宗鏡錄 61.7

61.7

答。乍看似同。細詳理別。且如安慧立一自證分。全不說證自證分。雖說見相二分。然一向判為遍計所執性。此乃四分中一分。分無二分有名無體。亦是其無。唯立一依他自證分。今護法雖攝四歸一。然不名自證分。但總名一心。雖總說一心分。而不失自證等四分義。但以與心無決定相離義。總名一分。與彼別立自證分義別。乃至攝四歸三時。內之二分。雖互相緣。其用各別。然其所緣。不失自體故。但名自證。雖總名自證。而互相緣二分之義。不失。不同。陳那自證。但有證自見分之自證。即無證自證之自證。由此義故。非諸師之知見。

Answer: At first glance they appear the same, but upon detailed examination the principle is different. Take Sthiramati, who establishes only a single svasaṃvittibhāga and does not speak of the saṃvittisvasaṃvittibhāga at all. Although he speaks of the two parts of darśanabhāga and nimittabhāga, he unequivocally classifies them as the imagined nature (parikalpitasvabhāva). This is just one of the four parts; the two parts are empty, having names without substance, and are likewise non-existent; he only establishes a single dependent (paratantra) svasaṃvittibhāga. Now, although Dharmapāla subsumes the four into one, he does not call it the svasaṃvittibhāga, but generally names it the one mind. Although he speaks generally of the one mind-part, he does not forfeit the meaning of the four parts, such as the svasaṃvittibhāga. Merely because they do not definitively exist separate from the mind, he generally designates them as one part. This is different from the meaning of his separately establishing the svasaṃvittibhāga. Furthermore, when subsuming the four into three: although the two internal parts cognize each other, their functions are distinct; yet because that which is cognized does not depart from their own substance, it is merely named svasaṃvitti. Although it is generally named svasaṃvitti, the meaning of the two parts cognizing each other is not lost. It is not like Dignāga's svasaṃvitti, which only has the svasaṃvitti that realizes its own darśanabhāga, lacking the svasaṃvitti that realizes the svasaṃvitti. By this principle, it is not the view of those masters.