宗鏡錄 33.7.3

33.7.3

如穀不作芽。 芽不作穀。 是故不一。 不異者。 不離二十有三十。 若二十姓張。 三十不異。 中論云。 若異。 何故分別穀芽穀莖穀葉。 是故不異。 不來者。 二十不至三十時。 是故不來。 不出者。 二十時當處自寂。 不復更生。 故不出也。 達此理者。 則離一切戲論。 契會中道。 則真諦矣。 是知於真諦中。 無一法可得。 豈有去來。 如大涅槃經云。 爾時世尊。 問彼菩薩。 善男子。 汝為到來。 為不到來。 瑠璃光菩薩言。 世尊。 到亦不來。 不到亦不來。 我觀是義。 都無有來。 世尊。 諸行若常。 亦復不來。 若是無常。 亦無有來。 若人見有眾生性者。 有來不來。 我今不見眾生定性。 云何當言有來不來。 有憍慢者。 見有去來。 無憍慢者。 則無去來。 有取行者。 見有去來。 無取行者。 則無去來。 若見如來畢竟涅槃。 則有去來。 不見如來畢竟涅槃。 則無去來。 不聞佛性。 則有去來。 聞佛性者。 則無去來。 般若燈論。 問。 汝為已行名初發。 為未行名初發。 為行時名初發耶。 三皆不然。 如偈曰。 已去中無發。 未去亦無發。 去時中無發。 何處當有發。 釋曰。 已去中無發者。 謂去作用。 於彼已謝故。 未去亦無發者。 謂未行無去。 去則不然。 去時中無發者。 謂已去未去等皆無去義。 云何可說去時有去。 如是三種。 俱無初發。 是故偈言。 何處當有發。 又偈云。 無已去未去。 亦無彼去時。 於無去法中。 何故妄分別。 釋云。 妄分別者。 如瞖目人於虛空中。 或見毛髮蠅等。 皆無體故。 又偈云。 是故去無性。 去者亦復然。 去時及諸法。 一切無所有。 又偈云。 未滅法不滅。 已滅法不滅。 滅時亦不滅。 無生何等滅。 釋曰。 第一句者。 以滅空故。 譬如住。 第二句者。 如人已死不復更死。 第三句者。 離彼已滅及未滅法。 更無滅時。 有俱過故。 是故定知滅時不滅。 第四句者。 其義云何。 一切諸法皆不生故。 言無生者。 生相無故。 無生有滅。 義則不然。 如石女兒。 乃至復次汝言滅者。 為有體滅耶。 為無體滅耶。 二俱不然。 如偈曰。 法若有體者。 有則無滅相。 釋曰。 以相違故。 譬如水火。 由如是故。 偈曰。 一法有有無。 於義不應爾。 復次偈曰。 法若無體者。 有滅亦不然。 如無第二頭。 不可言其斷。 是以既無來去之法。 亦無住止之時。 以因法明時。 亦因時辯法。 法既無有。 時豈成耶。 如中觀論偈云。 時住不可得。 時去亦叵得。 時若不可得。 云何說時相。 因物故有時。 離物何有時。 物尚無所有。 何況當有時。 釋曰。 如上引證。 直指世間。 皆即事辯真。 從凡見道。 目前現證。 可以絕疑。 去法既然。 乃至六趣輪迴。 四時代謝。 皆是不遷。 常住一心之道。 然則群籍殊文。 百家異說。 苟得其會。 豈文言能惑哉者。 若達萬法唯我一心。 觀此心性尚未曾生。 云何說滅。 尚不得靜。 云何說動。 如楞嚴會上。 即時如來於大眾中。 屈五輪指。 屈已復開。 開已又屈。 謂阿難言。 汝今何見。 阿難言。 我見如來百寶輪掌眾中開合。 佛告阿難。 汝見我手眾中開合。 為是我手有開有合。 為復汝見有開有合。 阿難言。 世尊。 寶手眾中開合。 我見如來手自開合。 非我見性自開自合。 佛言。 誰動誰靜。 阿難言。 佛手不住。 而我見性尚無有靜。 誰為無住。 佛言。 如是。 乃至云何汝今以動為身。 以動為境。 從始洎終。 念念生滅。 遺失真性。 顛倒行事。 性心失真。 認物為己。 輪迴是中。 自取流轉。 故知見性不遷。 理周法界。 但是認物為己。 背覺合塵。 若以動為身。

Just as grain does not make the sprout, and the sprout does not make the grain, therefore they are not one. As for their not being different: [a person aged] thirty is not separate from [that person aged] twenty; if at twenty their surname was Zhang, at thirty it is not different. The Madhyamakaśāstra says: "If they were different, why distinguish grain sprout, grain stalk, and grain leaf? Therefore they are not different." As for not coming: the age of twenty does not arrive at the time of thirty; therefore it does not come. As for not going out: at the time of twenty, it is naturally tranquil in its own place and does not arise again; therefore it does not go out. One who penetrates this principle is free from all conceptual proliferation and accords with the Middle Way; this is the ultimate truth. Thus we know that within the ultimate truth, not a single phenomenon can be apprehended; how could there be going and coming? As the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra says: "At that time the World-Honoured One asked that bodhisattva: 'Good son, did you come by arriving, or did you come by not arriving?' Bodhisattva Vaiḍūryaprabha said: 'World-Honoured One, I did not come by arriving, nor did I come by not arriving. As I observe this meaning, there is no coming at all. World-Honoured One, if conditioned formations were permanent, there would also be no coming; if they were impermanent, there would also be no coming. If someone sees the existence of a sentient being's nature, for them there is coming and not coming. I now do not see any fixed nature of sentient beings; how could I say there is coming and not coming? Those with pride see going and coming; those without pride have no going and coming. Those who grasp at practices see going and coming; those who do not grasp at practices have no going and coming. If one sees the Tathāgata as entering ultimate nirvāṇa, then there is going and coming; if one does not see the Tathāgata as entering ultimate nirvāṇa, then there is no going and coming. If one does not hear of the Buddha-nature, then there is going and coming; for one who hears of the Buddha-nature, there is no going and coming.'" The Prajñāpradīpaśāstra asks: "Do you call the initial departure that of one who has already gone, of one who has not yet gone, or of one who is presently going? All three are incorrect. As the verse says: / 'There is no departure in what has already gone, / Nor is there departure in what has not yet gone; / There is no departure in what is presently going; / Where could there be departure?' / The commentary says: 'There is no departure in what has already gone' means that the function of going has already ceased therein. 'Nor is there departure in what has not yet gone' means that in the absence of moving there is no going; going is not so. 'There is no departure in what is presently going' means that in both what has already gone and what has not yet gone, the meaning of going is absent; how could it be said that there is going in what is presently going? Thus in all three cases, there is no initial departure. Therefore the verse says: 'Where could there be departure?' / Furthermore, a verse says: / 'There is no "already gone" or "not yet gone", / Nor is there that "presently going"; / Within phenomena devoid of going, / Why falsely discriminate?' / The commentary says: 'Falsely discriminate' is like a person with cataracts seeing hairs, flies, and the like in empty space; all lack substance. / Furthermore, a verse says: / 'Therefore going lacks inherent nature; / The goer is also likewise; / What is presently going and all phenomena / Are entirely non-existent.' / Furthermore, a verse says: / 'An unextinguished phenomenon does not cease; / An already extinguished phenomenon does not cease; / What is presently ceasing also does not cease; / Being unproduced, what could cease?' / The commentary says: As for the first line, it is because cessation is empty, like remaining. As for the second line, it is like a person who has already died not dying again. As for the third line, apart from those phenomena already extinguished and not yet extinguished, there is no other time of ceasing, because both errors would apply. Therefore it is definitely known that what is presently ceasing does not cease. As for the fourth line, what does it mean? Because all phenomena are unproduced. Saying 'unproduced' means that the characteristic of production is non-existent. For the unproduced to have cessation is untenable, like the son of a barren woman. / And furthermore, as to your claim of cessation: does an existent entity cease, or does a non-existent entity cease? Both are incorrect. As the verse says: / 'If a phenomenon has an existent entity, / Being existent, it has no characteristic of cessation.' / The commentary says: Because they are contradictory, like water and fire. Because of this, the verse says: / 'For one phenomenon to have both existence and non-existence / Is not logically admissible.' / Furthermore, the verse says: / 'If a phenomenon lacks an existent entity, / For cessation to exist is also untenable; / Just as with the absence of a second head, / One cannot speak of its being cut off.' / Therefore, since phenomena of coming and going do not exist, a time of staying and abiding also does not exist. Because time is elucidated dependent on phenomena, and phenomena are also distinguished dependent on time; since phenomena do not exist, how could time be established? As the Madhyamakaśāstra verse says: / 'Time abiding cannot be apprehended; / Time passing can also not be apprehended; / If time cannot be apprehended, / How can the characteristics of time be spoken of? / Dependent on things, therefore time exists; / Apart from things, how could time exist? / Things themselves are already non-existent; / How much more so could time exist?' / The commentary says: The citations and proofs above point directly to the mundane world; all distinguish the real directly within the phenomenal, and see the Way from the ordinary. Direct evidence right before our eyes can put an end to doubts. The phenomenon of going being like this, even the transmigration through the six destinies and the succession of the four seasons are all the Way of the unmoving, ever-abiding one mind. This being so, though diverse texts have varied phrasing and the hundred schools have divergent doctrines, if one grasps their congruence, how could words and phrases mislead? If one penetrates that the ten thousand phenomena are only our one mind, and observes that the nature of this mind has never yet been produced, how could one speak of cessation? When even stillness cannot be apprehended, how could one speak of movement? Just as at the Śūraṅgama assembly, the Tathāgata thereupon bent the fingers of his five-wheeled hand in the midst of the great assembly; having bent them, he opened them again, and having opened them, he bent them again. He said to Ānanda: 'What do you see now?' Ānanda said: 'I see the Tathāgata's palm with a hundred jewel wheels opening and closing in the midst of the assembly.' The Buddha said to Ānanda: 'When you see my hand opening and closing in the midst of the assembly, is it my hand that has opening and closing, or is it your seeing that has opening and closing?' Ānanda said: 'World-Honoured One, the precious hand opens and closes in the assembly; I see the Tathāgata's hand opening and closing of itself, not that the nature of my seeing of itself opens and closes.' The Buddha said: 'Which is moving and which is still?' Ānanda said: 'The Buddha's hand does not abide, whereas the nature of my seeing does not even have stillness; what could be non-abiding?' The Buddha said: 'So it is.' [...] 'How is it that you now take movement to be your body and movement to be your environment, from beginning to end producing and ceasing in thought after thought, abandoning your true nature and conducting affairs in an inverted manner? When the nature of your mind loses truth, you mistake things for yourself, transmigrating therein and bringing about samsaric wandering upon yourself.' Therefore we know that the seeing nature does not move, its principle pervading the dharmadhātu; it is merely that by mistaking things for oneself, one turns one's back on enlightenment and conforms to dust. If one takes movement to be the body