止觀輔行傳弘決 5.57

5.57

「復次」下，當體名見，見秖是假，假者秖是不實為義，得名雖殊見體不別。所以重於當體立假名者，欲於一一立三假義。知見體是假，是故先云見體是假。假謂三假。又前文云「從解得名，見理方斷。」云何見理必推三假？是故復云當體名假。應以四句破假，假破故見理。亦應合云假所生惑。此釋三假為破惑故，不應生惑。若無四句及性相空，還生於惑。故此未明，出在後文。「法塵」下，釋三假相中，先約心釋。因內因外和合方成，故所生法名「因成假」。念不實故，故前念滅，滅已復生，生者必滅，計能相續，名「相續假」。他待於己故立他名，己待於他假立於己，相待不實，名「相待假」。若竪待者，意亦如是。言「三無為」者，一虛空、二擇滅、三非擇滅，舊名數緣、非數緣也。《俱舍》頌云「此中空無礙」，謂太虛空無礙為性，非謂所見空一顯色及竅隙等。頌云「擇滅謂離繫，隨繫事各別。」隨三界繫，見見品品皆名為繫，所繫不同名為隨事。離一繫故得一擇滅，擇力所得滅，名為擇滅。擇謂斷智，推度令滅，故名擇滅。非擇滅者，頌云「畢竟礙當生，別得非擇滅。」此非擇滅，二類不同，謂根塵闕緣及所證位。諸無知惑不得續起，名礙當生。如緣一色時，於餘諸色及餘四塵得非擇滅。為正緣色，礙餘色等當不生故，名礙當生。三皆無心，待我為有，故有是假。「開善」下，此明他解，後文當破。次約色者，四大色身體全不實，是三假故。前念滅時假後念續，故名為假。待中亦應具有橫竪，待往滅身名為不身，竪待也；他非我身名為不身，橫待也。夫相待文皆有二義，並須思知。次約依報者，正報既假，依報亦然。依必隨正，如影隨形。「委釋如論師」者，如成論師委明三假。今文雖釋，義猶似略。已明色心依正三假，足曉破見，故無旁及。「但此」下，明隨理三假。言「大乘」者，即衍門三教。無明幻化其名並通。外四大柱既從四微和合所成，外四大柱復現鏡中，鏡中豈有能成四微？能成尚無，豈有所成鏡中幻柱？鏡柱如幻，故云「幻柱」。以幻喻像，故復云幻。鏡柱無者，本是外柱由鏡明故像現其中，鏡是外柱現像之緣。若爾，外柱亦爾。柱體則由外四大種而令木現，復由工匠假立柱名，當知外柱亦復如是（云云）。言「四微」者，色、香、味、觸。由四大和合造此色柱，於外即是所造之柱，於像即是能成之柱。由有四微所造柱故，而令鏡中所成柱現，故於鏡中推能造微及所成柱永不可得。因成既無，安有續待？故但況云「況歷時節」者，即以相續況也。「以幻化長短」者，即以相待況也，故總結云「寧復可得」。以一況字冠下二句。《大論》四十六廣明衍門三假之相，雖云隨理，理有權實，通教隨權理、別圓隨實理。今云三假附無明起，故知無明亦通深淺。今既破見，且從竪義，且通教三假也。別圓三假，在第六卷修中觀中三番是也。故有次第三、不次第三等（云云）。又通論雖爾，若別論者，如章安云：「聲聞觀因成，緣覺觀相續，菩薩觀相待。雖此為首，後必具三。」「舉易況難」者，如向鏡柱以例外柱即其相也。言不實者，但以諸法從因緣故、念念不住故、待他假設故，當知鏡柱與外柱等，無非三假，不實義同。雖同不實，像等易解，外柱難解。故大乘經共立十喻。言「十喻」者，《大論》第七云「如幻者，譬如幻師幻作種種，雖無有實，然是色法而可見聞。諸法亦爾，無明幻化而可見聞。二如焰者，以日光風動塵，故曠野中猶如野馬，無智謂水。諸法亦爾，結使光、諸行塵、憶想風，生死曠野中轉，無智之人謂之為實。三水月者，月在空、影在水，實相之月在實際空，於凡夫人心水之中我所相現。四虛空者，空但有名而無真實，空不可見，遠視光轉令見縹色。諸法本無，遠無漏智故見諸相。五如響者，深山中語及打木聲，從聲有聲，無智謂有。一切語言亦復如是，但是口中優陀那風觸於七處和合有聲。六如城者，日初出時見城樓櫓行人去來，日高則滅，無智謂實。諸法亦爾，妄計吾我。七如夢者，夢中無實謂之為實，覺已知無而還自笑。諸結眠中無而生著，得道覺已乃知無實。八如影者，見不可捉，諸法亦爾。雖情謂實，求不可得。九如鏡像者，非鏡非面四句叵得，但有名字。諸法亦爾，非自等四，但有名字。十如化者，諸天聖人能有所化，所化無實。諸法亦爾，皆無生滅，猶如化人本自無生，何有老死。」「又釋論」下，會異也。謂會三有及三聶提與三假同。《大論》四十六，廣釋三有、三聶提義，並在三假品中明之，故得會同。然論文三有與三假名義有同有異，則相待名同，餘二名異。二異名中，法同因成，假名但覽法假而立，故不同相續。文中但釋而不見會。今文列釋意者，本在會同，故須會之。假名即當相續假也。何者？以於法上假立名故，則謂諸法相續名住。今文初釋相待有中全用彼文。如五寸之物待一尺為短，待三寸為長。「彼此亦爾」者，在此則以彼為彼，在彼則以此為彼。「物東」等者，如彼人在物東則以此物為西，故云「則以此為西」。「在西則東」者，我在物西，則以此物為東。一物未嘗異，由人在於物之東西，却謂物之在我東西，當知物上假名東西。次釋假名有中，云「雖有不同因緣」等者，和合法上立一假名，此之假名是有是無，能詮故有、不實故無，是故不同因緣實有及兔角無。何者？如酪四微非酥四微，方有酪名。故知酪名不同兔角。如瓶等名下則有實瓶，兔角名下無實兔角，龜毛亦爾，雖有復不同於實法之體，體則有實、名則假立，是故假有不同實有。言「色等四事因緣和合」者，此非和合造酪，因緣造酪，應以乳因人緣方名為酪。因緣所成必具四事，故名四事為和合法，和合具四假立酪名。「又如」下，重約端㲲立重重實法、重重假名釋假名有。論中廣破端㲲無常無我。如坐禪人觀於端㲲，作地水火風青黃赤白等，或復都空，是故端㲲但有名字。今文略撮，論文甚廣。從一極微色香味觸以為實法，假名毛分。毛分者，毛中小分名為毛分，故極微微等皆名毛分。合聚故名為毳，毳即細毛。《尚書》云「皆生濡毳細毛以自溫也。」故知七水為一兔，兔亦細毛之類也。乃至成衣，衣是假名，㲲是實法，如是展轉迭為假實。假名有無，例如前說。「論又云」下，次會三聶提。聶提西音，翻假施設。欲會令同，故先問起。「答」下，先會名、次釋義。法中既云五眾和合，故與因成義同。次受假中，受謂領納，由根莖枝葉故樹可領納，領納樹故有樹始終，即名相續。是故與前假名有同。「用是名字」下，會相待假。用於樹名及枝葉名，取二名下二種之法，樹名之下枝葉為法，枝葉名下四大為法。二名二法若待非樹，有樹名生。一切諸法乃至心所亦復如是。論云「行者先壞名至受，次壞受至法，以壞法故得諸法實相。」依論次第，即先破相待，以至相續，後破因成。若論三假起之次第，則必先因成，乃至相待。展轉生計，展轉破之，故破相待以至因成。得實相空，次第稍異。文意各別，善須思擇。「瓔珞」下，引證三假。初引《瓔珞》者，彼經具有，故總證也。彼《本業》下卷云「諸法緣成，假法無我。有法相待，一切相虛。相續名一，空不可得。」皆上句明其假相、次句明其總破。以破因成故求我叵得，破相待故一切相虛，破相續故空不可得。次第復不與《大論》文同。佛旨深遠，我別有意。《大品》下，別引三經，各證一假，此即衍門三假義也。「大品」者，有外緣故令內思生，思生即是所生之法。「大經文」者，第十二釋外道計常中云「如讀誦法，從一阿含至一阿含」者，如人欲誦四《阿含經》，能從一部以至一部者，由相續故。阿含，此云無比法也。食法亦爾，相續故飽。外計實故，謂相續常，故今破之。相續是假，具如後破。「淨名」等者，從破邊說云「不相待」。四句破已，待不可得，無一念住。引此衍文者，為欲顯於小衍同有故也。「所謂」下，具列小衍各具三假。前文雖明小門三假，未云四門各具三假及所生惑，今對衍門故重列之。「如來」下，明生惑之由。由生著故，佛教本意示人無諍。諍者人過，何關法非？但三藏門拙，易生諍耳。然《大論》文本斥三藏以為諍法，即以衍門為無諍法。故論云「佛法有二：一者諍處、二無諍處。餘經已說諍處，今欲示人無諍法，故說《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》。乃至有相無相、有依無依、有對無對、有上無上以分二門亦復如是。」今則通以佛法大小，皆本示人無諍之法，故云「生語見故，於十六門而起假」也。如天甘露本令長生，愚食不消反令壽促。佛教亦爾，本令通至常住涅槃，以生諍故反入三途。「言語見」者，語謂言教，依門各計隨生一見，既不能達語下之旨，名為語見。

From “Furthermore” downward, it takes the entity in its very essence as “view.” A view is merely provisional; “provisional” simply has the meaning of being unreal. Though the names obtained differ, the substance of the view is not different. The reason for repeatedly establishing the name “provisional” upon the entity in its very essence is that he wishes to establish the meaning of the three provisionals upon each and every one. Knowing that the substance of a view is provisional, he therefore first states that the substance of a view is provisional. “Provisional” refers to the three provisionals. Moreover, the earlier text stated: “Taking its name from understanding, only when one sees the principle is it severed.” Why must seeing the principle necessarily examine the three provisionals? Therefore, it again states that the entity in its very essence is called provisional. One ought to refute the provisional with the four propositions, and because the provisional is refuted, one sees the principle. It should also be collectively termed the delusions generated by the provisional. This explanation of the three provisionals is for the sake of refuting delusions, so delusions should not be generated. If there were no four propositions and the emptiness of nature and characteristics, delusions would still arise. Therefore, this has not yet been clarified here and will appear in the subsequent text.

From “Dharma-dust” downward, in explaining the characteristics of the three provisionals, it first explains them in terms of mind. Arising only through the conjunction of internal causes and external causes, the phenomenon that is produced is called the “provisionality of causal conditioning.” Because thoughts are unreal, the preceding thought ceases; having ceased, it arises again; what arises must cease. Positing that they are able to continue unbroken is called the “provisionality of continuity.” Because the other depends on the self, the name “other” is established; the self depends on the other to be provisionally established as “self.” Mutual dependence is unreal, so it is called the “provisionality of relativity.” As for vertical relativity, the meaning is also like this.

Regarding the “three unconditioned dharmas,” they are: first, space; second, cessation through analytical contemplation; and third, cessation independent of analytical contemplation—formerly named [cessation through] calculated conditions and non-calculated conditions. A verse in the Kośa says: “Herein space is unhindered.” This means that the nature of great space is unhindered, not referring to the visible space-form that appears as a single manifest color or crevices and apertures. The verse says: “Cessation through analytical contemplation means detachment from bonds; it is distinct according to each entity bound.” In accordance with the bonds of the three realms, every single view and every grade is called a bond; because what is bound differs, it is called “according to each entity.” Because of detaching from one bond, one attains one cessation through analytical contemplation; cessation obtained through the power of analytical selection is called cessation through analytical contemplation. “Analytical selection” refers to the wisdom of severing, which investigates and causes cessation; thus it is named cessation through analytical contemplation. As for cessation independent of analytical contemplation, the verse says: “Utterly obstructing future arising, cessation independent of analytical contemplation is separately attained.” This cessation independent of analytical contemplation comprises two different classes: namely, the deficiency of conditions between sense-faculties and objects, and the stage of what is realized. When the various ignorant delusions cannot arise in continuity, this is called “obstructing future arising.” For instance, when conditioning one visible form, one attains cessation independent of analytical contemplation regarding the remaining visible forms and the other four sensory dusts. Because one is primarily conditioning [that] form, the remaining forms and so forth are hindered from arising in the future, so it is called “obstructing future arising.” All three lack mind, yet depend on the self to exist; therefore, their existence is provisional.

From “Kaishan” downward, this clarifies others’ interpretations, which will be refuted in the subsequent text. Next, regarding form: the physical body composed of the four great elements is entirely unreal, because it consists of the three provisionals. When the preceding thought ceases, it is provisionally continued by the subsequent thought; hence it is called provisional. Relativity should also possess both the horizontal and the vertical: relative to the past, ceased body, it is termed “non-body”—this is vertical relativity; the other not being my body is termed “non-body”—this is horizontal relativity. Indeed, passages on relativity all possess these two meanings, and both must be pondered and understood.

Next, regarding the environment: since the direct retribution is provisional, the dependent environment is likewise. The dependent necessarily follows the direct, just like a shadow following a form. “A detailed explanation is as given by the Treatise Masters” means: just as the Chengshi treatise masters explained the three provisionals in detail. Although the present text explains it, the meaning is still somewhat concise. Having already clarified the three provisionals of form, mind, direct, and dependent retributions, it is sufficient for understanding the refutation of views, so there is no peripheral diversion.

From “Only this” downward, it clarifies the three provisionals in accord with principle. The term “Mahāyāna” refers to the three teachings of the Mahāyāna portal. Ignorance and illusion are terms common to all of them. Since an external pillar of the four great elements is formed through the conjunction of the four subtle particles, and that external pillar of the four elements also appears in a mirror, how could there be the four subtle particles that are able to form it within the mirror? If the forming [causes] do not even exist, how could there be the illusory pillar in the mirror that is formed? A pillar in a mirror is like an illusion, hence it is called an “illusory pillar.” Using illusion as a metaphor for an image, it is again called illusory. That the pillar in the mirror does not exist means: it was originally the external pillar which, owing to the clarity of the mirror, has its reflection appear therein; the mirror is the condition for the external pillar’s reflection to appear. If so, the external pillar is also like this. The pillar’s substance is caused to appear as wood through the external four great elements, and furthermore, through the craftsman, the name “pillar” is provisionally established; one should know that the external pillar is also just like this, and so forth.

Regarding the “four subtle particles,” they are visible form, odor, taste, and tangibility. Because the four great elements combine to produce this physical pillar, externally it is the pillar that is produced, while with respect to the reflection, it is the pillar that is able to produce. Because there is the pillar produced by the four subtle particles, the pillar produced within the mirror is caused to appear; therefore, within the mirror, seeking the subtle particles able to produce and the pillar that is produced is forever impossible to find. Since causal production is already absent, how could continuity and relativity exist? Therefore, merely using the analogy “how much more so enduring through time” uses continuity as an analogy. “Taking illusion to be long or short” uses relativity as an analogy. Thus, the text concludes collectively: “how could it be attained again?” It prefixes the two lower clauses with the single word “how much more so” (kuang).

Fascicle 46 of the Dazhidulun extensively clarifies the characteristics of the three provisionals of the Mahāyāna portal. Although it says “in accord with principle,” principle contains the provisional and the real: the shared teaching accords with the provisional principle, whereas the distinctive and perfect teachings accord with the real principle. Now, stating that the three provisionals arise attached to ignorance, we know that ignorance also extends through the shallow and the deep. Now, since we are refuting views, we temporarily follow the vertical meaning, temporarily taking the three provisionals of the shared teaching. The three provisionals of the distinctive and perfect teachings are the three turns in cultivating the middle contemplation in Fascicle 6. Hence there are the sequential three, non-sequential three, and so forth. Furthermore, while the general discussion is like this, if discussed specifically, as Zhang'an said: “Śrāvakas contemplate causal conditioning, pratyekabuddhas contemplate continuity, and bodhisattvas contemplate relativity. Although this is their primary focus, they must ultimately possess all three.”

“Taking what is easy to illustrate what is difficult” means: like using the mirrored pillar just mentioned to draw an analogy to the external pillar—that is its characteristic. In saying “unreal,” it is simply because all phenomena arise from causes and conditions, do not abide from thought-moment to thought-moment, and are provisionally posited relative to others. One should know that the mirrored pillar, the external pillar, and so forth are all nothing but the three provisionals, and the meaning of being unreal is identical. Although they are equally unreal, reflections and the like are easy to understand, while the external pillar is difficult to understand. Therefore, the Mahāyāna sūtras together establish ten similes.

Regarding the “ten similes,” Fascicle 7 of the Dazhidulun states: “First, like an illusion: for example, just as an illusionist creates various things through illusions, which, although having no reality, are physical forms that can be seen and heard. All phenomena are also like this: created by the illusions of ignorance, they can be seen and heard. Second, like a mirage: because the light of the sun and the wind stir up dust, in an open wilderness it is like wild horses; the unwise consider it water. All phenomena are also like this: the light of defilements, the dust of formations, and the wind of recollective thoughts swirl in the wilderness of birth and death; unwise people consider them real. Third, the moon in the water: the moon is in the sky, and its reflection is in the water; the moon of the true mark is in the space of the limit of reality, and within the mind-water of ordinary persons, the mark of ‘mine’ appears. Fourth, like empty space: space has only a name and no true reality; space cannot be seen, but when light shifts seen from afar, it causes one to see a pale blue color. All phenomena are originally non-existent, but distant from uncontaminated wisdom, one sees various marks. Fifth, like an echo: in deep mountains, speech or the sound of striking wood produces sound from sound; the unwise consider it existent. All speech is also like this; it is merely the udāna wind in the mouth touching seven places in conjunction to produce sound. Sixth, like a gandharva city: when the sun first rises, one sees the towers and parapets of a city with travelers coming and going, but when the sun rises high, it disappears; the unwise consider it real. All phenomena are also like this, falsely positing an ‘I’ and ‘mine.’ Seventh, like a dream: in a dream there is no reality, but one considers it real; upon awakening, knowing it is absent, one turns to laugh at oneself. In the sleep of defilements, where there is nothing one generates attachment; only upon awakening through attaining the Path does one know there is no reality. Eighth, like a shadow: seen, it cannot be grasped; all phenomena are also like this. Though the mind considers them real, seeking them, they cannot be obtained. Ninth, like a reflection in a mirror: neither the mirror nor the face, unattainable through the four propositions, it has merely a name. All phenomena are also like this: not the four [propositions] such as self-produced, they have merely a name. Tenth, like an apparition: heavenly beings and sages are able to create apparitions, yet what is magically created has no reality. All phenomena are also like this: none have arising or ceasing; just like an apparitional person originally has no birth, how could there be old age and death?”

From “Furthermore, the Commentary” downward, it reconciles differences: that is, it reconciles the three existences and three prajñaptis as being identical with the three provisionals. Fascicle 46 of the Dazhidulun extensively explains the meanings of the three existences and three prajñaptis, both of which are explained in the Chapter on the Three Provisionals; therefore they can be reconciled. However, in the text of the treatise, the names and meanings of the three existences and the three provisionals have similarities and differences: the name “relativity” is identical, while the other two names differ. Among the two differing names, “dharma” is identical with causal conditioning, while “provisional designation” is established merely by gathering dharma-provisionals, and so is not identical with continuity. In the text, it only explains them without overtly reconciling them. The intention of listing and explaining them in the present text is originally to reconcile them, so they must be reconciled: provisional designation corresponds to the provisionality of continuity. Why? Because upon dharmas a name is provisionally established, one then asserts that dharmas abide in continuity. The present text, in first explaining relative existence, fully uses that treatise's text: just as a five-inch object is short relative to one foot, and long relative to three inches. “This and that are also like this” means: being here, one regards that as that; being there, one regards this as this. “An object to the east,” and so on, means: if that person is to the east of the object, he considers this object to be west, hence it says “he considers this to be west.” “Being in the west, it is east” means: when I am to the west of the object, I consider this object to be east. A single object is never different; yet because a person is to the east or west of the object, he instead says the object is to his east or west; one should know that east and west are provisional designations upon the object.

Next, in explaining provisional-designation existence, where it says “although it exists, it is not like causes and conditions,” and so forth: upon conjoined dharmas a single provisional designation is established. Is this provisional designation existent or non-existent? Because it can express, it exists; because it is unreal, it is non-existent. Therefore, it is neither the real existence of causes and conditions, nor the non-existence of a rabbit’s horns. Why? Just as the four subtle particles of curds are not the four subtle particles of clarified butter, only then is there the name “curds.” Hence we know the name “curds” is not like a rabbit’s horns. Just as under names like “vase” there is a real vase, under the name “rabbit’s horns” there are no real rabbit’s horns; turtle hair is also like this. Although it exists, it is again unlike the entity of a real dharma: the entity has reality, whereas the name is provisionally established; therefore, provisional existence is unlike real existence. As for “the conjunction of the four factors of visible form and so forth as causes and conditions,” this is not that the conjunction produces curds, but that causes and conditions produce curds; taking milk as the cause and human effort as the condition, only then is it named curds. What is produced by causes and conditions must possess the four factors; hence the four factors are named the conjoined dharma, and possessing the four in conjunction, the name “curds” is provisionally established.

From “Furthermore, like” downward, it again relies on a bolt of fine woolen cloth to establish layers of real dharmas and layers of provisional designations to explain provisional-designation existence. The treatise extensively refutes the impermanence and non-self of a bolt of fine woolen cloth. Just as a meditator contemplates a bolt of fine woolen cloth, visualizing it as earth, water, fire, wind, blue, yellow, red, white, and so on, or furthermore as completely empty; therefore, the bolt of fine woolen cloth has merely a name. The present text summarizes briefly, whereas the treatise’s text is very extensive. From a single paramāṇu of form, odor, taste, and tangibility taken as a real dharma, it is provisionally named a hair-part. A “hair-part” means a minute fraction within a hair is named a hair-part, so the extremely minute and so on are all named hair-parts. Gathered together, it is named down; down is fine hair. The Classic of History says: “They all produce soft down and fine hair to warm themselves.” Hence we know that seven water-particles make one hare-particle, and the hare is also of the category of fine hair. Up to the point of forming a garment: the garment is a provisional designation, while the cloth is a real dharma; in this way, mutually revolving, they alternate as provisional and real. The existence or non-existence of provisional designations is by analogy to what was explained before.

From “The treatise also says” downward, it next reconciles the three prajñaptis. Prajñapti is the Western pronunciation, translated as provisional designation (jiashishe). Wishing to reconcile them as identical, it first raises a question. From “Answer” downward, it first reconciles the names and next explains the meanings. In “dharma,” since it says the conjunction of the five aggregates, it is identical in meaning with causal conditioning. Next, in “provisionality of apprehension,” apprehension means receiving and accepting; because of roots, stem, branches, and leaves, a tree can be apprehended, and because of apprehending the tree, there is the tree's beginning and end, which is named continuity. Therefore, it is identical with the preceding provisional-designation existence. From “using this name” downward, it reconciles the provisionality of relativity: using the name of the tree and the name of the branches and leaves, one grasps the two kinds of dharmas under the two names: under the name of the tree, branches and leaves are the dharma; under the name of branches and leaves, the four great elements are the dharma. If these two names and two dharmas are relative to what is not a tree, the name “tree” arises. All phenomena up to mental factors are also like this. The treatise says: “The practitioner first dismantles name down to apprehension, next dismantles apprehension down to dharma; by dismantling dharma, he attains the true mark of all phenomena.” According to the sequence of the treatise, one first refutes relativity down to continuity, and later refutes causal conditioning. If we discuss the sequence of the arising of the three provisionals, it must first be causal conditioning and up to relativity. Attachment arises in progression, and one refutes it in progression; hence one refutes relativity down to causal conditioning. In attaining the emptiness of the true mark, the sequence is slightly different. The intentions of the texts are distinct, and one must ponder and discriminate them well.

From “Yingluo” downward, it cites scriptural proof for the three provisionals. First, citing the Yingluo sūtra: that sūtra possesses all of them, so it serves as a collective proof. The lower fascicle of its Benye says: “All phenomena are formed through conditions; provisional dharmas lack a self. Dharmas that exist are mutually relative; all marks are vacuous. Continuity is named one; emptiness is unattainable.” In each case, the upper clause clarifies its provisional characteristic, and the subsequent clause clarifies the collective refutation. Because causal conditioning is refuted, an ‘I’ cannot be found; because relativity is refuted, all marks are vacuous; because continuity is refuted, emptiness is unattainable. The sequence is again not identical with the text of the Dazhidulun. The Buddha's intent is profound and far-reaching, having a distinct significance.

From “Dapin” downward, it separately cites three sūtras, each proving one provisional; this is the meaning of the three provisionals of the Mahāyāna portal. In “Dapin”: because there are external conditions, internal thought is caused to arise; the arising of thought is precisely the phenomenon produced. In “the text of the Great Sūtra”: Fascicle 12, in explaining the non-Buddhists’ attachment to permanence, states: “Like the method of recitation, progressing from one Āgama to another Āgama”—just as when a person wishes to recite the four Āgama sūtras, he can progress from one collection to another collection because of continuity. “Āgama” is translated here as “peerless dharma.” The method of eating is also like this: one is sated because of continuity. Non-Buddhists grasp it as real, claiming that continuity is permanent, so it is now refuted. Continuity is provisional, as fully explained in the refutations below. In “Vimalakīrti” and so forth: speaking from the side of refutation, it says “not mutually relative.” When the four propositions have been refuted, relativity cannot be found, and not a single thought abides. The citation of these Mahāyāna texts is intended to reveal that both the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna equally possess them.

From “The so-called” downward, it fully lists both the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna as each possessing the three provisionals. Although the earlier text clarified the three provisionals of the small portal, it did not state that the four portals each possess the three provisionals and their generated delusions; now, in contrast to the Mahāyāna portal, it lists them again.

From “The Tathāgata” downward, it clarifies the cause of generating delusions. Because attachment arises: the Buddha’s teaching was originally intended to demonstrate non-contention to people. Contention is the fault of people; how could it be the defect of the Dharma? It is merely that the portals of the Tripiṭaka are clumsy, so they easily generate contention. However, the text of the Dazhidulun originally reprimanded the Tripiṭaka as a teaching of contention, taking the Mahāyāna portal as the teaching of non-contention. Thus the treatise says: “The Buddha-Dharma has two: first, realms of contention; second, realms of non-contention. Other sūtras have already spoken of realms of contention; now, wishing to show people the teaching of non-contention, he speaks the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra. Up to having marks and lacking marks, having reliance and lacking reliance, having opposition and lacking opposition, having superior and having no superior, to divide the two portals—it is also like this.” Now, taking both the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna of the Buddha-Dharma generally, they originally both show people the teaching of non-contention; hence it says: “Because of generating views regarding words, one gives rise to the provisional regarding the sixteen portals.” Like heavenly ambrosia, originally meant to grant long life: when an ignorant person eats it and fails to digest it, it conversely causes his lifespan to shorten. The Buddha’s teaching is also like this: originally meant to lead through to eternal nirvāṇa, yet because people generate contention, they conversely enter the three evil destinies. “Views regarding words”: “words” refers to the verbal teachings; relying on a portal, they each harbor attachment and generate a view accordingly. Since they cannot fathom the meaning beneath the words, it is named “views regarding words.”