宗鏡錄 71.3

71.3

答。有。護法菩薩云。心生不必有本質。正義者。若疎所緣緣。有無不定。不假本質。心亦得生唯識之境。若親相分。若待外質方生。慈恩云。良恐理乖唯識。若第八第六有無不定。即如八識緣境時。前五第七定有本質。第八若緣他人扶塵根并異界器。及定果色時。即有本質。若緣自三境者。唯是親變親緣。即無本質。第六若緣現在十八界時。可有本質。若緣過去十八界。或緣無體法時。將何為質。故知六八所仗本質。有無不定。若定果色。有變有化。言有變者。託質即有本質。言有化者。是離質。或有緣他起者。即有變之義。即託他為質。自變影像。如攪長河為酥酪。變大地為黃金。此皆有本質。或有定力生者。即有化之義。即離質化。無而忽有。如虛空華。化出樓臺七寶等事。此皆從定心離質而化。應作四句。分別本質相分三境有無。一有本質相分。是實性境。即前五識。及明了意識初念。并少分獨頭意識是。二有本質相分。是假。即有質獨影。及帶質境是。三無質相分。是假。即無質獨影是。四無質相分。是實性境。即第八心王緣三境。及本智緣如是。又別行鈔云。所緣緣者。謂是心之所慮處故。名為所緣。只此所緣境。又有牽心令生。是心之所託故。復說名緣。即所緣為緣。名所緣緣。緣是體。所緣是用。六識之中。所緣即緣。持業釋也。今先立正義者。汝毱多師。不解我大乘所緣緣義。只如我大乘言。是帶已相者。帶與已相各有二義。言帶有二義者。一者挾帶。即能緣心親挾境體而緣。二者變帶。即能緣心變起相分而緣。已相亦有二義。一體相名相。二相狀名相。且初挾帶體相者。根本智緣真如。是挾帶體相而緣。是所緣緣。乃至內二分相緣。及自證分緣見分。亦是挾帶體相。名所緣緣。謂能緣心。親挾帶內二分見相也。二變帶相狀相者。有兩解不同。初龍興鈔主云。即有漏心心所。及無漏後得智見分。緣境之時。變相而緣。不簡有質無質。皆是變帶名帶。相狀名相。為所緣緣也。第二顯幽鈔云。八識見分緣自親相時。皆是挾帶者。然雖多此說。理恐未然。若爾。即有三失。一挾帶變帶無別失。親挾境體緣。名為挾帶。變起相分而緣。名為變帶。今既呼相分為挾帶。故知無別。二今古相違失。古時挾帶。有少乖理。若於變帶。即乃無違。今言相分是挾帶。古云變帶。豈不相違。三變帶唯緣本質失。豈無質相分。非心變耶。今以理而推。但是相分。非論有質無質。皆名變帶。若不變相分。直附境體。即名挾帶。所以唐三藏。將挾帶。以救前義。謂古大乘師。但明變帶也。次依論破小乘所緣緣義。分二。初破正量部師。論主云。夫五識所緣者。謂能緣識帶彼相起。及有實體。令能緣識託彼而生。汝正量部師。若言。所緣緣義但有能生識之一義。不許能緣眼識帶彼相起者。即應非是所緣緣。大乘量云。汝眼識所緣緣是有法。應非眼識所緣緣。宗因云。但有能生識一義故。同喻如眼識因緣。又返立量破云。汝眼識因緣是有法。應是眼識所緣緣。宗因云。但有能生一義故。如眼緣色時。此中意云。古大乘師不說挾帶。即本智緣真如時為所緣緣。義如有失。若正量部不許變帶。即眼識緣色時。所緣緣義不成。次破經部師者。論主云。汝經部師。將外和合假色作所緣緣者。不然。設許汝眼識帶彼麁色相故。許作所緣。亦不得名緣。以汝執假色無體故。猶如眼識錯亂。見第二月。彼無實體。不能生識。但名所緣。不得名緣。和合假色。亦復如是。立量破云。汝和合麁色是有法。設為眼識所緣非緣。宗因云。汝執是假無體故。同喻如第二月故。觀所緣緣論偈云。和合於五識。設所緣非緣。彼體實無故。猶如第二月。經部有執云。和合麁色。雖即是假有。能成一一極微。是其實有。各得為緣引生五識。又何不可。論主破云。其和合色等能成極微。設許為緣。又非所緣。以眼等識生。不帶彼極微相故。如眼識生。不帶彼眼根相。其眼等五根。但能生眼等五識。然眼等五識。即不能緣眼等五根。將根為喻。立量云。汝色等能成極微是有法。設為五識緣非所緣。宗因云。五識生不帶彼相故。同喻如五根。觀所緣緣論偈云。極微於五識。設許非所緣。彼相分無故。猶如眼根等。若十八部師義。已許帶彼相故。所以不破。今正解者。疎云。謂若有法。是帶已相。所言有法者。有兩解。初顯幽鈔解云。有法。即有體實法。揀於假法。及遍計相無體法。但是所緣。不成緣。夫為緣。須是有體實法。有力用。能牽生識。即圓成依他起。是有體法。二龍興云。謂若有法者。即依圓二性。以有體故。能牽於心。名之為緣。不通無體。若是遍計。以無體故。但有所緣。而非緣體。若是所緣。即體通有無。

Answer: There is. Bodhisattva Dharmapāla said: 'Mind in its arising does not necessarily have an archetype.' The correct doctrine is that regarding the mediate objective condition, its presence or absence is indefinite; without depending on an archetype, mind is still able to arise in the sphere of consciousness-only. As for the immediate nimittabhāga, if it had to depend on an external archetype to arise, Ci'en said: 'Truly, I fear this principle would contradict consciousness-only.'

Regarding the eighth and sixth consciousnesses having or lacking [archetypes] indefinitely: when the eight consciousnesses cognize objects, the first five and the seventh definitely have archetypes. If the eighth consciousness cognizes the supporting sensory matter of another person, the receptacle realm of another world, or form produced by meditative absorption (dhyānaphala-rūpa), it then has an archetype. If it cognizes its own three realms, it is solely an immediate transformation and immediate cognition, and thus has no archetype. If the sixth consciousness cognizes the present eighteen dhātus, it may have an archetype; if it cognizes the past eighteen dhātus or cognizes phenomena lacking substance, what could serve as the archetype? Therefore, we know that whether the sixth and eighth consciousnesses rely on archetypes is indefinite.

Regarding form produced by meditative absorption, there are transformations (biàn) and creations (huà). 'Transformations' means that it relies on an archetype, so there is an archetype. 'Creations' means that it is detached from an archetype. If it arises in dependence on something else, that has the meaning of transformation—relying on something else as the archetype to transform an image of its own, such as churning a long river into ghee, or transforming the great earth into gold; these all have archetypes. If it is produced by the power of meditative absorption, that has the meaning of creation—creation detached from an archetype, suddenly existing from non-existence, like flowers in empty space, creating towers, the seven jewels, and so forth; these are all created detached from archetypes by the meditative mind.

One should formulate four propositions to differentiate the presence or absence of the archetype, nimittabhāga, and the three realms:
1. There is an archetype and nimittabhāga, which is a real objective realm of nature (xìngjìng): namely, the first five consciousnesses, the initial moment of distinct manovijñāna, and a small part of solitary manovijñāna.
2. There is an archetype and nimittabhāga, which is unreal: namely, the solitary shadow with an archetype (yǒuzhì dúyǐng) and the realm with substance (dàizhìjìng).
3. There is no archetype and there is a nimittabhāga, which is unreal: namely, the solitary shadow without an archetype (wúzhì dúyǐng).
4. There is no archetype and there is a nimittabhāga, which is a real objective realm of nature: namely, the eighth citta-king cognizing the three realms, and fundamental wisdom cognizing suchness.

Furthermore, the Piexing chao states: 'Objective condition (ālambanapratyaya) means that because it is the locus deliberated upon by the mind, it is called the ālambana (object). It is this very objective realm that also attracts the mind to arise; because it is that which the mind relies upon, it is also called pratyaya (condition). Thus the object acting as a condition is called an objective condition. Condition is the substance; object is the function. Within the six consciousnesses, the object is itself the condition: this is a karmadhāraya compound.'

Now to first establish the correct doctrine: Master Guptā does not understand the meaning of ālambanapratyaya in our Mahāyāna. In our Mahāyāna, when it is said that it 'bears its own characteristic' (dài zǐ xiāng), 'bearing' (dài) and 'its own characteristic' (zǐ xiāng) each have two meanings. 'Bearing' has two meanings: first, holding directly (xiédài), where the cognizing mind directly holds the substance of the object and cognizes it; second, transformative bearing (biàndài), where the cognizing mind transforms into a nimittabhāga and cognizes it. 'Its own characteristic' also has two meanings: first, the essential characteristic (tǐxiāng) is called characteristic; second, the apparent form (xiāngzhuàng) is called characteristic.

First, regarding holding directly the essential characteristic: fundamental wisdom cognizing tathatā is cognizing by holding directly the essential characteristic, which is an objective condition; and likewise, the inner two parts cognizing each other, as well as the svasaṃvittibhāga cognizing the darśanabhāga, are also holding directly the essential characteristic, termed objective conditions, meaning that the cognizing mind directly holds the inner two parts' darśana and nimitta.

Second, regarding transformative bearing of the apparent form: there are two differing interpretations. First, the author of the Longxing chao says: defiled citta and caittas, as well as the darśanabhāga of undefiled subsequent wisdom (pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna), when cognizing objects, transform into characteristics and cognize them; without distinguishing whether there is an archetype or no archetype, all are called 'bearing' by transformative bearing, and called 'characteristic' by apparent form, serving as objective conditions. Second, the Xianyou chao says: when the darśanabhāga of the eight consciousnesses cognizes its own immediate characteristic, it is always holding directly. However, although many say this, I fear the principle is not so. If it were so, there would be three faults:
1. The fault of no distinction between holding directly and transformative bearing: cognizing by directly holding the substance of the object is called holding directly, while cognizing by transforming into a nimittabhāga is called transformative bearing. Now, if you call the nimittabhāga 'holding directly', we know there is no distinction.
2. The fault of contradiction between modern and ancient: the ancient view of holding directly slightly violated the principle, but regarding transformative bearing, there was no violation. Now saying that the nimittabhāga is holding directly, while the ancients said transformative bearing—how could they not contradict each other?
3. The fault that transformative bearing only cognizes an archetype: could a nimittabhāga without an archetype not be a transformation of mind? Now, inferring by principle: whatever is a nimittabhāga, regardless of whether it has an archetype or no archetype, is called transformative bearing. If it does not transform into a nimittabhāga but directly adheres to the substance of the object, it is called holding directly. For this reason, the Tang Tripiṭaka Master [Xuanzang] used 'holding directly' to rescue the former doctrine, because ancient Mahāyāna masters only explained transformative bearing.

Next, refuting the Hīnayāna meaning of objective condition based on the treatise has two parts. First, refuting the masters of the Saṃmatīya school. The author of the treatise states: 'The object cognized by the five consciousnesses means that the cognizing consciousness arises bearing its characteristic, and it has real substance, causing the cognizing consciousness to arise relying upon it. If you, masters of the Saṃmatīya school, say that the meaning of objective condition consists solely of the single meaning of being capable of generating consciousness, and do not accept that the cognizing eye-consciousness arises bearing its characteristic, then it should not be an objective condition.'
The Mahāyāna inference (anumāna) states:
[Thesis:] Your eye-consciousness's objective condition is the subject (dharmin);
[Probandum:] It should not be the objective condition of the eye-consciousness.
[Reason:] Because it only possesses the single meaning of being capable of generating consciousness.
[Example:] Like the causal condition (hetupratyaya) of the eye-consciousness.
And conversely, establishing an inference to refute them:
[Thesis:] Your eye-consciousness's causal condition is the subject;
[Probandum:] It should be the objective condition of the eye-consciousness.
[Reason:] Because it possesses the single meaning of being capable of generating [consciousness].
[Example:] Like when the eye cognizes form.
The meaning here is: if ancient Mahāyāna masters did not speak of holding directly, then when fundamental wisdom cognizes tathatā as an objective condition, the meaning would seem flawed. If the Saṃmatīya does not accept transformative bearing, then when the eye-consciousness cognizes form, the meaning of objective condition cannot be established.

Next, refuting the Sautrāntika masters: the author of the treatise states: 'It is incorrect for you Sautrāntika masters to make external, aggregated, nominal form into an objective condition. Even granted that your eye-consciousness bears that gross form-characteristic and it is granted to be an ālambana, it still cannot be called a condition (pratyaya). For the nominal form you cling to lacks real substance, just as an eye-consciousness in error sees a second moon. That [second moon] lacks real substance and cannot generate consciousness; it is only called an ālambana, and cannot be called a pratyaya. Aggregated nominal form is just the same.'
Setting up an inference to refute them:
[Thesis:] Your aggregated gross form is the subject;
[Probandum:] Even if it is the ālambana of the eye-consciousness, it is not a pratyaya.
[Reason:] Because you maintain it is nominal and lacks real substance.
[Example:] Like the second moon.
The verse of the Ālambanaparīkṣā says:
'The aggregate to the five consciousnesses,
Even if an object, is not a condition,
Because its substance is really non-existent,
Just like the second moon.'

A Sautrāntika may adhere to this view: 'Although aggregated gross form is nominal, the individual subtle atoms (paramāṇu) that constitute it are truly real; each is able to act as a condition to induce and generate the five consciousnesses—why would that not be acceptable?'
The author of the treatise refutes this: 'Even if the subtle atoms that constitute aggregated form and so on are granted to be conditions, they are still not objects (ālambana), because the arising of consciousnesses such as the eye-consciousness does not bear the characteristic of those subtle atoms, just as the arising of the eye-consciousness does not bear the characteristic of the visual faculty. The five faculties such as the eye can only generate the five consciousnesses such as the eye-consciousness, yet the five consciousnesses cannot cognize the five faculties.'
Taking the faculty as an example, an inference is established:
[Thesis:] Your subtle atoms that constitute form and so on are the subject;
[Probandum:] Even if they are conditions for the five consciousnesses, they are not objects.
[Reason:] Because the arising of the five consciousnesses does not bear their characteristics.
[Example:] Like the five faculties.
The verse of the Ālambanaparīkṣā says:
'Subtle atoms to the five consciousnesses,
Even if granted [to be conditions], are not objects,
Because their nimittabhāga is non-existent,
Just like the visual faculty and so on.'
As for the doctrine of the masters of the eighteen schools, because they already accept bearing its characteristic, they are not refuted here.

Now, for the correct interpretation: the Commentary says: 'It means if a phenomenon exists, it bears its own characteristic.' As for the phrase 'if a phenomenon exists' (yǒufǎ), there are two interpretations. First, the Xianyou chao explains: 'An existing phenomenon' means a real phenomenon with substance, excluding nominal phenomena and the substance-lacking phenomena of pervasive conceptualization (parikalpita), which are merely objects (ālambana) and do not constitute conditions (pratyaya). In order to be a condition, it must be a real phenomenon with substance, possessing efficacy and function, capable of drawing forth and generating consciousness—that is, the consummate (pariniṣpanna) and other-dependent (paratantra) natures, which are phenomena with substance.
Second, the Longxing states: 'What is called an existing phenomenon' refers to the other-dependent and consummate natures; because they have substance, they are able to attract the mind and are termed conditions, not extending to what lacks substance. If it is pervasive conceptualization, because it lacks substance, there is only an object, not the substance of a condition. If it is an object, its substance extends to both existence and non-existence.