宗鏡錄 53.14

53.14

Answer: Ancient masters stated: First, when the eye-consciousness conditions the nimittabhāga of the sense sphere of visible form, each [consciousness] conditions its own respective nimittabhāga. In terms of distinguishing among the three pramāṇas, it is direct perception (pratyakṣa). Direct perception possesses three meanings: first, present, not past or future; second, manifest, not seeds; third, presently existent, excluding non-substantial phenomena. As for calling the conditioning of a directly perceived object 'direct perception,' it means there is no inference (anumāna). That is, by virtue of cultivating and realizing the object, it does not carry nominal expressions (nāmasaṃketa); this is the meaning of spontaneity. That is, when the five consciousnesses condition objects, they attain the particular characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) of phenomena, and because there is no intermediary obstruction, it is called direct conditioning. If the nimittabhāga has red color, it immediately attains the nimittabhāga of red color; yet because it does not conceptualize and because it spontaneously does not carry nominal expressions, it is called 'attaining the particular characteristic.' Dharmapāla said: The five consciousnesses only condition the real objects of the five sense spheres and do not condition what is nominal. They merely condition spontaneously, not forming active conceptual understanding, nor carrying nominal expressions, because they are direct perception. For example, when the eye-consciousness conditions the four kinds of real colors—blue, yellow, red, and white—although nominal forms such as long, short, square, and round are not separated from the real colors, the eye-consciousness only conditions the real, not the nominal forms of long and short. The eye-consciousness definitively does not condition forms of length; it is only the manovijñāna that produces the mind of length and conditions it. Just as when the five consciousnesses in their initial moment condition the five dust-objects together with the clarifying manovijñāna, it is exclusively direct perception, attaining the real forms of the five dusts. But when the conceptual manovijñāna arises in subsequent moments, within the mind of active understanding it conditions long and short forms, which is conditioning by an inferential mind. Thus the five consciousnesses are exclusively direct perception, conditioning the real and not the nominal. Therefore a treatise states: 'There is no eye-consciousness or other [sensory consciousness] that arises without conditioning a real object.' That is, the five consciousnesses only condition the real, which is the domain of particular characteristics. For example, when the eye-consciousness conditions the particular characteristic of the object blue, it attains the particular characteristic of the color blue. If the conceptual manovijñāna arises in subsequent moments, it is an understanding of 'not-blue,' which is an inference of common characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa). As soon as the understanding mind is produced, the mental substance of the color blue is not real, because it carries nominal expressions and resides in nominal characteristics. Therefore the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'Nominal cognition and expression do not attain particular characteristics; they operate only with regard to the common characteristics of phenomena.' 'Nominal cognition' refers to the mind that produces active understanding, called nominal cognition. 'Expression' refers to the names, phrases, and phonemes of understanding in the mind and the names, phrases, and phonemes upon sound; these are the expressers, and none of them attain the particular characteristics that are expressed. Furthermore, an explanation states: 'This reveals that the nominal does not rely on the real, but operates solely relying on common characteristics.' In this real entity, one does not speak of the real substance of the mind-consciousness as 'real,' but rather that the particular entity-characteristic of the phenomenon apprehended by the mind is beyond the reach of verbal explanation and cannot be conditioned by nominal cognition; this is what is called 'real.' This is known only by direct perception's cognition, its nature being free from verbal explanation and intellectual conceptualization. This brings out the real substance, which is not [attained by] cognition and expression, just as the physical phenomenon of form and so forth serves as its own nature, or wetness is the nature of water: it can only be realized and known, beyond the reach of verbal explanation. The sixth manovijñāna, arising after the five consciousnesses, conditions this cognition and thus emits speech and so forth, yet what is conditioned and spoken of are merely the common characteristics of phenomena, not their particular characteristics. Furthermore, negating the attainment of particular characteristics is called attaining common characteristics. If among transformed [objects] there were a phenomenon of common characteristics that could be attained, then one would attain the substance itself, and consequently all phenomena could be spoken of and conditioned; therefore, the phenomenon of common characteristics is also beyond the reach of explanation and conditioning. Yet this is not an attachment (graha), because it is not clung to obstinately. For instance, among the five aggregates, the facts of the five aggregates are the particular characteristics, and the principles such as emptiness and non-self are the common characteristics. Furthermore, when inferred by principle, there is no substance of particular characteristics; for now, we call the ineffable phenomenal substance 'particular characteristic' and what can be expressed 'common characteristic.' Argued according to principle, the common is already not common, and the particular is also not particular; in order to mutually negate each other, they are merely spoken of separately. To say that emptiness, non-self, and so forth are common characteristics is said from the perspective of nominal cognition; here there is only the active understanding of the conditioning [agent], and there is no real, common substance of emptiness that is conditioned. When entering the contemplation of reality, each and every phenomenon is individually understood and not taken as a common understanding. If speech were attached to the particular characteristic, then when one spoke of 'fire,' the fire should burn the mouth, because fire has burning objects as its particular characteristic. Conditioning is also like this: when conditioning fire, the fire should burn the mind. Now, since it does not burn the mind nor burn the mouth, it is clear that both conditioning and speaking attain only the common characteristic. If that is so, then when calling for fire, why does one not obtain water, since one does not attain the particular characteristic of fire, just as when calling for water? This reasoning is incorrect, because of beginningless habitual conventional calling. Now, when conditioning blue and forming the understanding of blue, this inferential cognition does not correspond to the preceding phenomenon. Just as when the eye-consciousness conditions form, because it corresponds to the particular characteristic, it does not form the understanding of form. The subsequently arising manovijñāna, conditioning the common characteristic of form, because it is not attached to form, thereupon forms the understanding of blue, negating the conditioning of non-blue objects, and thereupon forms the understanding of blue; it does not mean that the understanding of blue directly corresponds to the factual blue. Therefore the Triṃśikā verse states: 'Present consciousness is like dreams and so forth; when present consciousness has already arisen, the seeing and the object are already absent—how can direct perception be admitted?' This means that nominal cognition can only arise by conditioning common characteristics, because the particular characteristics of phenomena are free from conceptualization. Speech is also like this: not corresponding to the fundamental phenomenon, it also merely operates at the locus of common characteristics. Now in the Mahāyāna school, there is only the substance of particular characteristics; there is no substance of common characteristics at all. Nominal cognition and expression only attain the common and do not attain the particular characteristic. If one speaks of common characteristics, they exist only in the contemplative mind. Direct perception universally conditions both particular characteristics and common characteristics. If it is the particular characteristic of a phenomenon, it is attained solely by direct perception; common characteristics are also attained through inference. … Therefore it is said: 'It operates only with regard to the common characteristics of phenomena.' This particular characteristic is known by pramāṇa of realization, because it is not an object of verbal explanation and so forth.