宗鏡錄 36.62

36.62

答曰。用即寂。寂即用。用寂體一。同出而異名。更無無用之寂。主於用也。是以智彌昧。照逾明。神彌靜。應逾動。豈曰明昧動靜之異哉。故成具曰。不為而過為。寶積曰。無心無識。無不覺知。斯則窮神盡智。極象外之談也。即之明文。聖心可知矣。釋曰。般若無知者。是一論之宏綱。乃宗鏡之大體。微妙難解。所以全引證明。夫般若者。是智用。無知者。是智體。用不離體。知即無知。體不離用。無知即知。若有知者。是取相之知。即為所知之相縛。不能遍知一切故。論云。夫有所知。則有所不知。若是無相之知。不被所知之相礙。即能遍知一切。故論云。以聖心無知。故無所不知。以要言之。但是理事無礙。非即非離。如論云。神無慮故。能獨王於世表。智無知。故。能玄照於事外者。不即事也。智雖事外。未始無事。神雖世表。終日域中者。不離事也。理非即非離。如事亦然。是以理從事顯。理徹於事。事因理成。事徹於理。理事交徹。般若方圓。故能有無齊行。權實雙運。豈可執有執無。迷於聖旨乎。所以論云。欲言其有。無狀無名。欲言其無。聖以之靈。何者。此有是不有之有。曷有其名。斯無是不無之無。寧虧其體。有無但分兩名。其性元一。不可以有為有。以無為無。故論云。非有。故知而無知者。以知自無性。豈待亡知。然後無知乎。論云。非無。故無知。而知者。以無相之知。非。同木石。無而失照。此靈知之性。雖無名相。寂照無遺。如論云。考之玄籍。本之聖意。豈復真偽殊心。空色異照耶。是以照無相。不失撫會之功。覩變動。不乖無相之旨。造有不異無。造無不異有。未嘗不有。未嘗不無。故曰。不動等覺而建立諸法。以此而推。寂用何妨。如何謂覩變之知。異無相之照乎。又論云。知即無知。無知即知。無以言異。而異於聖心也。故知若云。有之與無。同之與異。皆是世間言語。但有虛名。而無實體。豈可以不定之名言。而欲定其無言之妙性也。今總結大意。般若無知者。但是無心。自然靈鑒。非待相顯。靡假緣生。不住有無。不涉能所。非一非異。而成其妙道也。所以先德云。夫聖心無思。名言路絕。體虛不可以色。取無慮不可以心求。包法界而不大。處毫端而不微。寂寥絕於生滅。應物無有去來。鑒徹天鏡。而無鑒照之勤。智周十方。而不生二相。森羅萬像與之同原。大哉。妙用而無心者。其唯般若無知之謂乎。鈔云。然無知之興。為破邪執。有四。論文。一一破之。一者。或執有知。為常見。二者。或執無知。為斷見。三者。亦知亦無知。為相違見。四者。非有知非無知。為戲論見。第一破常見者。惑人聞說般若者。智慧也。智則知也。慧則見也。則謂聖人同於凡夫。有心取相。知見墮於常見。不了般若。論主便則斥云。聞聖有知。謂之有心。為破此執。故云般若無知也。斯則照俗不執相。照真不著空。無執無著。即四句本亡。無種不知。而未嘗分別。以無緣之知。照實相之境。智則雖照而無知。境則雖實而無相。境智冥一故。相與寂然。能所兩亡。故云般若無知也。故云是以真智觀真諦。未嘗取所知。智不取所知。此智何由知。又云。將無以般若體相真淨。本無惑取之知。不可以知名哉。又云。夫陳有無者。夫智之生也。極於相內。法本無相。聖智何知。故中論云。若使無有有。云何當有無。有無既已無。知有無者誰。此上並破有知之常見也。第二破無知之斷見者。惑人聞經云。真般若者。無知無見。無作無緣。便謂般若。同於太虛無情之流。墮於斷見。既乖般若。論主破之。故云世稱無知者。謂木石太虛無情之流。靈鑒幽燭。形于未兆。道無隱機。寧曰無知。所以論題無知者。為明聖心。無有取相之知。故云無知。非謂則無真知也。何者。般若靈鑒。無種不知。不同太虛。一向無知也。然則斷見無知。略明有十一種。論中略言三種。十一種者。一者太虛。一向空故。二者木石。謂無情故。三者聾瞽。謂根不具。無見聞故。此上三種。是論所破。四者愚癡。謂無智慧。於境不了故。五者癲狂。惡鬼惑心。失本性故。六者心亂。境多惑心。不能決斷故。七者悶絕。心神闇黑。如死人故。八者惛醉。為藥所迷故。九者睡眠。神識困熟故。十者無想定。外道伏惑。心想不行故。十一者滅盡定。二乘住寂。心智止滅故。此上並是惑倒。非般若無知也。第三破亦有知亦無知者。則是學人。聞經所明。或說般若有知。或說無知。不能正解。便生異執。論主而復破之。異執有三種。一者反照故無知。則是學人謂聖人實是有知。但以知物之時。忘却知心。不自言我能知。此只成不私自作知解。非都不知也。二者以般若性空故無知者。則是學人謂言般若實自有知。但以知性空故。則無知。此只成性空故無知。而未是無惑取之無知。第三真諦境淨故。歎美般若無知。何者。學人則謂般若能知真諦之境。因境淨無相故。則歎美般若無知。此只成境是無知。般若常是有知也。此上三見。並參亦有亦無知。俱乖聖智。論主所以破之也。第四破非有知非無知者。則是惑人。聞經云。真般若者。非有非無。無起無滅。不可說示。人。不能亡言會其玄旨。則謂般若唯是非有非無。便作非有非無之解。此並心量。乖乎真智。論主破之。故云言其非有者。言其非是有。非謂是非有。言其非無者。言其非是無。非謂是非無。非有非非有。非無非非無。此絕言之道。知何以傳。此破非有知非無知也。論若如此。則破四執之理昭然。今題目但云無知者。蓋是舉一隅而三隅反。所以智人聞說無。則不取無。不取亦有亦無。非有非無。斯則離四句。絕百非。可謂真無知也。論中分明破其四執。人自不見。故云是以聖人處有不有。此破有知也。居無不無。此破無知也。雖不取於有無。此破亦有知亦無知也。然亦不捨於有無。此破非有知非無知也。然上四破。說雖前後。辯之不同。論意只於一句中。則四句理圓。何者。處有不有。即是居無不無。即是不取有無。即是不捨有無。斯則聖心能亡四句。離諸現量。可謂無知。言偏理圓。故云無知也。今更依宗本義意。以釋般若無知。亦是一家美也。論明般若無知者。則權實二智。平等大慧也。今則以略攝廣。言約義豐。但云般若。則會二智矣。故宗本云。漚和般若者。大慧之稱也。何者。若唯般若觀於實相。而無權智涉有者。則沈滯於空。若唯權智涉有。而無般若達空者。則涉有之時。染於塵累。若能二智圓明者。則真智觀真諦而不取空。權智化物而不著有。故論云。智有窮幽之鑒。而無知焉者。此則真智照真。不取於無也。神有應會之用。而無慮焉者。此則權智涉俗。不取於有也。神無慮故。獨王於世表。智無知故。能玄照於事外者。此謂二智俱能照真。則權中有實也。智雖事外。未始無事。神雖世表。終日域中矣者。謂二智俱能照俗。則實中有權也。然則權實自在。事理混融。處有不取於塵。居無不沈於寂。真俗雙泯。空有兩亡。何實何權。誰境誰智。儻然靡據。蕭散縱橫。不取不捨。可謂平等大慧。故云般若無知也。如起信論云。所言覺義者。謂心體離念。離念相者。等虛空界。無所不遍。法界一相。即是如來平等法身。依此法身。說名本覺。離念者。即是此論之無知。無知之真知。即是本覺。本覺。即是佛一切智也。無所不遍者。即無所不知也。夫一切境界。只於一念心中。一時頓知。無有遺餘。真俗並照。不墮有無也。故論云。知即無知。無知即知。無以言異。而異於聖心也。知即無知。即是真智遍知。名一切智也。無知即知。即是無種不知。名一切種智也。聖心不殊。以心無二故。唯只一智。但隨境照說有二也。二既不二。一亦非一。若約天台。即言直緣中道。名一切智。雙照二諦。名一切種智。又佛智照空。如二乘所見。名一切智。照假。如菩薩所見。名道種智。佛智照中。皆見實相。名一切種智。故言三智一心中得。一心。即般若無知之智也。以心不屬有無。常照中道。即是自性。有大智慧光明義。遍照法界義。真實識知義。故云斯則不知而自知矣。即不假作意。故不知也。自性明照故。而自知也。以神解之性。自然寂而常照。不依他發起也。故信心銘云。虛明自照。不勞心力。又云。若體自無取相之知。故言無知。不是前念起知。至後念妄却知想。然後名無知。若然者。則成無記之心。何名般若無知耶。蓋是無緣之智。照無相之境。真境無相。真智無知。境智冥一。理無不盡。鑒無不窮。可謂佛智見性也。又夫有取相之知。則心有間礙。不能垢淨同如。有無一旨。照空迷於辯有。知俗乖乎了真。不能圓照萬法。故云。有所不知也。永嘉集云。若以知知寂。此非無緣知。如手執如意。非無如意手。若以自知知。亦非無緣知。如手自作拳。非無不拳手。亦不知知寂。亦不自知知。不可為無知。自性了然故。不同於木石。手不執如意。亦不自作拳。不可為無手。以手安然故。不同於兔角。乃至今言知者。不須知知。但知而已。則前不接滅。後不引起。前後斷續。中間自孤。當體不顧。應時消滅。知體既已滅。豁然如托空。寂爾少時間。唯覺無所得。即覺無覺。無覺之覺。異乎木石。觀和尚云。此上無緣之知。斯為禪宗之妙。以彼但顯無緣真智。以為真道。若奪之者。但顯本心。不隨妄心。未有智慧照了心原。故須能所平等。等不失照。為無知之知。此知。知於空寂無生如來藏性。方為妙耳。然上依教方便。雖分頓漸。不離一心。如有偈云。諸論各異端。修行理無二。競執有是非。達者無違諍。

Answer: Function is stillness; stillness is function. Function and stillness have a single substance; they emerge together yet have different names. There is no stillness apart from function that could preside over function. Therefore, the dimmer the cognition, the brighter the illumination; the quieter the spirit, the more dynamic the responsiveness. How could one speak of a difference between brightness and dimness, or stillness and motion? Thus the Chengju [jing] says: "Not acting, yet acting exceedingly." The Ratnakūṭa says: "Without thought and without consciousness, there is nothing not perceived and known." These are discourses that exhaust the spirit, bring wisdom to its end, and reach the utmost beyond phenomenal forms. Approaching these clear passages, the sage's citta can indeed be understood. Explaining this: Prajñā's being without knowing is the grand guideline of the whole treatise and the great substance of the Mirror of the Source. It is subtle and difficult to comprehend; hence it is quoted in full as proof. Prajñā is the function of wisdom, and "without knowing" is the substance of wisdom. Function does not depart from substance: knowing is precisely being without knowing. Substance does not depart from function: being without knowing is precisely knowing. If one has knowing, it is a knowing that grasps characteristics, which is then bound by the characteristics of what is known, so that it cannot know everything universally. Therefore the treatise says: "Whenever there is something known, there is something not known." If it is a knowing free of characteristics, it is not obstructed by the characteristics of what is known and thus can know everything universally. Therefore the treatise says: "Because the sage's citta is without knowing, there is nothing it does not know." To put it essentially, it is simply the non-obstruction of principle and phenomena, neither identical nor separate. As the treatise says: "Because the spirit is without deliberation, it can rule alone beyond the world. Because wisdom is without knowing, it can profoundly illuminate beyond phenomena"—this means not being identical to phenomena. "Although wisdom is beyond phenomena, it has never been without phenomena. Although the spirit is beyond the world, it remains all day within its realm"—this means not departing from phenomena. Principle is neither identical nor separate; phenomena are likewise so. Therefore, principle is revealed through phenomena, and principle penetrates phenomena. Phenomena are accomplished through principle, and phenomena penetrate principle. When principle and phenomena interpenetrate, prajñā is then completely rounded. Hence existence and non-existence proceed together, and the expedient and the real are operated simultaneously. How could one cling to existence or cling to non-existence, remaining deluded regarding the sage's intent? Thus the treatise says: "If one wishes to speak of its existence, it has no shape and no name; if one wishes to speak of its non-existence, through it the sage is spiritualized." Why so? This existence is an existence of non-existence—how could it have a name? This non-existence is a non-existence of non-non-existence—how could its substance be deficient? Existence and non-existence are merely distinguished as two names; their nature is fundamentally one. One cannot take existence as existence, nor take non-existence as non-existence. Therefore the treatise says: "'Not existent,' so it knows yet is without knowing"—since knowing itself has no nature, how could it wait for knowing to be extinguished before being without knowing? The treatise says: "'Not non-existent,' so it is without knowing yet knows"—because a knowing free of characteristics is not the same as wood or stone, being non-existent and lacking illumination. This nature of numinous awareness, though free of name and characteristic, is silent yet illuminates without omission. As the treatise says: "Examining the profound scriptures and grounding it in the sage's intent, how could there be distinct minds for the real and the false, or different illuminations for emptiness and form?" Therefore, illuminating the signless does not forfeit the work of comforting and convening; perceiving change and movement does not contravene the principle of the signless. Reaching existence is not different from non-existence; reaching non-existence is not different from existence. It has never not existed, and it has never not been non-existent. Hence it is said: "Without moving from universal enlightenment, one establishes all dharmas." Deducing from this, what impediment is there between stillness and function? How could one say that the knowing that perceives change is different from the illumination of the signless? Furthermore, the treatise says: "Knowing is being without knowing; being without knowing is knowing. Do not, because of words indicating difference, differentiate the sage's citta." Hence we know that speaking of existence and non-existence, identity and difference, are all worldly speech, possessing merely empty names without real substance. How could one use provisional names and words to determine the ineffable, wondrous nature? Now, to summarize the main purport: prajñā's being without knowing is simply being free of thought, naturally numinous in discernment, not waiting to be revealed through characteristics, not relying on conditions to arise, not abiding in existence or non-existence, not involving subject and object, neither one nor different, thus accomplishing its wondrous path. Therefore a predecessor said: "The sage's citta is free of thinking; the path of names and words is severed. Its substance is empty and cannot be grasped through form; it is without deliberation and cannot be sought with the citta. It encompasses the dharmadhātu without being large; it dwells on the tip of a hair without being tiny. Quiet and solitary, it cuts off arising and ceasing; responding to things, it has no coming or going. Its discernment penetrates like a heavenly mirror, yet without the effort of reflection; its wisdom pervades the ten directions, yet without generating the two characteristics. The myriad phenomena and forms share the same source with it. Great indeed! Wondrous function while free of thought—is this not what is meant by prajñā being without knowing?" The Commentary says: Now, the emergence of "without knowing" was to refute wrong attachments. There are four. The treatise refutes each of them. First, some attach to having knowing, which is the view of eternalism. Second, some attach to being without knowing, which is the view of annihilationism. Third, [some attach to] both knowing and being without knowing, which is the view of mutual contradiction. Fourth, [some attach to] neither having knowing nor being without knowing, which is the view of frivolous discourse (prapañca). First, refuting the view of eternalism: Deluded people, hearing it said that prajñā is wisdom, and that jñāna is knowing while prajñā is seeing, then claim that the sage is identical to ordinary beings in having a citta that grasps characteristics, so their knowing and seeing fall into the view of eternalism, failing to understand prajñā. The treatise master then reproaches them, saying: "Hearing that the sage has knowing, they say he has a citta." To refute this attachment, he therefore says: "Prajñā is without knowing." This means that illuminating the conventional does not grasp characteristics, and illuminating the real does not cling to emptiness. Neither grasping nor clinging, the four propositions are fundamentally extinguished. There is no kind it does not know, yet it never discriminates. With a conditionless knowing, it illuminates the realm of the real characteristic. Although wisdom illuminates, it is without knowing; although the realm is real, it is free of characteristics. Because realm and wisdom are merged into oneness, together they are silent. Subject and object are both extinguished; hence it is said that prajñā is without knowing. Thus it says: "Therefore, when true wisdom contemplates the true truth, it never grasps what is known. When wisdom does not grasp what is known, through what could this wisdom know?" It also says: "Could it not be that because the substance and characteristic of prajñā are truly pure, fundamentally free of the knowing of deluded grasping, it cannot be named by 'knowing'?" It also says: "As for those who lay out existence and non-existence, the arising of wisdom is bounded within characteristics. Dharmas are fundamentally without characteristics; what does the sage's wisdom know?" Therefore the Madhyamakaśāstra says: "If there were no existence, how could there be non-existence? Since existence and non-existence are already absent, who is it that knows existence and non-existence?" All the above refutes the view of eternalism regarding having knowing. Second, refuting the view of annihilationism regarding being without knowing: Deluded people, hearing the sūtras say that true prajñā is without knowing and without seeing, without action and without conditions, then claim that prajñā is identical to great space and insentient things, falling into the view of annihilationism. Since this departs from prajñā, the treatise master refutes it, saying: "What the world calls 'without knowing' refers to insentient things like wood, stone, and great space. But numinous discernment secretly illuminates, manifesting before the unmanifest; the Way has no hidden workings—how could it be called 'without knowing'?" The reason the treatise takes "without knowing" as its title is to clarify that the sage's citta has no knowing that grasps characteristics; hence it is called "without knowing." It does not mean that there is no true knowing. Why so? The numinous discernment of prajñā knows all kinds without omission; it is not like great space, which is entirely devoid of knowing. However, of the "without knowing" of annihilationist views, eleven kinds are briefly explained; the treatise mentions three kinds in brief. As for the eleven kinds: 1. Great space, because it is entirely empty. 2. Wood and stone, meaning insentient. 3. The deaf and blind, meaning their faculties are incomplete and lack seeing and hearing. The above three kinds are what the treatise refutes. 4. Ignorance and folly, meaning lacking wisdom and failing to comprehend realms. 5. Madness, where evil spirits delude the citta and lose its fundamental nature. 6. Mental distraction, where many realms confuse the citta so that it cannot judge. 7. Fainting and unconsciousness, where the citta and spirit are darkened as if dead. 8. Stupor and drunkenness, being confused by substances. 9. Sleep, where the spirit-consciousness is exhausted and slumbering. 10. The absorption of non-conception, where non-Buddhists suppress defilements and mental conceptions do not operate. 11. The absorption of cessation, where the two vehicles abide in stillness and the citta's wisdom is brought to a stop and extinguished. All of the above are delusions and inversions, not prajñā's being without knowing. Third, refuting both having knowing and being without knowing: This refers to practitioners who, hearing the sūtras clarify that prajñā is sometimes said to have knowing and sometimes said to be without knowing, cannot understand correctly and thus give rise to diverse attachments. The treatise master again refutes them. There are three kinds of diverse attachments: 1. Being without knowing due to reflexive illumination: This refers to practitioners claiming that the sage actually has knowing, but when knowing things, he forgets the knowing citta and does not himself say 'I can know.' This merely amounts to not personally constructing a concept of knowing, not that he does not know at all. 2. Being without knowing because the nature of prajñā is empty: This refers to practitioners claiming that prajñā actually has knowing of itself, but because it knows that the nature is empty, it is without knowing. This merely amounts to being without knowing because the nature is empty, not yet being the 'without knowing' that is free of deluded grasping. 3. Praising prajñā as without knowing because the realm of the true truth is pure: Why so? Practitioners claim that prajñā can know the realm of the true truth, and because the realm is pure and free of characteristics, they praise prajñā as being without knowing. This merely amounts to the realm being without knowing while prajñā always has knowing. The above three views all partake of both having and not having knowing, and all diverge from the sage's wisdom; therefore the treatise master refutes them. Fourth, refuting neither having knowing nor being without knowing: This refers to deluded people who, hearing the sūtras say that true prajñā is neither existent nor non-existent, without arising and without ceasing, and cannot be spoken of or shown to people, cannot forget words to tally with its profound purport; they then claim that prajñā is solely neither existent nor non-existent, and promptly form an understanding of neither existence nor non-existence. These are all mental measures, diverging from true wisdom. The treatise master refutes them, saying: "Saying that it is not existent means that it is not existent; it does not mean that it is non-existent. Saying that it is not non-existent means that it is not non-existent; it does not mean that it is non-non-existent. Not existent, nor not existent; not non-existent, nor not non-existent. Regarding this Way beyond words, how could knowing transmit it?" This refutes neither having knowing nor being without knowing. If the treatise is like this, the principle of refuting the four attachments is clear. That the title now merely says "without knowing" is simply raising one corner and expecting the other three in return. Therefore, when a person of wisdom hears 'without' spoken, he does not grasp 'without', nor does he grasp both existence and non-existence, nor neither existence nor non-existence. This, then, departs from the four propositions and cuts off the hundred negations; it can be called true non-knowing. In the treatise, the four attachments are clearly refuted, but people themselves do not see it. Thus it says: "Therefore the sage dwells in existence without existing"—this refutes having knowing; "abides in non-existence without being non-existent"—this refutes being without knowing; "although he does not grasp existence or non-existence"—this refutes both having knowing and being without knowing; "yet he also does not abandon existence or non-existence"—this refutes neither having knowing nor being without knowing. Although the above four refutations are explained sequentially and analyzed distinctly, the intent of the treatise is that within a single phrase, the principles of the four propositions are complete. Why so? Dwelling in existence without existing is precisely abiding in non-existence without being non-existent, is precisely not grasping existence or non-existence, is precisely not abandoning existence or non-existence. This means that the sage's citta can obliterate the four propositions and depart from all direct perceptions; it can be called "without knowing." The words are one-sided, but the principle is complete; hence it is called "without knowing." Now, relying further on the meaning of the Zongben yi, to explain prajñā's being without knowing is also a fine perspective of our school. What the treatise clarifies as prajñā's being without knowing is precisely the two wisdoms of the expedient and the real, the equal great wisdom. Now, subsuming the broad with the concise, the words are restrained while the meaning is rich: merely speaking of prajñā encompasses both wisdoms. Thus the Zongben says: "Upāya and prajñā are the designations of great wisdom." Why so? If one only uses prajñā to contemplate the real characteristic without expedient wisdom to engage with existence, one will sink into emptiness. If one only uses expedient wisdom to engage with existence without prajñā to penetrate emptiness, then when engaging with existence, one will be tainted by defilements. If one can make the two wisdoms completely bright, then true wisdom contemplates the true truth without grasping emptiness, and expedient wisdom transforms beings without clinging to existence. Therefore the treatise says: "Wisdom has the discernment that exhausts the profound, yet is without knowing"—this means true wisdom illuminates the true without grasping non-existence; "Spirit has the function of responding and convening, yet is without deliberation"—this means expedient wisdom engages the conventional without grasping existence. "Because the spirit is without deliberation, it rules alone beyond the world. Because wisdom is without knowing, it can profoundly illuminate beyond phenomena"—this means both wisdoms can illuminate the true, so within the expedient there is the real. "Although wisdom is beyond phenomena, it has never been without phenomena. Although the spirit is beyond the world, it remains all day within its realm"—this means both wisdoms can illuminate the conventional, so within the real there is the expedient. Thus, the expedient and the real are unimpeded, and phenomena and principle are blended. Dwelling in existence, one is not caught in defilement; abiding in non-existence, one does not sink into stillness. True and conventional are both obliterated; emptiness and existence are both extinguished. What is real? What is expedient? Which is realm? Which is wisdom? Unfettered and without reliance, free, expansive, and unrestricted, neither grasping nor abandoning, it can be called equal great wisdom; hence it is said that prajñā is without knowing. As the Treatise on the Awakening of Faith says: "What is meant by enlightenment is that the citta-substance is free from thought. The characteristic of being free from thought is equal to the realm of empty space, pervading everywhere. The single characteristic of the dharmadhātu is precisely the Tathāgata's equal dharmakāya. Based on this dharmakāya, it is called original enlightenment." Being free from thought is precisely the "without knowing" of this treatise. The true knowing of "without knowing" is precisely original enlightenment. Original enlightenment is precisely the Buddha's sarvajñatā. That which pervades everywhere is precisely that which has nothing it does not know. All realms are, within a single thought-moment of the citta, instantly and simultaneously known without remainder, illuminating both the true and conventional, not falling into existence or non-existence. Therefore the treatise says: "Knowing is being without knowing; being without knowing is knowing. Do not, because of words indicating difference, differentiate the sage's citta." Knowing is being without knowing: this is true wisdom knowing universally, named sarvajñatā. Being without knowing is knowing: this is knowing all kinds without omission, named sarvākārajñatā. The sage's citta is not different; because the citta is not dual, there is only one wisdom. It is only in accordance with illuminating realms that two are spoken of. Since the two are not two, the one is also not one. If explained according to Tiantai, directly conditioning the middle way is called sarvajñatā; illuminating both truths simultaneously is called sarvākārajñatā. Furthermore, the Buddha's wisdom illuminating emptiness, like that seen by the two vehicles, is called sarvajñatā; illuminating the provisional, like that seen by bodhisattvas, is called mārgarūpajñatā; the Buddha's wisdom illuminating the middle, wherein all see the real characteristic, is called sarvākārajñatā. Therefore it is said that the three wisdoms are attained in the one mind. The one mind is precisely the wisdom of prajñā's being without knowing. Because the citta does not belong to existence or non-existence, constantly illuminating the middle way, this is precisely the self-nature possessing the meaning of the light of great wisdom, the meaning of universally illuminating the dharmadhātu, and the meaning of true cognitive awareness. Therefore it is said: "This, then, is not knowing yet naturally knowing." Because it does not rely on deliberate intention, it does not know; because the self-nature clearly illuminates, it naturally knows. Because the nature of spiritual comprehension is naturally silent yet ever illuminating, it does not depend on other things to be aroused. Thus the Xinxin ming says: "Empty and clear, it illuminates itself, without taxing the mental effort." It is also said: If its substance is naturally free from the knowing that grasps characteristics, it is therefore called "without knowing." It is not that a preceding thought gives rise to knowing, and upon reaching a subsequent thought, one forgets the notion of knowing and only then calls it "without knowing." If that were so, it would become an unmanifest (avyākṛta) citta; how could it be called prajñā's being without knowing? It is simply conditionless wisdom illuminating the signless realm. The true realm is signless; true wisdom is without knowing. Realm and wisdom are merged into oneness; principle is completely exhausted, and discernment is thoroughly reached. This can be called the Buddha's wisdom seeing the nature. Furthermore, if there is a knowing that grasps characteristics, then the citta has intervals and obstructions, unable to make defilement and purity identical in suchness, or existence and non-existence of a single purport. Illuminating emptiness, one is confused about discerning existence; knowing the conventional, one contravenes comprehending the real; one cannot completely illuminate the myriad dharmas. Therefore it is said: "There is something not known." The Yongjia ji says: "If one uses knowing to know stillness, this is not conditionless knowing. It is like a hand holding a ruyi scepter—it is not a hand without a ruyi scepter. If one uses self-knowing to know, this is also not conditionless knowing. It is like a hand making a fist of itself—it is not a hand that does not make a fist. Neither knowing knowing stillness, nor self-knowing knowing, it cannot be deemed without knowing, because the self-nature is clearly apparent; it is not the same as wood and stone. The hand does not hold a ruyi scepter, nor does it make a fist of itself, yet it cannot be deemed without a hand, because the hand is secure; it is not the same as a rabbit's horn. Down to the present, when speaking of knowing, one need not know knowing; it is simply knowing. Then what precedes does not connect to cessation, and what follows is not induced; before and after are severed and disconnected, and the middle stands solitary on its own. Not looking back at its own substance, it dissolves at that very moment. When the substance of knowing has already dissolved, it is suddenly open like relying on empty space. Quietly for a short while, one only perceives that nothing is obtained. That is enlightenment without perception; the perception of no perception is different from wood and stone." Upādhyāya Guan said: "The conditionless knowing mentioned above is the marvel of the Chan school. Because they merely reveal the conditionless true wisdom as the true Way. If one strips it away: it merely reveals the fundamental citta without following the deluded mind, but does not yet possess wisdom that illuminates and comprehends the citta's source. Therefore, subject and object must be equal, and being equal without losing illumination constitutes the knowing of non-knowing. This knowing knows the empty, silent, unarisen tathāgatagarbha nature—only then is it wondrous." However, the above, relying on pedagogical expedients, though divided into sudden and gradual, does not depart from the one mind. As a verse says: "The various treatises have different viewpoints, / But in practice the principle is not dual. / Competing attachments have rights and wrongs, / But the realized are free of dispute."