止觀輔行傳弘決 5.26

5.26

「不思議」下，正明不思議境。文異義一，意非一異，以三諦法不出修性自他故也。於中初引《華嚴》者，重牒初引示境相文。前云心造即是心具，故引造文以證心具。彼經第十八中，如來林菩薩說偈云「心如工畫師，造種種五陰。一切世界中，無法而不造。如心佛亦爾，如佛眾生然，心佛及眾生，是三無差別。若人欲求知，三世一切佛，應當如是觀，心造諸如來。」不解今文，如何銷偈心造一切、三無差別？言心造者，不出二意：一者約理，造即是具；二者約事，不出三世。三世又三：一者過造於現，過現造當。如無始來及以現在，乃至造於盡未來際一切諸業，不出十界百界千如三千世間。二者現造於現，即是現在同業所感，逐境心變名之為造。以心有故一切皆有，以心空故一切皆空。如世一官，所見不同，是畏是愛、是親是冤。三者聖人變化所造，亦令眾生變心所見，並由理具方有事用。今欲修觀但觀理具，俱破俱立俱是法界，任運攝得權實所現。如向引經，雖復種種不出十界三世間等。「法界者」下，釋法界名。問：法界法性名義何別？答：名異義異而體是一。言法界者，法即諸法、界謂界分，相不同故。一切諸法皆以三諦而為界分，為明三諦故須加十以顯相狀，故釋三字離合不同，備成三諦。言法性者，亦是諸法具三諦性，性亦性分不可改故，三諦性冥始終無變。亦可界法性法即是實相，實相之體三諦具足。故今文中釋此三字。初約真諦作所依釋，十數是假、所依是空，能從於所十法皆空，是故此十以空法為界，故云十法界。從「又此」下，次約俗諦作隔異釋。十法差別名之為界，是故十法各有界分，故云十法界。從「又此」下，次約中道作法界釋。十法無非真如法界，故名十法界。若讀此中十法界三字，隨義為句。初番十字獨呼，法界字合呼；次番十法字合呼，界字獨呼；後番十法界三字合呼。依此讀文，隨語思之，三諦義顯。三諦無形俱不可見，然即假法可寄事辨，即此假法即空即中，空中二體二無二也。心性不動假立中名，亡泯三千假立空稱，雖亡而存假立假號。「十法界」下，次釋境中所攝法相。先明三種世間、次明一一世間皆具十如。三世間者，秖是十界五陰實法，假名眾生及所依土。於中先釋五陰世間。初列十種五陰；「釋論」下，次引一論二經，釋佛法界具五陰義。初引《大論》。意云：涅槃是無上五陰。次引《無量義經》釋成《大論》。云何得知涅槃猶名無上五陰？經言無者不可都無，驗知但無九界陰耳。次引《大經》釋《無量義》。云何得知涅槃名陰？《大經》既云「色常受想等常」，當知涅槃但無無常九界陰耳。如《俱舍》中蘊與取蘊俱名為蘊；今亦如是，常與無常俱名為陰。「攬五陰」下，次釋眾生世間，如攬五指。假名為拳。「大論下」次，引一論證成佛界亦名眾生。「大經」下，證成差別是世間義。三十四云「內色外色各十時異。內色異者，一歌羅邏時異、二阿浮陀時異、三閉手時異、四皰時異、五初生時異、六嬰孩時異、七童子時異、八年少時異、九盛壯時異、十老死時異。外色亦爾，牙、莖、枝、葉、華、果時異。」故用此異以釋世間。「十種所居」下，次釋國土世間。初列四土為十界陰眾生所居；「仁王」下，次引經證佛有所居亦名為土。前之九界名陰名生，有所居土，理在不疑。恐不信佛，名陰名生猶有居土，故但引證佛界三義。「此三十種」下，總結從心。問：於不思議中但明四聖，何法不攝，何必須明六道法邪？答：為實施權，從實開出，今欲示實，何得不論？總約一化有五意說：一者為示人天路故、二者為令厭輪迴故、三者為知菩薩自誓悲他境相故、四者為知不可思議境所攝法故、五者為欲令知性惡法門遍故。今文正在第四第五，兼用第二第三。問：依何教門立三世間？答：依《大論》釋百八三昧中至釋能照一切世間三昧，云「得是三昧故，能照三種世間，謂眾生世間、住處世間、五陰世間。」至釋一切住處三昧，云「得是三昧者，樂住世間、不樂住非世間，以世間有無常過故。」世間有三種，亦如前列。非世間者，無一切法，大可畏處。且指有漏名為世間。二乘所依名非世間，故云可畏。《大經》十六〈梵行品〉釋十號中至釋世間解中云「有六種世間：一者世間名五陰（五陰世間）；又世間者，十方阿僧祇世界（國土世間）；又世間者，一切凡夫（六界眾生）；又世間者，名蓮花（二乘）；又世間者，謂諸菩薩（亦攝二乘）；又世間者，名為五欲（更立因法世間）。」故知六種雖加因法，亦不出三，以十如中含因法故。今依義開，十界各三。

From "Inconceivable" below, it correctly explains the inconceivable object. The text differs but the meaning is one; the intention is neither one nor different, because the dharmas of the three truths do not go beyond cultivation and nature, self and other. Therein, first citing the Avataṃsaka-sūtra reiterates the earlier citation of the text showing the marks of the object. Previously it was said that the mind's creating is precisely the mind's possessing; therefore the text on creating is cited to verify the mind's possessing. In the eighteenth fascicle of that sūtra, Bodhisattva Tathāgatavana spoke a verse saying: / "The mind is like a skilled painter, / creating the various five aggregates. / In all worlds, / there is no dharma it does not create. / As is the mind, so is the Buddha; / as is the Buddha, so are sentient beings. / Mind, Buddha, and sentient beings— / these three are without distinction. / If someone wishes to know / all Buddhas of the three periods of time, / they should contemplate in this way: / the mind creates all Tathāgatas." / If one does not understand the present text, how could one resolve the verse's "the mind creates everything" and "the three are without distinction"? That the mind creates does not go beyond two meanings: first, in terms of principle, creating is precisely possessing; second, in terms of phenomena, it does not go beyond the three periods of time. The three periods of time also have three [meanings]: first, the past creates the present, and the past and present create the future. Just as from beginninglessness up to the present, and even creating all karmas to the exhaustion of the future boundary, they do not go beyond the ten realms, the hundred realms, the thousand thusnesses, and the three thousand worlds. Second, the present creates the present, which is the retribution induced by common karma in the present; the mind transforming in pursuit of objects is called "creating". Because the mind exists, all exist; because the mind is empty, all are empty. Just as with a single government official in the world, what is seen differs: [he is seen with] fear or love, as a relative or as an enemy. Third, what is created by the transformations of holy persons also causes sentient beings' minds to transform what they see; both are entirely due to intrinsic possession in principle that there is phenomenal function. Now, wishing to cultivate contemplation, one merely contemplates intrinsic possession in principle: both refuted and both established, all are the dharma-dhātu, naturally subsuming what is manifested by the provisional and real. As in the sūtra cited above, though diverse, they do not go beyond the ten realms, the three worlds, and so forth. From "As for dharma-dhātu" below, it explains the name "dharma-dhātu". Question: What is the difference in name and meaning between dharma-dhātu and dharma-nature? Answer: The names are different and the meanings are different, but their essence is one. As for dharma-dhātu: "dharma" means the various dharmas; "dhātu" means boundaries and divisions, because their marks are not the same. All dharmas take the three truths as their boundaries and divisions; in order to clarify the three truths, it is necessary to add "ten" to reveal their marks, so the explanation of these three characters differs in separation and combination, fully constituting the three truths. As for dharma-nature: it also means that all dharmas possess the nature of the three truths; "nature" also means nature and division, which cannot be altered, so the nature of the three truths is obscurely fused and without change from beginning to end. It may also be said that the dharmas of dhātu and the dharmas of nature are precisely the true mark; the essence of the true mark is completely endowed with the three truths. Therefore, in the present text it explains these three characters. First, in terms of the true truth, it explains it as that upon which [dharmas] rely: the number ten is provisional, and that upon which it relies is empty; since the relying follows that upon which it relies, the ten dharmas are all empty. Therefore, these ten take the dharma of emptiness as their boundary; hence it is called "ten-dharma dhātu". From "Moreover, this" below, next in terms of the conventional truth, it explains it as differentiation: the distinctions among the ten dharmas are called "dhātu"; therefore, each of the ten dharmas has its boundary and division; hence it is called "ten-dharmas-dhātu". From "Moreover, this" below, next in terms of the middle way, it explains it as the dharma-dhātu: the ten dharmas are none other than the true thusness dharma-dhātu; hence it is called the "ten-dharma-dhātu". When reading these three characters "ten-dharma-dhātu" here, one phrases them according to the meaning. In the first round, the character "ten" is read alone, and the characters "dharma-dhātu" are read together. In the second round, the characters "ten-dharma" are read together, and the character "dhātu" is read alone. In the last round, the three characters "ten-dharma-dhātu" are read together. If one reads the text according to this, reflecting on it according to the phrasing, the meaning of the three truths becomes manifest. The three truths have no physical form and are entirely invisible; however, based on provisional dharmas, they can be determined by relying on phenomenal matters: these very provisional dharmas are precisely empty and precisely the middle; the two essences of emptiness and the middle are two yet not two. The mind-nature being unmoving is provisionally given the name "middle"; the obliteration of the three thousand is provisionally given the designation "empty"; while obliterated yet enduring, it is provisionally given the appellation "provisional". From "Ten dharma-dhātus" below, it next explains the marks of dharmas subsumed within the object. It first explains the three kinds of worlds, and next explains that each and every world is endowed with the ten thusnesses. As for the three worlds, they are simply the real dharmas of the five aggregates of the ten realms, the provisionally named sentient beings, and the lands they rely upon. Therein, it first explains the world of the five aggregates. It first lists the ten kinds of five aggregates; from "The commentary on the treatise" below, it next cites one treatise and two sūtras to explain the meaning of the Buddha dharma-dhātu being endowed with the five aggregates. First, it cites the Dazhidulun; its intended meaning is: nirvāṇa is the unsurpassed five aggregates. Next, it cites the Anantanirdeśa-sūtra to explain and corroborate the Dazhidulun. How is it known that nirvāṇa is still named the unsurpassed five aggregates? When the sūtra speaks of "non-existence", it cannot be that they are completely non-existent; through verification one knows it merely lacks the aggregates of the nine realms. Next, it cites the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra to explain the Anantanirdeśa-sūtra. How is it known that nirvāṇa is named aggregates? Since the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says "form is permanent, and sensation and conception and so forth are permanent", one should know that nirvāṇa merely lacks the impermanent aggregates of the nine realms. Just as in the Abhidharmakośa, aggregates and aggregates of clinging are both named "aggregates"; here it is also like this: the permanent and the impermanent are both named "aggregates". From "Gathering the five aggregates" below, it next explains the world of sentient beings, just as gathering five fingers is provisionally named a fist. From "The Dazhidulun below" next, it cites one treatise to verify that the Buddha-realm is also named a sentient being. From "The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra" below, it verifies that differentiation is the meaning of "world". Fascicle 34 says: "Internal form and external form each have ten differences in stages. As for differences in internal form: first, the difference in the stage of the kalala; second, the difference in the stage of the abbuda; third, the difference in the stage of the pesi; fourth, the difference in the stage of the ghana; fifth, the difference in the stage of initial birth; sixth, the difference in the stage of infancy; seventh, the difference in the stage of childhood; eighth, the difference in the stage of youth; ninth, the difference in the stage of prime adulthood; tenth, the difference in the stage of old age and death. External form is also like this: the differences in the stages of sprout, stalk, branch, leaf, flower, and fruit." Therefore, it uses this differentiation to explain "world". From "Ten kinds of dwellings" below, it next explains the world of lands. It first lists the four lands as the dwellings of the aggregates and sentient beings of the ten realms; from "Humane Kings" below, it next cites a sūtra to verify that the Buddha has a dwelling, which is also named a land. That the preceding nine realms are called aggregates and called sentient beings and have lands where they dwell is beyond doubt in principle. Fearing that people would not believe that the Buddha is named aggregates and named sentient beings and still has a land where he dwells, it therefore only cites proofs for the three meanings in the Buddha-realm. From "These thirty kinds" below, it concludes by summarizing their origin in the mind. Question: In the inconceivable, if one merely explains the four noble ones, what dharma would not be subsumed—why is it necessary to explain the dharmas of the six destinies? Answer: Establishing the provisional for the sake of the real means opening out from the real; now wishing to show the real, how could one not discuss them? Summarizing a single teaching-period, there are five intentions in stating them: first, to show the path of humans and devas; second, to cause aversion to saṃsāra; third, to make known the objective marks of the bodhisattva's own vows and compassion for others; fourth, to make known the dharmas subsumed by the inconceivable object; fifth, to make known the universality of the dharma-gate of evil inherent in nature. The present text is primarily concerned with the fourth and fifth, while also employing the second and third. Question: Relying on which doctrinal gate are the three worlds established? Answer: Relying on the Dazhidulun's explanation of the hundred and eight samādhis, where in explaining the samādhi that illuminates all worlds, it says: "Because of attaining this samādhi, one can illuminate the three kinds of worlds, namely the world of sentient beings, the world of dwellings, and the world of the five aggregates." Reaching the explanation of the samādhi of all dwellings, it says: "One who attains this samādhi takes delight in dwelling in the world and does not take delight in dwelling in the non-world, because the world has the fault of impermanence." There are three kinds of worlds, also as listed above. The "non-world" has no dharmas at all and is a place of great terror. It provisionally points to what is contaminated as the "world"; that upon which the two vehicles rely is named the "non-world", and is therefore said to be terrifying. In fascicle 16 of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, the "Chapter on Pure Conduct", in explaining the ten titles [of the Buddha], reaching the explanation of "knower of the world", it says: "There are six kinds of worlds: first, the world named the five aggregates (the world of the five aggregates); second, the world that is the worlds in the ten directions [numerous as] asaṃkhyeyas (the world of lands); third, the world that is all ordinary beings (sentient beings of the six realms); fourth, the world named the lotus (the two vehicles); fifth, the world that refers to the bodhisattvas (also subsuming the two vehicles); sixth, the world named the five desires (further establishing the world of causal dharmas)." Thus one knows that although the six kinds add causal dharmas, they do not go beyond the three, because the ten thusnesses contain causal dharmas. Now, expanding according to meaning, the ten realms each have three.