宗鏡錄 53.18

53.18

The answer states: 'The common characteristic is a meaning upon the phenomenal substance itself; there is no separate substance. Furthermore, when this name expresses phenomena such as fire, it negates non-fire and so forth; this meaning then extends to all fire, hence it is called a common characteristic—that is its meaning, not the principle of common characteristics like suffering, emptiness, and so forth. If that were so, then all phenomena would be ineffable, yet "ineffable" also does not correspond to the principle: to negate what is effable, one says "ineffable," not that "ineffable" directly corresponds to the phenomenal substance, for the phenomenal substance is also not ineffable. And now one says that names attain the own-nature of common characteristics; this should now be understood as not being the phenomenal substance, but rather that its meaning is acceptable. Saying that names and so forth express common characteristics does not mean that they directly attain the substance of common characteristics; it merely negates the attainment of particular characteristics, hence it is said that names express common characteristics. Furthermore, the particular characteristic is the substance-characteristic of phenomena themselves. For example, fire has warmth as its particular characteristic; when calling for fire, warmth is not obtained, hence one does not attain the particular characteristic. This particular characteristic of warmth is realized only by the direct perception of the body-consciousness, and is not obtained by names. As for the common characteristic, it is the meaning expressed under the name that is called the common characteristic. Common characteristics are of two kinds: first, common to its own kind; second, common to different kinds. For instance, when one says "fire," it does not include water and so forth, but pervades all instances of fire, hence it is called "common to its own kind." If one speaks of suffering, emptiness, impermanence, and so forth, they are not only upon one class of phenomena, but pervade all phenomena such as water and fire, hence they are called "common to different kinds." Furthermore, particular characteristics are attained only by the five sense faculties, five dusts, and the mind and mental factors. That is, the five sense faculties are directly realized by the eighth [consciousness]; the five dusts are the essential substances directly realized by the direct perception of the fifth and eighth consciousnesses and their mental factors. The solitary, dispersed manovijñāna and so forth do not even attain the essential substance, how much less could verbal expressions attain the essential substance? When the five consciousnesses condition the five dust-objects, because they possess four meanings, they are said to attain the particular characteristics of phenomena: first, because they are spontaneous; second, because they are direct perception; third, because they do not carry nominal expressions; fourth, because they only condition present objects. Thus they are said to attain particular characteristics. The objects conditioned by the manovijñāna are of two kinds: if it is the object conditioned by the solitary manovijñāna, it is subsumed under the dharmāyatana; if it is the object conditioned by the clarifying manovijñāna, it is included under the rūpāyatana. For example, when the eye-consciousness and the clarifying manovijñāna spontaneously condition visible form together in the very first moment, they merely condition the particular characteristic of form. In subsequent moments, the clarifying manovijñāna discriminates nominal forms such as length upon the conditioned form, which are common characteristics. Although nominal forms such as length are the objects conditioned by the clarifying manovijñāna, they are also subsumed under the rūpāyatana; because they are nominal, the eye-consciousness does not condition them. The same applies to sound: for instance, when the ear-consciousness in the initial moment spontaneously conditions sound together with the clarifying manovijñāna, it also attains the particular characteristic of the phenomenon. When the manovijñāna arises in subsequent moments, it conditions the three—names, phrases, and phonemes—upon sound, having conceptual active understanding and so forth, conditioning the nominal. Now, since the five consciousnesses have no conceptual active understanding, they do not condition the nominal.'