宗鏡錄 53.18

53.18

答曰。共相是法自體上義。更無別體。又此名詮火等法時。遮非火等。此義即通一切火上。故言共相。即其義也。非苦空等之共相理。若爾。即一切法不可言。不可言亦不稱理。遮可言故言不可言。非不可言即稱法體。法體亦非不可言故。而今乃言名得共相之自性故。今應解此。非法體。其義可然。言名等詮共相。非謂即得共相體。但遮得自相。故言名詮共相。又自相者。即諸法之自體相。如火以煖為自相。喚火之時。不得煖故。不得自相。此煖自相。唯身識現量證故。非名所得。共相者。此以名下所詮之義名共相。共相有二。一者共自類相。二者共異類相。如言火時。不該於水等。但遍一切火上。故名共自類相。若言苦空無常等。則不唯在一類法上。及遍一切水火等法上。故名共異類相。又自相者。唯五根五塵。心心所得。謂五根。是第八現證。五塵是五八心心所現量。證。自體性。獨散意識等。尚不得自體性。何況名詮得自體性也。五識緣五塵境時。具四義故。名得法自相。一任運故。二現量故。三不帶名言故。四唯緣現在境故。得名自相。意識所緣境有二。若是獨頭意識。所緣境。即於法處收。若明了意識所緣境。即於色處攝。且如眼識明了意識。初一念率爾同緣色時。但緣色之自相。後念明了意識。分別所緣色上長等假色。即是共相。雖然長等假色是明了意識所緣境。亦在於色處收。為是假。故眼識不緣也。乃至聲亦耳。且如耳識初剎那。率爾。與明了意識同緣聲時。亦是得法自相。後念意識起。緣於聲上名句。文三有分別行解等。緣假也。今五識既無分別行解。所以不緣假也。

The answer states: 'The common characteristic is a meaning upon the phenomenal substance itself; there is no separate substance. Furthermore, when this name expresses phenomena such as fire, it negates non-fire and so forth; this meaning then extends to all fire, hence it is called a common characteristic—that is its meaning, not the principle of common characteristics like suffering, emptiness, and so forth. If that were so, then all phenomena would be ineffable, yet "ineffable" also does not correspond to the principle: to negate what is effable, one says "ineffable," not that "ineffable" directly corresponds to the phenomenal substance, for the phenomenal substance is also not ineffable. And now one says that names attain the own-nature of common characteristics; this should now be understood as not being the phenomenal substance, but rather that its meaning is acceptable. Saying that names and so forth express common characteristics does not mean that they directly attain the substance of common characteristics; it merely negates the attainment of particular characteristics, hence it is said that names express common characteristics. Furthermore, the particular characteristic is the substance-characteristic of phenomena themselves. For example, fire has warmth as its particular characteristic; when calling for fire, warmth is not obtained, hence one does not attain the particular characteristic. This particular characteristic of warmth is realized only by the direct perception of the body-consciousness, and is not obtained by names. As for the common characteristic, it is the meaning expressed under the name that is called the common characteristic. Common characteristics are of two kinds: first, common to its own kind; second, common to different kinds. For instance, when one says "fire," it does not include water and so forth, but pervades all instances of fire, hence it is called "common to its own kind." If one speaks of suffering, emptiness, impermanence, and so forth, they are not only upon one class of phenomena, but pervade all phenomena such as water and fire, hence they are called "common to different kinds." Furthermore, particular characteristics are attained only by the five sense faculties, five dusts, and the mind and mental factors. That is, the five sense faculties are directly realized by the eighth [consciousness]; the five dusts are the essential substances directly realized by the direct perception of the fifth and eighth consciousnesses and their mental factors. The solitary, dispersed manovijñāna and so forth do not even attain the essential substance, how much less could verbal expressions attain the essential substance? When the five consciousnesses condition the five dust-objects, because they possess four meanings, they are said to attain the particular characteristics of phenomena: first, because they are spontaneous; second, because they are direct perception; third, because they do not carry nominal expressions; fourth, because they only condition present objects. Thus they are said to attain particular characteristics. The objects conditioned by the manovijñāna are of two kinds: if it is the object conditioned by the solitary manovijñāna, it is subsumed under the dharmāyatana; if it is the object conditioned by the clarifying manovijñāna, it is included under the rūpāyatana. For example, when the eye-consciousness and the clarifying manovijñāna spontaneously condition visible form together in the very first moment, they merely condition the particular characteristic of form. In subsequent moments, the clarifying manovijñāna discriminates nominal forms such as length upon the conditioned form, which are common characteristics. Although nominal forms such as length are the objects conditioned by the clarifying manovijñāna, they are also subsumed under the rūpāyatana; because they are nominal, the eye-consciousness does not condition them. The same applies to sound: for instance, when the ear-consciousness in the initial moment spontaneously conditions sound together with the clarifying manovijñāna, it also attains the particular characteristic of the phenomenon. When the manovijñāna arises in subsequent moments, it conditions the three—names, phrases, and phonemes—upon sound, having conceptual active understanding and so forth, conditioning the nominal. Now, since the five consciousnesses have no conceptual active understanding, they do not condition the nominal.'