宗鏡錄 33.7.3

33.7.3

Just as grain does not make the sprout, and the sprout does not make the grain, therefore they are not one. As for their not being different: [a person aged] thirty is not separate from [that person aged] twenty; if at twenty their surname was Zhang, at thirty it is not different. The Madhyamakaśāstra says: "If they were different, why distinguish grain sprout, grain stalk, and grain leaf? Therefore they are not different." As for not coming: the age of twenty does not arrive at the time of thirty; therefore it does not come. As for not going out: at the time of twenty, it is naturally tranquil in its own place and does not arise again; therefore it does not go out. One who penetrates this principle is free from all conceptual proliferation and accords with the Middle Way; this is the ultimate truth. Thus we know that within the ultimate truth, not a single phenomenon can be apprehended; how could there be going and coming? As the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra says: "At that time the World-Honoured One asked that bodhisattva: 'Good son, did you come by arriving, or did you come by not arriving?' Bodhisattva Vaiḍūryaprabha said: 'World-Honoured One, I did not come by arriving, nor did I come by not arriving. As I observe this meaning, there is no coming at all. World-Honoured One, if conditioned formations were permanent, there would also be no coming; if they were impermanent, there would also be no coming. If someone sees the existence of a sentient being's nature, for them there is coming and not coming. I now do not see any fixed nature of sentient beings; how could I say there is coming and not coming? Those with pride see going and coming; those without pride have no going and coming. Those who grasp at practices see going and coming; those who do not grasp at practices have no going and coming. If one sees the Tathāgata as entering ultimate nirvāṇa, then there is going and coming; if one does not see the Tathāgata as entering ultimate nirvāṇa, then there is no going and coming. If one does not hear of the Buddha-nature, then there is going and coming; for one who hears of the Buddha-nature, there is no going and coming.'" The Prajñāpradīpaśāstra asks: "Do you call the initial departure that of one who has already gone, of one who has not yet gone, or of one who is presently going? All three are incorrect. As the verse says: / 'There is no departure in what has already gone, / Nor is there departure in what has not yet gone; / There is no departure in what is presently going; / Where could there be departure?' / The commentary says: 'There is no departure in what has already gone' means that the function of going has already ceased therein. 'Nor is there departure in what has not yet gone' means that in the absence of moving there is no going; going is not so. 'There is no departure in what is presently going' means that in both what has already gone and what has not yet gone, the meaning of going is absent; how could it be said that there is going in what is presently going? Thus in all three cases, there is no initial departure. Therefore the verse says: 'Where could there be departure?' / Furthermore, a verse says: / 'There is no "already gone" or "not yet gone", / Nor is there that "presently going"; / Within phenomena devoid of going, / Why falsely discriminate?' / The commentary says: 'Falsely discriminate' is like a person with cataracts seeing hairs, flies, and the like in empty space; all lack substance. / Furthermore, a verse says: / 'Therefore going lacks inherent nature; / The goer is also likewise; / What is presently going and all phenomena / Are entirely non-existent.' / Furthermore, a verse says: / 'An unextinguished phenomenon does not cease; / An already extinguished phenomenon does not cease; / What is presently ceasing also does not cease; / Being unproduced, what could cease?' / The commentary says: As for the first line, it is because cessation is empty, like remaining. As for the second line, it is like a person who has already died not dying again. As for the third line, apart from those phenomena already extinguished and not yet extinguished, there is no other time of ceasing, because both errors would apply. Therefore it is definitely known that what is presently ceasing does not cease. As for the fourth line, what does it mean? Because all phenomena are unproduced. Saying 'unproduced' means that the characteristic of production is non-existent. For the unproduced to have cessation is untenable, like the son of a barren woman. / And furthermore, as to your claim of cessation: does an existent entity cease, or does a non-existent entity cease? Both are incorrect. As the verse says: / 'If a phenomenon has an existent entity, / Being existent, it has no characteristic of cessation.' / The commentary says: Because they are contradictory, like water and fire. Because of this, the verse says: / 'For one phenomenon to have both existence and non-existence / Is not logically admissible.' / Furthermore, the verse says: / 'If a phenomenon lacks an existent entity, / For cessation to exist is also untenable; / Just as with the absence of a second head, / One cannot speak of its being cut off.' / Therefore, since phenomena of coming and going do not exist, a time of staying and abiding also does not exist. Because time is elucidated dependent on phenomena, and phenomena are also distinguished dependent on time; since phenomena do not exist, how could time be established? As the Madhyamakaśāstra verse says: / 'Time abiding cannot be apprehended; / Time passing can also not be apprehended; / If time cannot be apprehended, / How can the characteristics of time be spoken of? / Dependent on things, therefore time exists; / Apart from things, how could time exist? / Things themselves are already non-existent; / How much more so could time exist?' / The commentary says: The citations and proofs above point directly to the mundane world; all distinguish the real directly within the phenomenal, and see the Way from the ordinary. Direct evidence right before our eyes can put an end to doubts. The phenomenon of going being like this, even the transmigration through the six destinies and the succession of the four seasons are all the Way of the unmoving, ever-abiding one mind. This being so, though diverse texts have varied phrasing and the hundred schools have divergent doctrines, if one grasps their congruence, how could words and phrases mislead? If one penetrates that the ten thousand phenomena are only our one mind, and observes that the nature of this mind has never yet been produced, how could one speak of cessation? When even stillness cannot be apprehended, how could one speak of movement? Just as at the Śūraṅgama assembly, the Tathāgata thereupon bent the fingers of his five-wheeled hand in the midst of the great assembly; having bent them, he opened them again, and having opened them, he bent them again. He said to Ānanda: 'What do you see now?' Ānanda said: 'I see the Tathāgata's palm with a hundred jewel wheels opening and closing in the midst of the assembly.' The Buddha said to Ānanda: 'When you see my hand opening and closing in the midst of the assembly, is it my hand that has opening and closing, or is it your seeing that has opening and closing?' Ānanda said: 'World-Honoured One, the precious hand opens and closes in the assembly; I see the Tathāgata's hand opening and closing of itself, not that the nature of my seeing of itself opens and closes.' The Buddha said: 'Which is moving and which is still?' Ānanda said: 'The Buddha's hand does not abide, whereas the nature of my seeing does not even have stillness; what could be non-abiding?' The Buddha said: 'So it is.' [...] 'How is it that you now take movement to be your body and movement to be your environment, from beginning to end producing and ceasing in thought after thought, abandoning your true nature and conducting affairs in an inverted manner? When the nature of your mind loses truth, you mistake things for yourself, transmigrating therein and bringing about samsaric wandering upon yourself.' Therefore we know that the seeing nature does not move, its principle pervading the dharmadhātu; it is merely that by mistaking things for oneself, one turns one's back on enlightenment and conforms to dust. If one takes movement to be the body