觀心論疏 2.12

2.12

Now, to briefly set forth the features of interrogating and refuting through the four tetralemmas of self and other: all sentient beings, first, posit a self of mental spirit; second, posit all the myriad things. Now we shall first refute and examine the mental spirit. We now ask: As for positing that mind arises, within the four tetralemmas of arising and non-arising, does it arise from itself? Does it arise from another? Does it arise from both? Or does it arise without cause? If one says that a single thought-moment of mind arises not from external sense-objects, but solely from one's own mind, then it arises from itself; then it should constantly arise, so how could it be that it arises when facing an object and does not arise when not facing it? Therefore, the sūtra says: 'With conditions, thought arises; without conditions, thought does not arise.' Hence we know that mind does not arise from itself. If one says that it arises from the sense-object, then it arises from another. If it arises from another, it should be able to arise apart from the internal mind; if it definitely cannot arise apart [from it], how can it be called arising from another? If one says that due to having mind internally and relying on sense-objects externally, the internal and external combine to arise together: we now ask, since previously interrogating self-arising showed it to be impossible, that means internally there is no arising; since previously interrogating other-arising showed it to be impossible, that means the external object has no arising. These two each have no arising; when joined together, how could they produce arising? Just as one grain of sand has no oil, joining two grains of sand also has none. If the internal and external each had arising, joining them would produce two arisings. Furthermore, if they each certainly had their own arising, why would they need to combine to arise? Thus, arising from both still has three faults. If one says that apart from mind and apart from sense-objects it arises without cause and conditions: when there are causes and conditions, seeking arising is still impossible, so how much less could there be arising without causes and conditions? Therefore, the *Madhyamakaśāstra* says: 'Dharmas do not arise from themselves, nor do they arise from another, nor from both, nor without cause; therefore, they are spoken of as non-arisen.' The extensive refutation is as in the treatise. Next, refuting the insentient. To show that seeking arising among all dharmas is impossible, we provisionally lodge the examination and refutation in a cereal grain; by analogy, all other dharmas are also like this. Why? We now ask: Does a cereal grain arise from itself, arise from another, arise from both, or arise without cause? If one says that the cereal grain arises from itself, it should not rely on water and soil to arise; now, in reality, it is not so, hence we know that the cereal grain does not arise from itself. If one says that it arises from the other of water and soil, then apart from the cereal grain, the other of water and soil should be able to give rise to it; now, in reality, it is not so, hence we know that another cannot give rise to it. If one says that internally due to having the cereal grain and externally relying on water and soil as causes and conditions, they arise together: previously it was already interrogated that seeking arising from self and other respectively is impossible; how could they arise together? Arising from both has three faults, as explained before. If one says that apart from the cereal grain, water, and soil, it arises without cause: when there are causes and conditions, seeking arising is still impossible, so how much less could it arise without cause? Therefore, it is said: 'Dharmas do not arise from themselves', and so on (and so forth). Now I have briefly presented the main outline; those who grasp the meaning will find it sufficient to eliminate doubt. If one wishes to know it in detail, one may consult the treatise oneself.