宗鏡錄 51.55

51.55

Answer: The Hīnayāna says: 'Looking at first at the self-characteristic of what the proponent states explicitly, the three members have no fault. But when we investigate what is being established, it is originally implicit. If, regarding the implicit qualification on the subject, the reason and example are used to establish that the implicitly accepted nimittabhāga-form on the subject is not separate from the visual consciousness, then the visual consciousness cannot serve as the positive example. For visual consciousness has no non-separate form, since all form is separate from visual consciousness. Since it is separate from visual consciousness, it cannot serve as a positive example, and instead becomes a negative example. Thus the reason, "being subsumed under the first three [elements]," turns back upon the negative example of visual consciousness. Therefore the treatise says: "Where the positive instance is absent, the proponent's thesis is not established; where the negative instance is present, the opponent's contradictory thesis is conversely established."' That is, the Hīnayāna, without altering the proponent's reason, presents a counter-inference, saying: '"The universally recognized form, in the ultimate sense" is the subject; "is not not separate from visual consciousness" is the thesis; the reason is "because it is subsumed under the first three [elements] and not subsumed under the eye"; the positive example is "like visual consciousness." The application states: "Whatever is subsumed under the first three and not subsumed under the eye is not not separate from visual consciousness; like visual consciousness." The word "not" means "is absent." The Hīnayāna says that form not separate from visual consciousness does not exist, which refutes the Tripiṭaka Master's implicitly accepted nimittabhāga-form as non-existent. For this reason, the Tripiṭaka Master in advance inserted the phrase "by our own acceptance," taking the form of the Buddhas of other directions to confront the outsider's inference with the fault of inconclusiveness (aniyata). Pointing out the fault, he says: 'Is it as with visual consciousness, which is subsumed under the first three and not subsumed under the eye, and visual consciousness is not a form not separate from visual consciousness, thereby proving that your universally recognized form is not a form not separate from visual consciousness? Or is it as with the form of the Buddhas of other directions that I myself accept, which is also subsumed under the first three and not subsumed under the eye, and the form of the Buddhas of other directions is a form not separate from visual consciousness, conversely proving that your universally recognized form is not separate from visual consciousness?' Since the outsider's counter-inference incurs the common fault of inconclusiveness based on the other (para-aniyata), we clearly know it is not a genuine refutation. The Tripiṭaka Master's inference conversely turns out to be a genuine proof.