宗鏡錄 57.39

57.39

答。在種位能警心。以作意自性明利。雖在種位。若有境至。而能警心心所種。令生起現。舉喻。如多人同一室宿。外邊有賊來時。眾中有一人。為性少睡。便能警覺餘人。此人雖自身未起。而能警覺餘人令起。亦如內心相分。雖與見分同起。法爾有能牽心功能。今作意亦爾。其作意種子。既警彼諸心心所種。生現行已。作意現行。又能引心現行令趣前境。即此作意。有二功能。一心未起時。能警令起。二若起已。能引令趣境。初是體性。後是業用。二觸。謂根境識三事和合。分別為體。受依為業。又即三和是因。觸是其果。令心心所。觸境為性。受想思等。所依為業。觸若不生時。餘受一心所亦不能生。和合一切心及心所。令同觸前境。是觸自性也。即諸心所緣境時。皆是觸功能自性也。即此觸似彼三和。與受等為所依。是觸之業用也。三受。領納為體。愛緣為業。四想。謂名句文身熏習為緣。取相為體。發言議為業。又想能安立自境分劑。若心起時無此想者。應不能取境分劑相。於境取像為性。施設種種名言為業。種種名言。皆由於想。是想功能。五思。謂念心。造作一切善惡總別報為思體。於善品等。役心為業。觸等五法。心起必有。故是遍行。餘非遍行。別境有五。欲等不遍心故。以四境別。名為別境也。一欲。謂於所樂境。希望為體。勤依為業。又於一切事欲觀察者。有希望故。若不欲觀。隨因境勢。任運緣者。即全無欲。由斯理趣。欲非遍行。二勝解。謂於決定境。如其所應。印解為體。不可引轉為業。又謂邪正等教理證力。於所取境。審決印持。由此異緣。不能引轉故。猶預境。勝解全無。非審決心。亦無勝解。非遍行攝。三念。謂於慣習境。令心明記不忘為體。等持所依為業。又於曾未受體類境中。令不起念。設曾所受。不能明記。念亦不生故。念必非遍行所攝。念與定為所依。為業用。能生正定。故言定依為業。四定。亦云等持。謂於所觀境。專注一緣為體。令心不散。智依為業。又由定令心專注不散。依斯便有決擇智生。若不繫心專注境位。便無定起。故非遍行。五慧。謂於所觀境。簡擇為體。斷疑為業。又於非觀境。愚昧心中。無簡擇故。非遍行攝。此別境五隨位有無。所緣能緣。非定俱故。善有十一。一信。謂於有體。有德。有能。心淨為體。斷不信障。能得菩提資糧圓滿為業。又識論云。信以心淨為性。此性澄清。能淨心等。以心勝故。立心淨名。如水清珠。能清濁水。釋云。唯信是能淨。餘善等皆所淨。故。以心王為主。但言心淨。不言心所。水喻心等。清珠喻信體。以投珠故。濁水便清。以有信故。其心遂淨。二慚。謂依自增上。及法增上。羞恥過惡為體。斷無慚障為業。三愧。謂依世增上。羞恥過惡為體。斷無愧障為業。四無貪。謂於有有具。厭離無執。不藏不愛。無著為體。能斷貪障為業。五無瞋。謂於諸有情。心無損害。慈愍為體。能斷瞋障為業。六無癡。謂正了真實為體。能斷癡障為業。七精進。謂心勇無墮。不自輕賤為體。斷懈怠障為業。八輕安。謂遠離麁重。身心調暢為體。斷麁重障為業。九不放逸。謂總攝無貪瞋癡。精進為體。斷放逸障為業。十捨。謂總攝無貪瞋癡為體。依此捨故得心平等。得心正直。心無發動。斷發動障為業。十一不害。謂由不惱害諸有情故。悲哀惻愴愍物為體。能斷害障為業。根本煩惱有六。一貪。謂於五取蘊。愛樂覆藏。保著為體。損害自他。能趣惡道為業。二瞋。謂於有情。欲興損害為體。能障無瞋為業。三慢。謂以他劣己計我為勝。令心高舉為體。能障無慢為業。四無明。謂不正了真實為體。能障正了為業。五邪見。謂五見為體。一薩迦邪見。謂於五取蘊計我我所。染污慧為體。能障無我。無顛倒解為業。二邊執見。謂於五取蘊。執計斷常。染污慧為體。能障無常。無顛倒解為業。三邪見。謂謗因果。染污慧為體。唯分別起。能障正見為業。四見取。謂於前三見。及見所依蘊。計最勝上。及與第一染污慧為體。唯分別起。能障苦。及不淨。無顛倒解為業。五戒禁取。謂於前諸見。及見所依蘊。計為清淨解脫出離。染污慧為體。唯分別起。能障如前。無顛倒解為業。釋云。薩迦邪見者。此翻身見也。見取者。論又云。一切鬪諍所依為業。此於諸見。及所依蘊。執為最勝。能得涅槃清淨法。是見取。由此各各互執。為勝諸見等故。一切外道鬪諍。因斯而起。戒禁取者。又云。無利勤苦所依為業。謂依諸見所受戒。說此戒為勝。及能得涅槃。由此戒故。一切外道。受持拔髮等無利勤苦。六疑。謂於諸諦。猶豫不決為體。唯分別起。能障無疑為業。

Answer: It is capable of alerting the citta while in the seed state. Because the self-nature of attention (manaskāra) is lucid and acute, even while in the seed state, if an object arrives, it can alert the seeds of citta and caitta, causing them to arise into manifestation. To give an analogy: it is like many people lodging together in a single room. When a thief comes outside, among the crowd there is one person whose nature is to sleep lightly, and thus he can alert the other people. Although this person himself has not yet gotten up, he can alert the other people, causing them to arise. It is also like the internal nimittabhāga of the citta: although it arises simultaneously with the darśanabhāga, by the very nature of things it possesses the functional capacity to pull the citta. Here, attention is also like this. Its seed of attention, having alerted the seeds of those cittas and caittas to produce manifestation, the manifest attention can then also lead the manifest citta to direct itself toward the object in front. Thus this attention has two functional capacities: first, when citta has not yet arisen, it can alert it, causing it to arise; second, once it has arisen, it can lead it, causing it to direct itself toward the object. The former is its substance and nature; the latter is its activity and function. Second, contact (sparśa): meaning the harmonious union of the three things—indriya, viṣaya, and vijñāna—taking discrimination as its substance and serving as the support for feeling (vedanā) as its activity. Moreover, the harmonious union of the three is the cause, and contact is its fruit. Causing the citta and caittas to touch the object is its nature; serving as the support for feeling, conception (saṃjñā), volition (cetanā), and so on, is its activity. If contact does not arise, the other caitta of feeling also cannot arise. Bringing together into harmony all citta and caittas, causing them to touch the object before them simultaneously, is the self-nature of contact. Thus, when the various caittas grasp an object, it is all the functional capacity and self-nature of contact. Thus this contact resembles that harmonious union of the three, serving as the support for feeling and so on; this is the activity and function of contact. Third, feeling (vedanā): taking experiencing as its substance, and serving as the condition for craving (tṛṣṇā) as its activity. Fourth, conception (saṃjñā): meaning taking the perfuming of nāmakāya, padakāya, and vyañjanakāya as condition, taking the grasping of marks as substance, and producing speech and discourse as its activity. Moreover, conception can establish the boundaries and limits of its own object. If this conception were not present when citta arises, one would not be able to grasp the marks of the boundaries and limits of the object. Taking the grasping of an image of the object as its nature, and setting up various names and speech as its activity; various names and speech all depend on conception—this is the functional capacity of conception. Fifth, volition (cetanā): meaning the mind of intentional action, taking the fabrication of all general and specific retributions of good and bad as the substance of volition, and directing the citta toward wholesome states and so on as its activity. These five dharmas of contact and the rest are necessarily present whenever citta arises; therefore they are omnipresent (sarvatraga). The others are not omnipresent. There are five object-determined [factors] (viniyata), because desire and the rest do not pervade all citta. Because of the distinction of the four objects, they are named object-determined. First, desire (chanda): meaning, with respect to a desired object, taking longing as its substance and serving as the support for diligence as its activity. Moreover, in all matters where one desires to observe, because there is longing; if one does not desire to observe, and spontaneously grasps according to the momentum of the causal condition and object, then there is entirely no desire. Due to this reasoning, desire is not omnipresent. Second, resolve (adhimokṣa): meaning, with respect to a determined object, according to what is appropriate, taking decisive apprehension as its substance and being unshakeable as its activity. Moreover, it means that by the force of right or wrong teaching, reasoning, and realization, one carefully determines and decisively holds to the object grasped; because of this, other conditions cannot shake it. Thus, toward an ambiguous object, resolve is entirely absent; in a mind that is not carefully decisive, there is also no resolve; [hence] it is not included among the omnipresent. Third, mindfulness (smṛti): meaning, with respect to a habituated object, taking causing the citta to clearly remember without forgetting as its substance, and serving as the support for samādhi as its activity. Moreover, toward objects whose substances or types were never previously experienced, one does not cause mindfulness to arise; even if previously experienced, if one cannot clearly remember, mindfulness also does not arise. Therefore, mindfulness is definitely not included among the omnipresent. Mindfulness serves as the support and as the activity and function for samādhi, being able to produce correct samādhi; therefore it is said that serving as the support for samādhi is its activity. Fourth, concentration (samādhi), also called samādhi (děngtí): meaning, with respect to the observed object, taking focused attention on a single condition as its substance, causing the citta not to be distracted, and serving as the support for wisdom (jñāna) as its activity. Moreover, because concentration causes the citta to be focused and undistracted, relying on this, discriminating wisdom arises. If one does not tie the citta to focus on the stage of the object, then concentration does not arise; therefore it is not omnipresent. Fifth, discernment (prajñā/mati): meaning, with respect to the observed object, taking selection and evaluation as its substance, and severing doubt as its activity. Moreover, with respect to non-observed objects and in an ignorant and benighted citta, because there is no selection and evaluation, it is not included among the omnipresent. These five object-determined [factors] exist or not depending on the state, and the perceived object and perceiving [subject] are not definitely concomitant. There are eleven wholesome [factors] (kuśala). First, faith (śraddhā): meaning, toward what has reality, what has virtue, and what has capability, taking clarity of citta as its substance, and severing the obstacle of non-faith, being able to obtain the fulfillment of the provisions for bodhi, as its activity. Moreover, the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says: 'Faith takes clarity of citta as its nature. This nature is clear and pure, and can purify citta and so on. Because citta is superior, it is given the name "clarity of citta", just as a water-clearing jewel can clear muddy water.' The commentary explains: 'Only faith is that which can purify; the other wholesome [factors] and so on are that which is purified. Therefore, taking the citta-king as principal, it only speaks of "clarity of citta" and does not speak of caittas. Water is an analogy for citta and so on; the clearing jewel is an analogy for the substance of faith. Because the jewel is thrown in, the muddy water becomes clear; because faith is present, that citta consequently becomes pure.' Second, shame (hrī): meaning, relying on the dominance of oneself and the dominance of the Dharma, taking feeling shame at faults and evils as its substance, and severing the obstacle of shamelessness as its activity. Third, bashfulness (apatrāpya): meaning, relying on the dominance of the world, taking feeling bashful at faults and evils as its substance, and severing the obstacle of unbashfulness as its activity. Fourth, non-attachment (alobha): meaning, toward existence and the requisites for existence, taking disgust and detachment without grasping, not hoarding and not loving, and being without attachment as its substance, and being able to sever the obstacle of rāga as its activity. Fifth, non-hatred (adveṣa): meaning, toward all sentient beings, taking a citta free of harm and filled with benevolence and pity as its substance, and being able to sever the obstacle of dveṣa as its activity. Sixth, non-delusion (amoha): meaning taking the correct understanding of reality as its substance, and being able to sever the obstacle of moha as its activity. Seventh, diligence (vīrya): meaning taking the citta being courageous and free of laxity, not looking down on oneself, as its substance, and severing the obstacle of indolence as its activity. Eighth, pliancy (praśrabdhi): meaning, being free from coarse heaviness (dauṣṭhulya), taking the body and mind being harmonious and smooth as its substance, and severing the obstacle of coarse heaviness as its activity. Ninth, non-heedlessness (apramāda): meaning, taking non-attachment, non-hatred, and non-delusion along with diligence as its substance, and severing the obstacle of heedlessness as its activity. Tenth, equanimity (upekṣā): meaning taking non-attachment, non-hatred, and non-delusion as its substance; relying on this equanimity, one attains impartiality of citta, attains uprightness of citta, and citta without stirring; taking severing the obstacle of stirring as its activity. Eleventh, non-harming (ahiṃsā): meaning, by not distressing and harming sentient beings, taking grief, sorrow, and pity for creatures as its substance, and being able to sever the obstacle of harm as its activity. There are six root kleśas (mūlakleśa). First, attachment (rāga): meaning, toward the five grasping aggregates, taking loving, concealing, cherishing, and clinging as its substance, and harming oneself and others and being able to direct one toward the bad destinies as its activity. Second, anger (dveṣa): meaning, toward sentient beings, taking the desire to cause harm as its substance, and being able to obstruct non-hatred as its activity. Third, pride (māna): meaning, considering others inferior to oneself and reckoning oneself superior, taking causing the citta to be haughty as its substance, and being able to obstruct non-pride as its activity. Fourth, ignorance (avidyā): meaning taking not correctly understanding reality as its substance, and being able to obstruct correct understanding as its activity. Fifth, corrupt views (dṛṣṭi): meaning taking the five views as its substance. 1. The satkāyadṛṣṭi: meaning, toward the five grasping aggregates, reckoning a self and what belongs to a self, taking defiled discernment as its substance, and being able to obstruct the non-erroneous understanding of no-self as its activity. 2. The view of extreme grasping (antagrāhadṛṣṭi): meaning, toward the five grasping aggregates, clinging and reckoning annihilation or permanence, taking defiled discernment as its substance, and being able to obstruct the non-erroneous understanding of impermanence as its activity. 3. Corrupt view (mithyādṛṣṭi): meaning slandering cause and effect, taking defiled discernment as its substance, arising solely through discrimination, and being able to obstruct right view as its activity. 4. Attachment to views (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa): meaning, toward the previous three views and the aggregates on which the views rely, reckoning them as supreme and foremost, taking defiled discernment as its substance, arising solely through discrimination, and being able to obstruct the non-erroneous understanding of suffering and impurity as its activity. 5. Attachment to precepts and vows (śīlavrataparāmarśa): meaning, toward the previous views and the aggregates on which the views rely, reckoning them as purification, liberation, and transcendence, taking defiled discernment as its substance, arising solely through discrimination, and being able to obstruct the non-erroneous understanding as before as its activity. The commentary explains: 'Satkāyadṛṣṭi is translated here as "view of the body" (shēnjiàn). As for attachment to views, the treatise also says: "Taking serving as the support for all dispute as its activity." This grasps views and the aggregates on which they rely as supreme and as able to attain the pure dharma of nirvāṇa; this is attachment to views. Because of these mutual clingings to the superiority of various views and so on, all disputes of the non-Buddhists arise from this. As for attachment to precepts and vows, it also says: "Taking serving as the support for useless arduous toil as its activity." It means that relying on the precepts received under these views, one speaks of these precepts as supreme and as able to attain nirvāṇa; due to these precepts, all non-Buddhists undertake useless arduous toil such as plucking out hair.' Sixth, doubt (vicikitsā): meaning, toward the truths, taking indecisive hesitation as its substance, arising solely through discrimination, and being able to obstruct non-doubt as its activity.