止觀輔行傳弘決 5.65

5.65

Next, in the questions, answers, and analytical distinctions: the intent of the initial question is that since one is not permitted to refute the non-arising and non-perishing of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā using non-Buddhist views, what about giving rise to views regarding the non-arising and non-perishing of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā itself? In the reply, six propositions are further unfolded to analyze and explain. The intent in this explanation is that since the original objection took the non-arising and non-perishing of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā as its pretext for criticism, the answer is now given in turn using the intent of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Since the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā encompasses all four meanings, it also uses the non-arising and non-perishing of these four meanings to counter that non-Buddhist view of the ineffable; furthermore, it uses the four views of non-arising and non-perishing to counter the four correct ineffables under the four teachings. Therefore, there are mutual refutation, mutual cultivation, and mutual identity. To take the Tripiṭaka's differentiation against external [views] as an example: the Tripiṭaka's non-arising and non-perishing refutes the view of the ineffable, and the Tripiṭaka's ineffable refutes the view of non-arising and non-perishing. The view of the ineffable further cultivates the Tripiṭaka's non-arising and non-perishing, and the view of non-arising and non-perishing further cultivates the Tripiṭaka's ineffable. The Tripiṭaka's ineffable is identical to the Tripiṭaka's non-arising and non-perishing; the converse is likewise. Next, when explained in terms of external versus the Mahāyāna, this again forms three sets of six propositions. Furthermore, excluding the external and taking only teaching against teaching, when each independently uses the ineffable to refute non-arising and non-perishing and so forth, this forms another four sets of six propositions. Again, matching the Tripiṭaka against the shared, against the distinctive, and against the perfect forms another three sets of six propositions. Again, matching the shared against the distinctive and the perfect forms two sets of six propositions. Again, matching the distinctive against the perfect forms one set of six propositions. In this way, all together fourteen sets of six propositions are formed. If considered strictly as answering the question, a single set of six propositions refuting errors would suffice. However, based on the text of the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra which extensively explains the refutation of views, as well as on this text's reliance on teachings to generate views, it is necessary to discuss it in this full detail. Thus the fourth fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra says: 'Mahāmati addressed the Buddha: "Non-Buddhists also speak of non-arising and non-perishing; how do they differ from the Buddhadharma?" The Buddha said: "They are not the same. Arising like an illusion and perishing like an illusion is called non-arising and non-perishing."' This generally uses the Mahāyāna's non-arising and non-perishing to refute external non-arising and non-perishing. Bringing up one exemplifies the rest; all others follow this principle. Furthermore, as stated earlier regarding mutual refutation and mutual cultivation: in refutation, the greater is always used to refute the lesser. If based on the arising of views, they are all refuted using the Tripiṭaka. Again, one should contrast the Tripiṭaka with the [other] three and refute the three with the Tripiṭaka. In cultivation, the lesser also cultivates the greater; in aiding, the greater also cultivates the lesser. Next, [it is explained] in terms of ordinary beings being entirely comprised of views. Regarding 'king of fishes' and so forth: when these two move, schools of fish and clusters of shells all follow after them. The Erya says: 'Shells living on land are called piáo (fan qie: bi-yao); those in water are called hán (fan qie: gu-han).' The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, fascicle eleven, says: 'Just as the military commander of a wheel-turning king always leads in front and the king follows behind; and just as when a king of fish, a king of ants, a king of conches, a caravan leader, or a bull king moves forward, all their followers pursue.' 'Overgrown and tangled': abundant growth of grass is called 'overgrown' (wú); abundant growth of vines is called 'tangled' (màn). It is also said: tree-creepers are vines, and grass-creepers are tangles. From 'One should know' onward, the fault of views is revealed, encouraging diligent cultivation of contemplation. Taking the external [perspective], it says 'fleeing the comprehensive and entering the ineffable.' If taken from the Buddhadharma, one should also say: up to fleeing the distinctive and entering the perfect. All are pursued and refuted with calming and contemplation, completely as in the aforementioned fourteen sets of six propositions; thus it says 'there is nowhere far it does not reach.' Down to 'like a vajra blade' and so forth, this relates to refuting views so as to achieve the path of subduing. From 'If one attains' onward, it clarifies the achievement of the path of eradication. Views, when viewed in relation to thought, are referred to as many; hence it says 'speaking from the standpoint of the majority.' Tentatively, regarding the refutation of views, vertically speaking it is called universal; in contrast to the horizontal, to what follows, and to the single mind, it is not called universal. What follows below is analogous. Regarding the 'three fetters': Question: Since the afflictions of views comprise eighty-eight entanglements, why does it only say that by severing the three fetters one immediately attains the fruit? Answer: The treatise says: 'These three fetters are the proximate antidotes to the three samādhis: identity view is the proximate antidote to emptiness; grasping at precepts and vows is the proximate antidote to wishlessness; doubt is the proximate antidote to signlessness. Furthermore, the three fetters generate afflictions predominantly: identity view generates the sixty-two [views]; grasping at precepts generates all ascetic austerities; doubt generates hesitation regarding everything in the past and future. Therefore, the sūtra speaks only of the three fetters.' Fascicle thirty-three of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: 'The defilements severed by a srotāpanna are like water extending forty leagues across. Briefly speaking, there are three fetters because these three are the most heavy. For example, when a great king goes out on tour, though there are four divisions of troops, worldly people only say: the king goes, the king comes.' From 'Question' onward, doubts are resolved, first resolving the doubt regarding the ability to refute. The intent of the first question is: since the calming and contemplation capable of refuting are of three types, and the contemplation of emptiness has already been said to refute immeasurable views, what else is there for the subsequent two contemplations to refute? Regarding the 'immeasurable views': as listed earlier, from single and complex up to the ineffable of the perfect gate, even the perfect ineffable is refuted, how much more the rest? One should know that the subsequent contemplations have nothing left to refute. The intent of the reply is: what the initial contemplation refutes is view and thought; bundling these two refutations together merely constitutes refuting existence. Although views are immeasurable, thought has not yet been refuted; it is merely said that views are universally [refuted]. Broadly speaking, taking 'view' as the name, the subsequent two contemplations refute the view of non-existence and [the view of] neither-nor. Each has its rationale; why worry that there is nothing to refute? The quotation from 'Therefore the Expository Treatise' onward serves as scriptural proof: only the neither-nor of the middle way completely exhausts the two views. 'Therefore one knows that all views' onward concludes the meaning. Afflictions in general are uniformly given the name of views. Although the various views within the triple realm are complex and manifold, they are only refuted by the initial contemplation. Hence it says 'they are not even what the second contemplation refutes,' so how could one say that the third contemplation has nothing to refute? From 'How can...' onward, it additionally censures the previous perverse reckonings of views. While the various views still persist and the first contemplation has not yet been attained, let alone the second or third, how could these various reckonings claim themselves to be the true path? Thus in the Dazhidulun: 'Whether existence or non-existence, all are generally views. You have not yet escaped the view of existence, how much less non-existence?' This is the verse of homage in the preface of the Dazhidulun. Furthermore, broadly designating all views as 'existence' is for the sake of rebuking the two vehicles for their view of non-existence. Next, the question: existence and non-existence are equally rebuked as views. Since existence is immeasurable, how could non-existence not be so? The intent of the reply is: the verse in the Dazhidulun temporarily rebukes the lesser [vehicle] and broadly calls them views; because perverse reckonings have already been severed, they are not manifold.