宗鏡錄 61.13

61.13

Answer: A seed is a cause condition (hetupratyaya), not an objective condition (ālambanapratyaya). Furthermore, ancient masters asked: when the sixth consciousness cognizes a tortoise's hair, a hare's horn, and the like, does this cognized object exist or not? If one says it exists, the sacred teachings should not point to this as an analogy for the non-existence of the imagined nature (parikalpitasvabhāva). If one says it does not exist, a non-existent dharma lacks substance, and is not an ālambanapratyaya; if the manovijñāna cognizing this lacks an ālambanapratyaya, how could it arise? If one says that this mind lacks an ālambanapratyaya, why does the treatise state that with the immediate ālambanapratyaya, all cognizing [minds] have it? Although a tortoise originally has no hair and a hare originally has no horns, it is with respect to this original non-existence that they serve as an analogy for the imagined nature, because the grasped self and grasped dharmas are all originally non-existent. When the cognizing mind is about to cognize such non-existent dharmas, due to the power of beginningless perfuming, when arising based on seeds, it transforms from the svasaṃvittibhāga of consciousness a nimittabhāga of tortoise hair and the like, as well as a darśanabhāga cognizing this tortoise hair. This nimittabhāga and darśanabhāga are produced from the same seed as the svasaṃvittibhāga of the consciousness. Since they are produced based on seeds, they are of the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhāva) and are not completely devoid of substance, unlike the tortoise hair that is originally devoid of substance; therefore, they successfully constitute an ālambanapratyaya. For this reason, the mind cognizing this can also be said to arise from the four conditions (pratyaya). And so on: conceptualizing an actual self and actual dharmas apart from the skandhas is also like this. Apart from the nature of the skandhas, there is entirely no actual self, nor are there definitively actual dharmas; they are merely falsely grasped as existent by sentient beings. Examined through reasoning, they entirely lack substance, and are thus like the originally substanceless tortoise hair. However, when the mind grasping at self and dharmas cognizes and grasps this, it also, due to the power of beginningless false perfuming, transforms into the marks of a nominal self and dharmas; these marks share the same seed as the darśana and so forth, are also dependently arisen, and constitute the ālambanapratyaya. Therefore the treatise states: 'In this way, the skandhas external to one's own mind grasped as a self may exist or not exist, but the skandhas internal to one's own mind all exist.' 'The skandhas internal to one's own mind' are precisely the nimittabhāga. If one says that the isolated reflected image (dulying jing) is of the parikalpita nature, its substance is non-existent, just like a tortoise's hair and the like; then this single part, the nimittabhāga, would be non-existent—how could the treatise say that the skandhas internal to one's own mind all exist? The above are all the tenets of Dharmapāla. According to Sthiramati, both the darśanabhāga and nimittabhāga are of the parikalpita-svabhāva, and their substance is non-existent. Nowadays, many transmissions say that the isolated reflection is of the parikalpita-svabhāva and is not an ālambanapratyaya; this is Sthiramati's school. According to Dharmapāla, all four parts are dependently arisen (paratantra); only when one falsely clings to them as definitively real are they termed parikalpita. Furthermore, even regarding the pariniṣpanna nature and the real objects of the five dusts (viṣaya), if one firmly clings to them as real, they are also called parikalpita. However, tortoise hair, hare horns, and the like, which are originally devoid of substance, are not of the parikalpita nature when not confronted with a clinging mind. Nowadays, there are also many who mistakenly identify tortoise hair and the like as the parikalpita nature; this is incorrect. Furthermore, establishing an analogy to explain the svasaṃvittibhāga, darśanabhāga, and nimittabhāga: consider when the svasaṃvittibhāga gives rise to the darśanabhāga and nimittabhāga, and one further clings to the two parts as self and dharmas: it is like tying a cloth into a hare. The hand-cloth is existent, analogizing the svasaṃvittibhāga. Tying the hand-cloth into a hare's head: on the hand-cloth there was originally no hare's head, but now it is tied into one, hence it is called non-existent. Similarly, on the svasaṃvittibhāga there were originally no two parts of darśana and nimitta, but because of not realizing the real, they arise resembling two parts, and are hence called non-existent. As tying the hand-cloth into a hare's head is already one layer of nominal designation, tying out two ears is yet another layer of nominal designation; similarly, transforming the two parts of darśana and nimitta from the svasaṃvittibhāga is already one layer of nominal designation, and further clinging to the two parts as self and dharmas is yet another layer of nominal designation. Thus, although the two parts of darśana and nimitta are nominal and seemingly existent, because they arise from seeds, the two graspings of self and dharmas are non-existent, because they are parikalpita false graspings.