宗鏡錄 63.14

63.14

答。彼許種子在前六識中持。亦不離識有。論主云。其所變相分。似外五境。亦不離識。有能變五識種即五根。亦不離識有。雖分內外十處。然皆是唯識。言佛說彼為十者。以佛密意。為破外道執身為一合相我故。遂於無言之法。強以言分別說有根塵十處。有大勝利故。唯識頌云。依此教能入。數取趣無我。解云。為若有智者。即依此佛說根塵十處教文。便作觀云。我於無量劫來。為惡慧推求。愚癡迷闇。妄執自他身。為一合相我。因此生死沈淪。今依教觀。自他身。但有根塵十處。以成其體。於一一處中。都無主宰自在常一等用。何曾有我。因此便能悟入無我之理。成我空觀。此即大乘假將五種子為五根。假答小乘也。小乘又難云。若爾者。且如五塵相分色。是五識所變故。可如汝宗。是唯識。其本質五境色。未審是何識之唯識。謂五識及第六。皆不親緣本質五境。即此本質五境。豈不是離心外有。何成唯識。因此問故。便是論主第二正答。唯識論云。依識所變。非別實有。解云。此依大乘自宗正解。即約已建立第八識了。既論主云。五塵本質色。此是第八識之親相分。相分不離第八識。亦是唯識。第三喻答者。即論主舉喻答小乘。世尊建立十二處之所以。唯識論云。如遮斷見。說續有情。但是佛密意破於眾生一合相我。假說有十二處名。令眾生觀十二處法。都無有我。便入我空。次依唯識。能觀一切諸法之上。皆無實軌持勝性等用。既除法執。便成法空。小乘難云。既言一切諸法皆無實軌持自在勝性等用。成法空觀者。即此唯識之體。豈不亦空。因此便成。第四唯識成空難。論主答云。唯識體即不空。非所執故。我前言空者。但是空其一切法上妄心執有實軌持勝性等用。遍計虛妄之法。此即是空。非空離執唯識之體。即如根本智正證如時。離言絕相。其遍計虛妄一切我法。皆不現前。於此位中。唯有本智。與理冥合。不分能所。此識體亦空。便無俗諦。俗諦無故。真諦亦無。真俗相依而建立故。唯識論云。撥無二諦。是惡取空。諸佛說為不可治者。第五色相非心難。唯識論云。若諸色處亦識為體。何緣不似色相。顯現。一類。堅住。相續而轉。小乘難意云。若言一切外色皆心為體。由心自證分變似能取。說名見分。變似可取。說為相分者。何故所變色相即顯現。其能變心即不顯現。又若外色以心為體者。何故所變色即一類相續而轉。且如外色山河大地等。即千年萬年。一類更無改變。又相續不斷。得多時住。若有情能變心。即有改變不定。又不得多時。今外色既不似內心者。明知離心有外實色。何言一切皆是唯識。答云。唯識論云。名言熏習勢力起故。此但由一切有情。無始時來。前後遞互。以名言虛妄熏習。作心外堅住相續等解。由此勢力有此相現。非是真實有心外堅色等。外人又問。既言唯識者。有情何要變似外色而現。答。唯識論云。謂此若無。應無顛倒。便無雜染。亦無淨法。是故諸識變似色現。論主云。一切有情若不變似外色現者。便無染淨之法。且如一切凡夫。由先迷色等諸境。顛倒妄執。由此雜染便生。雜染體。即二障。汝外人若不許識變似外色現者。即有情不起顛倒。顛。倒妄執既若不起。即雜染煩惱不生。雜染既若不生。淨法因何而有。所以攝論頌云。亂相及亂體。應許為色識。及與非色識。若無餘亦無。言亂相者。即所變色相。言亂體者。即能變心體。應許為色識者。即前所變亂相。及與非色識者。即前變心是體。若無餘亦無者。若無所變似外色境為亂相者。亦無能變之識體。故知須變似外境現。所以諸色皆不離心。總是唯識。第六現量違宗難者。唯識論云。色等外境。分明現證。現量所得。察撥為無。小乘難意云。且如外五塵色境。分明五識現證。是現量所得。大小乘皆共極成。何故撥無。言一切唯識。三十唯識論中亦有此難云。諸法由量。刊定有無。一切量中。現量為勝。若無外境寧有此覺。我今現證如是境耶。意云。論主若言無外實境者。如何言五識現量。取外五塵境。若是比量。非量。遍計所起。遍計所執。強思計度。構畫所生。相分。不離於心。可成唯識。今五識既現量得外實五塵境者。何故亦言皆是唯識。答。唯識論云。現量證時。不執為外。後意分別。妄生外想。論主云。且如現量五識。正緣五塵境時。得法自性。不帶名言。無籌度心。不生分別。不執為外。但是後念分別意識。妄生分別。便執為外。言有實境。

Answer: They grant that seeds are held within the first six consciousnesses, and they also do not exist apart from consciousness. The author of the treatise states: The transformed nimittabhāga, which resembles the five external sense objects, likewise does not exist apart from consciousness. The seeds of the five consciousnesses that possess the capacity to transform—namely, the five sense faculties—likewise do not exist apart from consciousness. Although divided into the ten internal and external bases, yet all are vijñaptimātra. That the Buddha taught them as ten was due to the Buddha's esoteric intention: in order to demolish the non-Buddhists' clinging to the body as a solitary composite self, he thus forcedly used conceptual words upon wordless phenomena to speak of the ten bases of faculties and dusts, which brings great and superior benefit. Thus the Vijñaptimātrasiddhi verse states: 'Relying on this teaching, one is able to enter / the selflessness of the pudgala.' The explanation says: If there are wise persons, they thereupon rely on these scriptural passages in which the Buddha taught the ten bases of faculties and dusts, and immediately contemplate: 'For immeasurable eons, driven by faulty wisdom's scrutiny and mired in foolish delusion and darkness, I have falsely clung to the bodies of self and others as a solitary composite self; on account of this I have sunk and drowned in saṃsāra. Now relying on the teaching, I contemplate that the bodies of self and others have only the ten bases of faculties and dusts to constitute their substance. In each and every single base, there is utterly no function of a master, sovereignty, permanence, or oneness. How could there ever be a self?' Thereupon they are able to awaken and enter into the principle of selflessness, accomplishing the contemplation of the emptiness of self. This is Mahāyāna provisionally taking the five seeds to be the five faculties in order to provisionally answer the Hīnayāna. The Hīnayāna raises another objection: 'If so, then the forms that are the nimittabhāga of the five dusts are transformed by the five consciousnesses, and so may be vijñaptimātra as in your school; but as for the forms of the five fundamental objects (mūla-ālambana), one does not know of which consciousness they are the vijñaptimātra. The five consciousnesses and the sixth do not directly take the five fundamental objects as cognitive conditions; then do these five fundamental objects not exist outside the mind? How does this establish vijñaptimātra?' Because of this question, there is the treatise author's second correct reply. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'They depend on what is transformed by consciousness; they are not distinct real entities.' The explanation says: This is the correct explanation according to Mahāyāna's own school, based on having already established the eighth consciousness. Since the author of the treatise says that the fundamental forms of the five dusts are the direct nimittabhāga of the eighth consciousness, and the nimittabhāga is not separate from the eighth consciousness, it is also vijñaptimātra. As for the third, the reply by analogy: the author of the treatise raises an analogy to reply to the Hīnayāna regarding why the World-Honoured One established the twelve bases. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'Just as to avert the view of annihilation, he taught the continuity of sentient beings.' It was merely the Buddha's esoteric intention to demolish sentient beings' solitary composite self that he provisionally stated the names of the twelve bases, causing sentient beings to contemplate the phenomena of the twelve bases as completely lacking a self, and thereby enter the emptiness of self. Next, relying on vijñaptimātra, one is able to contemplate that upon all phenomena, none possess real functions such as upholding norms or maintaining a superior nature. Clinging to phenomena having been eliminated, one accomplishes the emptiness of phenomena. The Hīnayāna objects: 'Since you say all phenomena lack real functions such as upholding norms, sovereign autonomy, and superior nature, thereby accomplishing the contemplation of the emptiness of phenomena, then would the substance of this vijñaptimātra not also be empty?' From this there arises the fourth objection, that vijñaptimātra becomes empty. The author of the treatise replies: 'The substance of vijñaptimātra is not empty, because it is not that which is clung to. What I previously spoke of as empty was merely emptying the parikalpita false phenomena—those wherein the deluded mind clings upon all phenomena to real functions such as upholding norms and superior nature. These are empty. It does not empty the substance of vijñaptimātra that is free from clinging. Just as when the fundamental wisdom directly witnesses tathatā, it is free from words and transcends characteristics; its parikalpita false selves and phenomena all do not appear before it. In this stage, there is only the fundamental wisdom merging imperceptibly with principle, not dividing into subject and object. If this substance of consciousness were also empty, there would be no conventional truth. Because conventional truth would not exist, ultimate truth would also not exist, for the ultimate and conventional are established in mutual dependence.' The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'To deny the two truths is a pernicious grasp of emptiness; the Buddhas have declared such a person untreatable.' As for the fifth objection, that the characteristics of form are not mind: the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'If the bases of form also have consciousness as their substance, why do they not manifest as the characteristics of form—manifesting, uniform, solid and abiding, turning in succession?' The Hīnayāna's objection means: 'If all external forms have mind as their substance, and it is because mind's svasaṃvittibhāga transforms into the likeness of a grāhaka which is called darśanabhāga, and transforms into the likeness of a grāhya which is called nimittabhāga, then why do the transformed characteristics of form manifest, while the mind that transforms them does not manifest? Moreover, if external forms have mind as their substance, why do the transformed forms turn in a uniform succession? For instance, external forms such as mountains, rivers, and the great earth remain uniform without change for thousands or tens of thousands of years, continuous without interruption, abiding for a long time. But the transforming minds of sentient beings change and are unstable, and do not last long. Now since external forms do not resemble the internal mind, we know clearly that external real forms exist apart from mind. Why say that all is vijñaptimātra?' The reply states: The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says: 'Because they arise from the force of the perfuming of nominal conventions.' This is merely because from beginningless time, mutually from before to after, all sentient beings have falsely perfumed nominal conventions, conceiving them to be solid, abiding, continuous, and so forth outside the mind. Due to this force, such characteristics appear; it is not that there are real, solid forms and so on outside the mind. The outsider asks again: 'Since you say vijñaptimātra, why do sentient beings have to transform into the likeness of external forms and manifest them?' Answer: The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'If this were absent, there would be no inversion, and consequently no defilement, nor any purified phenomena. Therefore the consciousnesses transform into the likeness of form and manifest.' The author of the treatise says: 'If all sentient beings did not transform into the likeness of external forms to manifest, there would be neither defiled nor purified phenomena. For instance, because all ordinary persons are first deluded by objects such as form and falsely cling in inversion, defilement arises from this. The substance of defilement is the two hindrances. If you outsiders do not accept that consciousness transforms into the likeness of external form to manifest, then sentient beings would not produce inversions; if inverted false clinging does not arise, then defiled afflictions will not be produced; if defilement is not produced, how could purified phenomena exist?' Therefore the verse of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states: 'The characteristic of confusion and the substance of confusion / should be admitted as the consciousness of form / and the consciousness that is non-form; / if one is absent, the other is also absent.' 'The characteristic of confusion' is the transformed characteristic of form. 'The substance of confusion' is the transformed substance of mind. 'Should be admitted as the consciousness of form' is the aforementioned transformed characteristic of confusion; 'and the consciousness that is non-form' is the aforementioned transforming mind as substance. 'If one is absent, the other is also absent' means that if there were no transformed objects resembling external forms serving as characteristics of confusion, there would also be no substance of consciousness that transforms them. Hence we know that they must transform into the likeness of external objects to manifest. Therefore, all forms are not separate from the mind; all are vijñaptimātra. As for the sixth objection, that direct perception contradicts the school: the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'External objects such as form are clearly and directly witnessed, acquired by direct perception (pratyakṣa); why do you repudiate them as non-existent?' The Hīnayāna's objection means: 'For instance, external form objects of the five dusts are clearly directly witnessed by the five consciousnesses and acquired by direct perception; this is mutually established by both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. Why do you repudiate them as non-existent, saying all is vijñaptimātra?' In the Triṃśikā-vijñaptimātratā this objection is also raised: 'Phenomena are determined to exist or not by means of pramāṇa; among all pramāṇas, pratyakṣa is supreme. If there were no external objects, how could there be this awareness: "I am now directly witnessing such an object"?' The meaning is: If the author of the treatise says there are no external real objects, why say the five consciousnesses take external five-dust objects through pratyakṣa? If it were anumāna, non-pramāṇa, produced by parikalpa, clung to by parikalpa, produced by forced deliberation and conceptualization, the nimittabhāga would not be separate from the mind and could be established as vijñaptimātra. Now since the five consciousnesses obtain external real five-dust objects through pratyakṣa, why also say all is vijñaptimātra? Reply: The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'At the time of witnessing by pratyakṣa, one does not cling to them as external; later, the intellect discriminates and falsely gives rise to the idea of externality.' The author of the treatise says: 'When the five consciousnesses in direct perception are directly cognizing the objects of the five dusts, they attain the intrinsic nature of the phenomenon, without carrying nominal conventions, without a deliberating mind, without generating discrimination, and do not cling to them as external. It is merely the discriminating manovijñāna of a subsequent thought-moment that falsely gives rise to discrimination, and then clings to them as external, claiming there are real objects.'