止觀輔行傳弘決 3.21.2

3.21.2

From “Moreover, the conventional…” onward is the third explanation, in terms of refutation and application. If there is that which is refuted, there must be that which can refute; that which can refute is precisely the real truth that is applied, and since the active and passive are not isolated, both are therefore established. From “Moreover, discrimination…” onward is the fourth explanation, in terms of emotional disposition and wisdom. When our school explains the truths, across both the Great and Lesser Vehicles, the principle is exhausted only by contrasting emotional disposition with wisdom; therefore, the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra is used to explain the text of the Yingluo jing. Fascicle thirty-two of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: “As for following one's own mind, it is like the five hundred bhikṣus who each stated the cause of the body. All five hundred asked Śāriputra, ‘The Buddha spoke of the cause of the body; what is it?’ Śāriputra said, ‘You have each also attained correct liberation and should know it yourselves; on what account do you now ask such a question again?’ One bhikṣu said, ‘When we had not yet attained correct liberation, our thought took ignorance to be the cause of the body; when making this contemplation, we attained arhatship.’ One spoke of craving, one spoke of karmic formations, one spoke of food and drink and the five desires, and so on. After the five hundred had each spoken in this way, they went together to the Buddha's place, circumambulated him to the right and sat back, each recounting their own explanation. Śāriputra said to the Buddha, ‘Who has spoken correctly?’ The Buddha said, ‘None among the five hundred bhikṣus has spoken incorrectly.’” Each speaking of their own realization is called “following one's own mind,” and is also called “following wisdom.” Just like the elder Ciṭa, who called the Buddha an illusory man: because of this, the Buddha broadly expounded all illusory dharmas in their diverse differences; according with the emotional disposition of beings is called “following the minds of others,” and is also called “following emotional disposition.” As it is said, that which is seen by the minds of worldly people is called the worldly truth, and that which is seen by the minds of transworldly people is called the supreme-truth truth. The worldly truth belongs to emotional disposition, and the supreme truth belongs to wisdom; emotional disposition and wisdom joined together receive the name of the two truths, which is called “following both one's own and others' minds,” and is also called “following both emotional disposition and wisdom.” This is said in terms of the two truths of the Tripiṭaka and shared teachings, and its meaning corresponds to the intent of the first contemplation in the present text. For the latter two teachings, it can be known by applying this standard. For example, when expounding the three virtues, it says: the Tathāgata has one hundred thousand diverse names; a single dharma of prajñā is spoken of under various names, and liberation is likewise. Having manifold names is called “following emotional disposition.” Settling the various sons while dwelling in it oneself is called “following wisdom.” Cultivated virtue and inherent virtue are called “following both emotional disposition and wisdom.” Now, taking the first contemplation as the standard, it still possesses all three types of two truths such as emotional disposition—how much more so a single one? Question: Since one has not yet tallied with the real, one should only follow emotional disposition; how could one have the other two? Answer: Because it encompasses the beginning and the end, it must therefore be explained comprehensively. The present text specifically uses the two kinds, teaching and practice, to reveal the meaning of accomplishing the two truths in the initial cultivation. Next, from “Question” onward, is the critical analysis, consisting of eight tiers of questions and answers. In the first question, the meaning of the third explanation of the preceding first contemplation is used to challenge the second contemplation: The first contemplation refutes the conventional and applies the real; the next contemplation refutes the real and applies the conventional. Since both contemplations refute one and apply one, both should also receive the name “contemplation of the two truths.” Why is the second named “equality”? The meaning of the answer is: both being named “contemplation of the two truths” is indeed tenable in principle, but if the names before and after were the same, their superiority and inferiority would be confused; therefore, the second takes its name from what is superior. That which is called superior is: previously one only applied the real, but now one can apply the conventional. The real is solely for self-benefit; the conventional benefits others. Benefiting oneself while also assisting others is therefore called superior. In the next question, the third contemplation is used to challenge the second contemplation: The second receives its name from what is superior in view of the first; why does the third not take its name from what is superior in view of the first? The second, which applies [only] one side, is still called equality; the third, whose application is equal, should be named equality—yet why is it only called the “contemplation of the middle path”? The meaning of the answer is: both of the preceding two contemplations involve refutation and application, and considered within their own contemplations, neither is equal. In the second, viewed in contrast to the first, the beginning and end are spoken of together; therefore, only when reaching the second is it called equality—this is named “equal” relative to refutation and application. Now, this third contemplation, considered within its own contemplation, is already inherently equal; viewed in contrast to the preceding two contemplations, it conversely becomes the subsequent equality; therefore, it merely constitutes further refuting and further applying. Now, this [third contemplation] illuminates both and is not contrasted with refutation and application; therefore, it takes its designation solely from that which can be applied. Thus, in this third contemplation, there is no stagnation in either of the two; even if one is at the pre-stage levels and has not yet entered the middle path, stagnation in the extremes has already been broken, and one only applies [oneself] to the middle. Furthermore, the contemplation of the middle path is not unequal; if it were again named “equality,” this would again result in confusion. The next question challenges both preceding ones together: both contemplate the two truths, so both should also enter both. Why does the first only enter the real, while the next only enters the conventional? The meaning in the answer is: it only answers regarding the first contemplation, from which the second can be known by extension. Since the first contemplates both yet does not enter both, the second likewise refutes emptiness and applies provisionality; because refutation and application are not equal, their entries are also not the same. In the next question: previously, the refutation and application of the real and conventional were challenged; now, the real and the middle are used to challenge the conventional truth. Among the three truths, why are only the real and the middle raised to challenge the single conventional truth? Since both [types of conventional truth] are called conventional, why need they be challenged separately? The real and middle are precisely the real within and beyond the realms, and thus are that which refutes the conventional within and beyond the realms. The real and middle are principle, so they may well be called truths; that which is refuted is not principle, so how can it be called a truth? The meaning of the answer is: dharma-nature is principle, and principle is truth; since both are dharma-nature, both are therefore called truths. In the next question: being a truth, there is no delusion and therefore no birth-and-death; since both are called truths, are both nirvāṇa? The meaning of the answer is: although the real and conventional differ, both may be called truths; although worldly and transworldly differ, both are called nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is transworldly peace and joy, and therefore worldly peace and joy is also called nirvāṇa. In the next question: nirvāṇa is precisely uncontaminated and unconditioned; if both truths can be called nirvāṇa, they should also both be called uncontaminated. The meaning of the answer is: entering the uncontaminated necessarily requires right view; since it is granted that the worldly also has right view, it is then named worldly without contamination or loss. In the next question: because of being uncontaminated, it is precisely unarisen; since it is granted that both the real and conventional are called uncontaminated, both the real and conventional should also be called unarisen. The meaning of the answer is: the designation “unarisen” also applies across the two truths; therefore, the text from fascicle thirty-two of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra on the non-Buddhist assertions is borrowed in answer. It is like the world having four kinds of non-existence: first, not yet arisen is called non-existent, like clay having no vase; second, having ceased is called non-existent, like a vase already broken; third, mutual non-existence of different phenomena, like ox and horse mutually lacking each other; fourth, ultimate non-existence, like turtle hair and rabbit horns. Now, the third, mutual non-existence, is borrowed as an answer: that is, the transworldly lacks worldly arising, and the worldly also lacks transworldly arising. That which is called “borrowed”: although not the primary meaning, nevertheless, in terms of the worldly truth, the four kinds of non-existence are not erroneous; it is provisionally borrowed as an expedient answer suited to the occasion. The rest below follow this pattern. In the next question: as for the phrase “from the provisional,” does it refute or not refute? In the answer, it is opened into thirty-six propositions, fully detailed below in [the chapter on] the object of afflictions.