止觀輔行傳弘決 5.61.2

5.61.2

From "If it is produced from the sense-faculties" onward, it first refutes the prior line. Although the lesser tradition permits that the sense-faculties can produce consciousness, now it refutes production upon cessation; therefore, one must interrogate it. If it were produced from consciousness, then the prior consciousness would not cease and would again produce another consciousness, which would be the greatest fault; therefore, it does not wait to be interrogated. For this reason, the text only refutes production from the sense-faculties. From "Are the sense-faculties…" onward, it first posits both alternatives. From "If the sense-faculties possess…" onward, it interrogates both. First, it interrogates possessing consciousness: if the sense-faculties possessed consciousness, there would be two faults, namely, the simultaneous existence of sense-faculty and consciousness, and the simultaneous existence of producer and produced, which would entail the fault of infinite regeneration. If there were no producer and produced, the meaning of production would not be established; how could one speak of production? Furthermore, only upon immediate cessation is it called the production of consciousness; if the sense-faculties possessed consciousness, production and cessation would contradict each other, and thus both would have faults. From "If the sense-faculties lack consciousness" onward, it interrogates the second line. This is equivalent to [the absurdity of] that which lacks consciousness being able to produce consciousness. From "Although the sense-faculties…" onward, it interrogates possessing the nature of consciousness. This is a concessive refutation, which also first establishes two propositions. From "If having [the nature], it is already…" onward, it interrogates them: having [the nature] is still the same as having [consciousness], which also becomes simultaneous production; lacking [the nature] is still the same as lacking [consciousness], which is the same as production from insentient things. From "Furthermore, the nature of consciousness…" onward, it interrogates in terms of oneness and difference. As for "If one," it first interrogates one line: whenever one speaks of "nature," only later can it produce; if consciousness and its nature are one, there is no producer and produced. As for "If different," it interrogates the line of difference: if the nature were different from consciousness, it would be the same as an external object; if an external object can produce, consciousness would be identical with the other; how could one reckon it as self[-produced]? From "If one says…" onward, it next refutes the nature of otherness. Having been interrogated as before, one definitively knows that the mind is not produced from itself. Therefore, conceding that it is not produced from itself, one says: "Although one says that the mind is not self-produced, it is because there are external dust-objects that the mind is aroused." Looking from dust-objects toward the sense-faculties, dust-objects are called "other." From "Citing the sūtra, it says…" onward, as for citing the text of the Dapin to substantiate the nature of otherness: dust-objects are external conditions that come to stimulate the internal sense-faculties, and the generated thought is the dharma produced; the Buddha, accommodating one capacity, spoke in terms of the nature of otherness. The theorist, not understanding this, cites the sūtra to reinforce their attachment. From "If so…" onward, it classifies it as belonging to production from other. From "Now examining…" onward, it applies contemplation. It also first posits two propositions. From "If dust-objects are…" onward, it interrogates them. First, interrogating [the proposition that] they are mind, there are three faults: first, the fault of dust-objects not being mind, meaning mind is not called a dust-object; second, the fault of dust-objects not being external to thought, which is the same as self-production; third, the fault of simultaneous production—if dust-objects are not mind, one might allow the reckoning of production from dust-objects, but if dust-objects are mind, it turns out to be producing mind where mind already is, which is called simultaneous production. If a seed produces a sprout, there is producer and produced; if a seed were to produce a seed, two seeds would exist simultaneously—what producer and produced could there be? From "If dust-objects are not mind" onward, it next interrogates the proposition of "not mind." This is identical in meaning to the sense-faculties lacking consciousness above, and the intent of the interrogation is also the same; hence it says, "Refuted as before." That dust-objects possess the nature of consciousness can be known by analogy with the previous case. From "If sense-faculties…" onward, it interrogates combined production. Because singly reckoning self or other has already both been examined and refuted, one reckons combined production intending to avoid [the faults of] self and other. It also first establishes two propositions. From "If each individually…" onward, it interrogates them: if each individually has it, this is still the same as having it in the two propositions of the previous text, hence it says "falling into the nature of self and other"—how could it be called joint production? If each individually lacks it, just as two grains of sand lack oil and when combined still lack it, this is also not called joint. From "For example…" onward, it adduces an analogy. It also first establishes two propositions. From "If each has…" onward, it next interrogates the two propositions. It is fully like the case in the doctrine: if the mirror and face unite as one, fearing that if each has or each lacks in different locations they cannot produce the reflection, and that only when combined in the same location can they produce the reflection, it therefore concludes by interrogating: "in truth they do not unite as one." Only if the mirror reaches the face would it be called uniting as one. Now, the way an image is captured is neither too close nor too far, and then one can see the image. If so, it is of itself being neither too close nor too far that can produce the image; what does it have to do with mirror and face? Separation is again impossible; therefore, know that there is no image. From "The separation and union of sense-faculties and dust-objects" onward, it simply matches the text from "If mirror and face unite" below. As for the text above, it is because it is already complete in the doctrine. One should further match each of sense-faculties and dust-objects with the text above mirror and face uniting as one. From "Furthermore, sense-faculties and dust-objects…" onward, interrogating nature and oneness/difference is completely as explained above under self-production. From "If sense-faculties and dust-objects…" onward, it interrogates reckoning production without [either]. Since the former three, having been examined, cannot produce, therefore outside the three one separately reckons production apart from them. Within this, it first classifies it as belonging to having no causes or conditions; without causes, nothing is produced. Next, it also first posits two propositions. From "If there is…" onward, it interrogates. First, it interrogates there being separation: separation is itself a condition, which is the same as production from other; why call it separation? From "If there is no…" onward, it interrogates it as being the same as lacking mind. From "If one says…" onward, it interrogates nature. It also first posits two propositions; next, it refutes the two propositions: having it is also the same as other, lacking it is the same as lacking mind. From "The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā" onward, it next cites the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā generally to substantiate the four propositions: none of them should produce at all; why reckon them individually? From "If one examines…" onward, it concludes the establishment of the two emptineses of nature and marks. Herein, it first shows the characteristics of the two emptineses. Merely being free of the reckoning of nature is called "emptiness of nature." From "Nor does it not abide" onward, once nature is refuted, there are only the marks of form and mind, internal and external. Since they do not abide within the four propositions of non-existence, marks are also unattainable; this is called "emptiness of marks." As for stating "neither internal nor external," and so forth: "internal" is simply the cause, "external" is simply the condition, and "in between" is joint. "Always existing of itself" is simply causelessness. Because of the absence of these reckonings, there are no four natures. Although these two emptineses are spoken of sequentially, in meaning they are not at different times. From "If the four propositions…" onward, it again uses the two truths to conclude the establishment of the two emptineses. If there is attachment to nature, it is conventional but not a truth; only after refuting attachment to nature is it called conventional truth, hence it says "conventional truth refutes nature." Once attachment to nature is refuted, there are only names, which are called provisional; the provisional is precisely marks, because marks are empty. Contemplating dharma-nature, contemplating the principle and realizing the real, is called the ultimate truth refuting marks. Emptiness is not sequential; the two truths are simultaneous. It is only to distinguish nature and marks that they are spoken of sequentially. Reflect on this! Reflect on this! Failing to see this meaning, one vainly claims it to be identical to emptiness. Therefore, in the Dapin, passing through each and every dharma, it says that it is neither internal nor external nor in between, and so forth. This is the shared contemplation of the two emptineses by the three vehicles. Next, in the chapter "Exhortation to Learn," it says: "Bodhisattvas-mahāsattvas and others should all cultivate and learn this." These three provisionalities are precisely the provisionality refuted by emptiness. Next, in the chapter "Gathering and Dispersing," in each and every line it says: "There are only names; these names do not abide, nor do they not abide."