宗鏡錄 70.19

70.19

答。雖有見分而無分別。復無能取。正智緣如。親挾附體相緣故。更無相狀之相。說。無相分。言無能取者。即無分別妄執實能取故。不無內分能緣見分。又難。若言無相分者。所緣緣論云。依彼生。帶彼相。故名所緣相。若無真如相分者。即無所緣。護法云。亦有所緣緣義。雖見相分。而可有帶如相起。不離故。即本智見分。親挾帶真如之體相起故。名所緣緣。如自證分親帶見分。名所緣緣。此亦應爾。實無變帶之義。唯有挾帶。名所緣緣。故與後得別也。若變相分緣者。便非親證。即如後得智。應有分別。既異後得。即明知有見分無相分也。又一切見分。皆有挾帶境相義者。由相不離見故。即是挾帶之義。不離有二。一者有為相分。望自能變之識。血脈相連。猶如父子。故名不離。二者真如等境。雖非識變。然是識等實體。故名不離。

Answer: Although there is a darśanabhāga, there is no conceptual differentiation, nor is there a grāhaka. When correct wisdom cognizes reality, because it directly adheres to and takes along the substance-characteristic to cognize it, there is no further imagistic characteristic; thus it is said that there is no nimittabhāga. Saying there is no grāhaka means that there is no falsely conceptualized, real apprehender; it does not mean there is no internal part that is the cognizing darśanabhāga. Another objection: If you say there is no nimittabhāga, the Ālambana[parīkṣā] says: "Arising reliant on that, bearing that characteristic: hence it is called the characteristic of the cognitive object." If there is no nimittabhāga of tathatā, then there is no cognitive object. Dharmapāla says: There is also the meaning of the cognitive condition. Although it is the darśana- and nimittabhāga, it can arise bearing the characteristic of reality, because it is not separate from it. That is, because the darśanabhāga of fundamental wisdom directly takes along the substance-characteristic of tathatā to arise, it is called the cognitive condition. Just as the svasaṃvittibhāga directly bears the darśanabhāga and is called the cognitive condition, this should also be likewise. Truly there is no sense of transforming and bearing; there is only taking along, which is called the cognitive condition. Therefore, it is distinct from subsequently attained [wisdom]. If it cognized by transforming a nimittabhāga, it would not be direct realization; that is, like subsequently attained wisdom, it would have conceptual differentiation. Since it is different from subsequently attained [wisdom], one clearly knows that there is a darśanabhāga but no nimittabhāga. Furthermore, that all darśanabhāgas have the meaning of taking along the objective characteristic is because the characteristic is not separate from the seeing; this is the meaning of taking along. Non-separation has two kinds: first, the conditioned nimittabhāga, in relation to the consciousness that can transform it, is continuously connected by bloodline, like father and son, and hence is called not separate; second, objects such as tathatā, although not transformed by consciousness, are the real substance of consciousness and so forth, and hence are called not separate.