宗鏡錄 53.14

53.14

答。古德云。旦眼識緣色境相分。即各自緣自相分。三量分別者。是現量。現量具三義。一現在。非過未。二顯現。非種子。三現有。簡無體法。緣現量境名現量者。不度量也。即因修證境。不帶名言。是任運義。即五識緣境。得法自相。但中間無隔礙。故名親緣。相分有。赤色。即得赤色之相分。但不分別故。任運不帶名言故。名得自相也。護法云。五識唯緣實五塵境。即不緣假。但任運而緣。不作行解。不帶名言。是現量故。且如眼識緣青黃赤白四般實色時。長短方圓假色。雖不離實色上有。眼識但緣實。不緣長短假色也。眼識定不緣長短色。唯意識作長短心而緣也。如五識初念。與明了意識緣五塵境時。唯是現量。得五塵之實色。若後念分別意識起時。即行解心中。作長短色緣。是比量心緣也。即五識唯是現量。緣實不緣假。故論云。無有眼等識。不緣實境生。即五識唯緣實。是自相境。如眼識緣青境自相時。得青色之自相。若後念分別意識起時。即非青色解。便是共相比量也。纔作解心時。不實青色心體。為帶名言。是在假相也。故識論云。謂假智詮不得自相。唯於諸法共相而轉也。言假智者。即作行解心。名假智也。言詮者。心上解心名句文。及聲上名句文。是能詮。皆不得所詮自相也。又釋云。顯假不依真。唯依共相轉。即此真事。不說心識實體名真。但心所取法自體相。言說不及。假智緣不著。說之為真。此唯現量智。知。性離言說。及智分別。此出真體非智詮。及如色法等而為自性。水濕為性。但可證知。言說不及。第六意識。隨五識後起。緣此智故。發言語等。但是所緣所說。法之共相。非彼自相。又遮得自相。名得共相。若所變中。有共相法是可得者。即得自體。應一切法可說可緣故。共相法。亦說緣不及。然非是執。不堅取故。如五蘊中。以五蘊事為自相。空無我等理為共相。又以理推。無自相體。且說不可言法體名自相。可說為共相。以理而論。共既非共。自亦非自。為互遮故。但各別說。說空無我等是共相者。從假智說。此但有能緣行解。都無所緣空實共體。入真觀時。則一一法皆別了知。非作共解。言說。若著自相者。說火之時。火應燒口。火以燒物為自相故。緣亦如是。緣火之時。火應燒心。今不燒心。及不燒口。明緣及說。俱得共相。若爾。喚火。何不得水。不得火之自相故。如喚於水。此理不然。無始慣習共呼故。今緣於青。作青解者。此比量智。不稱前法。如眼識緣色。稱自相故。不作色解。後起意識。緣色共相。不著色故。遂作青解。遮緣非青之物。遂作青解。非謂青解。即稱青事。故唯識頌云。現覺如夢等。已起現覺時。見及境已無。寧許有現量。此謂假智。唯緣。共相而得起故。法之自相。離分別故。言說亦爾。不稱本法。亦但只於共相處轉。今大乘宗。唯有自相體。都無共相體。假智及詮。但唯得共。不得自相。若說共相。唯有觀心。現量。通緣自相共相。若法自相。唯現量得。共相亦通比量所得。乃至故言唯於諸法共相而轉。此之自相。證量所知。非言說等境故。

Answer: Ancient masters stated: First, when the eye-consciousness conditions the nimittabhāga of the sense sphere of visible form, each [consciousness] conditions its own respective nimittabhāga. In terms of distinguishing among the three pramāṇas, it is direct perception (pratyakṣa). Direct perception possesses three meanings: first, present, not past or future; second, manifest, not seeds; third, presently existent, excluding non-substantial phenomena. As for calling the conditioning of a directly perceived object 'direct perception,' it means there is no inference (anumāna). That is, by virtue of cultivating and realizing the object, it does not carry nominal expressions (nāmasaṃketa); this is the meaning of spontaneity. That is, when the five consciousnesses condition objects, they attain the particular characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) of phenomena, and because there is no intermediary obstruction, it is called direct conditioning. If the nimittabhāga has red color, it immediately attains the nimittabhāga of red color; yet because it does not conceptualize and because it spontaneously does not carry nominal expressions, it is called 'attaining the particular characteristic.' Dharmapāla said: The five consciousnesses only condition the real objects of the five sense spheres and do not condition what is nominal. They merely condition spontaneously, not forming active conceptual understanding, nor carrying nominal expressions, because they are direct perception. For example, when the eye-consciousness conditions the four kinds of real colors—blue, yellow, red, and white—although nominal forms such as long, short, square, and round are not separated from the real colors, the eye-consciousness only conditions the real, not the nominal forms of long and short. The eye-consciousness definitively does not condition forms of length; it is only the manovijñāna that produces the mind of length and conditions it. Just as when the five consciousnesses in their initial moment condition the five dust-objects together with the clarifying manovijñāna, it is exclusively direct perception, attaining the real forms of the five dusts. But when the conceptual manovijñāna arises in subsequent moments, within the mind of active understanding it conditions long and short forms, which is conditioning by an inferential mind. Thus the five consciousnesses are exclusively direct perception, conditioning the real and not the nominal. Therefore a treatise states: 'There is no eye-consciousness or other [sensory consciousness] that arises without conditioning a real object.' That is, the five consciousnesses only condition the real, which is the domain of particular characteristics. For example, when the eye-consciousness conditions the particular characteristic of the object blue, it attains the particular characteristic of the color blue. If the conceptual manovijñāna arises in subsequent moments, it is an understanding of 'not-blue,' which is an inference of common characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa). As soon as the understanding mind is produced, the mental substance of the color blue is not real, because it carries nominal expressions and resides in nominal characteristics. Therefore the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'Nominal cognition and expression do not attain particular characteristics; they operate only with regard to the common characteristics of phenomena.' 'Nominal cognition' refers to the mind that produces active understanding, called nominal cognition. 'Expression' refers to the names, phrases, and phonemes of understanding in the mind and the names, phrases, and phonemes upon sound; these are the expressers, and none of them attain the particular characteristics that are expressed. Furthermore, an explanation states: 'This reveals that the nominal does not rely on the real, but operates solely relying on common characteristics.' In this real entity, one does not speak of the real substance of the mind-consciousness as 'real,' but rather that the particular entity-characteristic of the phenomenon apprehended by the mind is beyond the reach of verbal explanation and cannot be conditioned by nominal cognition; this is what is called 'real.' This is known only by direct perception's cognition, its nature being free from verbal explanation and intellectual conceptualization. This brings out the real substance, which is not [attained by] cognition and expression, just as the physical phenomenon of form and so forth serves as its own nature, or wetness is the nature of water: it can only be realized and known, beyond the reach of verbal explanation. The sixth manovijñāna, arising after the five consciousnesses, conditions this cognition and thus emits speech and so forth, yet what is conditioned and spoken of are merely the common characteristics of phenomena, not their particular characteristics. Furthermore, negating the attainment of particular characteristics is called attaining common characteristics. If among transformed [objects] there were a phenomenon of common characteristics that could be attained, then one would attain the substance itself, and consequently all phenomena could be spoken of and conditioned; therefore, the phenomenon of common characteristics is also beyond the reach of explanation and conditioning. Yet this is not an attachment (graha), because it is not clung to obstinately. For instance, among the five aggregates, the facts of the five aggregates are the particular characteristics, and the principles such as emptiness and non-self are the common characteristics. Furthermore, when inferred by principle, there is no substance of particular characteristics; for now, we call the ineffable phenomenal substance 'particular characteristic' and what can be expressed 'common characteristic.' Argued according to principle, the common is already not common, and the particular is also not particular; in order to mutually negate each other, they are merely spoken of separately. To say that emptiness, non-self, and so forth are common characteristics is said from the perspective of nominal cognition; here there is only the active understanding of the conditioning [agent], and there is no real, common substance of emptiness that is conditioned. When entering the contemplation of reality, each and every phenomenon is individually understood and not taken as a common understanding. If speech were attached to the particular characteristic, then when one spoke of 'fire,' the fire should burn the mouth, because fire has burning objects as its particular characteristic. Conditioning is also like this: when conditioning fire, the fire should burn the mind. Now, since it does not burn the mind nor burn the mouth, it is clear that both conditioning and speaking attain only the common characteristic. If that is so, then when calling for fire, why does one not obtain water, since one does not attain the particular characteristic of fire, just as when calling for water? This reasoning is incorrect, because of beginningless habitual conventional calling. Now, when conditioning blue and forming the understanding of blue, this inferential cognition does not correspond to the preceding phenomenon. Just as when the eye-consciousness conditions form, because it corresponds to the particular characteristic, it does not form the understanding of form. The subsequently arising manovijñāna, conditioning the common characteristic of form, because it is not attached to form, thereupon forms the understanding of blue, negating the conditioning of non-blue objects, and thereupon forms the understanding of blue; it does not mean that the understanding of blue directly corresponds to the factual blue. Therefore the Triṃśikā verse states: 'Present consciousness is like dreams and so forth; when present consciousness has already arisen, the seeing and the object are already absent—how can direct perception be admitted?' This means that nominal cognition can only arise by conditioning common characteristics, because the particular characteristics of phenomena are free from conceptualization. Speech is also like this: not corresponding to the fundamental phenomenon, it also merely operates at the locus of common characteristics. Now in the Mahāyāna school, there is only the substance of particular characteristics; there is no substance of common characteristics at all. Nominal cognition and expression only attain the common and do not attain the particular characteristic. If one speaks of common characteristics, they exist only in the contemplative mind. Direct perception universally conditions both particular characteristics and common characteristics. If it is the particular characteristic of a phenomenon, it is attained solely by direct perception; common characteristics are also attained through inference. … Therefore it is said: 'It operates only with regard to the common characteristics of phenomena.' This particular characteristic is known by pramāṇa of realization, because it is not an object of verbal explanation and so forth.