宗鏡錄 47.7

47.7

答。但是假說。唯依識變。如唯識頌云。由假說我法。有種種相轉。彼依識所變。此能變唯三。謂異熟思量。及了別境識。世間聖教。說有我法。但由假立。非實有性。我謂主宰。法謂軌持。乃至云何應知實無外境。唯有內識似外境生。實我實法。不可得故。如何實我不可得耶。諸所執我。略有三種。一者。執我體常周遍。量同虛空。隨處造業受苦樂故。二者。執我其體雖常。而量不定。隨身大小有卷舒故。三者。執我體常至細。如一極微。潛轉身中作事業故。初且非理。所以者何。執我常遍量同虛空。應不隨身受苦樂等。又常遍故。應無動轉如何隨身能造諸業。乃至中亦非理。所以者何。執我體常住。不應隨身而有舒卷。既有舒卷。如槖籥風。應非常住。乃至後亦非理。所以者何。我量至小。如何速巡身。如旋火輪。以轉動故。則所執我非一非常。諸有往來。非常一故。又所執我。復有三種。一者。即蘊。二者。離蘊。三者。與蘊非即非離。初即蘊我。理且不然。我應如蘊非常一故。又內諸色。定非實我。如外諸色。有質礙故。心心所法。亦非實我。不恒相續。待眾緣故。餘行餘色。亦非實我。如虛空等。非覺性故。中離蘊我。理亦不然。應如虛空。無作受故。後具非我。理亦不然。許依蘊立。非即離蘊。應如瓶等。非實我故。又既不可說。有為無為。亦應不可說是我非我故。彼所執實我不成。乃至如是所說。一切我執。自心外蘊。或有或無。自心內蘊一切皆有。是故我執。皆緣無常五取蘊相。妄執為我。然諸蘊相。從緣生故。是如幻有。妄所執我。橫計度故。決定非有。故契經說。苾芻當知。世間沙門婆羅門。等所有我見。一切皆緣五取蘊起。

Answer: These are merely metaphorical designations, which occur purely based on the transformation of consciousness. As the Consciousness-Only verses state: “Because of the metaphorical designation of self and phenomena, / Various aspects evolve; / They are based on the transformation of consciousness, / And these transforming [consciousnesses] are only three: // Namely, the consciousness of maturation, the [consciousness] of cogitation, / And the consciousness that clearly perceives objects.”

When the mundane world and the holy teachings speak of the existence of self and phenomena, they are merely established through metaphorical designation and are not real existents in nature. “Self” means a sovereign agent, and “phenomenon” means a model and sustainer. Furthermore, [the treatise asks:] How should one know that there are actually no external objects, and that there is only internal consciousness arising in semblance of external objects? Because a real self and real phenomena cannot be obtained. How is it that a real self cannot be obtained? There are, in brief, three kinds of self grasped at [by heterodox paths]: First, they grasp that the substance of the self is permanent and omnipresent, its measure identical to empty space, because it creates karma and experiences suffering and pleasure wherever it is. Second, they grasp that although its substance is permanent, its measure is indeterminate, because it contracts or expands according to the size of the body. Third, they grasp that its substance is permanent and extremely subtle, like a single infinitesimal atom, latent and circulating within the body to carry out activities. The first is unreasonable. Why so? If one grasps that the self is permanent, omnipresent, and of the same measure as empty space, it should not experience suffering, pleasure, and so forth in accordance with the body. Moreover, because it is permanent and omnipresent, it should be devoid of movement; how could it create various karmas in accordance with the body? Next, the middle one is also unreasonable. Why so? If one grasps that the substance of the self is permanently abiding, it should not expand and contract in accordance with the body. Since it expands and contracts, it would be like the wind in a bellows and should not be permanently abiding. Next, the last is also unreasonable. Why so? If the measure of the self is extremely small, how could it quickly traverse the body like a whirling firebrand? Because it moves and turns, the grasped self would be neither single nor permanent. Whatever comes and goes is neither permanent nor single. Furthermore, the selves grasped are of another three kinds: first, that it is identical to the aggregates; second, that it is separate from the aggregates; third, that it is neither identical to nor separate from the aggregates. First, that the self is identical to the aggregates is unreasonable to begin with. The self would be impermanent and not a single unit, just like the aggregates. Furthermore, the internal forms are definitely not a real self, for like external forms, they possess physical obstruction. Citta and caitta phenomena are also not a real self, for they are not constantly continuous, relying on a multitude of conditions. The remaining formations and the remaining forms are also not a real self, for like empty space and so forth, they are not of the nature of awareness. In the middle, that the self is separate from the aggregates is also unreasonable. It should be like empty space, devoid of agency and experiencing. Finally, that it is both not [identical to nor separate from] the self is also unreasonable. If it is admitted to be established based on the aggregates without being identical to or separate from the aggregates, it should be like a vase and so forth, not a real self. Furthermore, since it cannot be said to be conditioned or unconditioned, it should also not be said to be self or not-self. Thus the real self they grasp is untenable. And so on, until: All such grasping at a self—regarding aggregates outside one's own mind, they may exist or not exist, but regarding the aggregates within one's own mind, they all exist. Therefore, grasping at a self always takes the characteristics of the impermanent five aggregates of clinging as its object, falsely grasping them as a self. However, because the characteristics of the aggregates arise from conditions, they exist like illusions; the self falsely grasped, being a product of arbitrary conceptualization, is definitively nonexistent. Therefore the sūtra states: “Bhikṣus, you should know that whatever views of self are held by the worldly śramaṇas and brāhmaṇas are all produced in dependence on the five aggregates of clinging.”