宗鏡錄 61.7

61.7

Answer: At first glance they appear the same, but upon detailed examination the principle is different. Take Sthiramati, who establishes only a single svasaṃvittibhāga and does not speak of the saṃvittisvasaṃvittibhāga at all. Although he speaks of the two parts of darśanabhāga and nimittabhāga, he unequivocally classifies them as the imagined nature (parikalpitasvabhāva). This is just one of the four parts; the two parts are empty, having names without substance, and are likewise non-existent; he only establishes a single dependent (paratantra) svasaṃvittibhāga. Now, although Dharmapāla subsumes the four into one, he does not call it the svasaṃvittibhāga, but generally names it the one mind. Although he speaks generally of the one mind-part, he does not forfeit the meaning of the four parts, such as the svasaṃvittibhāga. Merely because they do not definitively exist separate from the mind, he generally designates them as one part. This is different from the meaning of his separately establishing the svasaṃvittibhāga. Furthermore, when subsuming the four into three: although the two internal parts cognize each other, their functions are distinct; yet because that which is cognized does not depart from their own substance, it is merely named svasaṃvitti. Although it is generally named svasaṃvitti, the meaning of the two parts cognizing each other is not lost. It is not like Dignāga's svasaṃvitti, which only has the svasaṃvitti that realizes its own darśanabhāga, lacking the svasaṃvitti that realizes the svasaṃvitti. By this principle, it is not the view of those masters.