止觀輔行傳弘決 5.19

5.19

「問五陰」下，六番問答，為成不思議意。如前所明，必先觀陰，陰具色心，為即四陰以為能觀？為四陰外別有能觀？若色心外別有能觀，則所觀境攝法不盡？若秖四陰以為能觀，如何以陰而能觀陰？答中二意：先約不思議相即答：次約思議舉況答。初意云「不可思議」等者，無始色心本是理性妙境妙智，而隨妄轉不覺不知。今既聞名，知陰即是，即四陰心而能成觀。「亦可」下，約舉況答者，引小乘中有於善惡無記，乃至法性無等等陰。初心雖以惡及無記以為所觀，別立善陰以為能觀。觀之不已，惡無記陰轉成善陰，即成向來能觀善陰。當知初觀之時雖二而一，陰轉之時雖一而二，乃至轉為無等等陰亦復如是。何者？所觀雖轉，而復立能觀，故雖一而二。雖別立能觀，而所轉為能，故雖二而一。雖展轉互轉，終成陰外別立能觀。善惡等位在外凡，方便陰者位在內凡，無漏陰者極在羅漢，法性陰者在方便土。得法性陰，陰中無等，故以無等釋於法性。「豈非」下，結也。「小乘」下，況。小乘尚乃一中論二，況不思議境智相即？故不思議即陰是觀而境智宛然。次問者，既云惡無記陰轉為善陰，乃至轉為無等等陰，如是展轉轉所為能，為獨轉觀？果陰亦轉？答意者，向立問中以向小乘況答為問，今答直以初不思議相即意答，單約小乘不云報轉，故依《大品》、《法華》二文並是圓觀報陰轉義。報若不轉，何以父母所生諸根皆悉見聞三千大千？《大品》色淨，其意亦爾。故至六根清淨位時，亦得名為報陰轉也。次「問十境與五分」者，此問別生，非關向答。答中，先別、次同。言五分者，自以此五判所得禪有進退等諸相不同。今明十境，明所觀境十發不同。何得十境同於五分？「今當」下，彊會令同，則有通別二會。初以五分通判十境者，前四可知。「達」謂隨發，皆以自境體達於境（云云）。「若於」下，「別於境境自作五分」者，如判禪中亦有約禪約品通別兩判，故今亦然。若其約觀為五分者，藏通別圓四解起時，從初至後為進，前三隨一為住，得一須持為護，得已又失為退，得已自了為達。若約品者，三教皆有約品之義，今且從圓者。如圓解發，始自初品終至無生，進分也。齊二品來乃至六根，名住分也。始從初品乃至十信作意矜持，名護分也。纔得初品，得已即失，名退也。隨得一品，即能體達所得未深，即達分也。若約境者，煩惱起時，以貪望瞋名之為通。約諸惑者，貪中淺深名方為別。約諸品，進及住可知。防不欲除，名之為護。起已自滅，名之為退。自知是惑，名之為達。餘並如上判橫竪中，橫則是通、竪則是別，兩番對義，準上可知，不能委記。然約禪為正、九境旁通，是故不可例禪委悉，前之橫竪意亦如然。「然五分」下，更通伏難。難云：五分判禪與十境別，既得相會，亦可得與六即十地而相會耶？故為通云：五分十境俱是法相，義理雖別，彊為會通。六即十地二俱是位，故不可以五分判之。如云進至妙覺，不可更使退至六根，餘護住等準此說之。五品容有非文正意，又亦不可以六即判地。次問念性緣性等者，此取隨自意中文意為問，此問正顯不思議境。此中一問含於二意：先問緣念性離、次約此離以問十界。法性離能念，名為「念性離」。法性離所緣，名為「緣性離」。既離於能所，性亦非數量。唯觀一法性，性淨若虛空。云何性空中而具十法界？若具十法界，即是有緣念。若也有緣念，何得名為離？答中二意：先略申難意、次釋不思議。初文含二：先總標不思議、「無相」下正答二義。初云「無相而相」，先答十界無相而具十界之相。「觀智宛然」者，次答緣念雖無能所，觀智宛然。觀為能觀，十界為所。點空論界，界無界相，雖曰能所，緣念本無。「他解」下，次釋不思議義。他解但云須彌及芥相容入等，此事希奇；世間罕有，名不思議。言「須彌容芥」者，謂容入於芥。「芥容須彌」者，謂芥受須彌。「火出蓮華」者，《大經》云「火中生蓮華，是可謂希有。」「人能度海」者，《大經》十六云「若有人言我能度海，可思議不？佛言：『亦可思議，亦不可思議。若人能度則不可思議，若修羅度則可思議。』」如此釋者但是約事。若但約事，何能顯於不思議理？如《增一阿含》云「有四種不思議事，謂世界、眾生、龍、佛土。」《華嚴》亦云「自在天王有寶女名善音，於一語音出百千音樂，一一樂聲復出百千音聲。」此等但是人所不測，名不思議。又有解：須彌入芥等，是神力能爾。神力乃是本無今有，非常住法。有人云：大小無相故能相入。破曰：若小自是小、大自是大，此自性大小不得相入。若小是大小、大是小大，此是他性大小，何能相入？汝所立者，小無小相、大無大相，此是他性大小，亦不相入。若云小是大小之小、大是小大之大，名共性大小，亦無相入。若云小是非大小之小、大是非小大之大，此是無因大小，故無相入。若以理寄事，如《華嚴經》譬一塵中有大千經卷，一念如微塵，諸法如經卷。芥子須彌取譬亦爾，若失今意，理實難通。從「今解」去，即今家正解。秖約一念心性真如，契此理故有難思用。理性雖無能緣所緣，能所宛然。修此理故名曰能行，契此理故名為能到。到故有用，約證理釋，故云「理則勝事」。今文語略，應依《淨名疏》解〈不思議品〉，經云「菩薩有解脫名不可思議。若菩薩住是解脫者，以須彌之高廣內芥子中。」乃至一品皆如是說，以證解脫事用無窮，故云「乃至窮劫說不能盡」。疏中但以三軌銷此經文，理無不盡。諸佛菩薩有解脫，即真性軌，亦名真性解脫。若菩薩住是解脫者，即觀照軌，亦名實慧解脫。能以須彌之高廣等，即資成軌，亦名方便淨解脫。彼文具以前之三教三軌比決，方顯心性圓極三軌。今置三教直明心性，以真性軌與實慧合，名為能到。能從理起用，故云理則勝事。問：真性自與實慧和合，何關外境而云大小相入由於契理？答：然此直性遍於法界，迷謂內外、悟唯一心，是故四眼二智萬像森然，佛眼種智真空冥寂。今雖初觀，豈令順迷？制心從理，無非心性。次問者，為是一一因心具十界因？為復一一界果具十界果？答中初總答云「俱相有」者，法爾而然。一念因心道理具十，一界之果豈當一界？然言一果具於十果，果既隔越，遍顯似難。若知隨起十中一心，一必通十，是則一果具十因、一因具十因，故曰因通理則易知。文中先明因通、次明果隔。初因通者，但舉初後，中間比知。初「慈童女」者，如心，論云「慈童女長者欲隨伴入海采寶，從母求去。母云：『吾唯有汝，何棄吾去？』母恐其去，便抱其足。童女便以手捉母髮，一莖髮落，母乃放去。至海洲上，見熱鐵輪從空中下臨其頂上，便發誓言：『願法界苦皆集我身。』以誓願力，火輪遂落。從茲捨命生第六天，違母損髮成地獄心，發弘誓願即屬佛界。」引「未得記輕得記」者，雖未得記，已屬佛心。輕得記者，成地獄界。故《大品．觀空不證品》云「我證跋致，餘人永無，而輕弄餘人。以是事故，遠離菩提遠善知識。若即身悔，久久還依般若波羅蜜。若不即悔，當知是罪重於四禁、過於五逆，當知是菩薩旃陀羅。」「更引」下，略明果隔，示難顯相。從事理說，即十界果各具十果，故云「凡聖皆具五陰」。陰即是果。凡謂六凡、聖謂四聖，雖復各具，不可聖陰如凡陰也。言「不可」者，意說凡陰不同聖陰。又「佛具」下，舉一佛果具於十界。然不可以聖陰同凡，自是佛果能具十界。終不可以佛地獄界，以為凡夫地獄界也。佛果已滿，從事而說已具十界，初地初住分具十界，乃至凡夫但是理具，是則一一界果各各具十不相混濫。一往從易，且云因通及以界隔。理而言之，一念因心實具十界百界因果。何者？如云起一界心即具十界十如，十如秖是因果法耳。相至因緣以屬於因，果報屬果，當知一念恒具百界依正因果。故《佛藏》云「佛見一切眾生心中，皆有如來結跏趺坐。」尚具佛果，餘果亦然。是故下地雖具因果，但是理性，所以致有果隔之言。次問者，一念具十，為復任運恒具十界？為待遇緣作意現起名具十耶？若準前答因通易知，已明一心具十界竟。然觀前答狀似作念，是故更置此問。釋疑答中云「法性自爾」者，凡聖法悉皆自爾，自爾秖是自然異名。問：既云自爾，何殊外計？答：前第三卷已略分別。如《法華玄》云「外道已為初教所破，尚不同於通別二教，況以圓極比外自然？」若破性中云非自然者，為破計故理必自然。如第一卷釋四弘中「法性自天而然」等。小乘尚然，況復實理。問：一心既具，但觀於心何須觀具？答：一家觀門永異諸說。該攝一切十方三世若凡若聖一切因果者，良由觀具。具即是假，假即空中。理性雖具，若不觀之，但言觀心則不稱理。小乘奚嘗不觀心耶？但迷一心具諸法耳。問：若不觀具，為屬何教？答：別教教道從初心來，但云次第生於十界，斷亦次第，故不觀具。或稟通教即空但理，或稟三藏寂滅真空，如此等人何須觀具？何者？藏通但云心生六界，觀有巧拙即離不同，是故此兩不須觀具。尚不識具，況識空中？若不爾者，何名發心畢竟不別？成正覺已，何能現於十界身土？又復學者縱知內心具三千法，不知我心遍彼三千，彼彼三千互遍亦爾。苟順凡情生內外見，應照理體本無四性，心佛眾生三無差別。能知此者依俙識心。又此十乘得名皆同並有能所相對故也。

From "Question: The five aggregates..." onwards, there are six rounds of questions and answers to establish the meaning of the inconceivable. As explained previously, one must first contemplate the aggregates. The aggregates comprise form and mind. Does one directly use the four [mental] aggregates as the contemplating [agent]? Or is there another contemplating [agent] apart from the four aggregates? If there were another contemplating [agent] apart from form and mind, then the contemplated object would not exhaust all phenomena. If it is only the four aggregates that serve as the contemplating [agent], how can the aggregates contemplate the aggregates? In the answer, there are two points: first, answering in terms of the inconceivable mutual identity; next, answering by citing an analogy in terms of the conceivable. The first point, stating "inconceivable..." and so forth, means that beginningless form and mind are fundamentally the wondrous object and wondrous wisdom of the rational nature, yet they revolve along with delusion, imperceptible and unknown. Now, having heard this teaching, one knows that the aggregates are precisely it; directly through the mind of the four aggregates, one can accomplish contemplation. From "It may also be said..." onwards, answering by citing an analogy refers to citing the Hīnayāna, which possesses wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate aggregates, up to the peerless aggregate of dharma-nature. Although the beginner takes the unwholesome and indeterminate aggregates as the contemplated object, they separately establish the wholesome aggregates as the contemplating [agent]. Contemplating them unceasingly, the unwholesome and indeterminate aggregates transform into wholesome aggregates, which then become the previously contemplating wholesome aggregates. One should know that at the time of initial contemplation, although two, they are one; when the aggregates transform, although one, they are two; and transforming up to the peerless aggregate is also like this. Why is this? Although the contemplated transforms, one again establishes a contemplating [agent]; therefore, although one, they are two. Although one separately establishes a contemplating [agent], what was transformed becomes the agent; therefore, although two, they are one. Although they transform back and forth reciprocally, it ultimately amounts to separately establishing a contemplating [agent] outside the aggregates. The stages of wholesome, unwholesome, and so forth belong to the external ordinary stage; the expedient aggregates belong to the internal ordinary stage; the outflow-free aggregates culminate in the arhat; and the dharma-nature aggregates abide in the land of expedients. Having attained the dharma-nature aggregate, there is no equal among the aggregates; hence "peerless" is used to explain the dharma-nature. From "Is this not..." onwards, it concludes. From "The Hīnayāna..." onwards, it presents the analogy. If even the Hīnayāna discusses two within one, how much more so for the mutual identity of the inconceivable object and wisdom? Therefore, in the inconceivable, the aggregate is itself contemplation, yet object and wisdom remain clearly distinct. Next, the question: Since it was said that unwholesome and indeterminate aggregates transform into wholesome aggregates, and even transform into the peerless aggregate, and thus progressively transform the contemplated into the contemplating, is it only the contemplation that transforms, or does the retributive aggregate also transform? The sense of the answer is: the question earlier was framed based on the Hīnayāna analogy in the answer; the present answer directly replies with the initial meaning of inconceivable mutual identity. Speaking solely of the Hīnayāna, it does not speak of the transformation of retribution. Therefore, relying on the two texts of the Dapin and the Lotus, both present the meaning of the transformation of the retributive aggregates in the perfect contemplation. If retribution does not transform, how could all the sense faculties born of father and mother see and hear the three-thousandfold great-thousandfold [world]? The Dapin's [statement on] the purity of form has the same import. Thus, when reaching the stage of the purity of the six sense faculties, it can also be named the transformation of the retributive aggregates. Next, "Question: The ten objects and the five divisions...": this question arises separately and is unrelated to the preceding answer. In the answer, first differences, then similarities are discussed. Regarding the five divisions, these five are used to classify the varying marks of progress, regression, and so forth in attained dhyāna. Now, in explaining the ten objects, it explains the different manifestations of the ten contemplated objects. How could the ten objects be identical to the five divisions? From "Now we shall..." onwards, it harmonizes them by force to make them identical, which comprises two harmonizations: general and specific. First, using the five divisions to classify generally the ten objects, the first four can be known. "Penetration" means that according to what manifests, one penetrates the object with the essence of its own object, and so forth. From "If with regard to..." onwards, "specifically creating the five divisions within each object": as in classifying dhyāna, there are two classifications, general and specific, in terms of dhyāna and in terms of grades, so it is here. If one takes contemplation as the five divisions: when the four understandings—Tripiṭaka, shared, distinctive, and perfect—arise, moving from the initial to the subsequent is "progress"; abiding in any one of the first three is "abiding"; having attained one and having to maintain it is "protecting"; having attained it and losing it again is "regression"; having attained it and understanding it by oneself is "penetration". If in terms of grades: all three teachings have the meaning of grades, but now we follow the perfect teaching. For example, when the perfect understanding manifests, beginning from the initial grade up to non-arising is the division of progress. Coming up to the second grade and up to the six sense faculties is named the division of abiding. Beginning from the initial grade up to the ten stages of faith, intentionally exercising vigilance and holding fast is named the division of protecting. Just having attained the initial grade, and losing it immediately after attaining it, is named regression. Upon attaining any single grade, being able to comprehend that what has been attained is not yet deep is the division of penetration. If in terms of objects: when afflictions arise, regarding greed in comparison to anger is named general. In terms of the various delusions, shallow and deep within greed are first called specific. In terms of the various grades, progress and abiding can be known. Guarding them and not wishing to eliminate them is named protecting. Having arisen, they extinguish on their own, which is named regression. Naturally knowing that this is delusion is named penetration. The rest are all like the classification of the horizontal and vertical above: horizontal is general, and vertical is specific. The two sets of corresponding meanings can be understood according to the above, and cannot be recorded in full detail. However, taking dhyāna is primary, and the nine objects are secondary; therefore, one cannot compare them thoroughly with dhyāna; the import of the earlier horizontal and vertical is also like this. From "However, the five divisions..." onwards, it further resolves a hidden objection. The objection says: The five divisions classify dhyāna and are different from the ten objects; since they can be harmonized, can they also be harmonized with the six stages of identity and the ten grounds? Therefore, resolving it, it says: The five divisions and the ten objects are both phenomenal characteristics (dharmalakṣaṇa); though their principles are different, they are harmonized by force. The six stages of identity and the ten grounds are both stages; therefore, one cannot classify them by the five divisions. Just as saying "progressing to wondrous awakening" means one cannot cause it to regress to the six sense faculties; the remaining [divisions of] protecting, abiding, and so forth are explained accordingly. That the five grades may possess them is not the primary intent of the text; nor can one classify the grounds by the six stages of identity. Next, the question on "the nature of mindfulness, the nature of conditions," and so forth: this takes the textual meaning from "Following One's Own Will" as the question; this question directly reveals the inconceivable object. Here, one question contains two meanings: first, asking about the separation of the nature of conditions and mindfulness; next, asking about the ten realms based on this separation. The dharma-nature being separated from the contemplating mindfulness is called "separation of the nature of mindfulness." The dharma-nature being separated from the contemplated condition is called "separation of the nature of conditions." Since it is separated from the agent and object, its nature is also without quantity. One contemplates only the single dharma-nature, whose nature is pure like empty space. How can the ten dharma-realms be possessed within the empty nature? If it possesses the ten dharma-realms, then there are conditions and mindfulness. If there are conditions and mindfulness, how can it be called separated? In the answer, there are two points: first, briefly stating the intent of the difficulty; next, explaining the inconceivable. The first text contains two parts: first, generally stating the inconceivable; from "Formless yet form..." onwards, directly answering the two meanings. First, saying "Formless yet form" first answers that the ten realms are formless yet possess the forms of the ten realms. "Contemplative wisdom is clearly distinct" next answers that although conditions and mindfulness lack agent and object, contemplative wisdom is clearly distinct. Contemplation is the contemplating [agent]; the ten realms are the object. Pointing to emptiness to discuss realms, the realms lack the characteristics of realms; although called agent and object, conditions and mindfulness are fundamentally non-existent. From "Other interpretations..." onwards, next it explains the meaning of inconceivable. Other interpretations merely say that Sumeru and a mustard seed contain and enter each other, which is extraordinary; being rare in the world, it is called inconceivable. "Sumeru containing a mustard seed" means it enters into the mustard seed. "A mustard seed containing Sumeru" means the mustard seed receives Sumeru. "A lotus emerging from fire": the Great Sūtra says, "A lotus growing in fire may truly be called rare." "A person able to cross the ocean": the sixteenth fascicle of the Great Sūtra says, "If someone says 'I can cross the ocean,' is it conceivable or not? The Buddha said: 'It is both conceivable and inconceivable. If a human can cross, it is inconceivable; if an asura crosses, it is conceivable.'" Such interpretations merely rely on concrete phenomena. If merely relying on concrete phenomena, how can they reveal the inconceivable principle? As the Ekottara-āgama says, "There are four kinds of inconceivable matters: the world, sentient beings, dragons, and Buddha-lands." The Avataṃsaka also says, "The king of the Paranirmitavaśavartin Heaven has a precious maiden named Shan-yin (Sughoṣā), who produces hundreds of thousands of musical tones from a single vocal sound, each musical sound further producing hundreds of thousands of voices." These are merely what people cannot fathom, and are called inconceivable. Another interpretation says: Sumeru entering a mustard seed and the like is made possible by supernormal power. Supernormal power is fundamentally non-existent and now present; it is not an eternally abiding dharma. Someone says: Large and small are formless, hence they can enter each other. Refuting this, it says: If the small is of itself small and the large is of itself large, these [forms of] large and small of inherent nature cannot enter each other. If the small is the small of the large, and the large is the large of the small, these are large and small of other-nature; how could they enter each other? What you propose—that the small lacks the characteristic of small and the large lacks the characteristic of large—is large and small of other-nature, and also cannot enter each other. If one says that the small is the small of large-and-small, and the large is the large of small-and-large, these are called large and small of common nature, and also do not enter each other. If one says that the small is the small of neither-large-nor-small, and the large is the large of neither-small-nor-large, these are large and small without a cause, and therefore do not enter each other. If one anchors concrete phenomena in principle, as the Avataṃsaka Sūtra's metaphor of a great-thousandfold sutra scroll inside a single particle of dust: a single thought-moment is like the particle of dust, and all phenomena are like the sutra scroll. The metaphor of the mustard seed and Mount Sumeru is also like this; if one loses the present meaning, the principle is truly difficult to penetrate. From "The present interpretation..." onwards is the correct interpretation of our school. It relies solely on the true suchness of the mind-nature in a single thought-moment; because it accords with this principle, it has inconceivable functions. Although the rational nature has neither contemplating condition nor contemplated condition, agent and object are clearly distinct. Cultivating this principle is called 'being able to practice'; according with this principle is called 'being able to arrive.' Because one arrives, there is function; explained in terms of witnessing the principle, it is therefore said, 'principle surpasses concrete phenomena.' The present text is brief; one should rely on the Vimalakīrti Commentary's explanation of the 'Inconceivable Chapter,' where the sutra says: 'The bodhisattva has a liberation named inconceivable. If a bodhisattva abides in this liberation, they can place the height and breadth of Mount Sumeru into a mustard seed.' Up to the end of the chapter, all speaks like this, showing that the phenomena and functions of the witnessed liberation are inexhaustible; hence it says, 'even exhausting kalpas, it cannot be fully explained.' In the Commentary, it merely uses the three tracks to elucidate this sutra text, and the principle is completely exhausted. The liberation possessed by buddhas and bodhisattvas is the track of the true nature, also named the liberation of the true nature. If a bodhisattva abides in this liberation, it is the track of contemplative illumination, also named the liberation of real wisdom. Being able to place the height and breadth of Mount Sumeru and so forth is the track of supporting accomplishment, also named the pure liberation of expedients. That text fully compares and evaluates them with the three tracks of the previous three teachings to reveal the ultimate three tracks of the mind-nature. Now, setting aside the three teachings, it directly clarifies the mind-nature: combining the track of the true nature with real wisdom is named 'being able to arrive.' Being able to arouse function from principle, it is therefore said that principle surpasses concrete phenomena. Question: The true nature naturally unifies with real wisdom; what does it have to do with external objects, such that one says the mutual penetration of large and small is due to according with principle? Answer: However, this true nature pervades the dharma-dhātu; in delusion it is called internal and external, but in awakening it is only the one mind. Therefore, with the four eyes and two wisdoms, the myriad phenomena are dense and manifold; with the Buddha eye and the wisdom of all modes, the true emptiness is dark and tranquil. Now, although this is initial contemplation, how could we allow it to follow delusion? Subduing the mind to accord with principle, there is nothing that is not the mind-nature. Next, the question: Does each single causal mind possess the causes of the ten realms? Or does each single fruit of a realm possess the fruits of the ten realms? In the answer, first generally answering that 'both possess each other' means it is naturally so. The causal mind in a single thought-moment possesses the ten in principle; how could the fruit of a single realm correspond only to a single realm? However, saying that a single fruit possesses ten fruits—since the fruits are separated and distinct, showing this universally seems difficult. If one knows that upon arousing any single mind among the ten, that one necessarily penetrates the ten, then a single fruit possesses ten causes, and a single cause possesses ten causes; hence it is said that causes penetrating is easy to know in principle. In the text, it first clarifies that causes penetrate, and next clarifies that fruits are separated. First, regarding causes penetrating, it merely cites the beginning and the end, from which the intermediate can be known by inference. First, 'Maitrakanyaka' (Cí-tóngnǚ), like the mind: the treatise says, 'The merchant's son Maitrakanyaka wished to accompany his companions into the sea to gather jewels, and asked to leave from his mother. The mother said: "I have only you; why abandon me and go?" Fearing he would go, the mother held his feet. Maitrakanyaka then seized his mother's hair with his hand, and a single strand of hair was pulled out; the mother then let him go. Reaching an island in the ocean, he saw a glowing iron wheel descend from the sky above his head. He then made a vow: "May all the sufferings of the dharma-dhātu gather upon my body!" Through the power of his vow, the fiery wheel immediately fell away. Abandoning his life here, he was born in the sixth heaven. Disobeying his mother and damaging her hair constituted the mind of hell; generating the great vow belonged directly to the Buddha realm.' Citing 'despising those who have received prediction while oneself has not received it': although one has not received prediction, it already belongs to the Buddha mind. Despising those who have received prediction constitutes the hell realm. Thus the 'Contemplating Emptiness Without Realization' chapter of the Dapin says: '"I have realized non-retrogression (avaivartika); others never will," and thus despises and mocks others. Due to this matter, one is far removed from bodhi and far removed from good spiritual friends. If one repents in this very body, after a long time one will return to rely on the prajñāpāramitā. If one does not repent immediately, one should know that this offense is heavier than the four prohibitions and exceeds the five heinous sins; one should know that this is a caṇḍāla among bodhisattvas.' From 'Further citing...' onwards, it briefly clarifies that fruits are separated, showing the difficulty and revealing the marks. Speaking from phenomena and principle, the fruits of the ten realms each possess ten fruits; hence it says 'both ordinary beings and sages possess the five aggregates.' The aggregates are precisely the fruit. 'Ordinary beings' refers to the six ordinary realms; 'sages' refers to the four sage realms. Although each possesses them, the aggregates of a sage cannot be like the aggregates of an ordinary being. Saying 'cannot' means that the aggregates of an ordinary being are not identical to the aggregates of a sage. Also, from 'The Buddha possesses...' onwards, it adduces the single Buddha fruit possessing the ten realms. However, one cannot make the sage aggregates identical to the ordinary; it is simply that the Buddha fruit can possess the ten realms. One can never take the Buddha's hell realm to be the hell realm of an ordinary being. The Buddha fruit is already fully complete; speaking from phenomena, it already possesses the ten realms. The initial ground and initial dwelling possess the ten realms partially, up to ordinary beings who merely possess them in principle; thus the fruits of each and every realm each possess ten without being confounded. For the moment, following what is easier, it merely speaks of causes penetrating and realms being separated. Speaking from principle, the causal mind in a single thought-moment truly possesses the causes and fruits of the ten realms and the hundred realms. Why? As it is said, arousing the mind of a single realm possesses the ten realms and the ten suchnesses; the ten suchnesses are simply the phenomena of cause and fruit. From mark up to cause and condition belongs to cause; fruit and retribution belong to fruit. One should know that a single thought-moment constantly possesses the causes and fruits, primary and secondary retributions, of the hundred realms. Therefore the Fo zang [jing] says: 'The Buddha sees that within the minds of all sentient beings, there is a Tathāgata sitting cross-legged.' If it even possesses the Buddha fruit, the remaining fruits are also like this. Therefore, although the lower stages possess cause and fruit, it is merely the rational nature; this is why there is the statement that fruits are separated. Next, the question: Does a single thought-moment possess ten naturally and constantly possessing the ten realms? Or does it depend on encountering conditions and intentionally manifesting them to be called possessing ten? If according to the previous answer that causes penetrating is easy to know, it has already explained that a single mind possesses the ten realms. However, looking at the previous answer, it appears like arousing a thought; therefore, this question is posed again to resolve doubt. In the answer, saying 'the dharma-nature is naturally so' means that the phenomena of ordinary beings and sages are all naturally so; 'naturally so' is just another name for spontaneity (ziran). Question: Since you say 'naturally so,' how does it differ from non-Buddhist views? Answer: It was already briefly distinguished in the third fascicle. As the Fahua xuan[yi] says: 'Non-Buddhists have already been refuted by the initial teaching, and are not even equivalent to the shared and distinctive teachings, how much less could the ultimate perfect teaching be compared to non-Buddhist spontaneity?' If within refuting inherent nature it is said not to be spontaneous, that was to refute clinging; in principle it must be naturally so. As in the first fascicle explaining the four great vows: 'the dharma-nature is naturally so from heaven,' and so forth. Even the Hīnayāna is like this, how much more so the real principle. Question: Since a single mind possesses them, why must one contemplate possession rather than merely contemplating the mind? Answer: The contemplative approach of our school is forever distinct from other explanations. That it encompasses all causes and fruits of ordinary beings and sages across the ten directions and the three times is entirely due to contemplating possession. Possession is provisionality; provisionality is emptiness and the middle. Although the rational nature possesses them, if one does not contemplate them and merely speaks of contemplating the mind, it does not accord with principle. Did the Hīnayāna ever fail to contemplate the mind? They were merely deluded about a single mind possessing all phenomena. Question: If one does not contemplate possession, to which teaching does it belong? Answer: The teaching path of the distinctive teaching, from the initial mind onwards, only speaks of sequentially generating the ten realms and severing them sequentially; therefore, it does not contemplate possession. Or those who follow the shared teaching of identity-with-emptiness and mere principle, or those who follow the Tripiṭaka's quiescent true emptiness—why would such people need to contemplate possession? Why? The Tripiṭaka and shared teachings only say that the mind generates the six realms; their contemplations have differences of skillfulness and clumsiness, identity and separation; therefore, these two do not need to contemplate possession. They do not even know possession, how much less would they know emptiness and the middle? Were it not so, how could the initial arousing of the aspiration and the ultimate realization not be different? Having achieved correct awakening, how could one manifest the bodies and lands of the ten realms? Furthermore, even if scholars know that the internal mind possesses the three thousand phenomena, they do not know that my mind pervades those three thousand, and that each and every one of those three thousand mutually pervades likewise. If one complies with ordinary sentiments to give rise to internal and external views, one should illuminate the ontological essence as fundamentally devoid of the four natures, and that mind, Buddha, and sentient beings—these three are without distinction. One who can know this dimly recognizes the mind. Furthermore, these ten vehicles receive their names identically because they all have the mutual opposition of agent and object.