宗鏡錄 47.9

47.9

答。夫假法者。但是虛假。似有而轉。必不依真。如。唯識論云。有作是難。若無離識實我法者。假亦應無。謂假必依真事似事共法而立。乃至答云。又假必依真事立者。亦不應理。真謂自相。假智及詮。俱非境故。謂假智詮。不得自相。唯於諸法共相而轉。亦非離此有別方便。施設自相。為假所依。然假智詮。必依聲起。聲不及處。此便不轉。能詮所詮。俱非自相。故知假說不依真事。由此但依似事而轉。似謂增益。非實有相。聲依增益似相而轉。故不可說假必依真。

Answer: Metaphorical phenomena are merely false and deceptive, operating in semblance of existence, and definitely do not rely on the real. As the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: “Some make this objection: ‘If there are no real self and phenomena apart from consciousness, metaphorical [designations] should also not exist, for metaphorical designation must be established based on a real entity, a resembling entity, and a common property.’” And so on, until the reply: “Furthermore, that a metaphorical designation must be established based on a real entity is also unreasonable. The ‘real’ refers to the particular characteristic (svalakṣaṇa), whereas metaphorical cognition and designation both do not have it as their cognitive object. That is, metaphorical cognition and designation do not apprehend the particular characteristic; they operate only with respect to the common characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) of phenomena. Nor is there any other expedient apart from this by which the particular characteristic can be posited as the basis for the metaphor. However, metaphorical cognition and designation must arise based on conventional verbal sound. Where verbal sound does not reach, these do not operate. That which designates and that which is designated are both not the particular characteristic. Therefore one knows that metaphorical speech does not rely on real entities. Thus it operates solely based on resembling entities. ‘Resemblance’ means a superimposition, not an actual existing characteristic. Because verbal sound operates based on superimposed, resembling characteristics, it cannot be said that metaphorical designation must rely on the real.”