止觀輔行傳弘決 5.18.3

5.18.3

如此對者，念處但攝陰入、禪定、二乘、菩薩四境，具斯多意，故開合解之。 若更約九念處中，前七屬方便，即後二境所用。 若攝前八，應如前釋，思之可見。 「四弘攝九」者，四諦既為四弘之境，依前分別亦應可解。 「問境法名但通」等者，此下四問皆以別難通。 初問意者，境法及名既並互通，能觀行人為亦通不？ 法謂十境當體、名謂法上之名，以此十法通未離陰，乃至通名菩薩之法，是名法通； 文云通稱陰入乃至通稱菩薩，是為名通。 法名既通，是故更問能行行人為亦通不？ 答意，者即以俱通而為答也。 何者？ 前之九境未發心前尚名菩薩，故菩薩境而得通餘，是故文中且舉九境。 通稱菩薩，是則當知行人亦通。 言「未發心名菩薩」者，此據理性，一切眾生皆當作佛，豈非菩薩？ 問：境名容通，法云何通？ 答：名召於法，其名既通，其法不隔。 「通稱二乘」等者，《法華論》有四種聲聞，謂住果、應化、退菩提、增上慢。 今云佛道，即是應化。 言增上慢，攝下八者，二乘正當住果故也。 今論境發非前八境，復非菩薩義同住果，退菩提心亦在下九，若退為二乘則二乘境攝，若退圓入偏仍屬菩薩境也，若大小都失方在下八。 禪中復應分漏無漏以對十境，須審思之。 言「佛道」者，且約發心，終非圓極。 次一問答，答中合字解義，即以義別名通為答。 初問云「通是無常不」者，問前十境既得通稱二乘菩薩，八非三乘得稱三乘，二非無常是無常不？ 答意者，八非三乘，三乘收盡。 二非無常，有無常義，故引《寶性》出三界外猶有無常。 菩薩尚爾，況二乘耶？ 故後二境通是無常。 次問答，答中分字解義。 初問「通是有漏不」者，復以前八重難後二。 若許無常，無常即漏，何故向引《寶性論》言住無漏界？ 答意者，通皆是漏，有義不同。 降佛已來皆名為漏，有義異者，十境別故。 陰至見慢有界內漏，二乘菩薩有界外漏，內外不同故云有異。 彼《寶性論》言無漏者，望內得名，若於界外仍名為漏。 無常倒義亦復如是，於彼是倒，於此不倒。 若以大法形之，則內外俱漏。 次一問答中初問「通是偏真不」者，以二乘境難餘九境。 後二非有漏，通得名有漏； 二乘是偏真，餘九應偏真。 答中亦分字為答，仍未會圓，故通是偏。 真有差別，故云真異，二乘菩薩有界外真，餘之八境有界內真。 次問答者，問中云「通義可領」者，如前所釋境法名人，乃至無常有漏偏真亦通十境，為一向通亦有別耶？ 答者，不同本別，何須更問？ 故云十境即是別義。 此等三問，為成下三句也。 此即第二別句竟也。 次「復有」下，即第三句不更別問，於答別中便即釋出，故云「復有亦通亦別」。 於中復更分別亦通亦別與是通是別，雖俱屬第三句，而不無同異。 初陰入境具二義故，名亦通亦別。 何者？ 身本觀初，二義異九，故名亦別； 復使陰義通入餘九，復令餘九通得名陰，故名亦通。 餘之九境闕二義故，但得諸境展轉相異，名為是別； 展轉互通，故名是通。 是則一法自具二義，故云亦通亦別。 一法兩向，對他故二，但云是通是別。 言二義者，一者別當其首、二者與九互通。 所言兩向及對他者，異他故別，通他故通。 陰境非無異他之別，此別猶通，獨有別當其首，全異餘九，故云亦別； 以此亦別對於互通，故云亦通。 餘九不然，是故但云是通是別，以無初之二義故也。 下之九境，發可為觀，不發何所觀？ 故闕初義。 諸教所列不以為初，闕第二義。 無此二義，不名亦別，既非亦別不成亦通。 「若爾」下，將煩惱病患以難陰入。 此之二境亦具二義，何獨陰入？ 何者？ 煩惱亦是諸法之本，難同初義。 元為治惑，難同次義。 病境亦爾，病身四大難同初義，元為治病難同次義。 答意者，初明煩惱無二義中，遮用《大經》以伏難。

Matching them in this manner, the stations of mindfulness subsume only the four objects of the aggregates and sense bases, dhyāna-concentration, the two vehicles, and the bodhisattva. Because they possess these many meanings, they are explained by opening and combining them. If one further analyzes within the nine stations of mindfulness, the first seven belong to the expedients, which are what is utilized by the latter two objects. If they subsume the former eight, it should be explained as before; reflecting on it, this can be understood. As for "the four universal vows subsume nine," since the four noble truths are the objects of the four universal vows, they should likewise be understandable according to the preceding distinctions. Regarding "Query: Are the object, dharma, and name only pervasive, etc.": the four queries below all challenge pervasiveness by means of distinction. The import of the initial query is: since the object, dharma, and name are all mutually pervasive, is the contemplating practitioner also pervasive or not? "Dharma" refers to the intrinsic entity of the ten objects; "name" refers to the name applied to the dharma. Because these ten dharmas are pervasively not yet free from the aggregates, up to their being pervasively named dharmas of the bodhisattva, this is called the pervasiveness of dharmas. The text states that they are pervasively called aggregates and sense bases, up to their being pervasively called bodhisattva; this is the pervasiveness of names. Since the dharmas and names are pervasive, it therefore further asks whether the practicing practitioner is also pervasive or not. The import of the reply answers by stating that both are pervasive. Why? Prior to arousing the aspiration for awakening, the former nine objects are still called bodhisattva; thus the bodhisattva object is able to pervade the rest. For this reason, the text provisionally adduces the nine objects. Pervasively they are called bodhisattva; thus one should know that the practitioner is also pervasive. As for "prior to arousing the aspiration for awakening, one is called a bodhisattva," this is based on the nature-principle: all sentient beings will surely become buddhas, so how are they not bodhisattvas? Query: The names of the objects may indeed be pervasive, but how are the dharmas pervasive? Reply: Names invoke dharmas; since their names are pervasive, their dharmas are unobstructed. As for "pervasively called the two vehicles, etc.," the Fahua lun (Treatise on the Lotus Sūtra) identifies four kinds of śrāvakas: namely, those who abide in the fruit, those who are manifestations of response, those who regress from bodhi, and those of excessive pride. Here, "Buddha path" refers to manifestations of response. Regarding "excessive pride" subsuming the lower eight: this is because the two vehicles properly correspond to abiding in the fruit. In the present discussion, the manifestation of an object is neither the former eight objects nor identical in meaning to the bodhisattva abiding in the fruit. Those who regress from the aspiration for bodhi are also among the lower nine: if they regress to become the two vehicles, they are subsumed under the object of the two vehicles; if they regress from the perfect to enter the biased, they still belong to the bodhisattva object; and only if they lose both the Great and Small [vehicles] are they in the lower eight. Within dhyāna, one should further distinguish between the tainted and the untainted to correlate with the ten objects; this must be carefully considered. As for "the Buddha path," this is provisionally spoken in terms of arousing the aspiration, and is ultimately not the perfect culmination. In the next question and answer, the reply combines the words to explain the meaning, answering by means of distinct meaning and pervasive name. The initial query states, "Are they pervasively impermanent or not?" It asks: since the former ten objects can be pervasively called the two vehicles and bodhisattva, and the eight that are not the three vehicles can be called the three vehicles, are the two that are not impermanent impermanent or not? The import of the reply is: the eight that are not the three vehicles are entirely encompassed by the three vehicles; the two that are not impermanent possess the meaning of impermanence. Hence it cites the Ratnagotravibhāga stating that even outside the three realms there is still impermanence. If this is so for the bodhisattva, how much more so for the two vehicles? Thus the latter two objects are pervasively impermanent. In the next question and answer, the reply divides the words to explain the meaning. The initial query asks: "Are they pervasively tainted or not?" It again uses the former eight to challenge the latter two. If you grant that they are impermanent, impermanence is taint; why then did you previously cite the Ratnagotravibhāga stating that they abide in the untainted realm? The import of the reply is: pervasively all are tainted, but there are differences in meaning. From the buddhas downward, all are called tainted; as for there being a difference in meaning, it is because the ten objects are distinct. From the aggregates up to views and conceit, there are taints within the realms; for the two vehicles and bodhisattvas, there are taints outside the realms. Because internal and external differ, we say there are differences. What the Ratnagotravibhāga refers to as "untainted" receives its name in contrast to the internal; in relation to outside the realms, it is still called tainted. The meaning of impermanence and inversion is also like this: in relation to that it is inverted, but in relation to this it is not inverted. If one compares them with the Great Dharma, then both the internal and the external are tainted. In the next question and answer, the initial query asks: "Are they pervasively biased-true or not?" It challenges the other nine objects with the object of the two vehicles: if the latter two are not tainted yet pervasively can be called tainted, then since the two vehicles are biased-true, the other nine should also be biased-true. The reply also divides the words to answer: because they have not yet merged with the perfect, they are pervasively biased; as truth contains distinctions, we say "truth differs"—the two vehicles and bodhisattvas possess truth outside the realms, while the other eight objects possess truth within the realms. In the next question and answer, the query states, "The meaning of pervasiveness can be grasped": as previously explained, object, dharma, name, practitioner, and even impermanence, taint, and biased-true also pervade the ten objects; is this exclusively pervasive, or are there also distinctions? The reply is: since they are fundamentally distinct, why must one ask further? Hence, the ten objects are precisely the meaning of distinction. These three queries are for establishing the subsequent three propositions. This concludes the second proposition on distinction. Next, from "there is further" downward is the third proposition. Without asking a separate question, it is directly explained within the reply on distinction; hence it says "there is further both-pervasive and both-distinct." Within this, it further distinguishes between "both-pervasive and both-distinct" and "is pervasive and is distinct": although both belong to the third proposition, they are not without similarities and differences. Because the initial object of the aggregates and sense bases possesses two meanings, it is called "both-pervasive and both-distinct." Why? Being the basis of the body and the beginning of contemplation, these two meanings differ from the nine; hence it is called "also distinct." Furthermore, it causes the meaning of aggregate to pervasively enter the other nine, and causes the other nine to be pervasively called aggregates; hence it is called "also pervasive." Because the other nine objects lack these two meanings, one can only have the various objects progressively differing from one another, which is called "is distinct"; and their progressively pervading one another is called "is pervasive." Thus, a single dharma intrinsically possesses the two meanings, and hence it is called "both-pervasive and both-distinct." A single dharma facing in two directions, in relation to others, constitutes duality; hence it is only called "is pervasive and is distinct." Regarding the two meanings: first, distinctly heading the list; second, mutually pervading the nine. As for what is called facing two directions and in relation to others: differing from others constitutes distinction, and pervading others constitutes pervasiveness. It is not that the aggregate object lacks the distinction of differing from others, but this distinction is still pervasive; only in distinctly heading the list does it completely differ from the other nine, hence it is called "also distinct"; and placing this "also distinct" in relation to mutual pervasiveness, it is called "also pervasive." The other nine are not like this, and therefore are only called "is pervasive and is distinct," because they lack the initial two meanings. As for the lower nine objects: when they manifest, they can become [objects of] contemplation; if they do not manifest, what is there to contemplate? Hence they lack the first meaning. What the various teachings list does not place them at the beginning; hence they lack the second meaning. Lacking these two meanings, they are not called "also distinct"; and since they are not "also distinct," they do not constitute "also pervasive." From "if so" downward, afflictions and disease/suffering are used to challenge the aggregates and sense bases: these two objects also possess the two meanings, so why only the aggregates and sense bases? Why? Afflictions are also the root of all dharmas, which challenges along the lines of the first meaning; and they are originally for curing delusion, which challenges along the lines of the second meaning. The object of disease is also like this: the four elements of the diseased body challenge along the lines of the first meaning, and being originally for curing disease challenges along the lines of the second meaning. As for the import of the reply: first, in explaining that afflictions lack the two meanings, it precludes the use of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra to raise a latent objection.