宗鏡錄 51.55

51.55

答。小乘云。乍觀立者言陳自相。三支無過。及推所立。元是諳含。若於有法上意之差別。將因喻成立有法上意許相分色。不離眼識者。即眼識不得為同喻。且如眼識無不離色。以一切色皆離眼識故。既離眼識。不得為同喻。便成異喻。即初三等因。却向異喻眼識上轉。故論云。同品無處。不成立者之宗。異品有處。返成敵者相違宗義。即小乘不改立者之因。申相違量云。真故極成色是有法。非不離眼識宗。因云初三攝。眼所不攝故。同喻如眼識。合云。諸初三攝眼所不攝故者。皆非不離眼識。同喻如眼識。言非者。無也。小乘云。無不離眼識色。即遮三藏意許相分色是無也。所以三藏預著自許之言句。取他方佛色。却與外人量。作不定過。出過云。為如眼識。是初三攝眼所不攝。眼識非不離眼識色。證汝極成色非不離眼識色耶。為如我自許他方佛色。亦是初三攝眼所不攝。他方佛色是不離眼識色。却證汝極成色是不離眼識耶。外人相違量。既犯共中他不定過。明知非真能破也。三藏量却成真能立也。

Answer: The Hīnayāna says: 'Looking at first at the self-characteristic of what the proponent states explicitly, the three members have no fault. But when we investigate what is being established, it is originally implicit. If, regarding the implicit qualification on the subject, the reason and example are used to establish that the implicitly accepted nimittabhāga-form on the subject is not separate from the visual consciousness, then the visual consciousness cannot serve as the positive example. For visual consciousness has no non-separate form, since all form is separate from visual consciousness. Since it is separate from visual consciousness, it cannot serve as a positive example, and instead becomes a negative example. Thus the reason, "being subsumed under the first three [elements]," turns back upon the negative example of visual consciousness. Therefore the treatise says: "Where the positive instance is absent, the proponent's thesis is not established; where the negative instance is present, the opponent's contradictory thesis is conversely established."' That is, the Hīnayāna, without altering the proponent's reason, presents a counter-inference, saying: '"The universally recognized form, in the ultimate sense" is the subject; "is not not separate from visual consciousness" is the thesis; the reason is "because it is subsumed under the first three [elements] and not subsumed under the eye"; the positive example is "like visual consciousness." The application states: "Whatever is subsumed under the first three and not subsumed under the eye is not not separate from visual consciousness; like visual consciousness." The word "not" means "is absent." The Hīnayāna says that form not separate from visual consciousness does not exist, which refutes the Tripiṭaka Master's implicitly accepted nimittabhāga-form as non-existent. For this reason, the Tripiṭaka Master in advance inserted the phrase "by our own acceptance," taking the form of the Buddhas of other directions to confront the outsider's inference with the fault of inconclusiveness (aniyata). Pointing out the fault, he says: 'Is it as with visual consciousness, which is subsumed under the first three and not subsumed under the eye, and visual consciousness is not a form not separate from visual consciousness, thereby proving that your universally recognized form is not a form not separate from visual consciousness? Or is it as with the form of the Buddhas of other directions that I myself accept, which is also subsumed under the first three and not subsumed under the eye, and the form of the Buddhas of other directions is a form not separate from visual consciousness, conversely proving that your universally recognized form is not separate from visual consciousness?' Since the outsider's counter-inference incurs the common fault of inconclusiveness based on the other (para-aniyata), we clearly know it is not a genuine refutation. The Tripiṭaka Master's inference conversely turns out to be a genuine proof.