宗鏡錄 33.17

33.17

答。據體。則言亡四句。意絕百非。約用。則唯智能明。非情所及。華嚴經云。佛子。如來心意識俱不可得。但應以智無量故。知如來心。古釋云。如來心。意識俱不可得者。約體遮詮也。但應以智無量故。知如來心者。寄用表詮也。一師云。識等有二。一染。二淨。佛地無有漏染心及心所。而有淨分心及心所。果位之中。智強識劣故。於心王上。以顯無染。約彼智所。以明無量。若必無王所。智依何立。經云。如來無垢識。是淨無漏界。解脫一切障。圓鏡智相應。則有心王明矣。一師云。以無積集思量等義故。說心等叵得。就無分別智以顯無量。非無心體。上之二解。俱明心意識有。又云。佛果實無心意意識及餘心法。云不可得。唯有大智。故言智無量故。知如來心。經云。唯如如及如如智獨存。佛地。論中。五法攝大覺性。唯一真法界及四智菩提。不言更有餘法。此二說約無。若依前有。未免增益。亦不能通不可得言。若依後無。未免損減。亦不通能知佛心言。既云知如來心。不可言無心。可知明非無心矣。又心既是無。智何獨立。亦違涅槃滅無常識。獲常識義。若有無二義雙取。未免相違。若互泯雙非寧逃戲論。若後宗言唯如智者。以心即同真性。故曰唯如。照用不失。故云如智。豈離心外而別有如。是則唯如。不乖於有。前宗以純如之體。故有淨心。心既是如。有之何失。是知即真之有。與即有之真。二義相成。有無無礙。正消經意者。言不可得者。以心義深玄。言不及故。寄遮顯深。言但以智知如來心者。託心所寄表顯深。云何深玄。欲言其有。同如絕相。欲言其無。幽靈不竭。欲謂之情。無殊色性。欲謂無情。無幽不徹。是知佛心即有即無。即王即數。心中非有意。亦非不有意。意中非有心。亦非不有心。數。非依於王。亦非不依王。一一皆爾。圓融無礙。清涼記釋云。言佛無心有智。成相違過。心王最勝。尚說為無。智無所依。豈當獨立。如無君主。何有臣下。今先別會二宗。後通合二宗。先會法性宗意云。心即是如。智即如智。離心無如。則知有如已有心矣。況即體之用。稱如智。即用之體。即是真如。如一明珠。珠體即如。明即如智。豈得存如亡於心矣。前宗以純如。下。會法相宗意云。即如之有。有豈乖如。如鏡即虛。則有心無失。是知即真之有。通會二宗。即真之有。是法相宗。即有之真。是法性宗。兩不相離。方成無礙真佛心矣。又心中非有意亦復非無意者。非有。是不即義。二相別故。亦非不有。是不離義。無二體故。又非有者。以無二體。互攝盡故。亦非不有者。二相不壞。力用交徹故。

Answer: In terms of substance, words cease regarding the four propositions, and thought is cut off regarding the hundred negations. In terms of function, it can only be understood by wisdom, beyond the reach of emotional consciousness. The Avataṃsakasūtra says: 'Sons of the Buddha! The Tathāgata's citta, manas, and manovijñāna are all ungraspable. One should only know the Tathāgata's mind through the immeasurability of [his] wisdom.' An ancient commentary says: 'That the Tathāgata's citta, manas, and manovijñāna are all ungraspable is an apophatic explanation (pratiṣedha) in terms of substance. That one should only know the Tathāgata's mind through the immeasurability of wisdom is a kataphatic explanation (vidhi) by recourse to function.' One master says: 'Consciousness and the rest are of two kinds: first, defiled; second, pure. In the Buddha-stage, there are no defiled cittas or caittas with outflows, but there are pure cittas and caittas. In the stage of fruition, wisdom is strong while consciousness is weak; therefore, on the basis of the mind-king, freedom from defilement is revealed, and with respect to those caittas of wisdom, immeasurability is illuminated. If there were certainly no king and caittas, upon what would wisdom be established? A sūtra says: "The Tathāgata's immaculate consciousness is the pure, uncontaminated realm, liberated from all hindrances, associated with the great mirror wisdom." Thus it is clear that there is a mind-king.' Another master says: 'Because it lacks the senses of accumulation, intellection, and the like, citta and so forth are said to be ungraspable; immeasurability is revealed with respect to non-conceptual wisdom, which does not mean there is no substance of citta.' Both of the above two interpretations illuminate that citta, manas, and manovijñāna exist. Yet another says: 'In the Buddha-fruit there is truly no citta, manas, manovijñāna, or other mental dharmas; hence they are said to be ungraspable. There is only great wisdom; therefore it is said that through the immeasurability of wisdom one knows the Tathāgata's mind. A sūtra says: "Only suchness and the wisdom of suchness uniquely endure." In the Buddhabhūmiśāstra, five dharmas subsume the nature of great enlightenment: solely the one true dharmadhātu and the bodhi of the four wisdoms; it does not say there are any further dharmas.' These two explanations are in terms of non-existence. If one relies on the former [assertion of] existence, one cannot avoid [the fault of] superimposition (samāropa), nor can one explain the statement that they are ungraspable. If one relies on the latter [assertion of] non-existence, one cannot avoid [the fault of] deprecation (apavāda), nor can one explain the statement of being able to know the Buddha's mind. Since it says 'know the Tathāgata's mind', it cannot be said that there is no mind; one can know clearly that it is not without mind. Furthermore, since mind would be non-existent, how could wisdom stand alone? It would also contradict the Nirvāṇasūtra's principle of 'extinguishing impermanent consciousness and attaining permanent consciousness.' If one adopts both senses of existence and non-existence together, conflict is unavoidable. If one mutually cancels both in a double negation, how could one escape conceptual proliferation? If the latter school speaks of 'only suchness and wisdom', it is because mind is identical with the true nature, and therefore it is called 'only suchness'; its illuminating function is not lost, and therefore it is called 'the wisdom of suchness'. How could there be suchness separate from and outside of mind? Thus 'only suchness' does not conflict with existence. The former school takes the substance of pure suchness to be the reason that there is a pure mind. Since mind is suchness, what fault is there in its existence? From this we know that existence that is identical with truth, and truth that is identical with existence, are two meanings that mutually complete each other, existence and non-existence being without obstruction. Directly interpreting the sūtra's meaning: saying 'ungraspable' is because the meaning of mind is profound and mysterious, beyond the reach of words; recourse is had to negation to reveal its depth. Saying 'only through wisdom does one know the Tathāgata's mind' uses the caittas as a means to kataphatically reveal its depth. How is it profound and mysterious? If one wishes to say it exists, it is identical with suchness and devoid of characteristics; if one wishes to say it does not exist, its hidden spiritual efficacy is inexhaustible; if one wishes to call it sentient, it is no different from the nature of form; if one wishes to call it insentient, there is no profundity it does not penetrate. From this we know that the Buddha-mind is both existent and non-existent, both the king and the caittas. In citta there is not manas, nor is it that there is no manas; in manas there is not citta, nor is it that there is no citta. Caittas do not depend on the king, nor do they not depend on the king. Each and every one is like this, completely interfused and unobstructed. The commentary of Qingliang explains: 'Saying that the Buddha has no mind but has wisdom incurs the fault of contradiction. If the mind-king, which is supreme, is still said to be non-existent, upon what could wisdom rely, and how could it stand alone? Like having no sovereign, how could there be ministers? Now I shall first reconcile the two schools separately, and then unify both schools together. First, reconciling the meaning of the Dharma-Nature school (Faxing zong), it says: Citta is identical with suchness, and wisdom is identical with the wisdom of suchness. Apart from citta there is no suchness; thus we know that having suchness already entails having citta. How much more so since function identical with substance is called the wisdom of suchness, and substance identical with function is true suchness! Like a bright pearl: the substance of the pearl is suchness, and the brightness is the wisdom of suchness; how could one preserve suchness while obliterating citta? From "The former school takes pure suchness..." onwards, it reconciles the meaning of the Dharma-Characteristic school (Faxiang zong), saying: Existence that is identical with suchness—how could existence conflict with suchness? Just as a mirror is itself empty, there is no fault in having a mind. From this we know that existence identical with truth brings together and reconciles the two schools: existence identical with truth is the Dharma-Characteristic school, and truth identical with existence is the Dharma-Nature school. Only when the two are not separated from each other do they constitute the unobstructed true Buddha-mind. Furthermore, that "in citta there is not manas, nor is it without manas": "not existent" is the meaning of non-identity, because their two characteristics are distinct; "nor is it without" is the meaning of non-separation, because they have no two substances. Moreover, "not existent" is because, having no two substances, they mutually subsume each other entirely; "nor is it without" is because the two characteristics are not destroyed, their powers and functions interpenetrating.'