宗鏡錄 61.13

61.13

答。種是因緣。非所緣緣。又古德問。如第六識緣龜毛兔角等時。此所緣境。為有為無。若言有者。聖教不應指此喻於遍計所執性是無。若言無者。無法無體。非所緣緣。緣此意識闕。所緣緣。如何得起。若言此心無所緣緣者。云何論言親所緣緣。能緣皆有。若龜本無毛。兔本無角。約此本無。喻所執性。由所執我。及所執法。皆本無故。其能緣心。將緣此等無法之時。由無始來。熏習力故。依種生時。從識自證分上。變起龜毛等相分。及緣此龜毛見分。此相見分。與識自證分同一種生。既依種生。是依他性。非體全無。不同本來無體龜毛。故得成所緣緣。是故緣此之心。亦得說從四緣而生。乃至如離蘊計有實我實法等。亦復如是。離蘊性外。都無實我。亦無決定實法。但是有情虛妄執有。以理推徵。都無有體。故如本來無體龜毛。然我法執。心緣執此時。亦由無始虛妄熏習力故。變起假我法相。此相與見等同種。亦依他起。成所緣緣。是故論云。如是我執。自心外蘊。或有或無。自心內蘊。一切皆有。自心內蘊者。即相分也。若言獨影境是遍計性者。其體即無。猶如龜毛等。即此一分相分無。何得論言自心內蘊一切皆有耶。已上並護法義。若安慧。見相二分。是遍計所執性。其體是無。今相承多云。獨影是遍計所執性。非所緣緣者。此即安慧宗。護法一切四分。皆依他起。於中妄執為決定實者。方名遍計所執。乃至於圓成性。及五塵性境。若堅執為實者。亦名遍計所執。然本來無體龜毛兔角等。不對執心。即非遍計性。今亦多有妄認龜毛等為遍計性者。非也。又立況解自證分見相二分者。且如自證分起見相二分。更執二分為我法。如結巾成兔。手巾是有。喻自證分。結手巾為兔頭。手巾上本無兔頭。今結出之。是故名無。如自證分上本無見相二分。由不證實。故似二分起。是故名無。如所結手巾為兔頭。已是一重假。更結出二耳。又是一重假。如從自證分變起見相二分。已是一重假。更執二分為我法。又是一重假。則見相二分。雖假似有。從種生故。其我法二執非有。是遍計妄執故。

Answer: A seed is a cause condition (hetupratyaya), not an objective condition (ālambanapratyaya). Furthermore, ancient masters asked: when the sixth consciousness cognizes a tortoise's hair, a hare's horn, and the like, does this cognized object exist or not? If one says it exists, the sacred teachings should not point to this as an analogy for the non-existence of the imagined nature (parikalpitasvabhāva). If one says it does not exist, a non-existent dharma lacks substance, and is not an ālambanapratyaya; if the manovijñāna cognizing this lacks an ālambanapratyaya, how could it arise? If one says that this mind lacks an ālambanapratyaya, why does the treatise state that with the immediate ālambanapratyaya, all cognizing [minds] have it? Although a tortoise originally has no hair and a hare originally has no horns, it is with respect to this original non-existence that they serve as an analogy for the imagined nature, because the grasped self and grasped dharmas are all originally non-existent. When the cognizing mind is about to cognize such non-existent dharmas, due to the power of beginningless perfuming, when arising based on seeds, it transforms from the svasaṃvittibhāga of consciousness a nimittabhāga of tortoise hair and the like, as well as a darśanabhāga cognizing this tortoise hair. This nimittabhāga and darśanabhāga are produced from the same seed as the svasaṃvittibhāga of the consciousness. Since they are produced based on seeds, they are of the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhāva) and are not completely devoid of substance, unlike the tortoise hair that is originally devoid of substance; therefore, they successfully constitute an ālambanapratyaya. For this reason, the mind cognizing this can also be said to arise from the four conditions (pratyaya). And so on: conceptualizing an actual self and actual dharmas apart from the skandhas is also like this. Apart from the nature of the skandhas, there is entirely no actual self, nor are there definitively actual dharmas; they are merely falsely grasped as existent by sentient beings. Examined through reasoning, they entirely lack substance, and are thus like the originally substanceless tortoise hair. However, when the mind grasping at self and dharmas cognizes and grasps this, it also, due to the power of beginningless false perfuming, transforms into the marks of a nominal self and dharmas; these marks share the same seed as the darśana and so forth, are also dependently arisen, and constitute the ālambanapratyaya. Therefore the treatise states: 'In this way, the skandhas external to one's own mind grasped as a self may exist or not exist, but the skandhas internal to one's own mind all exist.' 'The skandhas internal to one's own mind' are precisely the nimittabhāga. If one says that the isolated reflected image (dulying jing) is of the parikalpita nature, its substance is non-existent, just like a tortoise's hair and the like; then this single part, the nimittabhāga, would be non-existent—how could the treatise say that the skandhas internal to one's own mind all exist? The above are all the tenets of Dharmapāla. According to Sthiramati, both the darśanabhāga and nimittabhāga are of the parikalpita-svabhāva, and their substance is non-existent. Nowadays, many transmissions say that the isolated reflection is of the parikalpita-svabhāva and is not an ālambanapratyaya; this is Sthiramati's school. According to Dharmapāla, all four parts are dependently arisen (paratantra); only when one falsely clings to them as definitively real are they termed parikalpita. Furthermore, even regarding the pariniṣpanna nature and the real objects of the five dusts (viṣaya), if one firmly clings to them as real, they are also called parikalpita. However, tortoise hair, hare horns, and the like, which are originally devoid of substance, are not of the parikalpita nature when not confronted with a clinging mind. Nowadays, there are also many who mistakenly identify tortoise hair and the like as the parikalpita nature; this is incorrect. Furthermore, establishing an analogy to explain the svasaṃvittibhāga, darśanabhāga, and nimittabhāga: consider when the svasaṃvittibhāga gives rise to the darśanabhāga and nimittabhāga, and one further clings to the two parts as self and dharmas: it is like tying a cloth into a hare. The hand-cloth is existent, analogizing the svasaṃvittibhāga. Tying the hand-cloth into a hare's head: on the hand-cloth there was originally no hare's head, but now it is tied into one, hence it is called non-existent. Similarly, on the svasaṃvittibhāga there were originally no two parts of darśana and nimitta, but because of not realizing the real, they arise resembling two parts, and are hence called non-existent. As tying the hand-cloth into a hare's head is already one layer of nominal designation, tying out two ears is yet another layer of nominal designation; similarly, transforming the two parts of darśana and nimitta from the svasaṃvittibhāga is already one layer of nominal designation, and further clinging to the two parts as self and dharmas is yet another layer of nominal designation. Thus, although the two parts of darśana and nimitta are nominal and seemingly existent, because they arise from seeds, the two graspings of self and dharmas are non-existent, because they are parikalpita false graspings.