. Māra is the master of desire; thinking that directing and driving proceed from oneself is called "causing an agent." [Thinking that] suffering and pleasure proceed from oneself is called "causing an experiencer." Causing someone to remain in the desire realm in future lives is called "causing an originator." Regarding "moreover, birth-and-death is simply subsumed under extreme views": birth-and-death is simply the beginning and end of the aggregates and sensory realms; re-explaining them as belonging to extremes is why it says "moreover." Conceiving permanence regarding birth and conceiving annihilation regarding death is called extreme. Regarding "pride is subsumed under the view of a self": because of the self there is pride; therefore pride belongs to the self. Regarding "the two vehicles and bodhisattvas are subsumed under crooked views": because they are not the perfect, direct path, they are called crooked. The Great Sūtra states: "If one sees a bodhisattva descending from Tuṣita, marrying a consort, fathering a child, leaping over the city wall to leave home, and so forth up to entering extinction, this is called the crooked view of the two vehicles." Although it specifies the two vehicles, it actually includes the provisional pedagogical path. Just as manifesting a body for bodhisattvas before the stages is called a reward body, it is not for one's own enjoyment; expediently manifesting another's body is not the real truth, so its meaning corresponds to being crooked. These sixteen views are found in the Dapin, and the Dazhidulun explains them extensively. Now they are only matched with eight; those not yet matched are subsumed within the eight. Namely: [first,] the view of a generator, conceiving of being able to generate sentient beings like parents giving birth to children. Second, the view of a nourisher, conceiving that I can nurture others. Third, the view of numerical grouping, conceiving that I possess the five aggregates, twelve sensory bases, and eighteen sensory elements. Fourth, the view of a person, conceiving that I am a practitioner. Fifth, the view of an experiencer, conceiving that my future body will experience retribution. Sixth, the view of an originator, conceiving that I can create future retribution. Seventh, the view of a knower, conceiving that my five sense faculties can cognize the five sense objects. Eighth, the view of a seer, conceiving that my sense faculties and objects can perceive forms and give rise to heterodox views. The order of the listed names is fully presented in the sūtras, treatises, and the Fajie cidi. The preceding quotations followed the meaning rather than this order. Those outside the initial eight, if integrated into the initial eight views: the generator and nourisher are subsumed under the demonic object. Although Māra is not identical to what Brahmā conceives, their general nature is largely the same. Numerical grouping is subsumed under the object of the aggregates. The experiencer and originator are subsumed under the object of karma. The person, knower, and seer are subsumed under the object of defilements. Regarding "the aggregates and sensory realms are subsumed under the pride of a self": grasping at self and what belongs to a self is called the pride of a self. The text of the Abhidharmakośa is the same. The aggregates are what belongs to a self; what can conceive them is the self. Regarding "defilement is the pride of superiority": the Abhidharmakośa states, "Deeming oneself equal to those who are superior is called pride of superiority." This shares the same meaning with defilement. Regarding "illness is the pride of inferiority": the treatise states, "Deeming oneself only slightly inferior to those who are far superior is called pride of inferiority." Just as in illness one is inferior to others, yet still gives rise to pride. Regarding "karma and dhyāna are the pride of self-inflation": the treatise states, "Deeming oneself equal to those who are equal." Although equal, because the mind is elevated, it is called pride. As they all equally attain dhyāna, there is none who does not elevate themselves. Being conceited is called self-inflation; disparaging others is called pride. Regarding "demons and views are extreme pride": the treatise states, "Deeming oneself superior to those who are superior is called extreme pride." The Tathāgata is truly superior, yet one is proud even toward the Buddha. Regarding "the pride of overestimation": the treatise states, "Deeming oneself to have attained what has not been attained." The stages of the two vehicles and bodhisattvas have not reached the ultimate; when this object arises, they are not yet able to apply contemplation, precisely corresponding to overestimation. Among the seven types of pride in the treatise, only deviant pride is missing—namely, deeming oneself virtuous among virtuous people. It can also be integrated into the two objects of demons and views, because those two objects do not revere others. In generally referring to the two vehicles, regarding "the four noble truths and four stations of mindfulness subsume the nine objects": the conditioned-arising and the four noble truths are merely general and distinct; the four noble truths subsuming phenomena is slightly more convenient in name and meaning, so it only speaks of the four noble truths and does not mention conditioned-arising. The aggregates and sensory realms are entirely the objects of the four stations of mindfulness; thus the truth of suffering and the four stations subsume the object of the aggregates and sensory realms. Moreover, distinctly matching them by the essence of the four stations of mindfulness: illness is subsumed under mindfulness of the body and feelings, and also belongs to the truth of suffering; dhyāna is mindfulness of phenomena and mindfulness of feelings, and thus belongs to the truth of the origin [of suffering]; pure dhyāna is also subsumed under the truth of the path; the mental king within the habituated causes of defilements, views, pride, dhyāna, and karmic marks is subsumed under mindfulness of the mind and the truth of the origin [of suffering]. The various mental factors and the mental factors within the habituated causes of karma, together with Māra, are all subsumed under mindfulness of phenomena and the truth of the origin [of suffering]; the bodhisattva's mindfulness of phenomena is subsumed under the truths of the path and cessation. Because mindfulness of phenomena encompasses many broad phenomena, namely conditioned and unconditioned. If we discuss the objects of the stations of mindfulness from the perspective of their belonging to the aggregates, the stations of mindfulness do not subsume unconditioned phenomena; therefore, among the four noble truths, they are subsumed only under the truth of suffering, which is why it says the four stations of mindfulness and four noble truths subsume them. Furthermore, in a general matching: the objects of the stations of mindfulness are subsumed only under the truth of suffering, while the wisdom that contemplates the stations of mindfulness is subsumed under the truth of the path.

Matching them in this manner, the stations of mindfulness subsume only the four objects of the aggregates and sense bases, dhyāna-concentration, the two vehicles, and the bodhisattva. Because they possess these many meanings, they are explained by opening and combining them. If one further analyzes within the nine stations of mindfulness, the first seven belong to the expedients, which are what is utilized by the latter two objects. If they subsume the former eight, it should be explained as before; reflecting on it, this can be understood. As for "the four universal vows subsume nine," since the four noble truths are the objects of the four universal vows, they should likewise be understandable according to the preceding distinctions. Regarding "Query: Are the object, dharma, and name only pervasive, etc.": the four queries below all challenge pervasiveness by means of distinction. The import of the initial query is: since the object, dharma, and name are all mutually pervasive, is the contemplating practitioner also pervasive or not? "Dharma" refers to the intrinsic entity of the ten objects; "name" refers to the name applied to the dharma. Because these ten dharmas are pervasively not yet free from the aggregates, up to their being pervasively named dharmas of the bodhisattva, this is called the pervasiveness of dharmas. The text states that they are pervasively called aggregates and sense bases, up to their being pervasively called bodhisattva; this is the pervasiveness of names. Since the dharmas and names are pervasive, it therefore further asks whether the practicing practitioner is also pervasive or not. The import of the reply answers by stating that both are pervasive. Why? Prior to arousing the aspiration for awakening, the former nine objects are still called bodhisattva; thus the bodhisattva object is able to pervade the rest. For this reason, the text provisionally adduces the nine objects. Pervasively they are called bodhisattva; thus one should know that the practitioner is also pervasive. As for "prior to arousing the aspiration for awakening, one is called a bodhisattva," this is based on the nature-principle: all sentient beings will surely become buddhas, so how are they not bodhisattvas? Query: The names of the objects may indeed be pervasive, but how are the dharmas pervasive? Reply: Names invoke dharmas; since their names are pervasive, their dharmas are unobstructed. As for "pervasively called the two vehicles, etc.," the Fahua lun (Treatise on the Lotus Sūtra) identifies four kinds of śrāvakas: namely, those who abide in the fruit, those who are manifestations of response, those who regress from bodhi, and those of excessive pride. Here, "Buddha path" refers to manifestations of response. Regarding "excessive pride" subsuming the lower eight: this is because the two vehicles properly correspond to abiding in the fruit. In the present discussion, the manifestation of an object is neither the former eight objects nor identical in meaning to the bodhisattva abiding in the fruit. Those who regress from the aspiration for bodhi are also among the lower nine: if they regress to become the two vehicles, they are subsumed under the object of the two vehicles; if they regress from the perfect to enter the biased, they still belong to the bodhisattva object; and only if they lose both the Great and Small [vehicles] are they in the lower eight. Within dhyāna, one should further distinguish between the tainted and the untainted to correlate with the ten objects; this must be carefully considered. As for "the Buddha path," this is provisionally spoken in terms of arousing the aspiration, and is ultimately not the perfect culmination. In the next question and answer, the reply combines the words to explain the meaning, answering by means of distinct meaning and pervasive name. The initial query states, "Are they pervasively impermanent or not?" It asks: since the former ten objects can be pervasively called the two vehicles and bodhisattva, and the eight that are not the three vehicles can be called the three vehicles, are the two that are not impermanent impermanent or not? The import of the reply is: the eight that are not the three vehicles are entirely encompassed by the three vehicles; the two that are not impermanent possess the meaning of impermanence. Hence it cites the Ratnagotravibhāga stating that even outside the three realms there is still impermanence. If this is so for the bodhisattva, how much more so for the two vehicles? Thus the latter two objects are pervasively impermanent. In the next question and answer, the reply divides the words to explain the meaning. The initial query asks: "Are they pervasively tainted or not?" It again uses the former eight to challenge the latter two. If you grant that they are impermanent, impermanence is taint; why then did you previously cite the Ratnagotravibhāga stating that they abide in the untainted realm? The import of the reply is: pervasively all are tainted, but there are differences in meaning. From the buddhas downward, all are called tainted; as for there being a difference in meaning, it is because the ten objects are distinct. From the aggregates up to views and conceit, there are taints within the realms; for the two vehicles and bodhisattvas, there are taints outside the realms. Because internal and external differ, we say there are differences. What the Ratnagotravibhāga refers to as "untainted" receives its name in contrast to the internal; in relation to outside the realms, it is still called tainted. The meaning of impermanence and inversion is also like this: in relation to that it is inverted, but in relation to this it is not inverted. If one compares them with the Great Dharma, then both the internal and the external are tainted. In the next question and answer, the initial query asks: "Are they pervasively biased-true or not?" It challenges the other nine objects with the object of the two vehicles: if the latter two are not tainted yet pervasively can be called tainted, then since the two vehicles are biased-true, the other nine should also be biased-true. The reply also divides the words to answer: because they have not yet merged with the perfect, they are pervasively biased; as truth contains distinctions, we say "truth differs"—the two vehicles and bodhisattvas possess truth outside the realms, while the other eight objects possess truth within the realms. In the next question and answer, the query states, "The meaning of pervasiveness can be grasped": as previously explained, object, dharma, name, practitioner, and even impermanence, taint, and biased-true also pervade the ten objects; is this exclusively pervasive, or are there also distinctions? The reply is: since they are fundamentally distinct, why must one ask further? Hence, the ten objects are precisely the meaning of distinction. These three queries are for establishing the subsequent three propositions. This concludes the second proposition on distinction. Next, from "there is further" downward is the third proposition. Without asking a separate question, it is directly explained within the reply on distinction; hence it says "there is further both-pervasive and both-distinct." Within this, it further distinguishes between "both-pervasive and both-distinct" and "is pervasive and is distinct": although both belong to the third proposition, they are not without similarities and differences. Because the initial object of the aggregates and sense bases possesses two meanings, it is called "both-pervasive and both-distinct." Why? Being the basis of the body and the beginning of contemplation, these two meanings differ from the nine; hence it is called "also distinct." Furthermore, it causes the meaning of aggregate to pervasively enter the other nine, and causes the other nine to be pervasively called aggregates; hence it is called "also pervasive." Because the other nine objects lack these two meanings, one can only have the various objects progressively differing from one another, which is called "is distinct"; and their progressively pervading one another is called "is pervasive." Thus, a single dharma intrinsically possesses the two meanings, and hence it is called "both-pervasive and both-distinct." A single dharma facing in two directions, in relation to others, constitutes duality; hence it is only called "is pervasive and is distinct." Regarding the two meanings: first, distinctly heading the list; second, mutually pervading the nine. As for what is called facing two directions and in relation to others: differing from others constitutes distinction, and pervading others constitutes pervasiveness. It is not that the aggregate object lacks the distinction of differing from others, but this distinction is still pervasive; only in distinctly heading the list does it completely differ from the other nine, hence it is called "also distinct"; and placing this "also distinct" in relation to mutual pervasiveness, it is called "also pervasive." The other nine are not like this, and therefore are only called "is pervasive and is distinct," because they lack the initial two meanings. As for the lower nine objects: when they manifest, they can become [objects of] contemplation; if they do not manifest, what is there to contemplate? Hence they lack the first meaning. What the various teachings list does not place them at the beginning; hence they lack the second meaning. Lacking these two meanings, they are not called "also distinct"; and since they are not "also distinct," they do not constitute "also pervasive." From "if so" downward, afflictions and disease/suffering are used to challenge the aggregates and sense bases: these two objects also possess the two meanings, so why only the aggregates and sense bases? Why? Afflictions are also the root of all dharmas, which challenges along the lines of the first meaning; and they are originally for curing delusion, which challenges along the lines of the second meaning. The object of disease is also like this: the four elements of the diseased body challenge along the lines of the first meaning, and being originally for curing disease challenges along the lines of the second meaning. As for the import of the reply: first, in explaining that afflictions lack the two meanings, it precludes the use of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra to raise a latent objection.

An objection states: "If afflictions cannot be taken as the basis of all phenomena, why does the sutra say: 'Although affliction and the physical body have no temporal precedence, one must rely on affliction to have a body'? One should know that affliction is definitely the basis of the body; why does it concern the aggregates and sense-entrances being the basis for contemplation?" Therefore, this is now refuted, saying: When it is said that "one has a body because of affliction," affliction already belongs to the category of the past lifetimes; how could it further be taken as the object of contemplation? Although contemplation is originally meant to cure delusions, how can it cure delusions that have already perished? Therefore, affliction lacks both meanings entirely. What is more, past delusions also exist on account of the body; for this reason, all teachings begin contemplation with the aggregates. Because present delusions arise by conceptualizing the aggregates, merely having one contemplate the aggregates prevents delusions from arising. From "Illness does not arise constantly" below, the answer that illness lacks the two meanings can be understood. Below this there is no question, but it directly explains the characteristics of the fourth proposition. "All are inconceivable": as in the non-gradual [practice], there is nothing that is not the dharma-dhātu; with what else could one discuss commonality and distinction? "One aggregate is all aggregates": this is fully described as in the explanation of the inconceivable object. That the text only raises the aggregates and does not mention the other nine is because the aggregates already subsume everything, and the nine arise from the aggregates; by analogy with the aggregates, one delusion should also be all delusions, all delusions should be one delusion, neither one nor all, and so forth up to a bodhisattva's one vow being all vows, all vows being one vow, neither one nor all. The next question and answer asks exclusively about the object of the aggregates. The other nine objects receive their names based on manifestation, and all have distinct designations. When understanding of the aggregates arises, it is also a manifestation attained, so a distinct designation should be established. The meaning of the answer is that although giving rise to understanding regarding the aggregates is a manifestation attained, because it lacks the characteristics of the nine, it still belongs to the aggregates. Just as when affliction arises, one contemplates the affliction and gives rise to the perfect understanding, yet when this understanding arises there is also no distinct designation; so it is here. Once this understanding has arisen, if one gives rise to grasping and generates craving, or if illness or karma receives a distinct name, this is due to one's grasping, etc., and does not concern the understanding of the aggregates; therefore, the understanding of the aggregates receives no distinct name. Hence it says "If understanding manifests," and so on. Below "This, then," it briefly evaluates the stages and functional efficacy. The "predisposing factor" (qifen) refers to the antecedent sign prior to entering the five grades. Below "Merely obtains," it concludes the evaluation. Distinct characteristics that arise on account of understanding of the aggregates, although also subsumed by the aggregates, cannot be called "both common and distinct." Saying "merely obtains common and distinct," and so on, means it merely can be common or distinct. When this understanding arises, its meaning is the same as the latter nine in all being manifestations attained; hence it also shares with the nine in being common or being distinct. Moreover, it is not the object of the aggregates itself, so it is not like the aggregates, which are both common and distinct. "Question: Are they categorically distinct?" and so forth: as in the previous answer to the question that the ten objects are not the same, that is the meaning of distinction. Since this distinction still entails commonality, it is further asked: "Are there also ten objects that are categorically and perpetually distinct, not mutually interchangeable?" The answering text fully sets out the characteristics of categorical distinction. "Categorical" (tiao) refers to distinct categories (tiaoke)—that is, the ten categories are perpetually different. "The distinction of the aggregates by the four stations of mindfulness": if one merely says "aggregates," the name of the aggregates is still common. If one speaks of the four stations of mindfulness contemplating the aggregates and so forth up to contemplating the realms as without self, then they cannot be called the causes of aggregates, distinct aggregates, and so forth. Regarding the "empty village," Vimalakīrti says: "Delighting in contemplating the internal sense-entrances as an empty village." The Great Sutra says: "Like an empty village, which from afar appears to exist, but looking closely does not. The sense-entrances are also like this; ordinary beings claim they exist, while the wise know they do not." Regarding "contemplating the realms as without self," the Great Sutra says: "For those who grasp heavily to a self, one discriminates the phenomena of the eighteen realms for them; searching for a self within each realm, none can be found." "The distinction of afflictions by the fivefold stilling of the mind": what is cured by each of the fivefold stillings is distinct; how could they still be called the fruits of affliction, and so on? "The distinction of illness by the eight recollections": when cultivating the nine visualizations of corpses causes fear, one is led to cultivate the eight recollections; taking fear as an illness, it is not even the same as disharmony of the four elements, so how could it be the same as rebellious illnesses, meditation illnesses, and the like? "The distinction of karma by the ten good deeds": in the ten, the three types of karma correspond to distinct items; they are not even the ten unwholesome actions, so how could they be the same as the taintless, the immovable, and so on? "The distinction of demons by the five bonds": the warnings of the four reliances and the restraint by the power of the Śūraṅgama are not the same as the demon of the aggregates, the demon of the aggregate of karmic formations, and so forth. Therefore, in the "Chapter on the Four Reliances" of the Great Sutra, the Bodhisattva of the Four Reliances expelled Māra, saying: "If the heavenly demon Pāpīyas comes again, I shall bind you with the five bonds." Zhang'an explained: "There are two kinds of bonds: first, binding with five corpses; second, binding in five places. As for binding with five corpses, it is like the contemplation of impurity curing the demon of craving; the five places accord with the principle to cure the demon of views." Therefore, in the Śūraṅgama [Sutra], "Śāriputra asked the Buddha: 'When this samādhi is spoken, is it not troubled by the various demons?' The Buddha said: 'Do you wish to see the afflictions and decline of the demons?' 'Indeed, I wish to see it.' The Buddha emitted light from between his brows, and they saw all the demons bound by the five bonds. Śāriputra said: 'Who did this?' The Buddha said: 'This is the power of the Śūraṅgama samādhi. Wherever this samādhi is spoken, if demons wish to cause obstruction, they will naturally see themselves under the five bonds. So it will also be wherever the samādhi is spoken after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa.'" "The distinction of meditation by the six wondrous gates": the six gates of counting and so forth differ in sequence; how could they be the same as mental factors, superior absorptions, and the like? "The distinction of views by the aids to the path": what is cured by the aids to the path are the views within the three realms, namely the grasp of precepts and rules, etc.; they are not the same as the sixteen views, distinct views, and so on. "The distinction of conceit by impermanence, suffering, and emptiness": both the Great and Small Vehicles have haughty conceit. In the Great Vehicle, if one has not yet attained the fruit of buddhahood and claims oneself to be ultimate, it is called haughty conceit. In the Small Vehicle, if one has not yet attained the four fruits and claims to have attained the four fruits, it is called haughty conceit. Now, in the Small Vehicle, claiming the contemplation of impermanence to be the ultimate principle—how could this be the same as taking worldly dhyāna to be the four fruits? Furthermore, it is not the same as the eight types of pride or the lower eight objects. "The distinction of the two vehicles by the four noble truths and dependent origination": these naturally belong to the two vehicles of the Tripiṭaka; how could they be the same as the two vehicles within the shared teaching, or the Buddha path of haughty conceit, and so forth? "The distinction of the bodhisattvas by the six perfections": subduing delusions for three asaṃkhyeya kalpas, how could they again be the same as those who have not yet aroused the aspiration for awakening, and so on? This categorical distinction is distinct because of two meanings: First, based on what cures them, these ten are distinctly established; just as the aggregates seem identical, they are differentiated across the three categories. The other nine cures can be understood by analogy with this. Second, these ten are distinctly different from one another, and are thus called distinct.