宗鏡錄 36.62

36.62

Answer: Function is stillness; stillness is function. Function and stillness have a single substance; they emerge together yet have different names. There is no stillness apart from function that could preside over function. Therefore, the dimmer the cognition, the brighter the illumination; the quieter the spirit, the more dynamic the responsiveness. How could one speak of a difference between brightness and dimness, or stillness and motion? Thus the Chengju [jing] says: "Not acting, yet acting exceedingly." The Ratnakūṭa says: "Without thought and without consciousness, there is nothing not perceived and known." These are discourses that exhaust the spirit, bring wisdom to its end, and reach the utmost beyond phenomenal forms. Approaching these clear passages, the sage's citta can indeed be understood. Explaining this: Prajñā's being without knowing is the grand guideline of the whole treatise and the great substance of the Mirror of the Source. It is subtle and difficult to comprehend; hence it is quoted in full as proof. Prajñā is the function of wisdom, and "without knowing" is the substance of wisdom. Function does not depart from substance: knowing is precisely being without knowing. Substance does not depart from function: being without knowing is precisely knowing. If one has knowing, it is a knowing that grasps characteristics, which is then bound by the characteristics of what is known, so that it cannot know everything universally. Therefore the treatise says: "Whenever there is something known, there is something not known." If it is a knowing free of characteristics, it is not obstructed by the characteristics of what is known and thus can know everything universally. Therefore the treatise says: "Because the sage's citta is without knowing, there is nothing it does not know." To put it essentially, it is simply the non-obstruction of principle and phenomena, neither identical nor separate. As the treatise says: "Because the spirit is without deliberation, it can rule alone beyond the world. Because wisdom is without knowing, it can profoundly illuminate beyond phenomena"—this means not being identical to phenomena. "Although wisdom is beyond phenomena, it has never been without phenomena. Although the spirit is beyond the world, it remains all day within its realm"—this means not departing from phenomena. Principle is neither identical nor separate; phenomena are likewise so. Therefore, principle is revealed through phenomena, and principle penetrates phenomena. Phenomena are accomplished through principle, and phenomena penetrate principle. When principle and phenomena interpenetrate, prajñā is then completely rounded. Hence existence and non-existence proceed together, and the expedient and the real are operated simultaneously. How could one cling to existence or cling to non-existence, remaining deluded regarding the sage's intent? Thus the treatise says: "If one wishes to speak of its existence, it has no shape and no name; if one wishes to speak of its non-existence, through it the sage is spiritualized." Why so? This existence is an existence of non-existence—how could it have a name? This non-existence is a non-existence of non-non-existence—how could its substance be deficient? Existence and non-existence are merely distinguished as two names; their nature is fundamentally one. One cannot take existence as existence, nor take non-existence as non-existence. Therefore the treatise says: "'Not existent,' so it knows yet is without knowing"—since knowing itself has no nature, how could it wait for knowing to be extinguished before being without knowing? The treatise says: "'Not non-existent,' so it is without knowing yet knows"—because a knowing free of characteristics is not the same as wood or stone, being non-existent and lacking illumination. This nature of numinous awareness, though free of name and characteristic, is silent yet illuminates without omission. As the treatise says: "Examining the profound scriptures and grounding it in the sage's intent, how could there be distinct minds for the real and the false, or different illuminations for emptiness and form?" Therefore, illuminating the signless does not forfeit the work of comforting and convening; perceiving change and movement does not contravene the principle of the signless. Reaching existence is not different from non-existence; reaching non-existence is not different from existence. It has never not existed, and it has never not been non-existent. Hence it is said: "Without moving from universal enlightenment, one establishes all dharmas." Deducing from this, what impediment is there between stillness and function? How could one say that the knowing that perceives change is different from the illumination of the signless? Furthermore, the treatise says: "Knowing is being without knowing; being without knowing is knowing. Do not, because of words indicating difference, differentiate the sage's citta." Hence we know that speaking of existence and non-existence, identity and difference, are all worldly speech, possessing merely empty names without real substance. How could one use provisional names and words to determine the ineffable, wondrous nature? Now, to summarize the main purport: prajñā's being without knowing is simply being free of thought, naturally numinous in discernment, not waiting to be revealed through characteristics, not relying on conditions to arise, not abiding in existence or non-existence, not involving subject and object, neither one nor different, thus accomplishing its wondrous path. Therefore a predecessor said: "The sage's citta is free of thinking; the path of names and words is severed. Its substance is empty and cannot be grasped through form; it is without deliberation and cannot be sought with the citta. It encompasses the dharmadhātu without being large; it dwells on the tip of a hair without being tiny. Quiet and solitary, it cuts off arising and ceasing; responding to things, it has no coming or going. Its discernment penetrates like a heavenly mirror, yet without the effort of reflection; its wisdom pervades the ten directions, yet without generating the two characteristics. The myriad phenomena and forms share the same source with it. Great indeed! Wondrous function while free of thought—is this not what is meant by prajñā being without knowing?" The Commentary says: Now, the emergence of "without knowing" was to refute wrong attachments. There are four. The treatise refutes each of them. First, some attach to having knowing, which is the view of eternalism. Second, some attach to being without knowing, which is the view of annihilationism. Third, [some attach to] both knowing and being without knowing, which is the view of mutual contradiction. Fourth, [some attach to] neither having knowing nor being without knowing, which is the view of frivolous discourse (prapañca). First, refuting the view of eternalism: Deluded people, hearing it said that prajñā is wisdom, and that jñāna is knowing while prajñā is seeing, then claim that the sage is identical to ordinary beings in having a citta that grasps characteristics, so their knowing and seeing fall into the view of eternalism, failing to understand prajñā. The treatise master then reproaches them, saying: "Hearing that the sage has knowing, they say he has a citta." To refute this attachment, he therefore says: "Prajñā is without knowing." This means that illuminating the conventional does not grasp characteristics, and illuminating the real does not cling to emptiness. Neither grasping nor clinging, the four propositions are fundamentally extinguished. There is no kind it does not know, yet it never discriminates. With a conditionless knowing, it illuminates the realm of the real characteristic. Although wisdom illuminates, it is without knowing; although the realm is real, it is free of characteristics. Because realm and wisdom are merged into oneness, together they are silent. Subject and object are both extinguished; hence it is said that prajñā is without knowing. Thus it says: "Therefore, when true wisdom contemplates the true truth, it never grasps what is known. When wisdom does not grasp what is known, through what could this wisdom know?" It also says: "Could it not be that because the substance and characteristic of prajñā are truly pure, fundamentally free of the knowing of deluded grasping, it cannot be named by 'knowing'?" It also says: "As for those who lay out existence and non-existence, the arising of wisdom is bounded within characteristics. Dharmas are fundamentally without characteristics; what does the sage's wisdom know?" Therefore the Madhyamakaśāstra says: "If there were no existence, how could there be non-existence? Since existence and non-existence are already absent, who is it that knows existence and non-existence?" All the above refutes the view of eternalism regarding having knowing. Second, refuting the view of annihilationism regarding being without knowing: Deluded people, hearing the sūtras say that true prajñā is without knowing and without seeing, without action and without conditions, then claim that prajñā is identical to great space and insentient things, falling into the view of annihilationism. Since this departs from prajñā, the treatise master refutes it, saying: "What the world calls 'without knowing' refers to insentient things like wood, stone, and great space. But numinous discernment secretly illuminates, manifesting before the unmanifest; the Way has no hidden workings—how could it be called 'without knowing'?" The reason the treatise takes "without knowing" as its title is to clarify that the sage's citta has no knowing that grasps characteristics; hence it is called "without knowing." It does not mean that there is no true knowing. Why so? The numinous discernment of prajñā knows all kinds without omission; it is not like great space, which is entirely devoid of knowing. However, of the "without knowing" of annihilationist views, eleven kinds are briefly explained; the treatise mentions three kinds in brief. As for the eleven kinds: 1. Great space, because it is entirely empty. 2. Wood and stone, meaning insentient. 3. The deaf and blind, meaning their faculties are incomplete and lack seeing and hearing. The above three kinds are what the treatise refutes. 4. Ignorance and folly, meaning lacking wisdom and failing to comprehend realms. 5. Madness, where evil spirits delude the citta and lose its fundamental nature. 6. Mental distraction, where many realms confuse the citta so that it cannot judge. 7. Fainting and unconsciousness, where the citta and spirit are darkened as if dead. 8. Stupor and drunkenness, being confused by substances. 9. Sleep, where the spirit-consciousness is exhausted and slumbering. 10. The absorption of non-conception, where non-Buddhists suppress defilements and mental conceptions do not operate. 11. The absorption of cessation, where the two vehicles abide in stillness and the citta's wisdom is brought to a stop and extinguished. All of the above are delusions and inversions, not prajñā's being without knowing. Third, refuting both having knowing and being without knowing: This refers to practitioners who, hearing the sūtras clarify that prajñā is sometimes said to have knowing and sometimes said to be without knowing, cannot understand correctly and thus give rise to diverse attachments. The treatise master again refutes them. There are three kinds of diverse attachments: 1. Being without knowing due to reflexive illumination: This refers to practitioners claiming that the sage actually has knowing, but when knowing things, he forgets the knowing citta and does not himself say 'I can know.' This merely amounts to not personally constructing a concept of knowing, not that he does not know at all. 2. Being without knowing because the nature of prajñā is empty: This refers to practitioners claiming that prajñā actually has knowing of itself, but because it knows that the nature is empty, it is without knowing. This merely amounts to being without knowing because the nature is empty, not yet being the 'without knowing' that is free of deluded grasping. 3. Praising prajñā as without knowing because the realm of the true truth is pure: Why so? Practitioners claim that prajñā can know the realm of the true truth, and because the realm is pure and free of characteristics, they praise prajñā as being without knowing. This merely amounts to the realm being without knowing while prajñā always has knowing. The above three views all partake of both having and not having knowing, and all diverge from the sage's wisdom; therefore the treatise master refutes them. Fourth, refuting neither having knowing nor being without knowing: This refers to deluded people who, hearing the sūtras say that true prajñā is neither existent nor non-existent, without arising and without ceasing, and cannot be spoken of or shown to people, cannot forget words to tally with its profound purport; they then claim that prajñā is solely neither existent nor non-existent, and promptly form an understanding of neither existence nor non-existence. These are all mental measures, diverging from true wisdom. The treatise master refutes them, saying: "Saying that it is not existent means that it is not existent; it does not mean that it is non-existent. Saying that it is not non-existent means that it is not non-existent; it does not mean that it is non-non-existent. Not existent, nor not existent; not non-existent, nor not non-existent. Regarding this Way beyond words, how could knowing transmit it?" This refutes neither having knowing nor being without knowing. If the treatise is like this, the principle of refuting the four attachments is clear. That the title now merely says "without knowing" is simply raising one corner and expecting the other three in return. Therefore, when a person of wisdom hears 'without' spoken, he does not grasp 'without', nor does he grasp both existence and non-existence, nor neither existence nor non-existence. This, then, departs from the four propositions and cuts off the hundred negations; it can be called true non-knowing. In the treatise, the four attachments are clearly refuted, but people themselves do not see it. Thus it says: "Therefore the sage dwells in existence without existing"—this refutes having knowing; "abides in non-existence without being non-existent"—this refutes being without knowing; "although he does not grasp existence or non-existence"—this refutes both having knowing and being without knowing; "yet he also does not abandon existence or non-existence"—this refutes neither having knowing nor being without knowing. Although the above four refutations are explained sequentially and analyzed distinctly, the intent of the treatise is that within a single phrase, the principles of the four propositions are complete. Why so? Dwelling in existence without existing is precisely abiding in non-existence without being non-existent, is precisely not grasping existence or non-existence, is precisely not abandoning existence or non-existence. This means that the sage's citta can obliterate the four propositions and depart from all direct perceptions; it can be called "without knowing." The words are one-sided, but the principle is complete; hence it is called "without knowing." Now, relying further on the meaning of the Zongben yi, to explain prajñā's being without knowing is also a fine perspective of our school. What the treatise clarifies as prajñā's being without knowing is precisely the two wisdoms of the expedient and the real, the equal great wisdom. Now, subsuming the broad with the concise, the words are restrained while the meaning is rich: merely speaking of prajñā encompasses both wisdoms. Thus the Zongben says: "Upāya and prajñā are the designations of great wisdom." Why so? If one only uses prajñā to contemplate the real characteristic without expedient wisdom to engage with existence, one will sink into emptiness. If one only uses expedient wisdom to engage with existence without prajñā to penetrate emptiness, then when engaging with existence, one will be tainted by defilements. If one can make the two wisdoms completely bright, then true wisdom contemplates the true truth without grasping emptiness, and expedient wisdom transforms beings without clinging to existence. Therefore the treatise says: "Wisdom has the discernment that exhausts the profound, yet is without knowing"—this means true wisdom illuminates the true without grasping non-existence; "Spirit has the function of responding and convening, yet is without deliberation"—this means expedient wisdom engages the conventional without grasping existence. "Because the spirit is without deliberation, it rules alone beyond the world. Because wisdom is without knowing, it can profoundly illuminate beyond phenomena"—this means both wisdoms can illuminate the true, so within the expedient there is the real. "Although wisdom is beyond phenomena, it has never been without phenomena. Although the spirit is beyond the world, it remains all day within its realm"—this means both wisdoms can illuminate the conventional, so within the real there is the expedient. Thus, the expedient and the real are unimpeded, and phenomena and principle are blended. Dwelling in existence, one is not caught in defilement; abiding in non-existence, one does not sink into stillness. True and conventional are both obliterated; emptiness and existence are both extinguished. What is real? What is expedient? Which is realm? Which is wisdom? Unfettered and without reliance, free, expansive, and unrestricted, neither grasping nor abandoning, it can be called equal great wisdom; hence it is said that prajñā is without knowing. As the Treatise on the Awakening of Faith says: "What is meant by enlightenment is that the citta-substance is free from thought. The characteristic of being free from thought is equal to the realm of empty space, pervading everywhere. The single characteristic of the dharmadhātu is precisely the Tathāgata's equal dharmakāya. Based on this dharmakāya, it is called original enlightenment." Being free from thought is precisely the "without knowing" of this treatise. The true knowing of "without knowing" is precisely original enlightenment. Original enlightenment is precisely the Buddha's sarvajñatā. That which pervades everywhere is precisely that which has nothing it does not know. All realms are, within a single thought-moment of the citta, instantly and simultaneously known without remainder, illuminating both the true and conventional, not falling into existence or non-existence. Therefore the treatise says: "Knowing is being without knowing; being without knowing is knowing. Do not, because of words indicating difference, differentiate the sage's citta." Knowing is being without knowing: this is true wisdom knowing universally, named sarvajñatā. Being without knowing is knowing: this is knowing all kinds without omission, named sarvākārajñatā. The sage's citta is not different; because the citta is not dual, there is only one wisdom. It is only in accordance with illuminating realms that two are spoken of. Since the two are not two, the one is also not one. If explained according to Tiantai, directly conditioning the middle way is called sarvajñatā; illuminating both truths simultaneously is called sarvākārajñatā. Furthermore, the Buddha's wisdom illuminating emptiness, like that seen by the two vehicles, is called sarvajñatā; illuminating the provisional, like that seen by bodhisattvas, is called mārgarūpajñatā; the Buddha's wisdom illuminating the middle, wherein all see the real characteristic, is called sarvākārajñatā. Therefore it is said that the three wisdoms are attained in the one mind. The one mind is precisely the wisdom of prajñā's being without knowing. Because the citta does not belong to existence or non-existence, constantly illuminating the middle way, this is precisely the self-nature possessing the meaning of the light of great wisdom, the meaning of universally illuminating the dharmadhātu, and the meaning of true cognitive awareness. Therefore it is said: "This, then, is not knowing yet naturally knowing." Because it does not rely on deliberate intention, it does not know; because the self-nature clearly illuminates, it naturally knows. Because the nature of spiritual comprehension is naturally silent yet ever illuminating, it does not depend on other things to be aroused. Thus the Xinxin ming says: "Empty and clear, it illuminates itself, without taxing the mental effort." It is also said: If its substance is naturally free from the knowing that grasps characteristics, it is therefore called "without knowing." It is not that a preceding thought gives rise to knowing, and upon reaching a subsequent thought, one forgets the notion of knowing and only then calls it "without knowing." If that were so, it would become an unmanifest (avyākṛta) citta; how could it be called prajñā's being without knowing? It is simply conditionless wisdom illuminating the signless realm. The true realm is signless; true wisdom is without knowing. Realm and wisdom are merged into oneness; principle is completely exhausted, and discernment is thoroughly reached. This can be called the Buddha's wisdom seeing the nature. Furthermore, if there is a knowing that grasps characteristics, then the citta has intervals and obstructions, unable to make defilement and purity identical in suchness, or existence and non-existence of a single purport. Illuminating emptiness, one is confused about discerning existence; knowing the conventional, one contravenes comprehending the real; one cannot completely illuminate the myriad dharmas. Therefore it is said: "There is something not known." The Yongjia ji says: "If one uses knowing to know stillness, this is not conditionless knowing. It is like a hand holding a ruyi scepter—it is not a hand without a ruyi scepter. If one uses self-knowing to know, this is also not conditionless knowing. It is like a hand making a fist of itself—it is not a hand that does not make a fist. Neither knowing knowing stillness, nor self-knowing knowing, it cannot be deemed without knowing, because the self-nature is clearly apparent; it is not the same as wood and stone. The hand does not hold a ruyi scepter, nor does it make a fist of itself, yet it cannot be deemed without a hand, because the hand is secure; it is not the same as a rabbit's horn. Down to the present, when speaking of knowing, one need not know knowing; it is simply knowing. Then what precedes does not connect to cessation, and what follows is not induced; before and after are severed and disconnected, and the middle stands solitary on its own. Not looking back at its own substance, it dissolves at that very moment. When the substance of knowing has already dissolved, it is suddenly open like relying on empty space. Quietly for a short while, one only perceives that nothing is obtained. That is enlightenment without perception; the perception of no perception is different from wood and stone." Upādhyāya Guan said: "The conditionless knowing mentioned above is the marvel of the Chan school. Because they merely reveal the conditionless true wisdom as the true Way. If one strips it away: it merely reveals the fundamental citta without following the deluded mind, but does not yet possess wisdom that illuminates and comprehends the citta's source. Therefore, subject and object must be equal, and being equal without losing illumination constitutes the knowing of non-knowing. This knowing knows the empty, silent, unarisen tathāgatagarbha nature—only then is it wondrous." However, the above, relying on pedagogical expedients, though divided into sudden and gradual, does not depart from the one mind. As a verse says: "The various treatises have different viewpoints, / But in practice the principle is not dual. / Competing attachments have rights and wrongs, / But the realized are free of dispute."