止觀輔行傳弘決 5.65

5.65

次問答料簡中，初問意者，既不許以外見而破《中論》不生不滅，若於《中論》不生不滅起見如何？答中更開六句，分別判釋。釋中意者，本以《中論》不生不滅而為難辭，故今還以《中論》意答。《中論》兼含既具四意，亦以四意不生不滅，對彼外人絕言之見，復以四種不生滅見，對四教下四正絕言，故有相破、相修、相即。且如三藏對外簡者，三藏不生不滅破絕言見，三藏絕言破不生不滅見。絕言見更修三藏不生不滅，不生不滅見更修三藏絕言。三藏絕言即三藏不生不滅，翻到亦爾。次以外外對衍說之，是則復成三箇六句。又除外外但於教教，自以絕言破不生不滅等，復成四箇六句。又以藏對通對別對圓，復成三箇六句。復以通對別圓，復成兩個六句。復以別對圓，復成一箇六句。如是都成十四六句。若論答問，一個破邪六句即足。準《楞伽》文中廣明破見，及以此文依教起見，是故須此委悉論之。故《楞伽》第四「大慧白佛：『外道亦說不生不滅，與佛法何別？』佛言：『不同。如幻而生、如幻而滅，名不生滅。』」此即通以大乘不生不滅破外不生不滅。舉一例諸，他皆準此。又如向所說相破相修，破中皆以大破於小。若準起見，皆以藏破之。復應以藏對三、以藏破三。修中亦以小修於大，助中亦以大修於小。次約一切凡夫無非見也。「魚王」等者，此二行時，眾魚眾貝皆悉隨從。《爾雅》云「貝居陸者曰𧷼（卑遙切），在水者曰蜬（古含切）。」《大經》十一云「如轉輪王主兵大臣，常在前導，王隨後行。亦如魚王、蟻王、螺王、商主、牛王，在前行時諸眾隨逐。」「蕪蔓」者，草滋長曰蕪，藤滋長曰蔓。又曰：木藤草蔓。「當知」下，示見過患，勸勤修觀。且約外外，故云「避具入絕」。若約佛法，亦應云乃至避別入圓。皆以止觀逐而破之，具足如向一十四番六句，故云「無遠不屆」。乃至「如金剛刀」等，此約破見以成伏道。「若得」下，明成斷道。以見望思名之為多，故云「從多為言」。且約破見，竪論名遍；望橫望後及以一心，不名為遍。下去例然。言「三結」者。問：見惑既有八十八使，如何但說斷三結已即令得果？答：論云「此三種結是三三昧近對治法，身見是空近對治法，戒取是無願近對治法，疑是無相近對治法。復次三結生惑增上，身見生六十二，戒取生一切苦行，疑於過未一切處生猶豫。是故經中但說三結。」《大經》三十三云「須陀洹人所斷煩惱，猶如縱廣四十里水。略言三結，此三重故。譬如大王出遊巡時，雖有四兵，世人但言王去王來。」「問」下，釋疑，先釋能破疑。初問意者，能破止觀既有三種，空觀已云破無量見，後之二觀更何所破？言無量見者，如前所列單複乃至圓門絕言，圓絕尚破，況復餘耶？當知後觀無所復破。答中意者，初觀所破謂見及思，束此二破但成破有。見雖無量尚未破思，且言見遍耳。若其通途，以見為名，後之二觀破於無見及以雙非。各有所以，何慮無破？「故釋論」下引證者，中道雙非方盡二見。「故知諸見」下，結意也。通以諸惑同作見名。界內諸見雖復縱橫，但為初觀之所破耳。故云「尚不為第二觀所破」，云何而言第三觀無所破耶？「云何」下，兼責前諸見橫計也。諸見尚在，未得初觀，況第二第三，云何諸計自謂真道？故《大論》中「若有若無通皆是見。汝尚未出有見，況復無耶？」即《大論》序中歸敬偈文也。又通以諸見而名有者，為斥二乘為無見故。次問者，有之與無同斥為見。有既無量，無豈不然？答意者，《大論》頌文一往斥小且通名見，妄計已斷故不縱橫。

Next, in the questions, answers, and analytical distinctions: the intent of the initial question is that since one is not permitted to refute the non-arising and non-perishing of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā using non-Buddhist views, what about giving rise to views regarding the non-arising and non-perishing of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā itself? In the reply, six propositions are further unfolded to analyze and explain. The intent in this explanation is that since the original objection took the non-arising and non-perishing of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā as its pretext for criticism, the answer is now given in turn using the intent of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Since the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā encompasses all four meanings, it also uses the non-arising and non-perishing of these four meanings to counter that non-Buddhist view of the ineffable; furthermore, it uses the four views of non-arising and non-perishing to counter the four correct ineffables under the four teachings. Therefore, there are mutual refutation, mutual cultivation, and mutual identity. To take the Tripiṭaka's differentiation against external [views] as an example: the Tripiṭaka's non-arising and non-perishing refutes the view of the ineffable, and the Tripiṭaka's ineffable refutes the view of non-arising and non-perishing. The view of the ineffable further cultivates the Tripiṭaka's non-arising and non-perishing, and the view of non-arising and non-perishing further cultivates the Tripiṭaka's ineffable. The Tripiṭaka's ineffable is identical to the Tripiṭaka's non-arising and non-perishing; the converse is likewise. Next, when explained in terms of external versus the Mahāyāna, this again forms three sets of six propositions. Furthermore, excluding the external and taking only teaching against teaching, when each independently uses the ineffable to refute non-arising and non-perishing and so forth, this forms another four sets of six propositions. Again, matching the Tripiṭaka against the shared, against the distinctive, and against the perfect forms another three sets of six propositions. Again, matching the shared against the distinctive and the perfect forms two sets of six propositions. Again, matching the distinctive against the perfect forms one set of six propositions. In this way, all together fourteen sets of six propositions are formed. If considered strictly as answering the question, a single set of six propositions refuting errors would suffice. However, based on the text of the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra which extensively explains the refutation of views, as well as on this text's reliance on teachings to generate views, it is necessary to discuss it in this full detail. Thus the fourth fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra says: 'Mahāmati addressed the Buddha: "Non-Buddhists also speak of non-arising and non-perishing; how do they differ from the Buddhadharma?" The Buddha said: "They are not the same. Arising like an illusion and perishing like an illusion is called non-arising and non-perishing."' This generally uses the Mahāyāna's non-arising and non-perishing to refute external non-arising and non-perishing. Bringing up one exemplifies the rest; all others follow this principle. Furthermore, as stated earlier regarding mutual refutation and mutual cultivation: in refutation, the greater is always used to refute the lesser. If based on the arising of views, they are all refuted using the Tripiṭaka. Again, one should contrast the Tripiṭaka with the [other] three and refute the three with the Tripiṭaka. In cultivation, the lesser also cultivates the greater; in aiding, the greater also cultivates the lesser. Next, [it is explained] in terms of ordinary beings being entirely comprised of views. Regarding 'king of fishes' and so forth: when these two move, schools of fish and clusters of shells all follow after them. The Erya says: 'Shells living on land are called piáo (fan qie: bi-yao); those in water are called hán (fan qie: gu-han).' The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, fascicle eleven, says: 'Just as the military commander of a wheel-turning king always leads in front and the king follows behind; and just as when a king of fish, a king of ants, a king of conches, a caravan leader, or a bull king moves forward, all their followers pursue.' 'Overgrown and tangled': abundant growth of grass is called 'overgrown' (wú); abundant growth of vines is called 'tangled' (màn). It is also said: tree-creepers are vines, and grass-creepers are tangles. From 'One should know' onward, the fault of views is revealed, encouraging diligent cultivation of contemplation. Taking the external [perspective], it says 'fleeing the comprehensive and entering the ineffable.' If taken from the Buddhadharma, one should also say: up to fleeing the distinctive and entering the perfect. All are pursued and refuted with calming and contemplation, completely as in the aforementioned fourteen sets of six propositions; thus it says 'there is nowhere far it does not reach.' Down to 'like a vajra blade' and so forth, this relates to refuting views so as to achieve the path of subduing. From 'If one attains' onward, it clarifies the achievement of the path of eradication. Views, when viewed in relation to thought, are referred to as many; hence it says 'speaking from the standpoint of the majority.' Tentatively, regarding the refutation of views, vertically speaking it is called universal; in contrast to the horizontal, to what follows, and to the single mind, it is not called universal. What follows below is analogous. Regarding the 'three fetters': Question: Since the afflictions of views comprise eighty-eight entanglements, why does it only say that by severing the three fetters one immediately attains the fruit? Answer: The treatise says: 'These three fetters are the proximate antidotes to the three samādhis: identity view is the proximate antidote to emptiness; grasping at precepts and vows is the proximate antidote to wishlessness; doubt is the proximate antidote to signlessness. Furthermore, the three fetters generate afflictions predominantly: identity view generates the sixty-two [views]; grasping at precepts generates all ascetic austerities; doubt generates hesitation regarding everything in the past and future. Therefore, the sūtra speaks only of the three fetters.' Fascicle thirty-three of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: 'The defilements severed by a srotāpanna are like water extending forty leagues across. Briefly speaking, there are three fetters because these three are the most heavy. For example, when a great king goes out on tour, though there are four divisions of troops, worldly people only say: the king goes, the king comes.' From 'Question' onward, doubts are resolved, first resolving the doubt regarding the ability to refute. The intent of the first question is: since the calming and contemplation capable of refuting are of three types, and the contemplation of emptiness has already been said to refute immeasurable views, what else is there for the subsequent two contemplations to refute? Regarding the 'immeasurable views': as listed earlier, from single and complex up to the ineffable of the perfect gate, even the perfect ineffable is refuted, how much more the rest? One should know that the subsequent contemplations have nothing left to refute. The intent of the reply is: what the initial contemplation refutes is view and thought; bundling these two refutations together merely constitutes refuting existence. Although views are immeasurable, thought has not yet been refuted; it is merely said that views are universally [refuted]. Broadly speaking, taking 'view' as the name, the subsequent two contemplations refute the view of non-existence and [the view of] neither-nor. Each has its rationale; why worry that there is nothing to refute? The quotation from 'Therefore the Expository Treatise' onward serves as scriptural proof: only the neither-nor of the middle way completely exhausts the two views. 'Therefore one knows that all views' onward concludes the meaning. Afflictions in general are uniformly given the name of views. Although the various views within the triple realm are complex and manifold, they are only refuted by the initial contemplation. Hence it says 'they are not even what the second contemplation refutes,' so how could one say that the third contemplation has nothing to refute? From 'How can...' onward, it additionally censures the previous perverse reckonings of views. While the various views still persist and the first contemplation has not yet been attained, let alone the second or third, how could these various reckonings claim themselves to be the true path? Thus in the Dazhidulun: 'Whether existence or non-existence, all are generally views. You have not yet escaped the view of existence, how much less non-existence?' This is the verse of homage in the preface of the Dazhidulun. Furthermore, broadly designating all views as 'existence' is for the sake of rebuking the two vehicles for their view of non-existence. Next, the question: existence and non-existence are equally rebuked as views. Since existence is immeasurable, how could non-existence not be so? The intent of the reply is: the verse in the Dazhidulun temporarily rebukes the lesser [vehicle] and broadly calls them views; because perverse reckonings have already been severed, they are not manifold.