觀心論疏 2.12

2.12

今略出自他四句責破之相者，但一切眾生：一計有心神之我；二計有一切萬物。今且破檢心神者，今問：夫計心生不生四句為自生？為他生？為共生？為無因生耶？若謂一念心起不從外境、但從自心而生者，即自生也，即應常生，何得對境即生、不對不生？故經云「有緣思生，無緣思不生」，故知心不自生也。若謂從境而生者，即他生也。若是他生，離於內心而應得生；若離必不能生，何謂他生耶？若言由內有心、外藉於境，內外和合共生。今問：前責自生不得，即是內無有生；前責他生不得，即是外境無生。是二各無生，合共云何得生耶？如一沙無油，合兩沙亦無也。若內外各有生，合則兩生。又若必各自有生，何用共合而生耶？是則共生猶有三過也。若謂離心離境無因緣而生者，有因緣責生尚不可得，何況無因緣而得有生耶？故《中論》云：「諸法不自生，亦不從他生，不共、不無因，是故說無生。」廣破如論也。次破無情。一切法求生不可得者，且寄穀子檢破，例餘一切法亦然也。何者？今問：穀子為自生、他生、共生、無因生耶？若言穀子自生者，不應藉水土而生耶；今實不爾，故知穀子不自生。若謂從水土之他生者，離穀子之外而水土之他應能生耶；今實不爾，故知他不能生也。若謂內由有穀子、外藉水土為因緣共生者，前已責自他各求生不可得，共云何生？共生有三過，如前說。若謂離穀子、水、土無因緣而生者，有因緣求生尚不可得，何況無因緣生耶？故云「諸法不自生」等（云云）。今略舉大綱，得意者亦足以除疑也。若欲廣知，可自往尋論也。

Now, to briefly set forth the features of interrogating and refuting through the four tetralemmas of self and other: all sentient beings, first, posit a self of mental spirit; second, posit all the myriad things. Now we shall first refute and examine the mental spirit. We now ask: As for positing that mind arises, within the four tetralemmas of arising and non-arising, does it arise from itself? Does it arise from another? Does it arise from both? Or does it arise without cause? If one says that a single thought-moment of mind arises not from external sense-objects, but solely from one's own mind, then it arises from itself; then it should constantly arise, so how could it be that it arises when facing an object and does not arise when not facing it? Therefore, the sūtra says: 'With conditions, thought arises; without conditions, thought does not arise.' Hence we know that mind does not arise from itself. If one says that it arises from the sense-object, then it arises from another. If it arises from another, it should be able to arise apart from the internal mind; if it definitely cannot arise apart [from it], how can it be called arising from another? If one says that due to having mind internally and relying on sense-objects externally, the internal and external combine to arise together: we now ask, since previously interrogating self-arising showed it to be impossible, that means internally there is no arising; since previously interrogating other-arising showed it to be impossible, that means the external object has no arising. These two each have no arising; when joined together, how could they produce arising? Just as one grain of sand has no oil, joining two grains of sand also has none. If the internal and external each had arising, joining them would produce two arisings. Furthermore, if they each certainly had their own arising, why would they need to combine to arise? Thus, arising from both still has three faults. If one says that apart from mind and apart from sense-objects it arises without cause and conditions: when there are causes and conditions, seeking arising is still impossible, so how much less could there be arising without causes and conditions? Therefore, the *Madhyamakaśāstra* says: 'Dharmas do not arise from themselves, nor do they arise from another, nor from both, nor without cause; therefore, they are spoken of as non-arisen.' The extensive refutation is as in the treatise. Next, refuting the insentient. To show that seeking arising among all dharmas is impossible, we provisionally lodge the examination and refutation in a cereal grain; by analogy, all other dharmas are also like this. Why? We now ask: Does a cereal grain arise from itself, arise from another, arise from both, or arise without cause? If one says that the cereal grain arises from itself, it should not rely on water and soil to arise; now, in reality, it is not so, hence we know that the cereal grain does not arise from itself. If one says that it arises from the other of water and soil, then apart from the cereal grain, the other of water and soil should be able to give rise to it; now, in reality, it is not so, hence we know that another cannot give rise to it. If one says that internally due to having the cereal grain and externally relying on water and soil as causes and conditions, they arise together: previously it was already interrogated that seeking arising from self and other respectively is impossible; how could they arise together? Arising from both has three faults, as explained before. If one says that apart from the cereal grain, water, and soil, it arises without cause: when there are causes and conditions, seeking arising is still impossible, so how much less could it arise without cause? Therefore, it is said: 'Dharmas do not arise from themselves', and so on (and so forth). Now I have briefly presented the main outline; those who grasp the meaning will find it sufficient to eliminate doubt. If one wishes to know it in detail, one may consult the treatise oneself.