宗鏡錄 47.7

47.7

Answer: These are merely metaphorical designations, which occur purely based on the transformation of consciousness. As the Consciousness-Only verses state: “Because of the metaphorical designation of self and phenomena, / Various aspects evolve; / They are based on the transformation of consciousness, / And these transforming [consciousnesses] are only three: // Namely, the consciousness of maturation, the [consciousness] of cogitation, / And the consciousness that clearly perceives objects.”

When the mundane world and the holy teachings speak of the existence of self and phenomena, they are merely established through metaphorical designation and are not real existents in nature. “Self” means a sovereign agent, and “phenomenon” means a model and sustainer. Furthermore, [the treatise asks:] How should one know that there are actually no external objects, and that there is only internal consciousness arising in semblance of external objects? Because a real self and real phenomena cannot be obtained. How is it that a real self cannot be obtained? There are, in brief, three kinds of self grasped at [by heterodox paths]: First, they grasp that the substance of the self is permanent and omnipresent, its measure identical to empty space, because it creates karma and experiences suffering and pleasure wherever it is. Second, they grasp that although its substance is permanent, its measure is indeterminate, because it contracts or expands according to the size of the body. Third, they grasp that its substance is permanent and extremely subtle, like a single infinitesimal atom, latent and circulating within the body to carry out activities. The first is unreasonable. Why so? If one grasps that the self is permanent, omnipresent, and of the same measure as empty space, it should not experience suffering, pleasure, and so forth in accordance with the body. Moreover, because it is permanent and omnipresent, it should be devoid of movement; how could it create various karmas in accordance with the body? Next, the middle one is also unreasonable. Why so? If one grasps that the substance of the self is permanently abiding, it should not expand and contract in accordance with the body. Since it expands and contracts, it would be like the wind in a bellows and should not be permanently abiding. Next, the last is also unreasonable. Why so? If the measure of the self is extremely small, how could it quickly traverse the body like a whirling firebrand? Because it moves and turns, the grasped self would be neither single nor permanent. Whatever comes and goes is neither permanent nor single. Furthermore, the selves grasped are of another three kinds: first, that it is identical to the aggregates; second, that it is separate from the aggregates; third, that it is neither identical to nor separate from the aggregates. First, that the self is identical to the aggregates is unreasonable to begin with. The self would be impermanent and not a single unit, just like the aggregates. Furthermore, the internal forms are definitely not a real self, for like external forms, they possess physical obstruction. Citta and caitta phenomena are also not a real self, for they are not constantly continuous, relying on a multitude of conditions. The remaining formations and the remaining forms are also not a real self, for like empty space and so forth, they are not of the nature of awareness. In the middle, that the self is separate from the aggregates is also unreasonable. It should be like empty space, devoid of agency and experiencing. Finally, that it is both not [identical to nor separate from] the self is also unreasonable. If it is admitted to be established based on the aggregates without being identical to or separate from the aggregates, it should be like a vase and so forth, not a real self. Furthermore, since it cannot be said to be conditioned or unconditioned, it should also not be said to be self or not-self. Thus the real self they grasp is untenable. And so on, until: All such grasping at a self—regarding aggregates outside one's own mind, they may exist or not exist, but regarding the aggregates within one's own mind, they all exist. Therefore, grasping at a self always takes the characteristics of the impermanent five aggregates of clinging as its object, falsely grasping them as a self. However, because the characteristics of the aggregates arise from conditions, they exist like illusions; the self falsely grasped, being a product of arbitrary conceptualization, is definitively nonexistent. Therefore the sūtra states: “Bhikṣus, you should know that whatever views of self are held by the worldly śramaṇas and brāhmaṇas are all produced in dependence on the five aggregates of clinging.”