宗鏡錄 64.11

64.11

答。如前已說。若立自他。於宗俱失。此皆約世諦識心分別故。識論頌云。他心知於境。不如實覺知。以非離識境。唯佛如實知。他心智者。不如實知。以自內心。虛妄分別。以為他心。以自心意。意識雜故。如彼佛地如實果體。無言語處勝妙境界。唯佛能知。餘人不知。以彼世間他心智者。於彼二法不如實知。以彼能取所取境界虛妄分別故。此唯是識。無量無邊甚深境界。非是心識可測量故。如上約法相宗說。若約法性宗。先德云。知他心者。皆如實知。審於事實。見理實故。亦非心外可見。亦非無境可知。若自他相絕。則與眾生心同一體。故無心外也。不壞所。故能知也。又他心者。安慧云。佛智緣他心。緣得本質。餘皆變影。若緣本質得心外法。壞唯識故。今以攝境唯心。不壞境故。能所兩亡。不礙存故。第一義唯心。非一非異。正緣他時。即是自故。以即佛心之眾生心為所緣。非即眾生心之佛心。即眾生心之佛心為能緣。非即佛心之眾生心。如是鎔融。非一非異。若離佛外。別有眾生。更須變影。却失真唯識義。釋云。攝境從心。不壞境者。即示心境有無。彼得本質。恐壞唯心。既不壞境。得之何妨。壞有何失。以無心者。無心於萬物。萬物未嘗無。此得在於神靜。失在於物虛。謂物實有故。若唯心壞境。則得在於境空。失在於心有。故以境由心變。故說唯心。所變不無。何必須壞。若以緣生無性。則心境兩亡。故借心以遣境。境遣而心亡。非獨存心矣。若能所兩亡。不礙存故者。上不壞境。且遣懼質之病。今遣空有之理故。心境並許存亡。心境因藉故空。相依緣生故有。有即存也。空即亡也。空有交徹。存亡兩全。云第一義唯心。非一非異者。正。出具分唯心之理。上第一釋。雖有唯心之義。尚通生滅唯心。第二義。雖兩亡不羈。而未言心境相攝。今明具分唯識。故云第一義唯心。同第一義。故非異。不壞能所。故非一。非一故。有能所。緣他義成矣。非異故。能所平等。唯心義成矣。云正緣他時。即是自故者。結成得於本質。無心外過。以即自故。不失唯識。云以即佛心之眾生心。正示法性他心之相。此有兩對語。前對明所緣。後對明能緣。今初言即佛心之眾生心者。此明所緣。眾生心即是佛心。此明不異。次云非即眾生心之佛心者。此句明眾生心與佛心非即。非即。故有所緣義。非異。故不壞唯心義。言為所緣者。結成心緣。簡非能緣也。次下辯能緣。云以即眾生心之佛心者。此句明能緣。佛心即是眾生心。此明非異。次云非即佛心之眾生心者。此明佛心與眾生心有非一義。非一故為能緣。非異。故不壞唯識之義。言為能緣者。結成能緣。簡非所緣也。更以喻況。如水和乳。乳為所和。喻眾生心是所緣。水為能和。喻佛心為能緣。以此二和合。如似一味。鵝王啑之。乳盡水存。則知非一。然此水名即乳之水。此乳名即水之乳。二雖相即。而有不一之義。故應喻云。以即水之乳。非即乳之水為所和。以即乳之水。非即水之乳。為能和。義可知矣。云如是鎔融。非一非異者。結成正義。若離佛外。結彈護法。言却失真唯識者。不知外質即佛心故。又諸佛如來。隨多心念。意能頓了。如金剛經云。爾所國土中。所有眾生若干種心。如來悉知。華嚴經頌云。無量億劫勤修學。得是無上菩提智。云何不於一念中。善知一切眾生心。此是意圓對。如來一念之中。皆一時頓應。無一不應。故名圓對。斯乃了心非心。方能遍應。若心在有無。則成隔礙。故金剛經云。如來說諸心。皆為非心。是名為心。

Answer: As stated previously, if one posits self and other, both are lost with respect to the source. These are all distinctions of the conscious mind based on worldly truth. A verse in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi says: 'Cognition of another's mind regarding its object / does not perceive and know it as it truly is, / because it is not an object apart from consciousness; / only a Buddha knows it as it truly is.' Cognition of another's mind does not know truly, because through one's own internal mind, one falsely discriminates, taking it to be another's mind; this is because one's own mind and manovijñāna are admixed. Like that true fruit-substance of the Buddha-ground, the supremely wondrous realm where speech does not reach, only a Buddha can know it; other people do not know it. Because those worldly people with cognition of another's mind do not know those two dharmas as they truly are, they falsely discriminate the realms of grāhaka and grāhya. This is consciousness-only; its immeasurable and boundless, extremely profound realm cannot be measured by the mind-consciousness. The above is explained according to the Faxiang school. If explained according to the Faxing school, former masters of virtue said: 'Those who know another's mind all know it as it truly is, because they examine the reality of things and perceive the reality of principle. Neither can it be perceived outside the mind, nor is it that there is no object to be known. If the characteristics of self and other are eliminated, then one is of the same single substance as the minds of sentient beings; therefore, there is nothing outside the mind. Because the objective realm is not destroyed, one is capable of knowing.' Furthermore, regarding another's mind, Sthiramati said: 'The Buddha's cognition, in cognizing another's mind, cognizes and reaches the substantive cause; all others merely transform an image. If cognizing the substantive cause meant reaching a dharma outside the mind, it would destroy consciousness-only.' Now, because we subsume objects into mind alone, we do not destroy objects; because grāhaka and grāhya are both obliterated, their subsistence is not obstructed. In ultimate-truth mind-only, they are neither one nor different. At the very moment of cognizing the other, it is precisely oneself. Taking the sentient beings' mind that is identical to the Buddha's mind as the cognized object (ālambana), not the Buddha's mind that is identical to the sentient beings' mind; taking the Buddha's mind that is identical to the sentient beings' mind as the cognizing subject, not the sentient beings' mind that is identical to the Buddha's mind. Fused in this manner, they are neither one nor different. If, apart from the Buddha, there were separate sentient beings, one would further need to transform an image, which on the contrary would lose the true meaning of consciousness-only. The explanation says: 'Subsuming objects into mind without destroying objects' indicates the existence or non-existence of mind and objects. Those [who say] reaching the substantive cause feared destroying mind-only; since it does not destroy objects, what harm is there in reaching it, and what fault is there in not destroying it? For one who is without mind is without mind toward the myriad things, yet the myriad things have never been non-existent. The gain in this lies in the spirit's tranquility; the loss lies in considering things empty, meaning that things are truly existent. If mind-only destroys objects, then the gain lies in the emptiness of objects, and the loss lies in the existence of mind. Therefore, because objects are transformed by mind, we speak of mind-only; what is transformed is not non-existent, so why must it be destroyed? If based on conditioned arising having no svabhāva, then both mind and object are obliterated; hence we borrow mind to dispel the object, and when the object is dispelled, mind is obliterated: it is not that mind alone subsists. As for 'because grāhaka and grāhya are both obliterated, their subsistence is not obstructed,' the above non-destruction of objects temporarily dispels the ailment of fearing substantive causes; now, in order to dispel the principles of emptiness and existence, mind and objects are both permitted to subsist and be obliterated. Mind and object are empty because they depend on each other; they exist because they arise in mutual dependence through conditions. Existing is subsistence; being empty is obliteration. Emptiness and existence interpenetrate; subsistence and obliteration are both preserved. Saying 'In ultimate-truth mind-only, they are neither one nor different' directly brings forth the principle of complete-part mind-only. Although the first explanation above possesses the meaning of mind-only, it still pertains to arising-and-ceasing mind-only. Although the second meaning obliterates both without entanglement, it has not yet stated that mind and object subsume each other. Now, clarifying complete-part consciousness-only, it says 'in ultimate-truth mind-only.' Being identical in the ultimate truth, they are not different; not destroying grāhaka and grāhya, they are not one. Because they are not one, there are cognizing subject and cognized object, and the meaning of cognizing the other is established. Because they are not different, cognizing subject and cognized object are equal, and the meaning of mind-only is established. Saying 'at the very moment of cognizing the other, it is precisely oneself' concludes that reaching the substantive cause has no fault of being outside the mind; because it is identical to oneself, consciousness-only is not lost. Saying 'taking the sentient beings' mind that is identical to the Buddha's mind' directly demonstrates the characteristics of another's mind in terms of dharmatā. This consists of two pairs of phrases: the former pair clarifies the cognized object, and the latter pair clarifies the cognizing subject. Now, first saying 'the sentient beings' mind that is identical to the Buddha's mind' clarifies the cognized object: sentient beings' mind is identical to the Buddha's mind; this clarifies non-difference. Next saying 'not the Buddha's mind that is identical to the sentient beings' mind': this phrase clarifies that sentient beings' mind and the Buddha's mind are not identical. Because they are not identical, there is the meaning of a cognized object; because they are not different, the meaning of mind-only is not destroyed. Saying 'as the cognized object' concludes the mental cognizing and excludes it from being the cognizing subject. Next, discerning the cognizing subject, saying 'taking the Buddha's mind that is identical to the sentient beings' mind': this phrase clarifies the cognizing subject: the Buddha's mind is identical to the sentient beings' mind; this clarifies non-difference. Next saying 'not the sentient beings' mind that is identical to the Buddha's mind': this clarifies that the Buddha's mind and the sentient beings' mind have the meaning of not being one. Because they are not one, it is the cognizing subject; because they are not different, the meaning of consciousness-only is not destroyed. Saying 'as the cognizing subject' concludes the cognizing subject and excludes it from being the cognized object. To further illustrate with an analogy: just as water blends with milk, the milk is what is blended, analogized to the sentient beings' mind being the cognized object; the water is what blends, analogized to the Buddha's mind being the cognizing subject. Because these two are blended together, they are as if of one flavor; yet when the king of geese sips it, the milk is exhausted while the water remains, so one knows they are not one. However, this water is called water identical to milk, and this milk is called milk identical to water. Although the two are identical, they have the meaning of not being one. Therefore, the analogy should say: taking the milk identical to water, not the water identical to milk, as what is blended; taking the water identical to milk, not the milk identical to water, as what blends. The meaning can be understood. Saying 'Fused in this manner, they are neither one nor different' concludes the correct meaning. Saying 'If, apart from the Buddha...' concludes with a critique of Dharmapāla. Saying 'which on the contrary would lose the true meaning of consciousness-only' is because he did not know that the external substantive cause is precisely the Buddha's mind. Furthermore, all Buddha-Tathāgatas, in accordance with the many thoughts and minds, are able to comprehend them instantly with their mental consciousness. As the Diamond Sūtra says: 'As many sentient beings as there are in all those world realms, with their various minds, the Tathāgata knows them all.' A verse in the Avataṃsakasūtra says: 'Having diligently practiced and learned for immeasurable kotis of kalpas, / he attained this unsurpassed bodhi cognition. / How could he not, in a single thought-moment, / skillfully know the minds of all sentient beings?' This is the mind's perfect confrontation: in a single thought-moment, the Tathāgata responds simultaneously and instantaneously to all, with not a single one to which he does not respond; hence it is called 'perfect confrontation.' Only by comprehending that mind is non-mind can one respond universally. If the mind resides in existence or non-existence, then obstruction is formed. Therefore the Diamond Sūtra says: 'All minds spoken of by the Tathāgata are all non-minds; this is called mind.'