止觀輔行傳弘決 5.61.2

5.61.2

「若根生」下，先破上句。 小宗雖許根能生識，今破滅生，是故須責。 若從識生，則前識不滅復生一識，為妨最大，故不俟責。 是故文中但破根生。 從「根為」下，先雙定之。 「根若有」下，雙責也。 初責有識。 根若有識則有二妨，謂根識並及能所並，則有生生無窮之過。 若無能所，生義不成，云何言生？ 又無間滅方名生識，根若有識，生滅相違，故並有過。 「根若無識」下，責下句也。 即類無識能生識也。 「根雖」下，責有識性，此是縱破，亦先立二句。 「有已是」下，責也。 有還同有，亦成並生； 無還同無，同無情生。 「又識性」下，作一異責。 「若一」者，先責一句。 凡言性者，後方能生； 識與性一，故無能所。 「若異」者，責異句。 性若異識則同外境，外境能生，識即同他，如何計自？ 「若言」下，次破他性。 如前責已，畢定知心不從自生。 故許不自生，云：雖言心不自生，由有外塵而來發心。 塵望於根，塵名為他。 「引經云」下，引《大品》文證他性者，塵是外緣，來發內根，生思即是所生之法，佛赴一機作他性說。 計者不了，引經助執。 「若爾」下，判屬他生。 「今推」下，用觀也。 亦先定兩句。 「塵若是」下，責也。 先責是心則有三妨：一塵非心妨，則心不名塵。 二塵非意外，同自生妨。 三並生妨，塵若非心，容計塵生； 塵若是心，還成心處生心，即名並生。 子若生苗則有能所，子還生子則二子並生，有何能所？ 「塵若非心」下，次責非心句也。 與前根中無識義同，責意亦爾，故云「如前破」。 塵有識性，例前可知。 「若根」下，責合生也。 單計自他既並推破，故計合生擬免自他。 亦先立兩句。 「若各各」下，責也。 若各各有，還同前文兩句中有，故云「墮自他性」，何名共生？ 若各各無，如二砂無油，和合亦無，亦不名共。 「譬如」下，舉譬。 亦先立兩句。 「若各有」下，次責兩句。 具如法中若鏡面合一者，各有各無恐計異方不能生像，和合同處方能生像，故結責云「實不合一」。 若鏡至面，方名合一。 今取像法不近不遠，則能見像。 若爾，自是不近不遠而能生像，何關鏡面？ 離復不可，故知無像。 「根塵離合」下，但合「若鏡面合」已下文耳。 已上文者，法中已具故也。 應一一更將根塵合鏡面合為一已上文也。 「又根塵」下，責性及一異，並如前自生中說。 「若根塵」下，責計離生。 前三被推既不得生，故於三外別計於離。 於中先判屬無因緣，無因不生。 次亦先定兩句。 「若有」下，責。 先責有離。 離即是緣，即同他生，何謂為離？ 「若無」下，責同無心。 「若言」下，責性也。 亦先定二句； 次難二句，有亦同他，無同無心。 「中論」下，次引《中論》總證四句，總不應生，何故各計？ 「若推」下，結成性相二空。 此中初示二空相。 但無性計，名為「性空」。 「亦不不住」下，性既破已，但有色心內外之相。 既不住於無四句中，故相亦叵得，名為「相空」。 言「不在內外」等者，內秖是因，外秖是緣，中間是共。 「常自有」者，秖是無因。 無此計故，即無四性。 此之二空，言雖前後，意不異時。 「若四句」下，復以二諦結成二空。 若有性執，世而非諦，破性執已，乃名世諦，故云「世諦破性」。 性執破已，但有名字，名之為假，假即是相，為空相故。 觀於法性，觀理證真，名真諦破相。 空非前後、二諦同時，為辨性相，前後說耳。 思之思之。 不見此意，徒謂即空。 故《大品》中歷一一法，皆云不在內外中間等。 此則三乘通觀二空。 次〈勸學品〉中云「菩薩摩訶薩等皆應修學」。 此之三假，即是空所破假。 次〈集散品〉一一句中皆云「但有名字，是字不住，亦不不住。

From "If it is produced from the sense-faculties" onward, it first refutes the prior line. Although the lesser tradition permits that the sense-faculties can produce consciousness, now it refutes production upon cessation; therefore, one must interrogate it. If it were produced from consciousness, then the prior consciousness would not cease and would again produce another consciousness, which would be the greatest fault; therefore, it does not wait to be interrogated. For this reason, the text only refutes production from the sense-faculties. From "Are the sense-faculties…" onward, it first posits both alternatives. From "If the sense-faculties possess…" onward, it interrogates both. First, it interrogates possessing consciousness: if the sense-faculties possessed consciousness, there would be two faults, namely, the simultaneous existence of sense-faculty and consciousness, and the simultaneous existence of producer and produced, which would entail the fault of infinite regeneration. If there were no producer and produced, the meaning of production would not be established; how could one speak of production? Furthermore, only upon immediate cessation is it called the production of consciousness; if the sense-faculties possessed consciousness, production and cessation would contradict each other, and thus both would have faults. From "If the sense-faculties lack consciousness" onward, it interrogates the second line. This is equivalent to [the absurdity of] that which lacks consciousness being able to produce consciousness. From "Although the sense-faculties…" onward, it interrogates possessing the nature of consciousness. This is a concessive refutation, which also first establishes two propositions. From "If having [the nature], it is already…" onward, it interrogates them: having [the nature] is still the same as having [consciousness], which also becomes simultaneous production; lacking [the nature] is still the same as lacking [consciousness], which is the same as production from insentient things. From "Furthermore, the nature of consciousness…" onward, it interrogates in terms of oneness and difference. As for "If one," it first interrogates one line: whenever one speaks of "nature," only later can it produce; if consciousness and its nature are one, there is no producer and produced. As for "If different," it interrogates the line of difference: if the nature were different from consciousness, it would be the same as an external object; if an external object can produce, consciousness would be identical with the other; how could one reckon it as self[-produced]? From "If one says…" onward, it next refutes the nature of otherness. Having been interrogated as before, one definitively knows that the mind is not produced from itself. Therefore, conceding that it is not produced from itself, one says: "Although one says that the mind is not self-produced, it is because there are external dust-objects that the mind is aroused." Looking from dust-objects toward the sense-faculties, dust-objects are called "other." From "Citing the sūtra, it says…" onward, as for citing the text of the Dapin to substantiate the nature of otherness: dust-objects are external conditions that come to stimulate the internal sense-faculties, and the generated thought is the dharma produced; the Buddha, accommodating one capacity, spoke in terms of the nature of otherness. The theorist, not understanding this, cites the sūtra to reinforce their attachment. From "If so…" onward, it classifies it as belonging to production from other. From "Now examining…" onward, it applies contemplation. It also first posits two propositions. From "If dust-objects are…" onward, it interrogates them. First, interrogating [the proposition that] they are mind, there are three faults: first, the fault of dust-objects not being mind, meaning mind is not called a dust-object; second, the fault of dust-objects not being external to thought, which is the same as self-production; third, the fault of simultaneous production—if dust-objects are not mind, one might allow the reckoning of production from dust-objects, but if dust-objects are mind, it turns out to be producing mind where mind already is, which is called simultaneous production. If a seed produces a sprout, there is producer and produced; if a seed were to produce a seed, two seeds would exist simultaneously—what producer and produced could there be? From "If dust-objects are not mind" onward, it next interrogates the proposition of "not mind." This is identical in meaning to the sense-faculties lacking consciousness above, and the intent of the interrogation is also the same; hence it says, "Refuted as before." That dust-objects possess the nature of consciousness can be known by analogy with the previous case. From "If sense-faculties…" onward, it interrogates combined production. Because singly reckoning self or other has already both been examined and refuted, one reckons combined production intending to avoid [the faults of] self and other. It also first establishes two propositions. From "If each individually…" onward, it interrogates them: if each individually has it, this is still the same as having it in the two propositions of the previous text, hence it says "falling into the nature of self and other"—how could it be called joint production? If each individually lacks it, just as two grains of sand lack oil and when combined still lack it, this is also not called joint. From "For example…" onward, it adduces an analogy. It also first establishes two propositions. From "If each has…" onward, it next interrogates the two propositions. It is fully like the case in the doctrine: if the mirror and face unite as one, fearing that if each has or each lacks in different locations they cannot produce the reflection, and that only when combined in the same location can they produce the reflection, it therefore concludes by interrogating: "in truth they do not unite as one." Only if the mirror reaches the face would it be called uniting as one. Now, the way an image is captured is neither too close nor too far, and then one can see the image. If so, it is of itself being neither too close nor too far that can produce the image; what does it have to do with mirror and face? Separation is again impossible; therefore, know that there is no image. From "The separation and union of sense-faculties and dust-objects" onward, it simply matches the text from "If mirror and face unite" below. As for the text above, it is because it is already complete in the doctrine. One should further match each of sense-faculties and dust-objects with the text above mirror and face uniting as one. From "Furthermore, sense-faculties and dust-objects…" onward, interrogating nature and oneness/difference is completely as explained above under self-production. From "If sense-faculties and dust-objects…" onward, it interrogates reckoning production without [either]. Since the former three, having been examined, cannot produce, therefore outside the three one separately reckons production apart from them. Within this, it first classifies it as belonging to having no causes or conditions; without causes, nothing is produced. Next, it also first posits two propositions. From "If there is…" onward, it interrogates. First, it interrogates there being separation: separation is itself a condition, which is the same as production from other; why call it separation? From "If there is no…" onward, it interrogates it as being the same as lacking mind. From "If one says…" onward, it interrogates nature. It also first posits two propositions; next, it refutes the two propositions: having it is also the same as other, lacking it is the same as lacking mind. From "The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā" onward, it next cites the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā generally to substantiate the four propositions: none of them should produce at all; why reckon them individually? From "If one examines…" onward, it concludes the establishment of the two emptineses of nature and marks. Herein, it first shows the characteristics of the two emptineses. Merely being free of the reckoning of nature is called "emptiness of nature." From "Nor does it not abide" onward, once nature is refuted, there are only the marks of form and mind, internal and external. Since they do not abide within the four propositions of non-existence, marks are also unattainable; this is called "emptiness of marks." As for stating "neither internal nor external," and so forth: "internal" is simply the cause, "external" is simply the condition, and "in between" is joint. "Always existing of itself" is simply causelessness. Because of the absence of these reckonings, there are no four natures. Although these two emptineses are spoken of sequentially, in meaning they are not at different times. From "If the four propositions…" onward, it again uses the two truths to conclude the establishment of the two emptineses. If there is attachment to nature, it is conventional but not a truth; only after refuting attachment to nature is it called conventional truth, hence it says "conventional truth refutes nature." Once attachment to nature is refuted, there are only names, which are called provisional; the provisional is precisely marks, because marks are empty. Contemplating dharma-nature, contemplating the principle and realizing the real, is called the ultimate truth refuting marks. Emptiness is not sequential; the two truths are simultaneous. It is only to distinguish nature and marks that they are spoken of sequentially. Reflect on this! Reflect on this! Failing to see this meaning, one vainly claims it to be identical to emptiness. Therefore, in the Dapin, passing through each and every dharma, it says that it is neither internal nor external nor in between, and so forth. This is the shared contemplation of the two emptineses by the three vehicles. Next, in the chapter "Exhortation to Learn," it says: "Bodhisattvas-mahāsattvas and others should all cultivate and learn this." These three provisionalities are precisely the provisionality refuted by emptiness. Next, in the chapter "Gathering and Dispersing," in each and every line it says: "There are only names; these names do not abide, nor do they not abide."