止觀輔行傳弘決 5.61.1

5.61.1

次明破假觀中，文自為兩，謂略、廣二破。 初略破者，略秖是總，先序略境，次明略觀。 境四觀二，合為六略。 言境四者，一者見略，不列有等四句，但云「必屬一見」。 二者假略，不明三假之相，但云「虛妄無實」。 三者所生惑略，不列八十八等，但云「浩浩如前」。 四者所防過略，不出生過之相，但云「具如後說」。 言觀二者，一止觀略，不云推至性相二空，但云「雙寂不二」。 二者結略，不云眼智無生，但云「從假入空」。 此六略意，並通此下四見首也。 後廣此六，故名為廣。 言如前者，具如五十校計所明。 言如後者，如此卷末得失中說。 前之四略，次第在文，可以意得。 「應當」下，明止觀略。 初文是止，從「又觀」去是觀。 此中亦是止觀總用，亦是別而不別。 乃至為成下文六十四番不別而別，故知直用四性以推三假，具含止觀。 初文云「颺依焰」者，颺字，弋障弋彰二反並通。 風飄曰颺，即焰之動轉也，必依於焰方有動故。 焰必依空，實處無故。 焰颺俱是動轉之法，如見及無明俱是動法。 如動依焰，焰依於空，空無所依。 如見依無明，無明依法性，法性無所依。 何者？ 法性無體，全是無明，故云空無所依。 眠喻同焰。 何者？ 眠心如法性，昏眠如無明，夢事如諸見。 無明為本、諸見為末，無明無依、諸見無住，故云「雙寂」。 次釋觀中云「無明既即是法性，不二秖是不異」。 亦可不二從性、不異從相。 「法性本來」下，釋上不二不異。 無明既其即是法性，法性不為無明所染，名「本清淨」。 在無明時法性不滅，出無明時法性不起。 又在無明時法性不起，無明破時法性不滅。 無明與法性其體一故，故無明體亦不生滅，故云「無明亦復如是」。 故知無明無始不起，今即法性亦復無滅。 無人計人，故並云「誰」。 「若謂此」下，重釋無明同法性故。 「法性無起」下，重以法性之體以釋無明。 「能觀」等者，無明法性並是所觀，即空之觀即是能觀。 非但所觀無明法性體性不二，能觀觀智即無明是。 無明如空，故觀智亦空。 「如此」下，略結。 以明通故，共立無明法性之名。 今依次第，且約破見之無明、真諦之法性，故云「從假入空」。 次廣釋中，先破有見者，雖對四見離總名別，據未分信法、迴轉等別仍名為總。 初立利根信法兩行，如前略破其文已足，為未解者更須後廣。 「其鈍根」下，欲明廣觀，先述廣意及用廣法，若不用廣則增眾失，故云今依中論廣觀之法。 《中論》正被末代之人，世觀心者何為棄之？ 龍樹不任為師，知復師於誰乎？ 故此下文並是龍樹《中論》觀法，故云今亦如是。 「今亦」下，依論立觀。 「若一念」下，重述前來所明三假為所破之假。 「當觀」下，正明用觀。 初文先以四句破因成假。 於中先列四句，「若心」下次正推破。 初破自生中，云「前念為根後念為識」者，根無別體，還指無間滅意為體。 根名能生，由前意滅生後意識。 故《俱舍》云「由即六識身無間滅為意。 身者，體也。 無間滅時為意根體，爾時五識亦依無間滅意以為親緣，用五色根以為疎緣，而生五識。 五識無間分別生時，即名意識。 」今此文意不是五識，是第六識。 緣於有見以為法塵，即名為識。 即以此識對根研責，故云根為有識故生識？ 根為無識故生識？ 《大論》「問曰：前念若滅，何能生後？ 答：有二義，一念念滅、二念念生。 有此二故，故滅得生。 」恐生斷見，是故須立； 今為破故，是故須責。 生滅雖殊，根之與識俱是自心，從根從識俱屬自性，於自性中根識互責求不可得。 又心之與識俱對於塵以立心名，是故文中兩名互用，終不得以法相分別心意識異而拘此文。 故此初立皆云生心，下句難中並云生識，故此文意兩名無在。 為從根生，問滅生也； 為從識生，問生生也。

Next, in explaining the contemplation that refutes provisionality, the text naturally falls into two parts: the brief and the detailed refutations. In the initial brief refutation, "brief" simply means general. It first outlines the brief object, and next clarifies the brief contemplation. With four [aspects] of the object and two of the contemplation, together they make six brief points. As for the four of the object: first, the views are briefed: without listing the four positions such as "existence," it merely says, "must belong to a single view." Second, the provisional is briefed: without clarifying the marks of the three kinds of provisionality, it merely says, "empty, deceptive, and lacking reality." Third, the afflictions produced are briefed: without listing the eighty-eight [afflictions] and so forth, it merely says, "surging forth as before." Fourth, the faults guarded against are briefed: without presenting the marks of the arising faults, it merely says, "fully as explained below." As for the two of contemplation: first, calming and contemplation are briefed: without speaking of deducing to the dual emptiness of nature and marks, it merely says, "both quiescent and non-dual." Second, the conclusion is briefed: without speaking of the eyes and wisdom [realizing] non-arising, it merely says, "entering emptiness from the provisional." The intent of these six brief points applies generally to the head of each of the four views below. Later, these six are expanded, which is therefore called the detailed [refutation]. When it says "as before," it is fully as clarified in the fifty computations. When it says "as below," it is as explained in the merits and faults at the end of this fascicle. The preceding four brief points follow sequentially in the text and can be grasped by their meaning. From "should" onward, it clarifies the brief calming and contemplation. The initial passage is calming; from "again contemplate" onward, it is contemplation. Here, too, calming and contemplation are used together generally, and are also distinct yet not distinct. Furthermore, in order to establish the sixty-four variations below that are not distinct yet distinct, one knows that directly using the four natures to deduce the three kinds of provisionality fully contains calming and contemplation. When the initial passage says "the wavering relies on the flame," for the character yang (颺, wavering), the two fanqie spellings yi-zhang and yi-zhang are both acceptable. When blown by the wind, it is called yang; that is, the flickering movement of the flame, which necessarily relies on the flame to have movement. The flame necessarily relies on space, because it does not exist in a solid place. The flame and its wavering are both dharmas of movement, just as views and ignorance are both dharmas of movement. Just as movement relies on the flame, the flame relies on space, and space has nothing to rely upon; so views rely on ignorance, ignorance relies on the dharma-nature, and the dharma-nature has nothing to rely upon. Why is this? The dharma-nature has no separate substance, but is entirely ignorance; hence it says that space has nothing to rely upon. The metaphor of sleep is the same as that of the flame. How so? The sleeping mind is like the dharma-nature, the drowsy slumber is like ignorance, and the dream events are like the views. Ignorance is the root and the views are the branches; ignorance has nothing to rely upon, and the views have no abode; hence it says "both are quiescent." Next, in explaining the contemplation, it says: "Since ignorance is identical with the dharma-nature, non-duality simply means not different." Alternatively, non-duality is according to nature, and not different is according to marks. From "the dharma-nature originally" onward, it explains the above "non-dual and not different." Since ignorance is identical with the dharma-nature, the dharma-nature is not defiled by ignorance, which is called "originally pure." At the time of ignorance, the dharma-nature does not perish; when emerging from ignorance, the dharma-nature does not arise. Furthermore, at the time of ignorance, the dharma-nature does not arise; when ignorance is destroyed, the dharma-nature does not perish. Because ignorance and the dharma-nature are one in substance, the substance of ignorance also neither arises nor perishes; hence it says, "ignorance is also like this." Therefore, one knows that from the beginningless [past], ignorance does not arise, and now, being identical with the dharma-nature, it also does not perish. Without a person, one conceptually constructs a person; hence it uniformly asks, "Who?" From "if one says this" onward, it reiterates that ignorance is identical with the dharma-nature. From "the dharma-nature has no arising" onward, it reiterates the substance of the dharma-nature to explain ignorance. "That which can contemplate" and so forth: ignorance and the dharma-nature are both the objects contemplated; the contemplation of identity with emptiness is precisely that which can contemplate. Not only is the substance-nature of the contemplated ignorance and dharma-nature non-dual, but the contemplative wisdom that can contemplate is itself ignorance. Ignorance is like space; therefore, the contemplative wisdom is also empty. From "like this" onward, it briefly concludes. Because its illumination is universal, the names of ignorance and dharma-nature are jointly established. Now, following the sequence, it provisionally considers the ignorance of broken views and the dharma-nature of the true truth; hence it says, "entering emptiness from the provisional." Next, in the detailed explanation, first refuting the view of existence: although relative to the four views, distinguishing them from the general is called specific, based on not yet differentiating the distinctions of faith, Dharma, turning, and so forth, it is still called general. It first establishes the two practices of faith and Dharma for those of sharp faculties; as in the previous brief refutation, the text was already sufficient, but for those who have not understood, the detailed [refutation] that follows is further required. From "those of dull faculties" onward, wishing to clarify the detailed contemplation, it first recounts the intent of the detailed [refutation] and the method used in it: if one does not use the detailed, then numerous faults will increase; hence it says, "Now we rely on the method of detailed contemplation in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā." The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā is precisely directed at people of the latter age; why do those in the world who contemplate the mind discard it? If Nāgārjuna is not fit to be a master, whom else would one take as master? Therefore, what follows is entirely Nāgārjuna's method of contemplation from the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā; hence it says, "Now it is also like this." From "now it is also" onward, it establishes the contemplation based on the treatise. From "if in a single thought" onward, it reiterates the three kinds of provisionality clarified previously as the provisionality to be refuted. From "one should contemplate" onward, it properly clarifies the application of contemplation. In the initial passage, it first refutes the provisionality of causal condition through the four positions. Therein, it first lists the four positions; from "if mind" onward, it properly investigates and refutes them. In the initial refutation of self-arising, when it says, "the preceding thought is the faculty and the subsequent thought is consciousness," the faculty has no separate substance, but still refers to the immediately preceding extinct mind as its substance. The faculty is called that which can produce: through the extinction of the preceding mind, it produces the subsequent mental consciousness. Hence the Abhidharmakośa says: "The immediate extinction of the six consciousness-bodies is the mind [faculty]. 'Body' means substance. At the moment of immediate extinction, it is the substance of the mental faculty; at that time, the five consciousnesses also rely on the immediately extinct mind as their proximate condition and use the five physical faculties as their remote conditions to produce the five consciousnesses. When the five consciousnesses immediately discriminate and arise, that is called mental consciousness." Now, the meaning of this text is not the five consciousnesses, but the sixth consciousness. Conditioned upon the view of existence as a dharma-datum, it is precisely called consciousness. It is precisely with this consciousness that one investigates and reproaches the faculty; hence it says: does the faculty produce consciousness because it has consciousness? Or does the faculty produce consciousness because it lacks consciousness? The Dazhidulun asks: "If the preceding thought is extinguished, how can it produce the subsequent? Answer: There are two meanings: first, thought-by-thought extinction; second, thought-by-thought arising. Because these two exist, from extinction there is arising." Fearing that a view of annihilation might arise, it must therefore be established; now, in order to refute it, it must therefore be reproached. Although arising and perishing are different, the faculty and the consciousness are both one's own mind; whether from the faculty or from consciousness, both belong to self-nature. Within self-nature, mutually reproaching the faculty and consciousness, [arising] cannot be found. Furthermore, mind and consciousness are both given the name "mind" in relation to dust [objects]; therefore, the two names are used interchangeably in the text, and one must never be constrained by this text through the doctrinal distinctions between mind, intellection, and consciousness. Therefore, in the initial establishment here it always says "producing mind," and in the objections of the subsequent lines it always says "producing consciousness"; hence, in the intent of this text, both names are acceptable. "Is it produced from the faculty?" asks about arising from extinction; "is it produced from consciousness?" asks about arising from arising.