止觀輔行傳弘決 5.18.4

5.18.4

難云：若也煩惱不得以為諸法本者，何故經云「煩惱與身雖無先後，要因煩惱而得有身。 」當知煩惱定為身本，何關陰入為觀本耶？ 故今遮云：言「因煩惱而有身」者，煩惱已屬過去世攝，云何更得以為觀境？ 雖元為治惑，豈可治於已謝之惑？ 是故煩惱二義全闕。 況過去惑亦由身有，是故諸教並初觀陰。 以現在惑計陰生故，但令觀陰惑則不生。 「病不恒起」下，答病無二義，可見。 此下無問，便即釋出第四句相。 「皆不思議」者，如不次第無非法界，更復與誰以論通別？ 「一陰一切陰」者，具如不思議境說。 文但舉陰不語餘九者，陰既遍攝，九從陰生，例陰亦應一惑一切惑、一切惑一惑、非一非一切，乃至菩薩一願一切願、一切願一願、非一非一切。 次一問答，獨問陰境。 餘之九境從發受名，皆有別稱。 陰解起時亦是發得，應別立名。 答意者，於陰生解雖是發得，無九相故還屬於陰。 如煩惱起，觀於煩惱而生圓解，此解起時亦無別稱。 今亦如是，此解生已生執起愛，若病若業受別名者，自由執等非關陰解，是故陰解不受別名，故云「若解發」等也。 「此則」下，略判位次功能。 言「氣分」者，即入五品之前相也。 「但得」下，結判。 因於陰解而生別相，雖亦陰攝，而不得名亦通亦別。 言「但得通別」等者，但得是通是別也。 此解起時，義同後九同是發得，故亦通九是通是別。 又非陰境，故不同陰亦通亦別。 「問條然別不」等者，如前答問十境不同，即別義也。 此別仍通，故更問云：亦有十境條然永別不互通耶？ 答文具出條然別相。 條謂條科，即十科永異。 「四念陰別」者，若但云陰，陰名尚通。 若云四念觀陰乃至無我觀界，則不得名陰因別陰等也。 言「空聚」者，《淨名》云「樂觀內入如空聚」，《大經》云「如空聚落，遠望謂有，近看則無。 入亦如是，凡夫謂有，智者知無。 」「無我觀界」者，《大經》云「著我多者，則為分別十八界法，一一界中求我叵得。 」「五停心煩惱別」者，五停所治各各不同，豈更得名煩惱果等？ 「八念病別」者，修九想怖令修八念，以怖為病，尚不同於四大不調，豈同逆病及禪病等？ 十善業別者，十中三業所對各別，尚非十惡，豈同無漏及無動等？ 「五繫魔別」者，四依所誡及《楞嚴》力制，不同陰魔行陰等魔。 故《大經．四依品》中，四依菩薩驅逐魔云：「天魔波旬若更來者，當以五繫繫縛於汝。 」章安釋云：「繫有二種：一者五屍繫、二者繫五處。 五屍繫者，如不淨觀治於愛魔，五處如理治於見魔。 」故《首楞嚴》中，「舍利子問佛：『說此三昧，不為諸魔之所惱不？ 』佛言：『欲見諸魔衰惱事不？ 』『唯然欲見。 』放眉間光，見一切魔皆被五繫。 舍利弗言：『是誰所作？ 』佛言：『是首楞嚴三昧之力。 但有說是三昧之處，魔欲為障，自見五繫。 佛滅度後說三昧處亦復如是。 』」「六妙門禪別」者，數等六門前後不同，豈同心數及上定等？ 「道品見別」者，道品所治即界內見，謂戒取等，不同十六知見及別見等。 「無常苦空慢別」者，大小兩乘各有上慢。 若大乘中，未得佛果自謂究竟，名增上慢。 若小乘中，未得四果謂得四果，名增上慢。 今小乘中因觀無常謂為極理，豈同世禪謂四果耶？ 又不同八慢及下八境。 「四諦因緣二乘別」者，自是三藏二乘，豈同通中二乘及以上慢佛道等耶？ 「六度菩薩別」者，三祇伏惑，豈得復同未發心等？ 此之條然二義故別。 一者依於能治別立此十，如陰似同，分三科異。 餘九能治，準此可知。 二者此十別別不同，故復名別。

An objection states: "If afflictions cannot be taken as the basis of all phenomena, why does the sutra say: 'Although affliction and the physical body have no temporal precedence, one must rely on affliction to have a body'? One should know that affliction is definitely the basis of the body; why does it concern the aggregates and sense-entrances being the basis for contemplation?" Therefore, this is now refuted, saying: When it is said that "one has a body because of affliction," affliction already belongs to the category of the past lifetimes; how could it further be taken as the object of contemplation? Although contemplation is originally meant to cure delusions, how can it cure delusions that have already perished? Therefore, affliction lacks both meanings entirely. What is more, past delusions also exist on account of the body; for this reason, all teachings begin contemplation with the aggregates. Because present delusions arise by conceptualizing the aggregates, merely having one contemplate the aggregates prevents delusions from arising. From "Illness does not arise constantly" below, the answer that illness lacks the two meanings can be understood. Below this there is no question, but it directly explains the characteristics of the fourth proposition. "All are inconceivable": as in the non-gradual [practice], there is nothing that is not the dharma-dhātu; with what else could one discuss commonality and distinction? "One aggregate is all aggregates": this is fully described as in the explanation of the inconceivable object. That the text only raises the aggregates and does not mention the other nine is because the aggregates already subsume everything, and the nine arise from the aggregates; by analogy with the aggregates, one delusion should also be all delusions, all delusions should be one delusion, neither one nor all, and so forth up to a bodhisattva's one vow being all vows, all vows being one vow, neither one nor all. The next question and answer asks exclusively about the object of the aggregates. The other nine objects receive their names based on manifestation, and all have distinct designations. When understanding of the aggregates arises, it is also a manifestation attained, so a distinct designation should be established. The meaning of the answer is that although giving rise to understanding regarding the aggregates is a manifestation attained, because it lacks the characteristics of the nine, it still belongs to the aggregates. Just as when affliction arises, one contemplates the affliction and gives rise to the perfect understanding, yet when this understanding arises there is also no distinct designation; so it is here. Once this understanding has arisen, if one gives rise to grasping and generates craving, or if illness or karma receives a distinct name, this is due to one's grasping, etc., and does not concern the understanding of the aggregates; therefore, the understanding of the aggregates receives no distinct name. Hence it says "If understanding manifests," and so on. Below "This, then," it briefly evaluates the stages and functional efficacy. The "predisposing factor" (qifen) refers to the antecedent sign prior to entering the five grades. Below "Merely obtains," it concludes the evaluation. Distinct characteristics that arise on account of understanding of the aggregates, although also subsumed by the aggregates, cannot be called "both common and distinct." Saying "merely obtains common and distinct," and so on, means it merely can be common or distinct. When this understanding arises, its meaning is the same as the latter nine in all being manifestations attained; hence it also shares with the nine in being common or being distinct. Moreover, it is not the object of the aggregates itself, so it is not like the aggregates, which are both common and distinct. "Question: Are they categorically distinct?" and so forth: as in the previous answer to the question that the ten objects are not the same, that is the meaning of distinction. Since this distinction still entails commonality, it is further asked: "Are there also ten objects that are categorically and perpetually distinct, not mutually interchangeable?" The answering text fully sets out the characteristics of categorical distinction. "Categorical" (tiao) refers to distinct categories (tiaoke)—that is, the ten categories are perpetually different. "The distinction of the aggregates by the four stations of mindfulness": if one merely says "aggregates," the name of the aggregates is still common. If one speaks of the four stations of mindfulness contemplating the aggregates and so forth up to contemplating the realms as without self, then they cannot be called the causes of aggregates, distinct aggregates, and so forth. Regarding the "empty village," Vimalakīrti says: "Delighting in contemplating the internal sense-entrances as an empty village." The Great Sutra says: "Like an empty village, which from afar appears to exist, but looking closely does not. The sense-entrances are also like this; ordinary beings claim they exist, while the wise know they do not." Regarding "contemplating the realms as without self," the Great Sutra says: "For those who grasp heavily to a self, one discriminates the phenomena of the eighteen realms for them; searching for a self within each realm, none can be found." "The distinction of afflictions by the fivefold stilling of the mind": what is cured by each of the fivefold stillings is distinct; how could they still be called the fruits of affliction, and so on? "The distinction of illness by the eight recollections": when cultivating the nine visualizations of corpses causes fear, one is led to cultivate the eight recollections; taking fear as an illness, it is not even the same as disharmony of the four elements, so how could it be the same as rebellious illnesses, meditation illnesses, and the like? "The distinction of karma by the ten good deeds": in the ten, the three types of karma correspond to distinct items; they are not even the ten unwholesome actions, so how could they be the same as the taintless, the immovable, and so on? "The distinction of demons by the five bonds": the warnings of the four reliances and the restraint by the power of the Śūraṅgama are not the same as the demon of the aggregates, the demon of the aggregate of karmic formations, and so forth. Therefore, in the "Chapter on the Four Reliances" of the Great Sutra, the Bodhisattva of the Four Reliances expelled Māra, saying: "If the heavenly demon Pāpīyas comes again, I shall bind you with the five bonds." Zhang'an explained: "There are two kinds of bonds: first, binding with five corpses; second, binding in five places. As for binding with five corpses, it is like the contemplation of impurity curing the demon of craving; the five places accord with the principle to cure the demon of views." Therefore, in the Śūraṅgama [Sutra], "Śāriputra asked the Buddha: 'When this samādhi is spoken, is it not troubled by the various demons?' The Buddha said: 'Do you wish to see the afflictions and decline of the demons?' 'Indeed, I wish to see it.' The Buddha emitted light from between his brows, and they saw all the demons bound by the five bonds. Śāriputra said: 'Who did this?' The Buddha said: 'This is the power of the Śūraṅgama samādhi. Wherever this samādhi is spoken, if demons wish to cause obstruction, they will naturally see themselves under the five bonds. So it will also be wherever the samādhi is spoken after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa.'" "The distinction of meditation by the six wondrous gates": the six gates of counting and so forth differ in sequence; how could they be the same as mental factors, superior absorptions, and the like? "The distinction of views by the aids to the path": what is cured by the aids to the path are the views within the three realms, namely the grasp of precepts and rules, etc.; they are not the same as the sixteen views, distinct views, and so on. "The distinction of conceit by impermanence, suffering, and emptiness": both the Great and Small Vehicles have haughty conceit. In the Great Vehicle, if one has not yet attained the fruit of buddhahood and claims oneself to be ultimate, it is called haughty conceit. In the Small Vehicle, if one has not yet attained the four fruits and claims to have attained the four fruits, it is called haughty conceit. Now, in the Small Vehicle, claiming the contemplation of impermanence to be the ultimate principle—how could this be the same as taking worldly dhyāna to be the four fruits? Furthermore, it is not the same as the eight types of pride or the lower eight objects. "The distinction of the two vehicles by the four noble truths and dependent origination": these naturally belong to the two vehicles of the Tripiṭaka; how could they be the same as the two vehicles within the shared teaching, or the Buddha path of haughty conceit, and so forth? "The distinction of the bodhisattvas by the six perfections": subduing delusions for three asaṃkhyeya kalpas, how could they again be the same as those who have not yet aroused the aspiration for awakening, and so on? This categorical distinction is distinct because of two meanings: First, based on what cures them, these ten are distinctly established; just as the aggregates seem identical, they are differentiated across the three categories. The other nine cures can be understood by analogy with this. Second, these ten are distinctly different from one another, and are thus called distinct.