宗鏡錄 47.9

47.9

Answer: Metaphorical phenomena are merely false and deceptive, operating in semblance of existence, and definitely do not rely on the real. As the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: “Some make this objection: ‘If there are no real self and phenomena apart from consciousness, metaphorical [designations] should also not exist, for metaphorical designation must be established based on a real entity, a resembling entity, and a common property.’” And so on, until the reply: “Furthermore, that a metaphorical designation must be established based on a real entity is also unreasonable. The ‘real’ refers to the particular characteristic (svalakṣaṇa), whereas metaphorical cognition and designation both do not have it as their cognitive object. That is, metaphorical cognition and designation do not apprehend the particular characteristic; they operate only with respect to the common characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) of phenomena. Nor is there any other expedient apart from this by which the particular characteristic can be posited as the basis for the metaphor. However, metaphorical cognition and designation must arise based on conventional verbal sound. Where verbal sound does not reach, these do not operate. That which designates and that which is designated are both not the particular characteristic. Therefore one knows that metaphorical speech does not rely on real entities. Thus it operates solely based on resembling entities. ‘Resemblance’ means a superimposition, not an actual existing characteristic. Because verbal sound operates based on superimposed, resembling characteristics, it cannot be said that metaphorical designation must rely on the real.”