止觀輔行傳弘決 6.43

6.43

Next, from "As previously..." onward, on extending by analogy to the remaining aggregates, sense bases, and so forth. Question: Should it not be at the end of the seventh roll, after clarifying the ten vehicles, that one extends them by analogy so that all remaining aggregates and sense bases cultivate the ten vehicles? Why extend them by analogy right here? Answer: Because of doctrinal convenience. From the beginning up to this point, it has dealt purely with the mind of consciousness. From here on up to relinquishing craving, the five aggregates must be fully treated to complete the doctrinal characteristics. Therefore, since in examining the passes and blockages one investigates the truths and conditions, and the truths and conditions must fully include the five aggregates; and because the stations of mindfulness among the aids to the path cannot elucidate the consciousness aggregate alone. The primary and supplementary [practices] merely support the aids to the path; the lower three merely clarify the stages and sequence of contemplating the aggregates. Hence one must extend by analogy to the remaining aggregates and sense bases here, taking the remaining aggregates and sense bases together as the object of contemplation. Question: What is the difference between traversing the other single minds and [contemplating] the four aggregates? Answer: There are similarities and differences, fully as distinguished above. Moreover, traversing the other single minds discusses general and specific by comparing mind with mind. If extending by analogy to the remaining aggregates, it discusses coarse and subtle, retributive and non-retributive differences, by comparing aggregate with aggregate. Because their doctrinal characteristics differ, they must be clarified separately. Although clarified separately, one should know their similarities and differences. The aggregates do not lie outside the mind; the mind is not apart from the aggregates. "Aggregate" derives from its capacity to cover; "mind" derives from its capacity to create. Creation is intimate, while covering is distant; both take the mind as the object. Next is the question-and-answer differentiation. The question is as in the text. In the answer, it first answers the causes and conditions for entering emptiness. Within this, it first answers generally; from "What are they?" onward, it lists them individually; from "Now, birth and death..." onward, it explains them. The opening text explains it as liberating oneself; from "Once having oneself..." onward, it explains it as liberating others. From "Worthies and sages..." downward, it explains it as the wisdom-life; from "All spiritual penetrations..." downward, it explains it as uncontaminated; from "Furthermore, the stage of dharma..." downward, it explains it as the stage of dharma. Yet one must reflect and consider the characteristics of the causes and conditions analogously shared with emerging into the provisional: liberating oneself corresponds to great compassion; liberating others corresponds to the original vow; the wisdom-life corresponds to sharp wisdom; the uncontaminated corresponds to expedient means; and the stage of dharma corresponds to energetic progress. Harmonize them individually and in detail so that their meanings correspond. Since the provisional follows emptiness, it says "analogous to the subsequent." Because it intends to make the earlier and later equally five conditions by analogy, there are also five. From "Now, the contemplation of emptiness..." downward, it next answers why entering the provisional has no four gates. Meaning: in "Emptiness pervades the small and the great," and so forth, the small is the Tripiṭaka, and the great refers to the Mahāyāna—the three biased and the one perfect. All of these enter emptiness by refuting [the delusions of] views and thoughts. The contemplations capable of refuting differ according to the gate; hence sixteen gates are listed so that analysis and embodiment are not conflated. Just as among the embodiments of emptiness the various emptinesses further differ, the place where views and thoughts are severed is common to the three vehicles. Although entering emptiness in the distinctive teaching rests solely with bodhisattvas, its wisdom and severing are identical [to the shared], while their aspirations remain ever distinct. The present text discusses the vertical, which resembles the distinctive teaching, yet the text's intent is again distinct; hence the present text says that the scope of what is undertaken differs. Thus it is differentiated against the distinctive teaching to distinguish it from the distinctive. Because establishing a sequence is originally meant to reveal non-sequence, it says "the differentiation is cleared." Lest people be confused, it draws upon the four teachings to differentiate; the text's intent fundamentally lies solely in the one perfect fusion. From "As for cognitive hindrance..." downward, it draws upon this following text to cite Dharmottara's explanation of the meaning of cognitive hindrance. Dharmottara is translated here as Fashang; he appeared eight hundred years after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa. An arhat, he extracted three hundred verses from the Vibhāṣā to form one work, named the Saṃyuktābhidharma[hṛdaya]. Whenever this treatise master offers explanations, his texts are mostly detailed and thorough; the Great Master cited him without any refutation at all. It is just as when the Xuanwen explains the twelve divisions of scriptures: although not directly using them, it completely preserves his intent. Now, the text from "From afflictions... to how can one say wisdom is a hindrance?" is the raising of the question. "Wisdom is of two kinds" is the answer. Having recounted his doctrine, one should temporarily follow his school, and not mix the present text into his intent. The initial question is easy to understand. In the answer, "realized wisdom" is the wisdom of buddhas and bodhisattvas. "Cognitive wisdom" is the wisdom of the two vehicles. Although the wisdom of the two vehicles obtains the name "wisdom," it does not accord with the true mark, so in meaning it corresponds to cognition; yet in its ability to break afflictions, it corresponds to wisdom. As for "its essence opposes," and so forth, it explains cognitive wisdom. Cognition accords with conception, and its nature is discrimination; this wisdom opposes the essence, so it is said that "its essence opposes"; this wisdom accords with conception, so it is said that "conception accords." It accords with the wisdom of the two vehicles, but opposes the Buddha's wisdom; because it creates an obstacle to the wisdom of buddhas and bodhisattvas, it is called a cognitive hindrance. In "Furthermore, the Buddha regarding the two hindrances..." and so forth, the Buddha had previously eliminated the affliction hindrance, and ignorance is also exhausted, which is termed being freed from the two hindrances. Hence it cites the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] to prove the two liberations. "Mind" refers to the uncontaminated; "wisdom" refers to realized wisdom. Wisdom not being hindered is called "liberation through wisdom." Next, it cites the Bodhisattvabhūmi (Dichi) to explain the intent of the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra]. The Bodhisattvabhūmi calls it prajñā, while the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] calls it wisdom; the names differ, but the meaning is the same. Next, from "If according to..." downward, it further explains liberation through prajñā in the Bodhisattvabhūmi. The Bodhisattvabhūmi states: "Knowing all knowables without obstruction is called the purity of wisdom." Thus it explains: "Because of ignorance, there is obstruction to knowing. If one shatters ignorance, knowing is unobstructed." That is to say, ignorance hinders realized wisdom, which is called cognitive hindrance. Because one shatters ignorance, one attains unobstructed wisdom. Next, it cites the Mahāyānāvatāra to prove that ignorance is cognitive hindrance. However, since the name "ignorance" is the same, it must be differentiated: only supramundane ignorance is called cognitive hindrance. From "Both hindrances are afflictions..." downward, it presents a further objection: Ignorance and craving are both afflictions; why is the affliction of ignorance alone considered a cognitive hindrance? From "Ignorance..." downward, it explains: Craving is an affliction, and affliction is distinct from wisdom. Although ignorance is also called an affliction, affliction is identical to wisdom. Therefore, ignorance is not the same as craving, which is why the two hindrances are distinguished as different. Next, it cites an analogy to explain cognitive hindrance: Segmented [birth and death] is birth and death, and birth and death is not the unconditioned; yet if it is unconditioned birth and death, birth and death is identical to the unconditioned. Ignorance is also like this: from its essence it derives the name of wisdom, and therefore ignorance is said to obtain the name of cognitive hindrance. From "Craving is the four entrenchments..." downward, it explains that affliction is a delusion that is not identical to wisdom. Therefore, when there is wisdom, there is no affliction; when there is affliction, there is no wisdom. Hence the text says: "Understanding and delusion do not coexist." Affliction is itself the hindrance, called the affliction hindrance. As for "unconditioned birth and death": among the seven kinds of birth and death established in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, there is birth and death of expedient means, which is unconditioned birth and death, and there is birth and death of causes and conditions, which is dharma-dhātu birth and death. These two kinds of birth and death exist in the land of transformation; hence that birth and death is identical to the unconditioned. Thus it is borrowed as an analogy for the present delusion that is identical to wisdom. Furthermore, from "Craving can make all realms of existence continuous" onward, it further re-explains that the essences of craving and ignorance are different. Craving arises from results and can perpetuate subsequent results; hence it is said to make all realms of existence continuous. This clarifies the function of craving. From "It can agitate the mind..." downward, it explains that the function of craving is merely affliction. From "Although ignorance conceals..." downward, it shows the function of ignorance in comparison to affliction. In producing rebirth, none is stronger than craving, so it receives its name from its strength; therefore, craving is only called affliction, not cognitive hindrance. From "Ignorance fails to comprehend..." downward, it directly explains that the function of ignorance is the meaning of cognitive hindrance. Both ignorance and craving oppose liberation, yet ignorance and craving differ as root and branch: ignorance is the root and directly opposes liberation; opposition is itself hindrance. Next, from "The nature of craving..." downward, it clarifies that craving is a branch. Since the root has already received the name of cognitive hindrance, craving is therefore only called affliction. Next, from "The nature of ignorance is delusive..." downward, it re-explains that ignorance directly hinders wisdom and its essence is inherently delusive. Delusion is itself hindrance; because it directly hinders wisdom, it is therefore said that "the meaning of hindering wisdom is evident." Next, from "There are two kinds of ignorance..." downward, it re-differentiates that ignorance is identical in name but different in essence, so as to distinguish the difference in essential marks between the two hindrances. First it asks: Although there is a distinction between delusion regarding phenomena and delusion regarding principle, since both equally receive the name "ignorance," how does ignorance come to be called cognitive hindrance? Next, it cites the Bodhisattvabhūmi to answer: If discussed in general terms, since that which is hindered is in both cases called wisdom, that which can hinder is in both cases called hindrance. Now, if discussed specifically, since the essences of the wisdoms that are hindered differ, the ignorances that can hinder are also distinguished. Therefore, the wisdom of personal selflessness of the two vehicles is that which is hindered, with afflictions being that which can hinder. The wisdom of phenomenal selflessness of the buddhas and bodhisattvas is that which is hindered, with the wisdom of personal selflessness being that which can hinder. Taking that which hinders the two vehicles as that which can hinder buddhas and bodhisattvas, for persons of the two vehicles it obtains the name of wisdom, but for buddhas and bodhisattvas it is merely called a hindrance. This is also wisdom itself being the hindrance, termed cognitive hindrance. From "If so..." downward, it judges that the personal and phenomenal selflessness in the Bodhisattvabhūmi just cited are both objects of delusion. Both personal and phenomenal selflessness are called principle; the two wisdoms of selflessness are both called pure wisdom; afflictions and wisdom are both hindrances to the wisdom of principle. From "Furthermore, the knowables of wisdom..." onward, it is phenomenal wisdom being hindered that constitutes cognitive hindrance. Next, from "If so..." downward, it questions the explanation just given: Delusion regarding phenomena and delusion regarding principle are both called cognitive hindrance; which one is definitive? From "Illuminating phenomena and illuminating principle..." onward, it reconciles the two explanations above as both having valid principle. Because the ancients' explanations had two different views: some took phenomena being hindered as cognitive hindrance, while others took ignorance hindering the Buddha's wisdom as cognitive hindrance. The treatise master accepts both; hence he says that although there are two, the two are non-dual. Why? It is just a single wisdom that can illuminate both phenomena and principle; although phenomena and principle differ, the essence of wisdom has no distinction. From "Furthermore, mental wisdom is hindrance..." downward, it presents yet another interpretation. Someone said: As for mental wisdom being the hindrance, the mind is discrimination, discrimination is phenomenal, and phenomena obstruct true reality. This interpretation takes being deluded about principle as cognitive hindrance. From "By extinguishing conception and extinguishing mind..." onward, it adduces the Hīnayāna dharma to explain the Mahāyāna by contrast. Just as a Hīnayāna person enters the cessation attainment, extinguishing conception and extinguishing mind, which is also called extinguishing wisdom—this is annihilation. Now, in extinguishing the cognitive hindrance, the mind cannot be extinguished; one directly relinquishes discrimination to enter non-discrimination, so one knows that discrimination actually cannot be relinquished. From "Furthermore, it is not distinctly..." downward, it re-explains that cognitive hindrance and middle-path wisdom are not distinctly separate. Cognitive hindrance is ignorance, and ignorance is dharma-nature; therefore, cognitive hindrance cannot be severed. Next, from "Therefore..." downward, it cites a sūtra as proof. If even a hair of merit unfailingly tends toward the ultimate, one should know that the essence of discriminating wisdom is not to be relinquished. To aid the path, one first breaks afflictions; if afflictions are broken, the essence of this wisdom that breaks delusion is realized wisdom, and therefore there is no error. From "People adopt a one-sided..." downward, it next refutes clinging views. Those with views believe themselves that there is a distinction between severing and non-severing; yet discussing the essence of wisdom, the essence is fundamentally without distinction. As in the numerous explanations above, the intent reveals that although ignorance is called cognitive hindrance, the essence of the hindrance is identical to wisdom. Furthermore, the various explanations previously given do not go beyond the meaning of cognitive hindrance initially clarified in the contemplation of the middle above. It opens into three interpretations: First, saying wisdom is hindrance means that wisdom is that which can hinder; both words, "cognitive" and "hindrance," pertain to that which can hinder. Next, saying "named cognitive hindrance from that which is hindered" means that realized wisdom being hindered is called cognitive hindrance; both words, "cognitive" and "hindrance," pertain to that which is hindered. Next, saying "furthermore, the obstruction of wisdom's knowables is called cognitive hindrance" means that the word "hindrance" is that which can [hinder], while the word "cognitive" is that which is [hindered]. Next is a question and answer, which re-explains an objection. The intent of the initial question is: In the Yingluo jing, the stages are listed from beginning to end, and it only says "at the first bhūmi the threefold contemplation becomes manifest"; why does the earlier text on double flow have three places of double flow? The intent of the answer is: Borrowing meanings to complement each other is without doctrinal error. Borrowing the distinctive eighth bhūmi completes the lower for the shared teaching; borrowing the distinctive first abode completes the higher for the perfect teaching. One must not cling exclusively to the Yingluo's distinctive stage being fixed at the first bhūmi. For clarifying stages in detail, none surpasses the Yingluo; hence it is borrowed to establish higher and lower. This question and answer is introduced to pick up omissions, and its text is likewise not in sequential order.