止觀輔行傳弘決 5.57

5.57

From “Furthermore” downward, it takes the entity in its very essence as “view.” A view is merely provisional; “provisional” simply has the meaning of being unreal. Though the names obtained differ, the substance of the view is not different. The reason for repeatedly establishing the name “provisional” upon the entity in its very essence is that he wishes to establish the meaning of the three provisionals upon each and every one. Knowing that the substance of a view is provisional, he therefore first states that the substance of a view is provisional. “Provisional” refers to the three provisionals. Moreover, the earlier text stated: “Taking its name from understanding, only when one sees the principle is it severed.” Why must seeing the principle necessarily examine the three provisionals? Therefore, it again states that the entity in its very essence is called provisional. One ought to refute the provisional with the four propositions, and because the provisional is refuted, one sees the principle. It should also be collectively termed the delusions generated by the provisional. This explanation of the three provisionals is for the sake of refuting delusions, so delusions should not be generated. If there were no four propositions and the emptiness of nature and characteristics, delusions would still arise. Therefore, this has not yet been clarified here and will appear in the subsequent text.

From “Dharma-dust” downward, in explaining the characteristics of the three provisionals, it first explains them in terms of mind. Arising only through the conjunction of internal causes and external causes, the phenomenon that is produced is called the “provisionality of causal conditioning.” Because thoughts are unreal, the preceding thought ceases; having ceased, it arises again; what arises must cease. Positing that they are able to continue unbroken is called the “provisionality of continuity.” Because the other depends on the self, the name “other” is established; the self depends on the other to be provisionally established as “self.” Mutual dependence is unreal, so it is called the “provisionality of relativity.” As for vertical relativity, the meaning is also like this.

Regarding the “three unconditioned dharmas,” they are: first, space; second, cessation through analytical contemplation; and third, cessation independent of analytical contemplation—formerly named [cessation through] calculated conditions and non-calculated conditions. A verse in the Kośa says: “Herein space is unhindered.” This means that the nature of great space is unhindered, not referring to the visible space-form that appears as a single manifest color or crevices and apertures. The verse says: “Cessation through analytical contemplation means detachment from bonds; it is distinct according to each entity bound.” In accordance with the bonds of the three realms, every single view and every grade is called a bond; because what is bound differs, it is called “according to each entity.” Because of detaching from one bond, one attains one cessation through analytical contemplation; cessation obtained through the power of analytical selection is called cessation through analytical contemplation. “Analytical selection” refers to the wisdom of severing, which investigates and causes cessation; thus it is named cessation through analytical contemplation. As for cessation independent of analytical contemplation, the verse says: “Utterly obstructing future arising, cessation independent of analytical contemplation is separately attained.” This cessation independent of analytical contemplation comprises two different classes: namely, the deficiency of conditions between sense-faculties and objects, and the stage of what is realized. When the various ignorant delusions cannot arise in continuity, this is called “obstructing future arising.” For instance, when conditioning one visible form, one attains cessation independent of analytical contemplation regarding the remaining visible forms and the other four sensory dusts. Because one is primarily conditioning [that] form, the remaining forms and so forth are hindered from arising in the future, so it is called “obstructing future arising.” All three lack mind, yet depend on the self to exist; therefore, their existence is provisional.

From “Kaishan” downward, this clarifies others’ interpretations, which will be refuted in the subsequent text. Next, regarding form: the physical body composed of the four great elements is entirely unreal, because it consists of the three provisionals. When the preceding thought ceases, it is provisionally continued by the subsequent thought; hence it is called provisional. Relativity should also possess both the horizontal and the vertical: relative to the past, ceased body, it is termed “non-body”—this is vertical relativity; the other not being my body is termed “non-body”—this is horizontal relativity. Indeed, passages on relativity all possess these two meanings, and both must be pondered and understood.

Next, regarding the environment: since the direct retribution is provisional, the dependent environment is likewise. The dependent necessarily follows the direct, just like a shadow following a form. “A detailed explanation is as given by the Treatise Masters” means: just as the Chengshi treatise masters explained the three provisionals in detail. Although the present text explains it, the meaning is still somewhat concise. Having already clarified the three provisionals of form, mind, direct, and dependent retributions, it is sufficient for understanding the refutation of views, so there is no peripheral diversion.

From “Only this” downward, it clarifies the three provisionals in accord with principle. The term “Mahāyāna” refers to the three teachings of the Mahāyāna portal. Ignorance and illusion are terms common to all of them. Since an external pillar of the four great elements is formed through the conjunction of the four subtle particles, and that external pillar of the four elements also appears in a mirror, how could there be the four subtle particles that are able to form it within the mirror? If the forming [causes] do not even exist, how could there be the illusory pillar in the mirror that is formed? A pillar in a mirror is like an illusion, hence it is called an “illusory pillar.” Using illusion as a metaphor for an image, it is again called illusory. That the pillar in the mirror does not exist means: it was originally the external pillar which, owing to the clarity of the mirror, has its reflection appear therein; the mirror is the condition for the external pillar’s reflection to appear. If so, the external pillar is also like this. The pillar’s substance is caused to appear as wood through the external four great elements, and furthermore, through the craftsman, the name “pillar” is provisionally established; one should know that the external pillar is also just like this, and so forth.

Regarding the “four subtle particles,” they are visible form, odor, taste, and tangibility. Because the four great elements combine to produce this physical pillar, externally it is the pillar that is produced, while with respect to the reflection, it is the pillar that is able to produce. Because there is the pillar produced by the four subtle particles, the pillar produced within the mirror is caused to appear; therefore, within the mirror, seeking the subtle particles able to produce and the pillar that is produced is forever impossible to find. Since causal production is already absent, how could continuity and relativity exist? Therefore, merely using the analogy “how much more so enduring through time” uses continuity as an analogy. “Taking illusion to be long or short” uses relativity as an analogy. Thus, the text concludes collectively: “how could it be attained again?” It prefixes the two lower clauses with the single word “how much more so” (kuang).

Fascicle 46 of the Dazhidulun extensively clarifies the characteristics of the three provisionals of the Mahāyāna portal. Although it says “in accord with principle,” principle contains the provisional and the real: the shared teaching accords with the provisional principle, whereas the distinctive and perfect teachings accord with the real principle. Now, stating that the three provisionals arise attached to ignorance, we know that ignorance also extends through the shallow and the deep. Now, since we are refuting views, we temporarily follow the vertical meaning, temporarily taking the three provisionals of the shared teaching. The three provisionals of the distinctive and perfect teachings are the three turns in cultivating the middle contemplation in Fascicle 6. Hence there are the sequential three, non-sequential three, and so forth. Furthermore, while the general discussion is like this, if discussed specifically, as Zhang'an said: “Śrāvakas contemplate causal conditioning, pratyekabuddhas contemplate continuity, and bodhisattvas contemplate relativity. Although this is their primary focus, they must ultimately possess all three.”

“Taking what is easy to illustrate what is difficult” means: like using the mirrored pillar just mentioned to draw an analogy to the external pillar—that is its characteristic. In saying “unreal,” it is simply because all phenomena arise from causes and conditions, do not abide from thought-moment to thought-moment, and are provisionally posited relative to others. One should know that the mirrored pillar, the external pillar, and so forth are all nothing but the three provisionals, and the meaning of being unreal is identical. Although they are equally unreal, reflections and the like are easy to understand, while the external pillar is difficult to understand. Therefore, the Mahāyāna sūtras together establish ten similes.

Regarding the “ten similes,” Fascicle 7 of the Dazhidulun states: “First, like an illusion: for example, just as an illusionist creates various things through illusions, which, although having no reality, are physical forms that can be seen and heard. All phenomena are also like this: created by the illusions of ignorance, they can be seen and heard. Second, like a mirage: because the light of the sun and the wind stir up dust, in an open wilderness it is like wild horses; the unwise consider it water. All phenomena are also like this: the light of defilements, the dust of formations, and the wind of recollective thoughts swirl in the wilderness of birth and death; unwise people consider them real. Third, the moon in the water: the moon is in the sky, and its reflection is in the water; the moon of the true mark is in the space of the limit of reality, and within the mind-water of ordinary persons, the mark of ‘mine’ appears. Fourth, like empty space: space has only a name and no true reality; space cannot be seen, but when light shifts seen from afar, it causes one to see a pale blue color. All phenomena are originally non-existent, but distant from uncontaminated wisdom, one sees various marks. Fifth, like an echo: in deep mountains, speech or the sound of striking wood produces sound from sound; the unwise consider it existent. All speech is also like this; it is merely the udāna wind in the mouth touching seven places in conjunction to produce sound. Sixth, like a gandharva city: when the sun first rises, one sees the towers and parapets of a city with travelers coming and going, but when the sun rises high, it disappears; the unwise consider it real. All phenomena are also like this, falsely positing an ‘I’ and ‘mine.’ Seventh, like a dream: in a dream there is no reality, but one considers it real; upon awakening, knowing it is absent, one turns to laugh at oneself. In the sleep of defilements, where there is nothing one generates attachment; only upon awakening through attaining the Path does one know there is no reality. Eighth, like a shadow: seen, it cannot be grasped; all phenomena are also like this. Though the mind considers them real, seeking them, they cannot be obtained. Ninth, like a reflection in a mirror: neither the mirror nor the face, unattainable through the four propositions, it has merely a name. All phenomena are also like this: not the four [propositions] such as self-produced, they have merely a name. Tenth, like an apparition: heavenly beings and sages are able to create apparitions, yet what is magically created has no reality. All phenomena are also like this: none have arising or ceasing; just like an apparitional person originally has no birth, how could there be old age and death?”

From “Furthermore, the Commentary” downward, it reconciles differences: that is, it reconciles the three existences and three prajñaptis as being identical with the three provisionals. Fascicle 46 of the Dazhidulun extensively explains the meanings of the three existences and three prajñaptis, both of which are explained in the Chapter on the Three Provisionals; therefore they can be reconciled. However, in the text of the treatise, the names and meanings of the three existences and the three provisionals have similarities and differences: the name “relativity” is identical, while the other two names differ. Among the two differing names, “dharma” is identical with causal conditioning, while “provisional designation” is established merely by gathering dharma-provisionals, and so is not identical with continuity. In the text, it only explains them without overtly reconciling them. The intention of listing and explaining them in the present text is originally to reconcile them, so they must be reconciled: provisional designation corresponds to the provisionality of continuity. Why? Because upon dharmas a name is provisionally established, one then asserts that dharmas abide in continuity. The present text, in first explaining relative existence, fully uses that treatise's text: just as a five-inch object is short relative to one foot, and long relative to three inches. “This and that are also like this” means: being here, one regards that as that; being there, one regards this as this. “An object to the east,” and so on, means: if that person is to the east of the object, he considers this object to be west, hence it says “he considers this to be west.” “Being in the west, it is east” means: when I am to the west of the object, I consider this object to be east. A single object is never different; yet because a person is to the east or west of the object, he instead says the object is to his east or west; one should know that east and west are provisional designations upon the object.

Next, in explaining provisional-designation existence, where it says “although it exists, it is not like causes and conditions,” and so forth: upon conjoined dharmas a single provisional designation is established. Is this provisional designation existent or non-existent? Because it can express, it exists; because it is unreal, it is non-existent. Therefore, it is neither the real existence of causes and conditions, nor the non-existence of a rabbit’s horns. Why? Just as the four subtle particles of curds are not the four subtle particles of clarified butter, only then is there the name “curds.” Hence we know the name “curds” is not like a rabbit’s horns. Just as under names like “vase” there is a real vase, under the name “rabbit’s horns” there are no real rabbit’s horns; turtle hair is also like this. Although it exists, it is again unlike the entity of a real dharma: the entity has reality, whereas the name is provisionally established; therefore, provisional existence is unlike real existence. As for “the conjunction of the four factors of visible form and so forth as causes and conditions,” this is not that the conjunction produces curds, but that causes and conditions produce curds; taking milk as the cause and human effort as the condition, only then is it named curds. What is produced by causes and conditions must possess the four factors; hence the four factors are named the conjoined dharma, and possessing the four in conjunction, the name “curds” is provisionally established.

From “Furthermore, like” downward, it again relies on a bolt of fine woolen cloth to establish layers of real dharmas and layers of provisional designations to explain provisional-designation existence. The treatise extensively refutes the impermanence and non-self of a bolt of fine woolen cloth. Just as a meditator contemplates a bolt of fine woolen cloth, visualizing it as earth, water, fire, wind, blue, yellow, red, white, and so on, or furthermore as completely empty; therefore, the bolt of fine woolen cloth has merely a name. The present text summarizes briefly, whereas the treatise’s text is very extensive. From a single paramāṇu of form, odor, taste, and tangibility taken as a real dharma, it is provisionally named a hair-part. A “hair-part” means a minute fraction within a hair is named a hair-part, so the extremely minute and so on are all named hair-parts. Gathered together, it is named down; down is fine hair. The Classic of History says: “They all produce soft down and fine hair to warm themselves.” Hence we know that seven water-particles make one hare-particle, and the hare is also of the category of fine hair. Up to the point of forming a garment: the garment is a provisional designation, while the cloth is a real dharma; in this way, mutually revolving, they alternate as provisional and real. The existence or non-existence of provisional designations is by analogy to what was explained before.

From “The treatise also says” downward, it next reconciles the three prajñaptis. Prajñapti is the Western pronunciation, translated as provisional designation (jiashishe). Wishing to reconcile them as identical, it first raises a question. From “Answer” downward, it first reconciles the names and next explains the meanings. In “dharma,” since it says the conjunction of the five aggregates, it is identical in meaning with causal conditioning. Next, in “provisionality of apprehension,” apprehension means receiving and accepting; because of roots, stem, branches, and leaves, a tree can be apprehended, and because of apprehending the tree, there is the tree's beginning and end, which is named continuity. Therefore, it is identical with the preceding provisional-designation existence. From “using this name” downward, it reconciles the provisionality of relativity: using the name of the tree and the name of the branches and leaves, one grasps the two kinds of dharmas under the two names: under the name of the tree, branches and leaves are the dharma; under the name of branches and leaves, the four great elements are the dharma. If these two names and two dharmas are relative to what is not a tree, the name “tree” arises. All phenomena up to mental factors are also like this. The treatise says: “The practitioner first dismantles name down to apprehension, next dismantles apprehension down to dharma; by dismantling dharma, he attains the true mark of all phenomena.” According to the sequence of the treatise, one first refutes relativity down to continuity, and later refutes causal conditioning. If we discuss the sequence of the arising of the three provisionals, it must first be causal conditioning and up to relativity. Attachment arises in progression, and one refutes it in progression; hence one refutes relativity down to causal conditioning. In attaining the emptiness of the true mark, the sequence is slightly different. The intentions of the texts are distinct, and one must ponder and discriminate them well.

From “Yingluo” downward, it cites scriptural proof for the three provisionals. First, citing the Yingluo sūtra: that sūtra possesses all of them, so it serves as a collective proof. The lower fascicle of its Benye says: “All phenomena are formed through conditions; provisional dharmas lack a self. Dharmas that exist are mutually relative; all marks are vacuous. Continuity is named one; emptiness is unattainable.” In each case, the upper clause clarifies its provisional characteristic, and the subsequent clause clarifies the collective refutation. Because causal conditioning is refuted, an ‘I’ cannot be found; because relativity is refuted, all marks are vacuous; because continuity is refuted, emptiness is unattainable. The sequence is again not identical with the text of the Dazhidulun. The Buddha's intent is profound and far-reaching, having a distinct significance.

From “Dapin” downward, it separately cites three sūtras, each proving one provisional; this is the meaning of the three provisionals of the Mahāyāna portal. In “Dapin”: because there are external conditions, internal thought is caused to arise; the arising of thought is precisely the phenomenon produced. In “the text of the Great Sūtra”: Fascicle 12, in explaining the non-Buddhists’ attachment to permanence, states: “Like the method of recitation, progressing from one Āgama to another Āgama”—just as when a person wishes to recite the four Āgama sūtras, he can progress from one collection to another collection because of continuity. “Āgama” is translated here as “peerless dharma.” The method of eating is also like this: one is sated because of continuity. Non-Buddhists grasp it as real, claiming that continuity is permanent, so it is now refuted. Continuity is provisional, as fully explained in the refutations below. In “Vimalakīrti” and so forth: speaking from the side of refutation, it says “not mutually relative.” When the four propositions have been refuted, relativity cannot be found, and not a single thought abides. The citation of these Mahāyāna texts is intended to reveal that both the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna equally possess them.

From “The so-called” downward, it fully lists both the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna as each possessing the three provisionals. Although the earlier text clarified the three provisionals of the small portal, it did not state that the four portals each possess the three provisionals and their generated delusions; now, in contrast to the Mahāyāna portal, it lists them again.

From “The Tathāgata” downward, it clarifies the cause of generating delusions. Because attachment arises: the Buddha’s teaching was originally intended to demonstrate non-contention to people. Contention is the fault of people; how could it be the defect of the Dharma? It is merely that the portals of the Tripiṭaka are clumsy, so they easily generate contention. However, the text of the Dazhidulun originally reprimanded the Tripiṭaka as a teaching of contention, taking the Mahāyāna portal as the teaching of non-contention. Thus the treatise says: “The Buddha-Dharma has two: first, realms of contention; second, realms of non-contention. Other sūtras have already spoken of realms of contention; now, wishing to show people the teaching of non-contention, he speaks the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra. Up to having marks and lacking marks, having reliance and lacking reliance, having opposition and lacking opposition, having superior and having no superior, to divide the two portals—it is also like this.” Now, taking both the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna of the Buddha-Dharma generally, they originally both show people the teaching of non-contention; hence it says: “Because of generating views regarding words, one gives rise to the provisional regarding the sixteen portals.” Like heavenly ambrosia, originally meant to grant long life: when an ignorant person eats it and fails to digest it, it conversely causes his lifespan to shorten. The Buddha’s teaching is also like this: originally meant to lead through to eternal nirvāṇa, yet because people generate contention, they conversely enter the three evil destinies. “Views regarding words”: “words” refers to the verbal teachings; relying on a portal, they each harbor attachment and generate a view accordingly. Since they cannot fathom the meaning beneath the words, it is named “views regarding words.”