大乘百法明門論開宗義記 1.24
大乘百法明門論開宗義記 1.24
- Language
- Classical Chinese
1.24
論。別境五者一欲二勝解三念四三摩地五慧 開曰。此列別境也。所緣境事多分不同。於六位中次初說故。所言欲者。於所樂境希望為性。勤依為業。所樂境者謂欲觀境。於一切事欲觀察者。有希望故方有欲生。若不欲觀隨因勢力任運緣者。全無欲故。由斯故說欲非遍行。若善法欲能發正勤。由彼助成一切善事。故論說此勤依為業。言勝解者。於決定境印持為性。不可引轉以為其業。為邪正等教理證力於所取境審決印持。由此異緣不可引轉故。猶預境勝解全無。非審決心亦無勝解。由斯勝解亦非遍行。所言念者。於曾習境令心明記不忘為性。定依為業。謂數憶持曾所受境。令不忘失能引定故。於曾未受體類境中全不起念。設曾所受不能明記。念亦不生。故念必非遍行所攝。三摩地者。此名等持。謂即是定於所觀境平等持心。令心專注不散為性。智依為業。謂觀德失俱非境中由定令心專注不散。依斯便有決擇智生。若不繫心專注境位。便無定起故非遍行。所言慧者。於所觀境簡擇為性。斷疑為業。謂觀德失俱非境中由慧推求得決定故。於非觀境愚昧心中無簡擇故非遍行攝。而小乘論同前遍行名通大地。遍諸心者未達理故。如唯識破。然此五種或各別起。謂依所樂唯起一欲。乃至所觀唯起定慧。或互相資隨應俱起。謂於所樂決定曾習所觀境中。起欲勝解念定慧中二三四五。或有心位五皆不起。如非四境率爾墮心二皆與五受相應。於苦憂事欲出離故。於喜樂事欲和合故。於平等事亦希望故。餘相應義准此說之。此五復依性界地等。諸餘門義如理應思。
The Treatise: "The five that are viniyata are: (1) desire, (2) resolute resolve, (3) mindfulness, (4) samādhi, and (5) wisdom." / Revealing the Doctrine says: This lists the viniyata [caittas]. The objects of cognition and conditions are for the most part distinct, and thus they are explained immediately after the first [category] among the six categories. / That which is called "desire" has as its nature longing for an object in which one takes pleasure; its function is to serve as the support for diligence. The "object in which one takes pleasure" refers to an object one wishes to observe. One who wishes to observe any matter possesses longing, and only then does desire arise. If one does not wish to observe, and instead spontaneously grasps [an object] merely following the force of causes, desire is completely absent. On this basis, desire is said not to be sarvatraga. If it is the desire for wholesome dharmas, it can initiate right diligence, and through its assistance all wholesome matters are accomplished; therefore, the treatise states that its function is to serve as the support for diligence. / As for "resolute resolve," it has as its nature the confident endorsement of an object that is determined; its function is that it cannot be diverted. Through the power of evil or right teachings, reasoning, and direct realization, one scrutinizes, determines, and endorses the apprehended object, and on this account it cannot be diverted by other conditions. Therefore, resolute resolve is completely absent toward an object of hesitation, nor does resolute resolve exist in an unreflective and indeterminate mind. On this basis, resolute resolve is likewise not sarvatraga. / That which is called "mindfulness" has as its nature causing the mind clearly to remember and not forget an object previously experienced; its function is to serve as the support for absorption (samādhi). That is, by repeatedly recalling and holding an object previously experienced, causing it not to be forgotten, it is able to induce absorption. Toward objects of an essence or class that have never before been experienced, mindfulness does not arise at all. Even if an object was previously experienced, if it cannot be clearly remembered, mindfulness likewise does not arise. Therefore, mindfulness is definitely not included among the sarvatraga. / As for "samādhi," this is called "equipoise" (samāhita); that is, it is meditative absorption. It has as its nature holding the mind equally upon the object of observation, causing the mind to remain focused and undispersed; its function is to serve as the support for gnosis. That is, when observing an object that is virtuous, faulty, or neither, meditative absorption causes the mind to remain focused and undispersed, and reliant upon this, the gnosis of discrimination arises. If the mind is not bound to a state of focused concentration on an object, then no meditative absorption arises; therefore, it is not sarvatraga. / That which is called "wisdom" has as its nature discrimination regarding the object of observation; its function is to cut off doubt. That is, when observing an object that is virtuous, faulty, or neither, one achieves certainty through the inquiry of wisdom. Because in non-observed objects and in an ignorant mind there is no discrimination, it is not included among the sarvatraga. / Now, the treatises of the Hīnayāna, assimilating them with the preceding sarvatraga, call them "dharmas common to the major ground" (mahābhūmika) and hold that they are common to all minds; this is because they have not penetrated the underlying principle, as refuted in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. / However, these five kinds may either arise individually—meaning that relying on what is desired, only desire alone arises, up to: relying on what is observed, only meditative absorption and wisdom arise; or they may mutually assist one another and arise together as appropriate—meaning that regarding an object of observation that is desired, determined, and previously experienced, two, three, four, or all five among desire, resolute resolve, mindfulness, meditative absorption, and wisdom may arise; or there may be mental states in which none of the five arise, as in the spontaneous, fallen mind directed toward what is not [one of] these four objects. All two [groups of caittas—sarvatraga and viniyata] are associated with the five feelings: because one desires to be separated from painful and sorrowful matters, desires to be united with pleasant and joyful matters, and likewise has longing regarding neutral matters. The other senses of association should be inferred in accordance with this. The further distinctions of these five according to nature, realm, plane, and so forth, should be contemplated in accordance with the principle.
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