宗鏡錄 70.19

70.19

Answer: Although there is a darśanabhāga, there is no conceptual differentiation, nor is there a grāhaka. When correct wisdom cognizes reality, because it directly adheres to and takes along the substance-characteristic to cognize it, there is no further imagistic characteristic; thus it is said that there is no nimittabhāga. Saying there is no grāhaka means that there is no falsely conceptualized, real apprehender; it does not mean there is no internal part that is the cognizing darśanabhāga. Another objection: If you say there is no nimittabhāga, the Ālambana[parīkṣā] says: "Arising reliant on that, bearing that characteristic: hence it is called the characteristic of the cognitive object." If there is no nimittabhāga of tathatā, then there is no cognitive object. Dharmapāla says: There is also the meaning of the cognitive condition. Although it is the darśana- and nimittabhāga, it can arise bearing the characteristic of reality, because it is not separate from it. That is, because the darśanabhāga of fundamental wisdom directly takes along the substance-characteristic of tathatā to arise, it is called the cognitive condition. Just as the svasaṃvittibhāga directly bears the darśanabhāga and is called the cognitive condition, this should also be likewise. Truly there is no sense of transforming and bearing; there is only taking along, which is called the cognitive condition. Therefore, it is distinct from subsequently attained [wisdom]. If it cognized by transforming a nimittabhāga, it would not be direct realization; that is, like subsequently attained wisdom, it would have conceptual differentiation. Since it is different from subsequently attained [wisdom], one clearly knows that there is a darśanabhāga but no nimittabhāga. Furthermore, that all darśanabhāgas have the meaning of taking along the objective characteristic is because the characteristic is not separate from the seeing; this is the meaning of taking along. Non-separation has two kinds: first, the conditioned nimittabhāga, in relation to the consciousness that can transform it, is continuously connected by bloodline, like father and son, and hence is called not separate; second, objects such as tathatā, although not transformed by consciousness, are the real substance of consciousness and so forth, and hence are called not separate.