宗鏡錄 33.17

33.17

Answer: In terms of substance, words cease regarding the four propositions, and thought is cut off regarding the hundred negations. In terms of function, it can only be understood by wisdom, beyond the reach of emotional consciousness. The Avataṃsakasūtra says: 'Sons of the Buddha! The Tathāgata's citta, manas, and manovijñāna are all ungraspable. One should only know the Tathāgata's mind through the immeasurability of [his] wisdom.' An ancient commentary says: 'That the Tathāgata's citta, manas, and manovijñāna are all ungraspable is an apophatic explanation (pratiṣedha) in terms of substance. That one should only know the Tathāgata's mind through the immeasurability of wisdom is a kataphatic explanation (vidhi) by recourse to function.' One master says: 'Consciousness and the rest are of two kinds: first, defiled; second, pure. In the Buddha-stage, there are no defiled cittas or caittas with outflows, but there are pure cittas and caittas. In the stage of fruition, wisdom is strong while consciousness is weak; therefore, on the basis of the mind-king, freedom from defilement is revealed, and with respect to those caittas of wisdom, immeasurability is illuminated. If there were certainly no king and caittas, upon what would wisdom be established? A sūtra says: "The Tathāgata's immaculate consciousness is the pure, uncontaminated realm, liberated from all hindrances, associated with the great mirror wisdom." Thus it is clear that there is a mind-king.' Another master says: 'Because it lacks the senses of accumulation, intellection, and the like, citta and so forth are said to be ungraspable; immeasurability is revealed with respect to non-conceptual wisdom, which does not mean there is no substance of citta.' Both of the above two interpretations illuminate that citta, manas, and manovijñāna exist. Yet another says: 'In the Buddha-fruit there is truly no citta, manas, manovijñāna, or other mental dharmas; hence they are said to be ungraspable. There is only great wisdom; therefore it is said that through the immeasurability of wisdom one knows the Tathāgata's mind. A sūtra says: "Only suchness and the wisdom of suchness uniquely endure." In the Buddhabhūmiśāstra, five dharmas subsume the nature of great enlightenment: solely the one true dharmadhātu and the bodhi of the four wisdoms; it does not say there are any further dharmas.' These two explanations are in terms of non-existence. If one relies on the former [assertion of] existence, one cannot avoid [the fault of] superimposition (samāropa), nor can one explain the statement that they are ungraspable. If one relies on the latter [assertion of] non-existence, one cannot avoid [the fault of] deprecation (apavāda), nor can one explain the statement of being able to know the Buddha's mind. Since it says 'know the Tathāgata's mind', it cannot be said that there is no mind; one can know clearly that it is not without mind. Furthermore, since mind would be non-existent, how could wisdom stand alone? It would also contradict the Nirvāṇasūtra's principle of 'extinguishing impermanent consciousness and attaining permanent consciousness.' If one adopts both senses of existence and non-existence together, conflict is unavoidable. If one mutually cancels both in a double negation, how could one escape conceptual proliferation? If the latter school speaks of 'only suchness and wisdom', it is because mind is identical with the true nature, and therefore it is called 'only suchness'; its illuminating function is not lost, and therefore it is called 'the wisdom of suchness'. How could there be suchness separate from and outside of mind? Thus 'only suchness' does not conflict with existence. The former school takes the substance of pure suchness to be the reason that there is a pure mind. Since mind is suchness, what fault is there in its existence? From this we know that existence that is identical with truth, and truth that is identical with existence, are two meanings that mutually complete each other, existence and non-existence being without obstruction. Directly interpreting the sūtra's meaning: saying 'ungraspable' is because the meaning of mind is profound and mysterious, beyond the reach of words; recourse is had to negation to reveal its depth. Saying 'only through wisdom does one know the Tathāgata's mind' uses the caittas as a means to kataphatically reveal its depth. How is it profound and mysterious? If one wishes to say it exists, it is identical with suchness and devoid of characteristics; if one wishes to say it does not exist, its hidden spiritual efficacy is inexhaustible; if one wishes to call it sentient, it is no different from the nature of form; if one wishes to call it insentient, there is no profundity it does not penetrate. From this we know that the Buddha-mind is both existent and non-existent, both the king and the caittas. In citta there is not manas, nor is it that there is no manas; in manas there is not citta, nor is it that there is no citta. Caittas do not depend on the king, nor do they not depend on the king. Each and every one is like this, completely interfused and unobstructed. The commentary of Qingliang explains: 'Saying that the Buddha has no mind but has wisdom incurs the fault of contradiction. If the mind-king, which is supreme, is still said to be non-existent, upon what could wisdom rely, and how could it stand alone? Like having no sovereign, how could there be ministers? Now I shall first reconcile the two schools separately, and then unify both schools together. First, reconciling the meaning of the Dharma-Nature school (Faxing zong), it says: Citta is identical with suchness, and wisdom is identical with the wisdom of suchness. Apart from citta there is no suchness; thus we know that having suchness already entails having citta. How much more so since function identical with substance is called the wisdom of suchness, and substance identical with function is true suchness! Like a bright pearl: the substance of the pearl is suchness, and the brightness is the wisdom of suchness; how could one preserve suchness while obliterating citta? From "The former school takes pure suchness..." onwards, it reconciles the meaning of the Dharma-Characteristic school (Faxiang zong), saying: Existence that is identical with suchness—how could existence conflict with suchness? Just as a mirror is itself empty, there is no fault in having a mind. From this we know that existence identical with truth brings together and reconciles the two schools: existence identical with truth is the Dharma-Characteristic school, and truth identical with existence is the Dharma-Nature school. Only when the two are not separated from each other do they constitute the unobstructed true Buddha-mind. Furthermore, that "in citta there is not manas, nor is it without manas": "not existent" is the meaning of non-identity, because their two characteristics are distinct; "nor is it without" is the meaning of non-separation, because they have no two substances. Moreover, "not existent" is because, having no two substances, they mutually subsume each other entirely; "nor is it without" is because the two characteristics are not destroyed, their powers and functions interpenetrating.'