止觀輔行傳弘決 5.61

Next, in explaining the contemplation that refutes provisionality, the text naturally falls into two parts: the brief and the detailed refutations. In the initial brief refutation, "brief" simply means general. It first outlines the brief object, and next clarifies the brief contemplation. With four [aspects] of the object and two of the contemplation, together they make six brief points. As for the four of the object: first, the views are briefed: without listing the four positions such as "existence," it merely says, "must belong to a single view." Second, the provisional is briefed: without clarifying the marks of the three kinds of provisionality, it merely says, "empty, deceptive, and lacking reality." Third, the afflictions produced are briefed: without listing the eighty-eight [afflictions] and so forth, it merely says, "surging forth as before." Fourth, the faults guarded against are briefed: without presenting the marks of the arising faults, it merely says, "fully as explained below." As for the two of contemplation: first, calming and contemplation are briefed: without speaking of deducing to the dual emptiness of nature and marks, it merely says, "both quiescent and non-dual." Second, the conclusion is briefed: without speaking of the eyes and wisdom [realizing] non-arising, it merely says, "entering emptiness from the provisional." The intent of these six brief points applies generally to the head of each of the four views below. Later, these six are expanded, which is therefore called the detailed [refutation]. When it says "as before," it is fully as clarified in the fifty computations. When it says "as below," it is as explained in the merits and faults at the end of this fascicle. The preceding four brief points follow sequentially in the text and can be grasped by their meaning. From "should" onward, it clarifies the brief calming and contemplation. The initial passage is calming; from "again contemplate" onward, it is contemplation. Here, too, calming and contemplation are used together generally, and are also distinct yet not distinct. Furthermore, in order to establish the sixty-four variations below that are not distinct yet distinct, one knows that directly using the four natures to deduce the three kinds of provisionality fully contains calming and contemplation. When the initial passage says "the wavering relies on the flame," for the character yang (颺, wavering), the two fanqie spellings yi-zhang and yi-zhang are both acceptable. When blown by the wind, it is called yang; that is, the flickering movement of the flame, which necessarily relies on the flame to have movement. The flame necessarily relies on space, because it does not exist in a solid place. The flame and its wavering are both dharmas of movement, just as views and ignorance are both dharmas of movement. Just as movement relies on the flame, the flame relies on space, and space has nothing to rely upon; so views rely on ignorance, ignorance relies on the dharma-nature, and the dharma-nature has nothing to rely upon. Why is this? The dharma-nature has no separate substance, but is entirely ignorance; hence it says that space has nothing to rely upon. The metaphor of sleep is the same as that of the flame. How so? The sleeping mind is like the dharma-nature, the drowsy slumber is like ignorance, and the dream events are like the views. Ignorance is the root and the views are the branches; ignorance has nothing to rely upon, and the views have no abode; hence it says "both are quiescent." Next, in explaining the contemplation, it says: "Since ignorance is identical with the dharma-nature, non-duality simply means not different." Alternatively, non-duality is according to nature, and not different is according to marks. From "the dharma-nature originally" onward, it explains the above "non-dual and not different." Since ignorance is identical with the dharma-nature, the dharma-nature is not defiled by ignorance, which is called "originally pure." At the time of ignorance, the dharma-nature does not perish; when emerging from ignorance, the dharma-nature does not arise. Furthermore, at the time of ignorance, the dharma-nature does not arise; when ignorance is destroyed, the dharma-nature does not perish. Because ignorance and the dharma-nature are one in substance, the substance of ignorance also neither arises nor perishes; hence it says, "ignorance is also like this." Therefore, one knows that from the beginningless [past], ignorance does not arise, and now, being identical with the dharma-nature, it also does not perish. Without a person, one conceptually constructs a person; hence it uniformly asks, "Who?" From "if one says this" onward, it reiterates that ignorance is identical with the dharma-nature. From "the dharma-nature has no arising" onward, it reiterates the substance of the dharma-nature to explain ignorance. "That which can contemplate" and so forth: ignorance and the dharma-nature are both the objects contemplated; the contemplation of identity with emptiness is precisely that which can contemplate. Not only is the substance-nature of the contemplated ignorance and dharma-nature non-dual, but the contemplative wisdom that can contemplate is itself ignorance. Ignorance is like space; therefore, the contemplative wisdom is also empty. From "like this" onward, it briefly concludes. Because its illumination is universal, the names of ignorance and dharma-nature are jointly established. Now, following the sequence, it provisionally considers the ignorance of broken views and the dharma-nature of the true truth; hence it says, "entering emptiness from the provisional." Next, in the detailed explanation, first refuting the view of existence: although relative to the four views, distinguishing them from the general is called specific, based on not yet differentiating the distinctions of faith, Dharma, turning, and so forth, it is still called general. It first establishes the two practices of faith and Dharma for those of sharp faculties; as in the previous brief refutation, the text was already sufficient, but for those who have not understood, the detailed [refutation] that follows is further required. From "those of dull faculties" onward, wishing to clarify the detailed contemplation, it first recounts the intent of the detailed [refutation] and the method used in it: if one does not use the detailed, then numerous faults will increase; hence it says, "Now we rely on the method of detailed contemplation in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā." The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā is precisely directed at people of the latter age; why do those in the world who contemplate the mind discard it? If Nāgārjuna is not fit to be a master, whom else would one take as master? Therefore, what follows is entirely Nāgārjuna's method of contemplation from the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā; hence it says, "Now it is also like this." From "now it is also" onward, it establishes the contemplation based on the treatise. From "if in a single thought" onward, it reiterates the three kinds of provisionality clarified previously as the provisionality to be refuted. From "one should contemplate" onward, it properly clarifies the application of contemplation. In the initial passage, it first refutes the provisionality of causal condition through the four positions. Therein, it first lists the four positions; from "if mind" onward, it properly investigates and refutes them. In the initial refutation of self-arising, when it says, "the preceding thought is the faculty and the subsequent thought is consciousness," the faculty has no separate substance, but still refers to the immediately preceding extinct mind as its substance. The faculty is called that which can produce: through the extinction of the preceding mind, it produces the subsequent mental consciousness. Hence the Abhidharmakośa says: "The immediate extinction of the six consciousness-bodies is the mind [faculty]. 'Body' means substance. At the moment of immediate extinction, it is the substance of the mental faculty; at that time, the five consciousnesses also rely on the immediately extinct mind as their proximate condition and use the five physical faculties as their remote conditions to produce the five consciousnesses. When the five consciousnesses immediately discriminate and arise, that is called mental consciousness." Now, the meaning of this text is not the five consciousnesses, but the sixth consciousness. Conditioned upon the view of existence as a dharma-datum, it is precisely called consciousness. It is precisely with this consciousness that one investigates and reproaches the faculty; hence it says: does the faculty produce consciousness because it has consciousness? Or does the faculty produce consciousness because it lacks consciousness? The Dazhidulun asks: "If the preceding thought is extinguished, how can it produce the subsequent? Answer: There are two meanings: first, thought-by-thought extinction; second, thought-by-thought arising. Because these two exist, from extinction there is arising." Fearing that a view of annihilation might arise, it must therefore be established; now, in order to refute it, it must therefore be reproached. Although arising and perishing are different, the faculty and the consciousness are both one's own mind; whether from the faculty or from consciousness, both belong to self-nature. Within self-nature, mutually reproaching the faculty and consciousness, [arising] cannot be found. Furthermore, mind and consciousness are both given the name "mind" in relation to dust [objects]; therefore, the two names are used interchangeably in the text, and one must never be constrained by this text through the doctrinal distinctions between mind, intellection, and consciousness. Therefore, in the initial establishment here it always says "producing mind," and in the objections of the subsequent lines it always says "producing consciousness"; hence, in the intent of this text, both names are acceptable. "Is it produced from the faculty?" asks about arising from extinction; "is it produced from consciousness?" asks about arising from arising.

From "If it is produced from the sense-faculties" onward, it first refutes the prior line. Although the lesser tradition permits that the sense-faculties can produce consciousness, now it refutes production upon cessation; therefore, one must interrogate it. If it were produced from consciousness, then the prior consciousness would not cease and would again produce another consciousness, which would be the greatest fault; therefore, it does not wait to be interrogated. For this reason, the text only refutes production from the sense-faculties. From "Are the sense-faculties…" onward, it first posits both alternatives. From "If the sense-faculties possess…" onward, it interrogates both. First, it interrogates possessing consciousness: if the sense-faculties possessed consciousness, there would be two faults, namely, the simultaneous existence of sense-faculty and consciousness, and the simultaneous existence of producer and produced, which would entail the fault of infinite regeneration. If there were no producer and produced, the meaning of production would not be established; how could one speak of production? Furthermore, only upon immediate cessation is it called the production of consciousness; if the sense-faculties possessed consciousness, production and cessation would contradict each other, and thus both would have faults. From "If the sense-faculties lack consciousness" onward, it interrogates the second line. This is equivalent to [the absurdity of] that which lacks consciousness being able to produce consciousness. From "Although the sense-faculties…" onward, it interrogates possessing the nature of consciousness. This is a concessive refutation, which also first establishes two propositions. From "If having [the nature], it is already…" onward, it interrogates them: having [the nature] is still the same as having [consciousness], which also becomes simultaneous production; lacking [the nature] is still the same as lacking [consciousness], which is the same as production from insentient things. From "Furthermore, the nature of consciousness…" onward, it interrogates in terms of oneness and difference. As for "If one," it first interrogates one line: whenever one speaks of "nature," only later can it produce; if consciousness and its nature are one, there is no producer and produced. As for "If different," it interrogates the line of difference: if the nature were different from consciousness, it would be the same as an external object; if an external object can produce, consciousness would be identical with the other; how could one reckon it as self[-produced]? From "If one says…" onward, it next refutes the nature of otherness. Having been interrogated as before, one definitively knows that the mind is not produced from itself. Therefore, conceding that it is not produced from itself, one says: "Although one says that the mind is not self-produced, it is because there are external dust-objects that the mind is aroused." Looking from dust-objects toward the sense-faculties, dust-objects are called "other." From "Citing the sūtra, it says…" onward, as for citing the text of the Dapin to substantiate the nature of otherness: dust-objects are external conditions that come to stimulate the internal sense-faculties, and the generated thought is the dharma produced; the Buddha, accommodating one capacity, spoke in terms of the nature of otherness. The theorist, not understanding this, cites the sūtra to reinforce their attachment. From "If so…" onward, it classifies it as belonging to production from other. From "Now examining…" onward, it applies contemplation. It also first posits two propositions. From "If dust-objects are…" onward, it interrogates them. First, interrogating [the proposition that] they are mind, there are three faults: first, the fault of dust-objects not being mind, meaning mind is not called a dust-object; second, the fault of dust-objects not being external to thought, which is the same as self-production; third, the fault of simultaneous production—if dust-objects are not mind, one might allow the reckoning of production from dust-objects, but if dust-objects are mind, it turns out to be producing mind where mind already is, which is called simultaneous production. If a seed produces a sprout, there is producer and produced; if a seed were to produce a seed, two seeds would exist simultaneously—what producer and produced could there be? From "If dust-objects are not mind" onward, it next interrogates the proposition of "not mind." This is identical in meaning to the sense-faculties lacking consciousness above, and the intent of the interrogation is also the same; hence it says, "Refuted as before." That dust-objects possess the nature of consciousness can be known by analogy with the previous case. From "If sense-faculties…" onward, it interrogates combined production. Because singly reckoning self or other has already both been examined and refuted, one reckons combined production intending to avoid [the faults of] self and other. It also first establishes two propositions. From "If each individually…" onward, it interrogates them: if each individually has it, this is still the same as having it in the two propositions of the previous text, hence it says "falling into the nature of self and other"—how could it be called joint production? If each individually lacks it, just as two grains of sand lack oil and when combined still lack it, this is also not called joint. From "For example…" onward, it adduces an analogy. It also first establishes two propositions. From "If each has…" onward, it next interrogates the two propositions. It is fully like the case in the doctrine: if the mirror and face unite as one, fearing that if each has or each lacks in different locations they cannot produce the reflection, and that only when combined in the same location can they produce the reflection, it therefore concludes by interrogating: "in truth they do not unite as one." Only if the mirror reaches the face would it be called uniting as one. Now, the way an image is captured is neither too close nor too far, and then one can see the image. If so, it is of itself being neither too close nor too far that can produce the image; what does it have to do with mirror and face? Separation is again impossible; therefore, know that there is no image. From "The separation and union of sense-faculties and dust-objects" onward, it simply matches the text from "If mirror and face unite" below. As for the text above, it is because it is already complete in the doctrine. One should further match each of sense-faculties and dust-objects with the text above mirror and face uniting as one. From "Furthermore, sense-faculties and dust-objects…" onward, interrogating nature and oneness/difference is completely as explained above under self-production. From "If sense-faculties and dust-objects…" onward, it interrogates reckoning production without [either]. Since the former three, having been examined, cannot produce, therefore outside the three one separately reckons production apart from them. Within this, it first classifies it as belonging to having no causes or conditions; without causes, nothing is produced. Next, it also first posits two propositions. From "If there is…" onward, it interrogates. First, it interrogates there being separation: separation is itself a condition, which is the same as production from other; why call it separation? From "If there is no…" onward, it interrogates it as being the same as lacking mind. From "If one says…" onward, it interrogates nature. It also first posits two propositions; next, it refutes the two propositions: having it is also the same as other, lacking it is the same as lacking mind. From "The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā" onward, it next cites the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā generally to substantiate the four propositions: none of them should produce at all; why reckon them individually? From "If one examines…" onward, it concludes the establishment of the two emptineses of nature and marks. Herein, it first shows the characteristics of the two emptineses. Merely being free of the reckoning of nature is called "emptiness of nature." From "Nor does it not abide" onward, once nature is refuted, there are only the marks of form and mind, internal and external. Since they do not abide within the four propositions of non-existence, marks are also unattainable; this is called "emptiness of marks." As for stating "neither internal nor external," and so forth: "internal" is simply the cause, "external" is simply the condition, and "in between" is joint. "Always existing of itself" is simply causelessness. Because of the absence of these reckonings, there are no four natures. Although these two emptineses are spoken of sequentially, in meaning they are not at different times. From "If the four propositions…" onward, it again uses the two truths to conclude the establishment of the two emptineses. If there is attachment to nature, it is conventional but not a truth; only after refuting attachment to nature is it called conventional truth, hence it says "conventional truth refutes nature." Once attachment to nature is refuted, there are only names, which are called provisional; the provisional is precisely marks, because marks are empty. Contemplating dharma-nature, contemplating the principle and realizing the real, is called the ultimate truth refuting marks. Emptiness is not sequential; the two truths are simultaneous. It is only to distinguish nature and marks that they are spoken of sequentially. Reflect on this! Reflect on this! Failing to see this meaning, one vainly claims it to be identical to emptiness. Therefore, in the Dapin, passing through each and every dharma, it says that it is neither internal nor external nor in between, and so forth. This is the shared contemplation of the two emptineses by the three vehicles. Next, in the chapter "Exhortation to Learn," it says: "Bodhisattvas-mahāsattvas and others should all cultivate and learn this." These three provisionalities are precisely the provisionality refuted by emptiness. Next, in the chapter "Gathering and Dispersing," in each and every line it says: "There are only names; these names do not abide, nor do they not abide."

Regarding the words "aggregation and dispersion": because they disperse what has aggregated, they are termed the two emptineses of nature and characteristic. Thus, all bodhisattvas and others study these two emptineses, and by attaining these two emptineses they are endowed with the eighteen emptineses. Regarding "both nature and characteristic are empty," etc.: this concludes by generally demonstrating the characteristics of emptiness in both general and specific ways. Here, when "general" is mentioned, it simply points to the two emptineses and designates them as general; because these two emptineses universally empty everything, they are termed general. Looking back at the beginning of the text, this "general" is still specific, because refutation is carried out phrase by phrase across the four phrases. If one attains entry through a single phrase, it is also endowed with the two emptineses; it is not necessarily through all four phrases that they are termed the two emptineses. The text speaks of four because, for those whose attachments shift even to [the view of] causelessness, it says that refuting the four is termed the emptiness of nature and characteristic. What is general here is again termed general when viewed in relation to the sixty-four phrases below. Regarding "Therefore the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā," etc.: earlier this text was cited to verify that the four all possess inherent nature, and that inherent nature must universally be refuted; once refuted it is termed emptiness, which is inherent-nature emptiness. What is cited here verifies that there is no self-nature, up to there being no causeless nature, nor is there even any name; this is termed the two emptineses. Hence it says, "The application of contemplation is the same as in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā." Regarding "If examining the sense-faculties," etc.: because one is endowed with the two emptineses, one is thereby endowed with the eighteen [emptineses]. The internal, external, and so forth are all what is emptied; emptying eighteen things yields eighteen names. If one goes through them one by one, all are known as the grasper and the grasped, and explaining them will make this visible. The Fajie cidi also briefly explains this, and its meaning is extremely clear. Comparing this with that, although the words differ slightly, the meaning is largely the same. Question: Since from "emptiness of existent dharmas" to "emptiness of nonexistent and existent dharmas" corresponds to three phrases, why is the phrase "neither existent nor nonexistent" not emptied? Answer: The preceding "ultimate emptiness" refutes "neither arising nor ceasing," which is precisely the refutation of the fourth phrase; hence it is absent from the text below. Question: Since the preceding six emptineses have already clarified the two emptineses, why must the subsequent seven emptineses be explained? Answer: Because they re-examine the various dharmas through nature and characteristic, the seven are further clarified. Question: Since from "internal" to "ultimate" all dharmas are exhausted in refutation, why are the latter five needed? Answer: The Dazhidulun states: "The thirteen exhaust the refutation; the latter five merely restate it." These eighteen emptineses are extensively explained in their characteristics in fascicle 34 of the Dazhidulun. Furthermore, fascicle 92 states: "These eighteen emptineses are themselves also empty in nature." That is, that which can empty is also entirely empty. How could the eleven emptineses and twenty emptineses of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra go beyond these eighteen emptineses? The Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra lists only seven emptineses: first, emptiness of characteristics, because self, other, and shared are analysed as non-arising; second, emptiness of self-nature, because all dharmas are empty and non-arising in self-nature; third, emptiness of non-activity, because the aggregates are originally nirvāṇa; fourth, emptiness of activity, because the conjunction of aggregates and sense-fields is free from self and what belongs to self; fifth, emptiness of the unattainable, because false conceptualisations of all dharmas are ineffable; sixth, emptiness of the ultimate truth, because the self-realised noble knowledge is free from faults and habit-energies; seventh, emptiness of relativity (itaretara-śūnyatā), which is the lowest among emptineses, leaving no further "this" or "that." This is also combining the eighteen into seven emptineses. However, the intent of that sūtra is not without slight differences from the Dazhidulun; hence we know that the seven emptineses of the Laṅkāvatāra mostly reside in the Tripiṭaka and shared teachings, because under self-realisation it speaks of being free from faults and habit-energies. Taking it flexibly, it slightly connects to the perfect and distinctive teachings, just as the eighteen of the Dapin also connect to the three teachings. Next, explaining continuity: compared with explanation by causal formation, it should also be visible; however, it must be finely analysed to bring out its characteristics. What is termed here "falling into annihilationism or eternalism" means precisely fixed existence and fixed non-existence. In mutual dependence, first distinguish the difference between mutual dependence and the other two provisionalities. First, from "If not attaining" downward, clarifies the reason for the difference, which is due to conceiving an existent mind as depending on a nonexistent mind. From "Causal formation" downward, directly clarifies the distinct characteristics. Pointing to what is in continuity as a distinct cessation means it is specifically the cessation of sentient beings' mental factors; it differs from empty space because it resides in arising and ceasing; it differs from analytical cessation because it is conditioned; and within non-analytical cessation, it is not identical with the meaning of lacking conditions. Because in the cognitive sphere the mind arises and ceases, it is identical only with the meaning of arising and ceasing. It is only in contrast to this cessation that the subsequent thought-moment of mind arises, which is termed continuity. When speaking of corresponding universally in mutual dependence, the three unconditioned dharmas are universally non-arising, and the designation "non-arising" is identical in meaning to cessation. In contrast to those three cessations, one knows that one has a mind. Regarding "Although they are not all concurrently": this means that although the three unconditioned are not all concurrently the cessation of arising and ceasing, yet they can be non-arising, because the three unconditioned dharmas are equally non-arising. The cessation of arising and ceasing is similar in meaning to non-arising; because those three unconditioned are non-arising, and non-arising is cessation, one therefore knows arising in contrast to cessation. Regarding "Empty space," etc.: raising one example serves for the other two. From "The above has already" downward, borrows the term "causal combination" from Kaishan to explain mutual dependence. First, citing the old interpretation of Kaishan: the old is that established by Dharma Master Zang of Kaishan Monastery; relying on the above while combining this, it is thus called "causal combination." The above has only two tiers, and now reaching the third, it is therefore said to "surpass them." From "Furthermore, causal combination" downward, the present interpretation differs from the old. Although in causal formation and continuity above the delusions have not yet been refuted, understanding is conditioned on non-arising; taking this non-arising in contrast to the arising of the mental sense-faculty is precisely the characteristic of causal formation within mutual dependence. Relying on the above provisional mind to continue into mutual dependence is precisely the characteristic of continuity within mutual dependence. Relying on the above to reach this point is therefore called "causal." Because this is endowed with the above two, it is therefore called "combination." Thus the general meaning of explaining "causal" agrees with the old, but "combination" and "surpassing them" differ from the old interpretation. Kaishan merely takes arising together as "combination," without saying that it is endowed with both. When the delusions above are not eliminated and this delusion arises again, it is therefore called "combination." Not mentioning universal cessation is called "surpassing them." From "Since the interpretation" downward, concludes with a reprimand. Although using another's terms, the meaning differs from his; merely borrowing the old terms to reveal the meaning of mutual dependence, one then uses the present meaning to turn back and refute him. From "Now examining" downward, directly explains. From "Such four" downward, concludes by establishing the two emptineses, eighteen emptineses, and so forth. The fact that the above text lacks the mention of the "wisdom eye" is an abbreviation. Furthermore, it should also mention all-knowledge and so forth; that the text lacks them is an abbreviation. From "Not only" downward, refutes the various views by analogy. And because this view-delusion sees the principle, it refutes the view of existence; at the time of seeing the principle, the remaining three within the single [views], and further possessing the cessation of speech, are all refuted together. From "This is named" downward, concludes. That calming and contemplation can manifest and shine forth is entirely due to the refutation of views; hence the doctrinal gate shines brightly. Merely refuting views is already illuminating, not to mention refuting the various thought-delusions, dust-and-sand delusions, and ignorance! Not to mention refuting in a single mind, fully as explained before! It is only that the former was based on the perfect gate, whereas this is lodged in refuting views; when the idea is grasped, what difference is there? The wondrous purport is as in the beginning. Regarding this view of existence, it is also called general cultivation. From "If not awakening" downward, in contrast to the sixty-four turns of faith and Dharma, it is again called specific.

This returns to separating from the initial general calming and contemplation mentioned before, in order to correspond to the four siddhāntas and two practices. The same applies below by analogy, fully as explained before under calming the mind. This conclusion is drawn for each and every view; hence we know that in the preceding text, setting out the three truths and the single mind is still termed general. Applying this general and specific, the view of existence is subdued; compared with the Hinayana, it is equivalent to the stage of the four roots of goodness, and is therefore temporarily concluded as wholesome contaminated aggregates. From "Because of being refuted" downward, the view shifts its attachment: because [existence] does not arise, it immediately gives rise to the view of non-existence. The view of existence still remains, thinking that the mind gives rise to non-existence, which also becomes a view. From "Now, refuting views" downward: wishing to refute the view of non-existence. First clarify the reason for refutation, which is the two practices and three faculties. Giving rise to attachment based on non-existence has already become the inferior faculty. Just as after the general explanation earlier the sharp and dull faculties of the two practices were also distinguished, so too below, or else the text is simply abridged. In clarifying the three faculties, regarding "Hearing contemplation on arising," etc.: arising is the view of existence, regarding existence as non-existence and non-existence as real. Therefore, this view must be comprehensively refuted. From "Furthermore, one should" downward, directly refutes. First it marks out [the categories]. General means directly cultivating contemplation to refute; specific means the three provisionalities and four phrases. Hence these instances of "general" are identical to the initial text, where before it was termed general in contrast to a single view. Although termed general in contrast to the four views, the present text restates it, and therefore within a single view it is termed general in contrast to the specific. Moreover, it is also not the same as the general and specific at the end of causal formation in the view of existence. If contrasted with the sixty-four turns of faith and Dharma, this general and specific again becomes general. From "The general refutation" downward, directly clarifies the refutation of non-existence. First two sūtras are cited to clarify the characteristics of refutation. First, citing the Dapin: using consciousness to discriminate, in arising there is the view of existence, and in non-arising there is the view of non-existence; both existence and non-existence are refuted, so they are compared with each other, both said to be unattainable. That is, using the profound to compare with the shallow, and using the shallow to compare with the profound. Ponder this! Ponder this! Next, citing the Laṅkāvatāra: fascicle 4 of that sūtra states: "If one gives rise to the view of emptiness, one is called a destroyer, falling into self and shared [arising]." The text before and after that refutes views in more than one way. Next, from "However, non-arising" downward, reprimands and rejects it. Abandoning existence to cling to non-existence, how does it differ from an inchworm? Next, the specific refutation: also first sets forth the origin of the view. Because the delusion of the three provisionalities of the preceding view of existence has been subdued, it forms the object grasped by the present view of non-existence. The two refutations, general and specific, are termed the application of calming and contemplation; not seeing the three provisionalities resembles the emptiness of nature and characteristic, hence it says, "Obliviously entering absorption." Not seeing internal or external resembles the refutation of causal formation; having neither before nor after resembles the refutation of continuity; lacking mutual comparison and dependence resembles the refutation of mutual dependence. From "Silently" downward, directly clarifies the characteristics conceived by the view of non-existence. From "Yet giving rise to attachment to views" downward, reprimands the characteristics of the faults of views. Therefore the treatise verse states: "The Buddhas teach the Dharma of emptiness / In order to refute all views; / But if one further clings to emptiness, / Such a one the Buddhas cannot convert." From "The commentary" downward, makes comparisons, determinations, and distinctions. Fascicle 18 of the Dazhidulun states: "Because non-Buddhists have much craving and conceit, they do not relinquish all dharmas." The treatise asks: "When non-Buddhists contemplate emptiness they relinquish everything; why do you say they do not relinquish? Answer: Although non-Buddhists contemplate emptiness, they grasp the mark of emptiness. Although they know all dharmas are empty, they do not know the emptiness of the self. Because of craving and clinging to the wisdom that contemplates emptiness, if they crave and cling, it becomes the view of self, and the view of self is endowed with the eighty-eight proclivities." The treatise further asks: "Since non-Buddhists have absorptions such as non-conception that extinguish mental factors, they should be free from grasping the wisdom that contemplates emptiness. Answer: The power of the absorption of non-conception is not the power of wisdom." From "Like this" downward, brings out the reasons for the faults of views, concluding in the view of emptiness. From "Disciples of the Buddha" downward, reveals the correct and distinguishes the different, clarifying the reason for knowing faults, which is due to the clinging mind. If a clinging mind arises, knowing the fault one abandons it; abandoning it, one immediately cultivates contemplation—how could one further consider this to be true non-arising? From "How" downward, shows that the three provisionalities are fully present within the view of non-existence, precisely because the view of existence has come and entered into this. From "The mental dust of non-arising dharmas" downward, brings out the characteristics of the three provisionalities within the view of non-existence. From "One should examine" downward, next directly applies contemplation, first refuting causal formation. From "One should know" downward, concludes by establishing the two emptineses, eighteen emptineses, and so forth. From "Not only" downward, refutes the various views by analogy, the meaning being as explained before. From "Those who have not yet" downward, specifically treats the sixty-four turns, as explained before. From "Diligently cultivating" downward, the view shifts its attachment.