止觀輔行傳弘決 6.43

6.43

○次「前來」下，例餘陰入等者。問：應在第七卷末明十乘竟，例餘陰入皆修十乘，何故於此即例餘耶？答：以義便故。從初至此單約識心，從此已去乃至離愛，具約五陰方成法相，故通塞中既檢校諦緣，諦緣必須具足五陰，道品念處不可獨明一識陰故。正助秖是助於道品，下三秖是明於觀陰次位等耳。故須於此例餘陰入，將餘陰入共為觀境。問：歷餘一心與四陰何別？答：有同有異，具如向簡。又歷餘一心，以心對心而論總別。若例餘陰，以陰對陰而論麁細、報非報異。法相別故，故須別明。雖復別明，應知同異。陰不出心、心不離陰，陰從能覆、心從能造，造親覆疎並心為境。次問答料簡。問，如文。答中，先答入空因緣。於中先總答，「何者」下別列，「夫生死」下釋也。初文釋為自脫，「自既有」下釋為脫他。「賢聖」以下釋為慧命，「諸神通」下釋為無漏，「又法位」下釋為法位。然須思擇例同出假因緣相者，自脫同大悲，脫他同本誓，慧命同利智，無漏同方便，法位同精進，一一細會令義相當。假在空後，故云「例後」。欲以前後一例五緣，故亦五耳。「夫空觀」下，次答入假無四門。意。「空通大小」等者，小藏大衍偏三圓一，此等皆破見思入空。能破之觀依門不同，故列十六門，使析體不濫。如體空中諸空復別，見思斷處三乘共有。別教入空雖獨在菩薩，智斷復同，標心永異。今文明竪相似別教，文意復殊，故今文云所為處別。故對別簡，使與別異。以立次第本顯不次，故云「料簡閑」也。恐人迷故寄四教簡，文意本在唯一圓融。「智障者」下，寄此文後以引達磨欝多羅釋智障義。達磨欝多羅，此云法尚，佛滅度後八百年出。是阿羅漢，於《婆沙》中取三百偈以為一部，名《雜阿毘曇》。此論主凡有釋義，文多委悉，大師引用全無破斥。亦如《玄》文釋十二部經，雖不正用，具存彼意。今文初從「煩惱至云何說智為障」，即徵起也。「智有二種」云，答也。既述彼義，且順彼宗，勿將今文以雜彼意。初徵可解。答中言「證智」者，是佛菩薩智。言「識智」者，是二乘智。二乘之智雖得智名，未順實相義當於識，能破煩惱義當於智。言「體違」等者，釋識智。識順於想，性是分別，此智違體故曰體違，此智順想故曰「想順」。順二乘智，違於佛智，與佛菩薩智而作障故，故云智障。「又佛於二障」等者，佛煩惱障先已除竟，無明復盡，名離二障。故引《涅槃》證二解脫。「心」謂無漏，「智」謂證智。智不被障，名「智解脫」。次引《地持》釋《涅槃》意。《地持》名慧，《涅槃》名智，名異義同。次「若以」下，轉釋地持慧解脫也。《地持》中云「於一切所知知無障礙，名為智淨。」故釋云「以無明故，於知有礙。若破無明，知無障礙。」即是無明障於證智，名為智障。破無明故，得智無障。次引《入大乘》以證無明是智障義。然無明名同，是故須簡，出世無明方名智障。「二障俱是煩惱」下，更轉難也。無明與愛俱是煩惱，何故獨以無明煩惱而為智障？從「無明」下，釋也。愛是煩惱，煩惱異智。無明雖亦名為煩惱，煩惱即智。是故無明不同於愛，所以分於二障不同。次引例釋智障。分段是生死，生死非無為；若無為生死，生死即無為。無明亦如是，即體得名智，是故說無明得名為智障。「愛即四住」下，釋煩惱非即智之惑，故有智慧時則無煩惱，有煩惱時則無智慧，是故文云「解惑不俱」。煩惱即障，名煩惱障。言「無為生死」者，《攝大乘》立七種生死中，有方便生死即無為生死，有因緣生死即法界生死。此二生死在變易土，故彼生死即是無為，故借例今即智之惑。復次「愛能令諸有相續」去，更重釋出愛與無明其體不同。愛從果起，能續後果，故云能令諸有相續，此明愛之功能。「能令心煩」下，釋愛功能秖是煩惱。「雖無明覆蔽」下，出無明功能以望煩惱。招生彊者不過於愛，故從彊受名，是故愛但名為煩惱，不名智障。「無明不了」下，正釋無明功能是智障義。無明與愛俱違解脫，而無明與愛枝本不同，無明為本正違解脫，違即是障。次「愛性」下，明愛是枝。本既已受智障之名，是故愛但名為煩惱。次「無明性迷」下，重釋無明親能障智，體性復迷。迷即是障，親障智故，是故名為「障智義顯」。次「無明有二種」下，重簡無明名同體異，以辨二障體相不同。先問云：雖有迷事迷理之殊，二既同得名為無明，云何無明得名智障？次引《地持》答。若通論者，所障既其俱名智，故使能障俱名障。今別論者，所障智體既不同，故令能障無明別。是故二乘人無我智而為所障，即以煩惱而為能障。諸佛菩薩法無我智而為所障，人無我智而為能障。以二乘之所障，為佛菩薩之能障，於二乘人得名為智，於佛菩薩但名為障。此亦即智是障，名為智障。「若爾」下，判向《地持》人法無我俱是所迷。人法無我二俱名理，二無我智俱名淨智，煩惱及智俱是理智家障。從「又智所知」去，即是事智被障為智障。次「若爾」下，徵向所解。迷事迷理俱名智障，何者為定？從「照事照理」去，會向二解並有道理。以古人釋有二不同，或以諸法被障名為智障，或以無明障於佛智名為智障。論主俱許，故云雖二二無二也。何者？秖是一智能照事理，事理雖殊智體無別。「又心智為障」下，又出異解。有人云：心智為障者，心是分別，分別為事，事礙如實。此釋即取以迷理者名為智障。「以滅想滅心」去，舉小乘法對釋於大。如小乘人入滅盡定，滅想滅心，亦名滅智。此是斷滅，今滅智障心不可滅，即捨分別入無分別，故知分別實不可捨。「又非條然」下，重釋智障與中道智非條然別。智障是無明，無明是法性，是故智障不可斷也。次「是以」下，引經為證。福尚一毫無不趣極，當知分別智體無捨。為助道故先破煩惱，煩惱若破，此破惑智體是證智，是故無失。「人作一向」下，次破執見。見者自謂有斷不斷之別，論其智體，體本無殊。如上眾釋，意顯無明雖云智障，障體即智。又前來諸解亦不出前釋中觀初明智障義。開為三釋：初云說智為障，即是智為能障，智障兩字俱屬能也。次云「從所障故名為智障」者，即是證智被障名為智障，智障兩字俱屬所障。次云「又智所知礙名為智障」者，即障字為能智字為所。次問答者，重釋妨也。初問意者，《瓔珞經》中列位始終，唯云「初地三觀現前」，前雙流文何故得有三處雙流？答意者，借義相成，於理無失。借別八地成通教下，借別初住成圓教高，不可專執《瓔珞》別位定在初地，明位委悉不過瓔珞，是故借之以成高下。此一問答，拾遺故來，文亦非次。

Next, from "As previously..." onward, on extending by analogy to the remaining aggregates, sense bases, and so forth. Question: Should it not be at the end of the seventh roll, after clarifying the ten vehicles, that one extends them by analogy so that all remaining aggregates and sense bases cultivate the ten vehicles? Why extend them by analogy right here? Answer: Because of doctrinal convenience. From the beginning up to this point, it has dealt purely with the mind of consciousness. From here on up to relinquishing craving, the five aggregates must be fully treated to complete the doctrinal characteristics. Therefore, since in examining the passes and blockages one investigates the truths and conditions, and the truths and conditions must fully include the five aggregates; and because the stations of mindfulness among the aids to the path cannot elucidate the consciousness aggregate alone. The primary and supplementary [practices] merely support the aids to the path; the lower three merely clarify the stages and sequence of contemplating the aggregates. Hence one must extend by analogy to the remaining aggregates and sense bases here, taking the remaining aggregates and sense bases together as the object of contemplation. Question: What is the difference between traversing the other single minds and [contemplating] the four aggregates? Answer: There are similarities and differences, fully as distinguished above. Moreover, traversing the other single minds discusses general and specific by comparing mind with mind. If extending by analogy to the remaining aggregates, it discusses coarse and subtle, retributive and non-retributive differences, by comparing aggregate with aggregate. Because their doctrinal characteristics differ, they must be clarified separately. Although clarified separately, one should know their similarities and differences. The aggregates do not lie outside the mind; the mind is not apart from the aggregates. "Aggregate" derives from its capacity to cover; "mind" derives from its capacity to create. Creation is intimate, while covering is distant; both take the mind as the object. Next is the question-and-answer differentiation. The question is as in the text. In the answer, it first answers the causes and conditions for entering emptiness. Within this, it first answers generally; from "What are they?" onward, it lists them individually; from "Now, birth and death..." onward, it explains them. The opening text explains it as liberating oneself; from "Once having oneself..." onward, it explains it as liberating others. From "Worthies and sages..." downward, it explains it as the wisdom-life; from "All spiritual penetrations..." downward, it explains it as uncontaminated; from "Furthermore, the stage of dharma..." downward, it explains it as the stage of dharma. Yet one must reflect and consider the characteristics of the causes and conditions analogously shared with emerging into the provisional: liberating oneself corresponds to great compassion; liberating others corresponds to the original vow; the wisdom-life corresponds to sharp wisdom; the uncontaminated corresponds to expedient means; and the stage of dharma corresponds to energetic progress. Harmonize them individually and in detail so that their meanings correspond. Since the provisional follows emptiness, it says "analogous to the subsequent." Because it intends to make the earlier and later equally five conditions by analogy, there are also five. From "Now, the contemplation of emptiness..." downward, it next answers why entering the provisional has no four gates. Meaning: in "Emptiness pervades the small and the great," and so forth, the small is the Tripiṭaka, and the great refers to the Mahāyāna—the three biased and the one perfect. All of these enter emptiness by refuting [the delusions of] views and thoughts. The contemplations capable of refuting differ according to the gate; hence sixteen gates are listed so that analysis and embodiment are not conflated. Just as among the embodiments of emptiness the various emptinesses further differ, the place where views and thoughts are severed is common to the three vehicles. Although entering emptiness in the distinctive teaching rests solely with bodhisattvas, its wisdom and severing are identical [to the shared], while their aspirations remain ever distinct. The present text discusses the vertical, which resembles the distinctive teaching, yet the text's intent is again distinct; hence the present text says that the scope of what is undertaken differs. Thus it is differentiated against the distinctive teaching to distinguish it from the distinctive. Because establishing a sequence is originally meant to reveal non-sequence, it says "the differentiation is cleared." Lest people be confused, it draws upon the four teachings to differentiate; the text's intent fundamentally lies solely in the one perfect fusion. From "As for cognitive hindrance..." downward, it draws upon this following text to cite Dharmottara's explanation of the meaning of cognitive hindrance. Dharmottara is translated here as Fashang; he appeared eight hundred years after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa. An arhat, he extracted three hundred verses from the Vibhāṣā to form one work, named the Saṃyuktābhidharma[hṛdaya]. Whenever this treatise master offers explanations, his texts are mostly detailed and thorough; the Great Master cited him without any refutation at all. It is just as when the Xuanwen explains the twelve divisions of scriptures: although not directly using them, it completely preserves his intent. Now, the text from "From afflictions... to how can one say wisdom is a hindrance?" is the raising of the question. "Wisdom is of two kinds" is the answer. Having recounted his doctrine, one should temporarily follow his school, and not mix the present text into his intent. The initial question is easy to understand. In the answer, "realized wisdom" is the wisdom of buddhas and bodhisattvas. "Cognitive wisdom" is the wisdom of the two vehicles. Although the wisdom of the two vehicles obtains the name "wisdom," it does not accord with the true mark, so in meaning it corresponds to cognition; yet in its ability to break afflictions, it corresponds to wisdom. As for "its essence opposes," and so forth, it explains cognitive wisdom. Cognition accords with conception, and its nature is discrimination; this wisdom opposes the essence, so it is said that "its essence opposes"; this wisdom accords with conception, so it is said that "conception accords." It accords with the wisdom of the two vehicles, but opposes the Buddha's wisdom; because it creates an obstacle to the wisdom of buddhas and bodhisattvas, it is called a cognitive hindrance. In "Furthermore, the Buddha regarding the two hindrances..." and so forth, the Buddha had previously eliminated the affliction hindrance, and ignorance is also exhausted, which is termed being freed from the two hindrances. Hence it cites the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] to prove the two liberations. "Mind" refers to the uncontaminated; "wisdom" refers to realized wisdom. Wisdom not being hindered is called "liberation through wisdom." Next, it cites the Bodhisattvabhūmi (Dichi) to explain the intent of the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra]. The Bodhisattvabhūmi calls it prajñā, while the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] calls it wisdom; the names differ, but the meaning is the same. Next, from "If according to..." downward, it further explains liberation through prajñā in the Bodhisattvabhūmi. The Bodhisattvabhūmi states: "Knowing all knowables without obstruction is called the purity of wisdom." Thus it explains: "Because of ignorance, there is obstruction to knowing. If one shatters ignorance, knowing is unobstructed." That is to say, ignorance hinders realized wisdom, which is called cognitive hindrance. Because one shatters ignorance, one attains unobstructed wisdom. Next, it cites the Mahāyānāvatāra to prove that ignorance is cognitive hindrance. However, since the name "ignorance" is the same, it must be differentiated: only supramundane ignorance is called cognitive hindrance. From "Both hindrances are afflictions..." downward, it presents a further objection: Ignorance and craving are both afflictions; why is the affliction of ignorance alone considered a cognitive hindrance? From "Ignorance..." downward, it explains: Craving is an affliction, and affliction is distinct from wisdom. Although ignorance is also called an affliction, affliction is identical to wisdom. Therefore, ignorance is not the same as craving, which is why the two hindrances are distinguished as different. Next, it cites an analogy to explain cognitive hindrance: Segmented [birth and death] is birth and death, and birth and death is not the unconditioned; yet if it is unconditioned birth and death, birth and death is identical to the unconditioned. Ignorance is also like this: from its essence it derives the name of wisdom, and therefore ignorance is said to obtain the name of cognitive hindrance. From "Craving is the four entrenchments..." downward, it explains that affliction is a delusion that is not identical to wisdom. Therefore, when there is wisdom, there is no affliction; when there is affliction, there is no wisdom. Hence the text says: "Understanding and delusion do not coexist." Affliction is itself the hindrance, called the affliction hindrance. As for "unconditioned birth and death": among the seven kinds of birth and death established in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, there is birth and death of expedient means, which is unconditioned birth and death, and there is birth and death of causes and conditions, which is dharma-dhātu birth and death. These two kinds of birth and death exist in the land of transformation; hence that birth and death is identical to the unconditioned. Thus it is borrowed as an analogy for the present delusion that is identical to wisdom. Furthermore, from "Craving can make all realms of existence continuous" onward, it further re-explains that the essences of craving and ignorance are different. Craving arises from results and can perpetuate subsequent results; hence it is said to make all realms of existence continuous. This clarifies the function of craving. From "It can agitate the mind..." downward, it explains that the function of craving is merely affliction. From "Although ignorance conceals..." downward, it shows the function of ignorance in comparison to affliction. In producing rebirth, none is stronger than craving, so it receives its name from its strength; therefore, craving is only called affliction, not cognitive hindrance. From "Ignorance fails to comprehend..." downward, it directly explains that the function of ignorance is the meaning of cognitive hindrance. Both ignorance and craving oppose liberation, yet ignorance and craving differ as root and branch: ignorance is the root and directly opposes liberation; opposition is itself hindrance. Next, from "The nature of craving..." downward, it clarifies that craving is a branch. Since the root has already received the name of cognitive hindrance, craving is therefore only called affliction. Next, from "The nature of ignorance is delusive..." downward, it re-explains that ignorance directly hinders wisdom and its essence is inherently delusive. Delusion is itself hindrance; because it directly hinders wisdom, it is therefore said that "the meaning of hindering wisdom is evident." Next, from "There are two kinds of ignorance..." downward, it re-differentiates that ignorance is identical in name but different in essence, so as to distinguish the difference in essential marks between the two hindrances. First it asks: Although there is a distinction between delusion regarding phenomena and delusion regarding principle, since both equally receive the name "ignorance," how does ignorance come to be called cognitive hindrance? Next, it cites the Bodhisattvabhūmi to answer: If discussed in general terms, since that which is hindered is in both cases called wisdom, that which can hinder is in both cases called hindrance. Now, if discussed specifically, since the essences of the wisdoms that are hindered differ, the ignorances that can hinder are also distinguished. Therefore, the wisdom of personal selflessness of the two vehicles is that which is hindered, with afflictions being that which can hinder. The wisdom of phenomenal selflessness of the buddhas and bodhisattvas is that which is hindered, with the wisdom of personal selflessness being that which can hinder. Taking that which hinders the two vehicles as that which can hinder buddhas and bodhisattvas, for persons of the two vehicles it obtains the name of wisdom, but for buddhas and bodhisattvas it is merely called a hindrance. This is also wisdom itself being the hindrance, termed cognitive hindrance. From "If so..." downward, it judges that the personal and phenomenal selflessness in the Bodhisattvabhūmi just cited are both objects of delusion. Both personal and phenomenal selflessness are called principle; the two wisdoms of selflessness are both called pure wisdom; afflictions and wisdom are both hindrances to the wisdom of principle. From "Furthermore, the knowables of wisdom..." onward, it is phenomenal wisdom being hindered that constitutes cognitive hindrance. Next, from "If so..." downward, it questions the explanation just given: Delusion regarding phenomena and delusion regarding principle are both called cognitive hindrance; which one is definitive? From "Illuminating phenomena and illuminating principle..." onward, it reconciles the two explanations above as both having valid principle. Because the ancients' explanations had two different views: some took phenomena being hindered as cognitive hindrance, while others took ignorance hindering the Buddha's wisdom as cognitive hindrance. The treatise master accepts both; hence he says that although there are two, the two are non-dual. Why? It is just a single wisdom that can illuminate both phenomena and principle; although phenomena and principle differ, the essence of wisdom has no distinction. From "Furthermore, mental wisdom is hindrance..." downward, it presents yet another interpretation. Someone said: As for mental wisdom being the hindrance, the mind is discrimination, discrimination is phenomenal, and phenomena obstruct true reality. This interpretation takes being deluded about principle as cognitive hindrance. From "By extinguishing conception and extinguishing mind..." onward, it adduces the Hīnayāna dharma to explain the Mahāyāna by contrast. Just as a Hīnayāna person enters the cessation attainment, extinguishing conception and extinguishing mind, which is also called extinguishing wisdom—this is annihilation. Now, in extinguishing the cognitive hindrance, the mind cannot be extinguished; one directly relinquishes discrimination to enter non-discrimination, so one knows that discrimination actually cannot be relinquished. From "Furthermore, it is not distinctly..." downward, it re-explains that cognitive hindrance and middle-path wisdom are not distinctly separate. Cognitive hindrance is ignorance, and ignorance is dharma-nature; therefore, cognitive hindrance cannot be severed. Next, from "Therefore..." downward, it cites a sūtra as proof. If even a hair of merit unfailingly tends toward the ultimate, one should know that the essence of discriminating wisdom is not to be relinquished. To aid the path, one first breaks afflictions; if afflictions are broken, the essence of this wisdom that breaks delusion is realized wisdom, and therefore there is no error. From "People adopt a one-sided..." downward, it next refutes clinging views. Those with views believe themselves that there is a distinction between severing and non-severing; yet discussing the essence of wisdom, the essence is fundamentally without distinction. As in the numerous explanations above, the intent reveals that although ignorance is called cognitive hindrance, the essence of the hindrance is identical to wisdom. Furthermore, the various explanations previously given do not go beyond the meaning of cognitive hindrance initially clarified in the contemplation of the middle above. It opens into three interpretations: First, saying wisdom is hindrance means that wisdom is that which can hinder; both words, "cognitive" and "hindrance," pertain to that which can hinder. Next, saying "named cognitive hindrance from that which is hindered" means that realized wisdom being hindered is called cognitive hindrance; both words, "cognitive" and "hindrance," pertain to that which is hindered. Next, saying "furthermore, the obstruction of wisdom's knowables is called cognitive hindrance" means that the word "hindrance" is that which can [hinder], while the word "cognitive" is that which is [hindered]. Next is a question and answer, which re-explains an objection. The intent of the initial question is: In the Yingluo jing, the stages are listed from beginning to end, and it only says "at the first bhūmi the threefold contemplation becomes manifest"; why does the earlier text on double flow have three places of double flow? The intent of the answer is: Borrowing meanings to complement each other is without doctrinal error. Borrowing the distinctive eighth bhūmi completes the lower for the shared teaching; borrowing the distinctive first abode completes the higher for the perfect teaching. One must not cling exclusively to the Yingluo's distinctive stage being fixed at the first bhūmi. For clarifying stages in detail, none surpasses the Yingluo; hence it is borrowed to establish higher and lower. This question and answer is introduced to pick up omissions, and its text is likewise not in sequential order.