止觀輔行傳弘決 3

English (machine translation) 3

Language: English

3.21 — 4 parts

3.1

Exposited by Zhanran, Śramaṇa of Piling under the Tang.

Regarding the second major chapter, "Explaining the Name": now, the establishment of names is not uniform, as the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra says, "Some have causes and conditions, like Maudgalyāyana and the like; some have no causes and conditions, like peaches, plums, and the like." Nirvāṇa is also like this: having no cause or condition, a name is forced upon it. Calming and contemplation are also like this: one arbitrarily designates them as "calming and contemplation." This absence of a cause is itself named as having a cause; for the sake of sentient beings, designations are established in accordance with their capacities. Furthermore, relying on worldly names, supramundane names are established. Therefore, all the noble ones first establish worldly names to serve as expedient means for supramundane names. Yet these worldly names originally derive from the supramundane; hence the Suvarṇaprabhāsa Sūtra says, "Worldly names all issue from the Buddha's sūtras." Thus we know that all names are established in imitation of the principle. Since names imitate the principle, the principle is also made known through names; therefore, wondrous names are provisionally used to express the wondrous principle. Zhuangzi says, "Yet what the world values is words, passing down books; these are not worthy of value." Since Zhuang[zi] himself used words to pass down books, then Zhuang[zi] himself is not worthy of value. Laozi said, "One who knows does not speak; one who speaks does not know." Yet Lao[zi] had words, so he is identical to one who does not know. His intention was to make the world speechless while solely extolling his own words, unaware that he in turn used speechlessness to castigate worldly people. When people are subjected to these words of self-castigation, yet secretly castigate others while conversely taking themselves to have attained it—this is an extreme delusion! Now, here it is not so: by means of the snare one catches the hare, and having caught it, one forgets the snare. What does the snare forget? It is simply not spoken of as the hare. Is this not what is meant by "liberation through words and letters"? Establishing the names of calming and contemplation can be understood by this analogy.

In the previous differentiation, they were called "the extensive and the brief," and also called "the general and the specific." The two texts of the general and the specific mutually illumine each other; hence the preceding text says that the arising of the five brief sections illustrates the ten extensive chapters. Furthermore, the preceding is brief and the subsequent is extensive in order to bring about understanding of the meaning; the preceding is extensive and the subsequent is brief in order to encompass and preserve it. Now we elaborate on the previous brief exposition so that the meaning may be easily understood. If [distinguished] by the difference between sharp and dull faculties, as in fascicle thirty-one of the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra: "The Buddha told Śāriputra: 'Take care not to preach the Dharma extensively to people of sharp faculties, nor preach the Dharma briefly to people of dull faculties.' Śāriputra said: 'I speak out of compassion, not because I am fully endowed with [the knowledge of] faculties and powers.' The Buddha said: 'Preaching the Dharma extensively or briefly is not something known by the voice-hearers or pratyekabuddhas.'" The sūtra clarifies adapting to capacities, and thus uses Śāriputra as a foil for rebuke. Here, the treatise explains them to benefit both types of people. Moreover, the previous brief text was merely to give rise to understanding, and since understanding was not yet complete, it is now treated extensively. Furthermore, the intention of this extensive text is also the same as the fivefold profound meaning. The fivefold profound meaning mysteriously discourses on the gist of the teaching, whereas here one arouses practice relying on the sūtra. Therefore, that one is for explaining the sūtra, while this one is for accomplishing contemplation; hence their sequence differs slightly from that one.

First, "Explaining the Name" means setting forth the name. Next, "Substance and Characteristics" means revealing the substance; "Encompassing the Dharmas" merely clarifies the dharmas encompassed by that substance. The three sections from "Expedient Means" onward clarify the core purpose; "Arousing the Teaching" is the function; and evaluating the teaching classifies it into the biased and the perfect. In that text's explanation of the Lotus Sūtra, it is necessary by principle to differentiate the teachings of [the Buddha's] entire lifetime, so the teaching is placed at the end. In differentiating the former four, this text aims at accomplishing contemplation. Contemplation arises from understanding; name, substance, and the biased versus the perfect all pertain to understanding. Because practice is established based on understanding, expedient means and correct contemplation follow after understanding. Practice at its inception is the cause, and practice at its culmination is the fruit; hence correct contemplation is followed by clarifying the karmic reward. The core purpose is one's own practice; the function is benefiting others. Because one's own practice is fulfilled, one is able to arouse the teaching; the ultimate intent is simply that which is realized by self and others. Therefore, that Profound Meaning text cites the "Spiritual Powers" chapter in accordance with the sequence of the teaching, and thus names function, substance, and core purpose; if it cites the "Introduction" chapter in accordance with the sequence of practice, it thus names substance, core purpose, and function. The present text properly corresponds to the sequence of practice, but because the characteristics of the teaching precede the core purpose, the intention of this order is as just explained.

Now we explain the name. First, it concludes what came before and introduces what follows, which is also the sequential order of the intent. From "the broad road" onward concludes what came before. From "furthermore, by what..." onward introduces what follows. "Road" (途) means path; because it has not yet examined the trails and paths in detail, it is called "the broad road." "Rough" (梗) means brief; "outline" (概) means level; it merely roughly puts forward its main guidelines. As in the preceding Great Intent, the cause and effect, practice and understanding, of self and others were briefly complete; furthermore, by what meaning is it named calming and contemplation? Therefore, within the present text it is opened into four gates. If there were not this explanation, how would one distinguish the efficacy of the name and substance? For this reason there are four sections: the first three directly clarify the names that are the expressive [means], while the latter one is established supplementarily to reveal the expressive [means] by means of the expressed [object]. Expressing in relative dependence is sequential; expressing in absolute transcendence is non-sequential. Harmonizing the differences is merely the different names for absolute transcendence.

First, regarding "relative dependence" (相待): mutually comparing this and that is called mutual (相); viewing oneself from the perspective of another is called dependence (待). It is like long and short, or large and small, mutually receiving their names. Zhuangzi says, "A person seven feet tall is not considered large, yet a mole cricket seven inches long obtains the name of large." The Abhidharmakośa Commentary says: "Dependence means comparative dependence. Viewing the earlier from the perspective of the later is called the past; viewing the later from the perspective of the earlier is called the not-yet." Fathers, sons, elder and younger brothers mutually obtain their names; this can be seen by analogy. In judging the present Lotus Sūtra, it possesses only two kinds of wonder: namely, relative dependence and absolute transcendence. What is called relative dependence is only the dependence on the crude to constitute the wondrous; there is never dependence on the wondrous to constitute the crude. If one looks from the trace toward the origin, they may also be mutually compared; but if one looks from one section of teachings toward another section, it is entirely and exclusively wondrous. Now, in terms of the Lotus Sūtra's principle of the trace, mutual comparison is set aside; therefore, the Profound Meaning text calls both relative dependence and absolute transcendence wondrous. Thus, looking at the divisions and teachings in mutual relation, there are also horizontal and vertical: viewing against the previous four periods is called vertical dependence; viewing the perfect against the three teachings is called horizontal dependence. Since this text relies on the intent of the Lotus Sūtra, the explanation of the name and so forth broadly conforms to it. Relative dependence is crude; its meaning corresponds to discussing the wondrous in dependence on the crude. Absolute transcendence is wondrous; its meaning corresponds to opening the crude to discuss the wondrous. These two are also called discarding the crude and opening the crude; therefore, within the Lotus Sūtra, only two wonders are discussed, and there is no name such as "neither dependent nor absolute." Because that text evaluates the teachings, both relative dependence and absolute transcendence are equally called wondrous. In the present text, relative dependence is judged as crude, and it clarifies only absolute contemplation. Since there is no division [of teachings] to depend upon, there is no vertical dependence; since there is no teaching to view against, this is called having no horizontal dependence; therefore, there is only the single absolute transcendence serving as that which expresses. Although relative dependence is established to reveal absolute transcendence, there is not even an absolute—what dependence could there be? In order to express the three virtues, it is provisionally named absolute; borrowing the name of relative dependence, it is judged as conceivable. Therefore, only absolute transcendence is called wondrous. Hence, although the Buddha-realm after the conceivable object is wondrous, because it sits at the end of the nine realms, it is collectively named crude; therefore, all are judged as not what is presently used. The sequential and non-sequential are also of this intent; therefore, the sequential intention only refers to the Mahāyāna gate, and applying the shared or applying the distinctive only refers to seeming shared or seeming distinctive. Although it is said not to be used, it directly relies on the conceivable to clarify the inconceivable, opening that which is depended upon to accomplish that which is absolute; this is precisely the intent of the wondrous contemplation in the present text. From "Explaining the Name" onward, all meanings are like this. Therefore, explaining the name discusses relative dependence and absolute transcendence, whereas substance and characteristics discuss only the sequential and non-sequential. The six meanings of encompassing dharmas and the five gates of the biased and the perfect are also like this. Although there is no assembly of divisions to be discussed in contrast, it still borrows the flavors of the teachings to reveal the perfect and wondrous. In every single object, the ten contemplations should only be wondrous; yet it still relies on the horizontal and vertical to reveal what is neither horizontal nor vertical. Thus we know that the entire text of this work collectively accomplishes the wondrous contemplation of opening the provisional in the perfect vehicle; how could it point to a single phrase and separately call it high and profound? If that were the case, how would it differ from mere nominal recitation? In these four sections, there are four texts and two meanings, but the intent rests solely on one. Relative dependence and absolute transcendence are two, but the intent lies in absolute transcendence. Furthermore, the expressed object is one and the expressive means are three, which is also called one meaning; because the expressed object reveals the expressive means, the intent is said to be one.

Regarding the "three types of calming": although three names are opened, the names are still general and collective, encompassing the three truths without yet distinguishing shallow from profound; only when arriving at revealing the substance are superiority and inferiority distinguished. The three meanings in contemplation are also like this. Regarding "all evil discursive thoughts and investigations," etc.: the wording seems like [the afflictions of] views and thoughts, but the intent is still general, and the cited Vimalakīrti is also general evidence. If we borrow the text of substance and characteristics to distinguish it beforehand here: it means that putting to rest views and thoughts brings the mind to rest in the true principle, yet the true principle does not admit of calming or non-calming; if putting to rest dust-and-sand brings the mind to rest in the provisional principle, the provisional principle does not admit of calming or non-calming; if putting to rest ignorance brings the mind to rest in the middle principle, the middle principle does not admit of calming or non-calming. Thus, each of the three truths has three kinds of calming, and contemplation is also like this; it can be understood by analogy. Hence the subsequent text says, "The first three accomplish the subsequent three, and the last one contains the first three." Since this is so for the sequential, the single mind is likewise. Next, in "stopping and resting," where the cognitive mind conditions the principle of truth, as well as the prajñā entering the principle in the Benevolent Kings [Sūtra], they are general and not yet distinct, and the intent is also as before. Therefore, the "principle" spoken of here refers only to the wisdom that can enter, and has not yet spoken of the principle that is entered; it is also like this in contemplation. In the third calming, it says "the words are shared but the intent is distinct"; and where it also says here "clarifying calming in contrast to non-calming," the words seem like the text above. In the above two kinds of calming, putting to rest is contrasted with not putting to rest, and stopping is contrasted with not stopping; now, taking ignorance in contrast to dharma-nature, viewing them provisionally: ignorance seems like neither putting to rest nor stopping, while dharma-nature seems like putting to rest and stopping. Hence it says: "The words are shared with the above, but the intent is not so." Ignorance is precisely dharma-nature, and dharma-nature is precisely ignorance; their substance is identical while their names differ, and designations are established in mutual opposition. Therefore, it is eternally distinct from the above two kinds of calming. The above two cannot be said to be mutually identical; hence "now specifically relying on..." directly sets forth the characteristics of the third calming. What is meant by "specifically": because the above two kinds of calming merely belong to the general path. What is meant by "the general path": both of the two kinds of calming have one wisdom and one severing. On the side of severing there is wisdom, provisionally contrasted with saṃsāra, so the name of severing is established in terms of nirvāṇa; on the side of wisdom there is severing, provisionally contrasted with that which is outside the principle, so the name of wisdom is established in terms of prajñā. Because of severing it is named putting to rest; because of wisdom it is named stopping. Wisdom is understood in terms of that which is able to sever, and severing is understood in terms of that which is severed; hence it says that wisdom and severing generally discuss the two types of calming. Now, it is not so: it relies exclusively on the principle of truth. The principle is neither the subject nor the object; it is merely that by possessing defilements, defilement is itself dharma-nature. Defilement and nature are mutually dependent and have nothing to do with wisdom and severing; therefore, the third is unlike the previous two. Furthermore, the third calming establishes its name in terms of principle, but calming is not the principle; the former two kinds of calming merely rely on wisdom and severing, and wisdom and severing are calming; therefore, the third is unlike the previous two. Furthermore, wisdom and severing rely on the principle, but wisdom and severing are not the principle; hence the former two kinds of calming merely take wisdom and severing as their direct reliance, unlike the third which exclusively takes the principle of truth as its direct reliance; therefore, the third is unlike the previous two. Furthermore, this difference exists merely in accordance with the conceivable; in terms of the inconceivable, the three substances are fundamentally one. From "as the sūtra says" onward, citations are provided as evidence. It cites various sūtras generally without providing a specific proof, so there is no specific pointing. Ignorance and dharma-nature are both neither arising nor perishing; although in principle both are neither, if one speaks of dharma-nature one must speak of quietude and cessation, and if one speaks of ignorance one must speak of arising and perishing. Thus, these two names both pervade the three truths. The names are all established in opposition, but in principle they are without discrepancy. Thus we know that explaining the name merely consists in explicating the two words "calming" and "contemplation" as putting to rest, penetrating, etc., without having the leisure to detail the depth or shallowness of subject and object. Hence the subsequent text says: "One must not seek the distinctive substance through the shared name." Since this is so for the three types of calming, the three types of contemplation are likewise. In the first contemplation, where it says "sharp mattock," etc.: a large hoe is called a mattock (钁); this [character in the text] refers to carving jade, which is not the present intent. It should be written as this "hew" (斲); hewing means breaking. A large rock is called a boulder (磐); powdered stone is called sand (砂); small stones are called gravel (礫). Fascicle eighteen of the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, the "Nature" chapter, says: "It is like a person who knows well where a hidden treasure is; he then hews the earth with a sharp mattock, passing straight through boulders, sand, and gravel without difficulty, only failing to pierce through when reaching adamantine." Now, borrowing that analogy, it comprehensively contains the three defilements; it can be understood by analogy with calming. One should set aside adamantine and merely retain piercing through; this is the meaning here. Next, citing the meaning of digging through from the Lotus Sūtra to prove penetrating: since dry and moist are not yet distinguished, it is also general. Next, in explaining contemplation as penetration, the text of the Ruiying is cited; although it mentions putting to rest, the intent rests on the side of penetration. Next, non-contemplative contemplation, citing sūtras, etc., can be understood by analogy with calming. The conclusion from "therefore" onward is as in the text.

3.3

Next, in explaining the absolute: first, a general indication of the text's intention; second, refuting the horizontal and vertical; third, directly clarifying the absolute. Regarding the first, the text's intention: refuting by means of horizontal dharmas, refuting so as to make them horizontal, makes one know that horizontal relativity is not called the absolute; refuting by means of vertical dharmas, refuting so as to make them vertical, makes one know that vertical relativity is not called the absolute. What is called 'horizontal' means that looking among the four propositions, there is not yet shallow or deep, hence it is termed horizontal. In the four, such as 'production of production', looking among the four propositions, there is depth and shallowness, hence it is termed vertical. First, in refuting the horizontal, as for the previous two propositions both stating 'illuminating the object is primary, eliminating defilement is secondary': secondary is the other, primary is the self; wishing to judge the fault of self-nature, one first establishes the secondary and the primary. What are the secondary and primary? It is merely a single calming, differing in the basis for receiving its name. In terms of breaking defilement, it is named halting; in terms of relying on wisdom, it is named stopping; in terms of relying on the essential nature, it is named neither-stopping-nor-non-stopping. Thus it causes the reception of distinctions such as primary and secondary. Why is this? Generally speaking, in entering the path, the primary is employing wisdom, and the secondary is eliminating defilement. If the name is established from eliminating defilement, the name is established from the secondary; if the name is established from illuminating the object, the name is generated from the primary. What is refuted is defilement; defilement in relation to wisdom is the other, hence the calming of halting is established from what is refuted, and falls into 'other-nature'. The calming that can refute is again from what can illuminate; illuminating in relation to defilement is the self, hence the calming of stopping is established from what can illuminate, and falls into 'self-nature'. Here, stating 'illuminating the object' and so forth is done for convenience of phrasing. According to the principle, it should say relying on the truth is primary, halting defilement is secondary; only when arriving below at explaining contemplation can one speak of illuminating. From 'if neither' below, if grasping both self and other, one falls into 'common nature'. The text seems like a double negation, but the intent is actually a double affirmation, hence it says 'calming through the causes and conditions of wisdom and severance'. Not using one exclusively, it therefore seems like a double negation. The meaning of the calming of neither-stopping-nor-non-stopping falls into 'uncaused nature', which is precisely the double negation, simply because it is free of both self and other. 'Non-calming' is being free of self; 'neither non-calming' is being free of the other. Being free of the other is being free of what is refuted; being free of self is being free of what can be relied upon. Hence the third calming falls into uncaused nature. Contemplation is also like this, and can be known by analogy. However, the names that can express [it] in fact do not exceed these three calmings and three contemplations; therefore, in the absolute and in revealing the essence, it is also in terms of these names that the sudden is distinguished. To eliminate emotional reckonings, it is necessary to refute natures; therefore, Nāgārjuna's [statement that dharmas are] not produced from self and so forth is cited to verify freedom from the faults of nature. From 'unproduced' downward, it concludes. The absolute is unproduced; it does not establish its name from the four propositions of mutual relativity. Below 'establishing names from the four propositions', it reproves forming the meaning of relativity. Being mutually dependent and established in opposition, being thinkable and speakable, it is then conceivable. Not yet having severed grasping to natures is called bound defilement. Due to bound defilement, not yet realizing the unproduced is called the production of bound defilement. Being refuted by horizontal dharmas is called being refutable. The meaning of twofold emptiness being established, the meaning of mutual relativity is broken, which is called destructible. From 'arising and perishing' onward, it refutes specifically in terms of the three calmings and three contemplations. It briefly adduces the middle calming and middle contemplation; fully, it should explain that all three calmings and three contemplations are not established. The middle exemplifies the preceding and succeeding, hence it is briefly omitted.

3.4

Below 'further, vertically', next is the vertical refutation: because it is produced from the previous four natures of self and other, it is the production of production. Both the subject and the object are produced, hence it is called the production of production. Not escaping the fault of nature, it is conditioned; being conditioned, it is shifted by the four characteristics. Great production produces small production, hence it is called the production of production. Causes and conditions being production, forming the dharmas produced, it is also called production, hence it is called the production of production. Furthermore, cause produces and fruit produces, hence it is called the production of production. Even if one gives rise to the fault of nature regarding the middle way, it still belongs to birth-and-death, so how much more so for the rest? Although the names of the three calmings and contemplations apply to the three truths, if one gives rise to the four attachments, one does not even have the initial contemplation, so it belongs to birth-and-death, called the production of production. Refuting these productions to enter nirvāṇa is called non-production. This non-production receives its name in relativity to production, called the non-production of production. Relative to the unproduced ultimate truth, conventional production is spoken of, called the production of non-production. Relative to the extremes, the middle is spoken of; both extremes are production, and refuting these two productions is called the non-production of non-production. In each text there should be the three calmings and three contemplations; in the text there are only the names of two calmings. Initially, stating 'halting views and thoughts' is the calming of halting; 'stopping in the ultimate truth' is the calming of stopping; the two below follow this example. Thus we know the three truths all lack the calming of neither-stopping-nor-non-stopping and the three contemplations; because the calming of neither-stopping-nor-non-stopping is merely the principle of truth, it is not mentioned, and the meaning of contemplation should also be known by analogy with calming. The four propositions successively generate the subsequent names; therefore, all four propositions are called mutual relativity. Hence one must bring the horizontal into the vertical. Each vertical proposition is never without the horizontal; therefore the names of halting and so forth pervade the vertical. Hence both horizontal and vertical refutations are necessary before revealing the inconceivable name of the absolute. Below 'all are', it delivers a general reproof. Although the horizontal and vertical differ, the reckonings are equal in meaning; therefore it also says 'opposed... up to broken and destroyed', and so forth. Question: Horizontally reckoning self, other, and up to uncaused, one therefore produces defilement; vertically reaching the middle way, why does it also say the production of bound defilement and so forth? Answer: The subsequent are all the bound defilements of the preceding, hence all are production. Furthermore, the middle way not yet being ultimate still belongs to the teaching path; the teaching path having defilement, it is also production. Furthermore, believing in the teaching path in the initial mind, pre-reckoning the stages as being able to produce successively, it therefore judges the initial mind as producing bound defilement and so forth. Below 'is not yet', it also reproves specifically. Gathering relative names to form the absolute, one turns around and uses the relative names to compare them successively; therefore, looking at the subsequent from the preceding, although it receives the name of calming, looking again at the subsequent, it turns back into non-calming. Therefore, summing up the three within mutual relativity, they do not yet form halting and stopping within the absolute, how much less neither-stopping-nor-non-stopping; contemplation is also like this. Although the middle way does not have a separate object of truth following it, when viewed from the inconceivable within the true path, it also does not yet form calming; therefore the calmings of the three truths are not yet called calming. Below 'why is this', it explains the intent of the preceding reproof. 'Not completely dispelling attachment' explains that in opposition, the grasping to natures in the horizontal and vertical four propositions is unsevered. 'The path of speech is not severed' explains that successive generation forms the conceivable. 'Karma' explains defilement. 'Fruit' explains production. It is also permissible that both karma and fruit are production. Saying 'unceasing' explains refutable and destructible.

3.5

Below 'now, speaking of', it directly explains the absolute. First, it clarifies that which is made absolute. That which is made absolute refers to the aforementioned horizontal and vertical relativities. Affliction is simply reckoning the four natures; due to reckoning natures, there are karma and fruit; receiving the teachings and cultivating contemplation, one realizes attainments in sequence—such as these all form the conceivable and so forth, and therefore must be refuted. Below 'all are', next it clarifies that which can make absolute, which is calming and contemplation. Although it speaks of that which can make absolute, the subject matches the object. Why is this? Since it says making relativity absolute, then relativity is called absolute, hence it is called calming. Calming also self-annihilates; its name cannot be obtained. Contemplation is also like this: not outside what is contemplated, the subject matches the object, hence it says 'contemplation merges with the object like reality'. Contemplation also self-annihilates, hence it says 'how could there be contemplation?' 'Calming and contemplation are not even present' and so on reproves mutual relativity. If even the absolute is absent, how could mutual relativity be established? Therefore, this calming and contemplation not only lacks the darkness and distraction to be removed, but the essence of calming and contemplation itself is originally annihilated. Why is this? Because there is what is refuted, one speaks of that which can refute; what is refuted is precisely that which can refute, so there is no subject that can be discussed. One cannot, as in those names of mutual relativity, speak of the object relative to the subject, or speak of the subject relative to the object. Furthermore, the third calming and contemplation speaks of dharma-nature relative to ignorance, naming it calming; it speaks of ignorance relative to dharma-nature, naming it non-calming. Dharma-nature is not equivalent to calming or non-calming; hence, in terms of dharma-nature, explaining the third calming is different relative to the preceding, which is why it says 'relative to calming and non-calming, it speaks of neither calming nor non-calming'. That is, relative to the preceding two calmings, it speaks of the third calming; both calmings are spoken of in opposition to non-calming, hence it says 'calming and non-calming'. If speaking vertically, the present absolute calming and contemplation does not even have the absolute, so how could it speak of the calming and contemplation of the non-production of production relative to the non-calming of the production of production, up to speaking of the calming and contemplation of the non-production of non-production relative to the non-calming of the production of non-production? The two words 'how could' govern the three sentences below. Below 'therefore know', it concludes and explains the meaning of the absolute. First, in calming, stating 'none can be obtained' means relativity is precisely the absolute, and there is no relativity that can be discussed; hence it says calming, non-calming, up to neither calming nor non-calming all cannot be obtained. Both horizontal and vertical are like this; only with careful reflection can this be seen. Below 'oppositional relativity being severed', it generally concludes that the horizontal and vertical are all severed; it reproves that both horizontal and vertical are conditioned, and now since they are severed, it is not conditioned. 'Inconceivable' and so forth means that it cannot be seen through thinking with the previous horizontal and vertical four propositions. 'Not expressed by words' and so forth clarifies that the absolute is inexpressible. Since there are no names and characteristics of the horizontal and vertical four propositions, all bound defilements and so forth generated within the previous horizontal and vertical four propositions are extinguished. Extinguishing the absolute, it is therefore called 'extinguishing and absolute'. That which can extinguish is also absent, hence it says 'absolute and extinguished'. Next, in concluding contemplation, 'inverted' and so forth means that the horizontal and vertical four propositions are all called conceptions. 'It also cuts off the conditioned' and so forth concludes the difference in receiving names. The essence that can make absolute is one, but receives different names in accordance with the places where things are made absolute.

3.6

Regarding the passage from "absolute calming and contemplation" onward: next is explaining benefiting others. First, the intention of explaining is clarified. Having personally realized the absolute, one can adapt to the four kinds of capacities; expounding without exposition, it is therefore called "expoundable." If so, how could only the [first] three siddhāntas be methods for transforming others? The supreme-truth siddhānta is also for transforming others; hence the four chapters are matched to the four siddhāntas. From "If there is..." onward, the correct explanation begins. Question: Now when explaining the absolute, one should only clarify the absolute; why then match the four chapters to the four siddhāntas? Answer: Personal practice is exclusively absolute, but what is suitable for others varies; hence the absolute is divided into four teachings. Therefore, the text of the *Fahua xuanyi* states, when distinguishing and showing function: "The core is personal practice, so it must be distinguished from others; function is benefiting others, so both are adopted." If the inconceivable function still employs provisional devices, how much more so can the perfect absolute not be expounded as the four perfect siddhāntas? Thus, at the end of fascicle six of the *Fahua xuanyi*, in clarifying the opening of the four siddhāntas, it states: "Opening the crude worldly siddhānta perfects the wonderful worldly siddhānta, and so forth up to opening the crude supreme truth identically perfects the wonderful supreme truth. Therefore, either there is no exposition at all, but if there is exposition, it must be the four siddhāntas. Why? Difference means separation; converging them perfects the perfect difference. Differing without being different is thus matched to the worldly. Pervasion is the meaning of production; the name can penetrate principle; hence the goodness of principle is matched to the individual. Countering has that which counters and that which is countered; the absolute lacks that which counters and that which is countered; yet one temporarily relies on countering and countered to form the perfect therapeutic. The absolute pertains to principle; although principle is beyond exposition, based on the absolute principle the supreme truth is also expounded. When expounded as calming and contemplation, none of these four chapters is not calming and contemplation, and there is none that does not arrive at the absolute principle." Furthermore, regarding clarifying the absolute in terms of the manner of conversion: as in the *Vimalakīrti*, the thirty-two bodhisattvas each expounded the gate through which they entered; the gates all penetrated principle, and principle is therefore called absolute. Thus, after the bodhisattvas had spoken, they said to Mañjuśrī: "Virtuous one, you should speak." Mañjuśrī said: "Up to the absence of words and letters is truly entering the Dharma-gate of non-duality." This is named "extinguishing the absolute." Vimalakīrti closed his mouth and spoke not a word; this is named "the absolute extinguished." Question: If both attain the absolute, why are they different? Answer: Because they concurrently symbolize [different things], different avenues are shown. The bodhisattvas symbolize the difference of that which expresses; Mañjuśrī symbolizes the non-difference of that which is expressed; Vimalakīrti symbolizes the inexpressibility of that which is expressed. Furthermore, the bodhisattvas symbolize only transforming others; Mañjuśrī symbolizes both personal practice and transforming others; Vimalakīrti symbolizes only personal practice; each taking up one side, together they accomplish the wonderful matter. The absolute in the four siddhāntas can be understood by analogy to this. Furthermore, the inexpressible of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*, the wordlessness of the *Mahāsaṃnipāta-sūtra*, the purity of the *Prajñāpāramitā*, the stopping and praising of the *Lotus Sūtra*, and the non-arising of the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* are all different names for the absolute. Yet one must also know that the absolute differences of the various teachings are opened and revealed to have nothing outside them; only then does it match the present text. From "This..." onward, this absolute is concluded to establish the two emptinesses. First it is posited; next, from "This word..." onward, it is explained. First, emptiness of nature is clarified. From "Nor does it reside..." onward, next the emptiness of characteristics is clarified. Having refuted the horizontal and vertical and then responded to the four capacities, what is the absolute principle? It is the so-called true mark. The substance of the true mark fully possesses the two emptinesses, eternally different from the former two emptinesses of entering emptiness from provisionality. From "This word is unobtainable" onward, the name is concluded. From "It is also named..." onward, different names for the absolute are clarified. From "Therefore, like this..." onward, the characteristic of the absolute is explained. Since the substance of the absolute is omnipresent, there is nothing to be opposed to it; thus it is not named great because of the small. From "For example..." onward, an analogy is raised; this is clear. From "Calming and contemplation are also like this" onward, the analogy is matched. It is not named contemplation because of foolishness; it is not named calming because of distraction. From "Worldly people..." onward, the error is refuted. First, it generally refutes worldly people who speak based on the worldly mind, using words to refute words: words cannot be made absolute, and their explanation of the absolute fails to succeed; therefore, one should know that one must recognize the absolute principle. From "Why?" onward, the reason why the words of worldly people do not succeed in being absolute is explained: because words change following thoughts, words are not absolute. Therefore, though they speak of awakening, non-awakening, and so forth, they do not escape affliction and defilement. Mutually opposing endlessly, it is thus called "revolving." Awakening pertains to realization by wisdom; the mind pertains to the object of delusion. Having a mind is not awakening; awakening is cutting off the mind—it is not merely non-existence. Lacking the mind of the nine realms, it is thus called "non-mind." When compliant with thoughts there is empty talk, the absolute turns back into the relative; having no principle to rely upon, it is therefore said to be "without lodgment." From "If one grasps the meaning..." onward, the correct substance of the absolute is brought forth. Once one has penetrated the absolute principle, who discriminates anymore? Although focusing on the absolute principle, if discrimination does not perish, all are termed relative; thus only realization is called "the opening of true wisdom." Furthermore, from "grasps the meaning" onward, it clarifies that the absolute is inconceivable in discussion. From "activity of mind" onward, it clarifies that the absolute is inconceivable in thought. From "following wisdom" onward, it reiterates the stage of the absolute. From "Nor does it..." onward, it overturns the mistaken understanding of worldly people mentioned before. "And so forth" encompasses revolving and the like. From "various kinds..." onward, it reiterates the reprimand. From "true wisdom" onward, it reiterates the functions of the stage. From "As before..." onward, it again raises an analogy to illustrate the absolute. "Before" means moving forward, referring to the fire-poker. Once the poker has stoked the fire, it also burns itself; having made all relatives absolute, the absolute also makes itself absolute. Therefore the *Dazhidulun* says: "Question: One should not speak of signlessness. Why? If one speaks of signlessness, that is itself a sign. If there is no signlessness, it should not be able to refute the signs of all phenomena. If there is signlessness, one should not say that all are signless. Answer: One uses signlessness to refute all signs. If there were a sign of signlessness, one would fall among all phenomena. Signlessness extinguishes all signs, and also extinguishes signlessness itself. Just as the aforementioned fire-wood, having burned all the fuel, also burns itself. Therefore, the sage cultivates the samādhi of signless signlessness to refute signlessness; the samādhi of empty emptiness and the samādhi of unconditioned unconditioned are also like this." To make absolute what is already absolute has the same intention. From "If so..." onward, doubt is resolved. The doubt states: If only when true wisdom opens is it called the absolute, this only applies to the first abodement; what benefit does it have for the initial mind? From "Now with..." onward, it explains. The initial mind is precisely it, so nothing is lost. Sages reside in the ultimate stage and must not be conflated with the initial stage.

3.7

3. Converging differences: converging all sūtras and treatises so that all become absolute calming and contemplation. The initial text first converges different names for the absolute. From "The various sūtras..." onward, different names for calming and contemplation are converged. Although universally named absolute, quiescence and illumination are fully present; therefore, all different names in the sūtras and treatises are merely different names for quiescence and illumination. From "Therefore different names..." onward, all say that the absolute and great is inconceivable. From "Why?" onward, the intention of converging differences is explained. All are different names for the three virtues; therefore, they are converged to enter the three virtues. First, from "Prajñā..." onward, these are different names for contemplation, which is the virtue of prajñā. From "Liberation..." onward, these are different names for calming, which is the virtue of liberation. From "Like empty space..." onward, these are different names for the non-duality of calming and contemplation, which is the virtue of the dharma-body. "Prajñā is one phenomenon..." and so forth is the verse text praising prajñā. "Liberation is also like this, having many names" is the text on the hundred phrases of liberation in the fifth [fascicle] of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*. It spans nearly seven or eight pages; lecturers past and present have merely chanted it through. Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha had a one-fascicle record explaining these hundred phrases. Great Master Tiantai once spent a summer retreat at Lingshi Monastery lecturing on these hundred phrases of liberation, explaining each single phrase with a hundred phrases, so that the hundred phrases became ten thousand Dharma-gates and ten thousand names. Zhang'an said: "Former students satisfied themselves and did not record it, so now nothing is transmitted. How regrettable, how regrettable! Later generations have heard nothing." Regarding "empty space" and so forth: for example, empty space also has four names: first, empty space; second, having nothing; third, unmoving; fourth, unimpeded. If shapeless empty space still has four names, how much more so the inconceivable non-calming and non-contemplation? Question: Here it only converges different names for calming and contemplation; why is it necessary to list these differences for the dharma-body? Answer: Below, in penetrating the virtues, since calming and contemplation are made to penetrate the three virtues, in converging differences the dharma-body is listed. Hence one knows that although the various sūtras have many names, they do not go beyond calming and contemplation. Furthermore, because of non-duality, one knows they are merely different names for the three virtues. From "One should know..." onward, it concludes that the three virtues are merely the one Dharma of the true mark, with different names established according to the categories of sentient beings. From "If one hears..." onward, this is admonition and encouragement. The meaning of the absolute is deep, so one is admonished not to be alarmed or afraid. Converging different names is broad, so one is encouraged not to give rise to doubt. The meaning of the relative is shallow, so encouragement is not needed. Penetrating the virtues is merely what the absolute penetrates, so encouragement is also not needed. From "Furthermore, calming and contemplation converge with each other..." onward: now, having made absolute all former relative names, the relative names all become the absolute; therefore, one still relies on the meanings of cessation and the like to converge them with each other. Calming is also named contemplation, which is the calming of stopping; contemplation is also named calming, which is the contemplation of penetration. Non-calming is precisely non-calming calming; non-contemplation is precisely non-contemplation contemplation; all must be explained according to the perfect teaching regarding cessation and so forth. The substance of the three delusions being quiescent is named cessation; the principle of the three truths being omnipresent is called stopping. The principle of truth is not subject to calming or non-calming; having no delusion to destroy is named penetration; having no wisdom to illuminate is named contemplated penetration. Penetrating principle is not subject to contemplation or non-contemplation. If the names of the absolute converge with each other: calming is also named contemplation, because quiescence is illumination; it is also named non-calming, because the substance of quiescence itself perishes. Contemplation is also named calming, because illumination is quiescence; it is also named non-contemplation, because the substance of illumination itself perishes. Just as space is neither light nor darkness, yet light and darkness are space. Spatial light is not light; spatial darkness is not darkness; being non-darkness yet dark, being non-light yet light. Calming and contemplation as quiescence and illumination can be understood by analogy to this.

3.8

4. In penetrating the three virtues: the initial text first clarifies the intention of using the names. First a question is asked, and answered from "Is it to counter..." onward. Next, from "All phenomena..." onward, a question is asked again, and answered again from "The *Dazhidulun*..." onward. Regarding "self and other, beginning and end" and so forth: the bodhisattva at the initial mind always contemplates nirvāṇa—this is the initial cultivation of personal practice; they also cause sentient beings to always contemplate nirvāṇa—this is the initial cultivation of transforming others; they settle all children within the secret treasury—this is the subsequent entry of transforming others; "I also shall before long abide within it myself"—this is the subsequent entry of personal practice. Therefore, one knows that the initial mind of self and other without exception cultivates, and the subsequent mind of self and other without exception enters; this is precisely the main intention of the entire text here: from beginning to end, it is merely contemplating the three virtues and entering the three virtues. Why? In the five summaries, from initially arousing the great mind onward is the initial cultivation of personal practice; from tearing the great net onward is the initial cultivation of transforming others; from returning to the great place onward is the subsequent entry of self and other.

3.9

Next, in the extensive explanation, explaining the names is the beginning of one's own practice; giving rise to the teachings is the beginning of transforming others; and pointing to the final return is the conclusion of both oneself and others. If discussed separately, nirvāṇa is solely the fruit; but here, following the comprehensive meaning, it pervades beginning and end, and is thus used as an equivalent to serve as the basis of practice. Next, in the passage beginning with "If used...", which directly clarifies mutual connection: first, as for "using the two characters to connect mutually with the three virtues," if one separates the two characters they cannot be replete with the virtues; thus, the two must be combined in meaning so as to be replete with the three. In the passage beginning with "Question...", doubts are resolved. Generally, a name that is capable of connecting connects to that which is connected; only when the capable and the object correspond can one expect to reach [the goal]. If one only uses two dharmas as the capable connecting name, how can it connect to the three dharmas that are connected? Answer: The two dharmas of calming and contemplation in the Tripiṭaka and shared teachings are separate and distinct, and cannot even connect to the separate and distinct three virtues. If it is the inconceivable calming and contemplation of the single mind, then it can connect to the three virtues of the single mind. Although two and three are different, they are the inconceivable one; being not two and yet two, they connect to the two virtues, and being two and yet not two, they connect to the dharma-body. In the passage beginning with "Furthermore, the Dapin...", citations are adduced as proof. Thus, in fascicle fifty-two of the Dazhidulun, having listed and explained in detail the one hundred and eight samādhis, it immediately says: "The preceding eighteen kinds of emptiness have finished explaining prajñā." Here, using the one hundred and eight samādhis to explain dhyāna, since it is Śūraṅgama dhyāna and prajñā of the knowledge of all modes, we know that these two cannot stand in isolation. Thus, within each emptiness is all emptiness, and within each emptiness is all concentration; within each concentration is all concentration, and within each concentration is all emptiness. Sūtras and treatises list numbers based on phenomena: refuting the eighteen forms of existence is called the eighteen kinds of emptiness, and countering the one hundred and eight distractions is called the one hundred and eight concentrations. Just as fire burning objects takes its name according to the object, how could the differences in what is burned make the fire itself different? Therefore, the eighteen kinds of emptiness are cited to prove contemplation, and the one hundred and eight samādhis are cited to prove calming; being two and yet not two proves the dharma-body. In the passage beginning with "Therefore...", the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra is again cited to corroborate that the two names implicitly encompass the three virtues. Fascicle twenty-five states: "All sentient beings fully possess the Śūraṅgama concentration. The Śūraṅgama concentration is also called prajñā, also called the vajra samādhi, also called the lion's roar, and also called buddha-nature." The sūtra states that the Śūraṅgama concentration has five names, and the Śūraṅgama is also within the five names. Here, citing buddha-nature as having five names, buddha-nature is also within the five names. The present citation is because the comprehensive encompasses the specific. What does this mean? Answer: The sūtra explains that sentient beings possess the Śūraṅgama concentration, and therefore says that the Śūraṅgama has five names. If spoken of comprehensively, saying that the lion's roar has five names, or even that prajñā has five names, would not be faulty in principle. Although none are faulty, among the five names, buddha-nature is comprehensive because it encompasses both concentration and wisdom; the remaining four names are paired and provisionally restricted: prajñā and lion's roar are named from the perspective of wisdom, while vajra and Śūraṅgama are named from the perspective of concentration. Here it is clarified that buddha-nature is neither concentration nor wisdom and yet is concentration and wisdom; hence it says buddha-nature has five names, in order to prove that the present text is "not two and yet two." In the passage beginning with "Furthermore...", each connects individually. First, the intention of individual connection is clarified. Because calming and contemplation mutually possess each other, each is able to connect. Just as calming possesses contemplation, it also naturally possesses neither calming nor contemplation; if contemplation possesses calming, it also naturally possesses neither calming nor contemplation; therefore, calming and contemplation can each connect to the three. In the passage beginning with "Like resting...", next is the actual individual connection: first calming, then contemplation. Furthermore, the previous mutual connection was for the convenience of names; the present individual connection is for the convenience of meaning; hence two kinds of calming are matched with two virtues. The meaning of "non-calming calming" resembles neither calming nor contemplation, and thus connects to the dharma-body; contemplation is also like this and can be inferred accordingly. Furthermore, the term "mutual connection" in the passage below "Calming and contemplation..." differs from the previous mutual connection of the two characters. Here, calming and contemplation each have three meanings; the two pairs both connect, and hence it is called mutual. In the passage beginning with "Furthermore, the three virtues...", the three virtues are again connected to calming and contemplation. Question: Calming and contemplation connecting to the virtues is the capable-of-explaining connecting to that which is explained; why are the virtues again used to connect to calming and contemplation? Answer: When names evoke principle, it is called names connecting to virtues; when principle corresponds to names, it is called virtues connecting. If principle did not correspond to names, the names would have nothing to connect to; if names did not evoke principle, the principle would have nothing to reveal it. Furthermore, because names are identical to principle, calming and contemplation connect to the virtues; because principle is identical to names, the virtues connect to calming and contemplation. Furthermore, because both calming and contemplation possess the meaning of the three virtues, calming and contemplation connect to the virtues; because the three virtues also possess the meaning of calming and contemplation, the virtues connect to calming and contemplation. For these three reasons, virtues connecting is again necessary. In order to reveal that principle and teaching are interfused and unimpeded, they are mutually distinguished to make the present text consummate. That the name is primary and the principle secondary has already been stated above. One should also discuss the mutual connection of calming and contemplation with the virtues in terms of practice; the meaning lies in the text below, so it is not analyzed here. Therein, first is mutual, and next is individual. Mutual means that the three virtues mutually connect to calming, contemplation, and neither calming nor contemplation; individual means that each of the three virtues individually possesses three, as can be seen in the text. In the passage beginning with "If one believes...", examples are given to exhort faith. First, different names are adduced to exhort faith in the three virtues. That which is called the mutual connection of calming and contemplation originally shows that calming and contemplation are absolute and subtle, capable of connecting to the absolute, subtle, and inconceivable virtues. Having believed in the three virtues, one must believe in calming and contemplation. In the passage beginning with "If one believes...", analogies are adduced to exhort faith. In the passage beginning with "Yet the various sūtras...", the names are partial but the meaning is round. First, concerning the various sūtras, the Śūraṅgama and Zhidu have been cited as proof above, and that they are "not two and yet two" is already briefly known. Since each is complete with all dharmas, one should know that none is not the secret treasury. Regarding the term Śūraṅgama, others say it is the name of a jewel, and all great bodhisattvas use this jewel as a headdress. When a bodhisattva obtains this headdress jewel, they are complete with samādhi; named after the jewel, it is called the Śūraṅgama concentration. The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: "Śūraṅ means all matters are finished; gama means firm; when all is ultimately attained and firm, it is called Śūraṅgama." Fascicle eighteen of the Dazhidulun translates it as "heroic aspect." Both the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra and the Dazhidulun take all three characters as Sanskrit sounds, all naming a samādhi. For the two explanations in Chinese and Sanskrit, no basis has been found; thus we know that the sūtra title is not derived from a headdress. In the passage beginning with "Calming and contemplation are also like this...", calming and contemplation are adduced to draw an analogy with the various sūtras. In the passage beginning with "Singling out...", a comparative explanation is given. If the various sūtras singling out [one name] are still complete with the three virtues, how much more so when the present calming and contemplation are a round presentation? This is "roundly complete," not meaning "round and sudden"; although the meaning is round and sudden, the intent of the phrasing is provisionally like this. Next, connecting to the various different names is as in the text. As for "Furthermore, connecting to the various sets of three names," sets of three names are limitless, so it says "all." Now, relying on the Suvarṇaprabhāsa, Guanyin xuan, and Jingming shu, thirteen are used as examples to explain the three virtues. Regarding the thirteen, a verse says: "Paths, consciousnesses, natures, prajñā, / Bodhi, Great Vehicle, and bodies, / Nirvāṇa, Three Jewels, and virtues: / Each and every one has three dharmas." The present text briefly lists three beginning with bodhi, yet still briefly does not explain them. Now, relying on those works, they are briefly correlated. The three virtues are as above. The three bodhis: the real nature is the dharma-body, the real wisdom is prajñā, and the expedient means is liberation. The three buddha-natures: the direct cause is the dharma-body, the revealing cause is prajñā, and the conditional cause is liberation. As for the Three Jewels: the Dharma Jewel is the dharma-body, the Buddha Jewel is prajñā, and the Saṅgha Jewel is liberation. The three paths: afflictions are prajñā, bound karma is liberation, and suffering is the dharma-body. As for the three consciousnesses, Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha says: "The ādānavijñāna, the seventh consciousness, is translated here as the consciousness grasping at self; this is the nature of delusion, and its essence is the conditional cause. The ālayavijñāna, the eighth consciousness, is named the storehouse consciousness; because it can hold and maintain the seeds of wisdom without loss, its essence is non-submerged ignorance, and the nature of ignorance is the revealing cause. The amalavijñāna, the ninth consciousness, is named the pure consciousness, and is the direct cause." The Tang Tripiṭaka Master did not accept this explanation, saying: "The ninth is merely a different name for the eighth." Therefore, the new translation of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha does not retain the ninth, and within the Daśabhūmika treatise text there is also no ninth; it only matches the eighth with the direct cause, the seventh with the revealing cause, and the sixth with the conditional cause. Now, relying on Paramārtha, we still combine the sixth and seventh together as the conditional cause, because within the sixth, phenomenal good and evil are also the nature of delusion. A detailed explanation of the meaning of consciousness is not the present topic; merely correlating the essences of the three consciousnesses with the three virtues and three causes is sufficient in principle. Although the treatise masters say that consciousness is transformed into wisdom, they do not immediately illuminate that the three consciousnesses are the single mind, and that this single mind is complete with the three wisdoms. The three prajñās: true mark is the direct cause, contemplative illumination is the revealing cause, and words and letters are the conditional cause. Their correlation with the virtues can be known. The three Great Vehicles: the vehicle of principle is the dharma-body, the conforming vehicle is prajñā, and the attaining vehicle is liberation. As for the three bodies, they are as in the Zhigui. The three nirvāṇas: essential purity is the dharma-body, complete purity is prajñā, and expedient purity is liberation. The ancients did not establish complete purity, and still correlated expedient means with the reward body, which is refuted in various texts (and so forth). However, these thirteen correspond to one another, and their meanings are not different. Although their meanings are not different, their sequence of arising is not without precedence and succession. Beginningless transmigration does not go beyond the three paths; transmigration is due to consciousness; consciousness internally possesses nature; illuminating nature is due to wisdom; when wisdom is fulfilled, the path is completed; the path is arrived at through the vehicle; arriving, therefore the body is revealed; being revealed, it must be nirvāṇa; because nirvāṇa is complete, they are called the Three Jewels; the Jewels must possess the virtues. Therefore, from beginning to end, these [thirteen] are provisionally listed.

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止觀輔行傳弘決 — Classical Chinese

止觀輔行傳弘決 3

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